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The four years I spent writing this thesis at Tilburg were very enjoyable.  I was 
essentially left to my own devices to formulate and implement a research project.  
My research question was originally inspired by an encounter in the dormitory 
cafeteria at the university where I was a freshman undergraduate student.  A fellow 
economics student observed that he didn't think that it was right that students with 
mobility disabilities were given golf carts by the university to help them get around 
campus.  He reasoning was that is was acceptable that student athletes get golf 
carts upon receiving injuries because they can further contribute to the coffers of 
the university, however, those with disabilities can’t make such contributions and 
therefore shouldn't receive any special treatment.  Such calculative reasoning is 
indicative of a type of self-interest that is common and acceptable within standard 
economic theory.  Economic man is often portrayed as non-ethical and as pursuing 
aims which are narrowly focused on a very select set of interests.  But why have 
economists  saddled  themselves  with  such  a  narrow  and  mean  view  of  human 
nature?  Answering that question involves establishing the limits of self-interest in 
economic reasoning, the subject I attempt to address in the following pages.  The 
contention presented is that such a limited view of motivation causes economists to 
misidentify important economic phenomena.  Economics is often identified as the 
study of self-interest and rationality.  I concentrate on the role of self-interest in 
economic theory and determining precisely what it means to be economically self-
interested.  What self-interest entails is a fundamental question in many disciplines, 
particularly  in  ethics;  therefore,  my  approach  has  been  to  analyze  economic 
interpretations of self-interest through the theoretical lens of ethics.  Given the 
breadth of the topic, my more limited aim has been to set the broad boundaries of 
economic self-interest. 
 
I would like to take the opportunity to thank several people who have helped me 
during the process of completing this manuscript.  Thanks to professors Barkema 
and Hennart for allowing me to enter the economics program at Tilburg.  I thank 
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the manuscript and helpful comments.  In particular, the last two pushed for clarity 
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The case of open source software raises questions about the fundamental economic 
assumption of self-interest.  In general, open source programmers combine their 
talents via the Internet to produce high quality, financially valuable software which 
they  then  make  conditionally  available  to  anyone  who  wishes  to  download  it.  
There are no employment contracts among the programmers and there is no formal 
hierarchical structure within a given software project, programmers are free to join 
and quit projects as they choose.  Perhaps even more surprising from a business 
perspective, anyone, whether participating in the original software project or not, 
can freely acquire the code and begin their own, perhaps rival, software project.  In 
effect, the code that results from open source projects exists independently of any 
one person or group.  The licenses commonly allow anyone to use the resulting 
software  for  whatever  purposes  they  desire  and  to  examine,  change,  and 
redistribute those changes.  One important category of open source license even 
allows licensees to take open source code and reissue it under proprietary licenses.  
Such  licenses  have  created  a  large  pool  of  publicly  available  software  which 
anyone can use for whatever purposes they deem fit provided they abide by the 
relatively liberal open source licensing conditions.  However, it is important to 
realize that not all open source licenses offer the same conditions.  Regardless of 
the  type  of  license  used,  open  source  software  is  an  important  economic 
phenomenon  to  which  proprietary  software  firms  have  been  forced  to  respond 
whether as contributors, collaborators or competitors.  In particular, open source is 
theoretically  important  because  of  what  it  implies  for  the  basic  motivational 
assumption of economic models. 
 
Economics  has  a  specific  theory  about  motivation,  it  assumes  agents  are  self-
interested.    Furthermore,  it  assumes  that  they  are  rational.    Self-interest  and 
rationality are closely related; self-interest is a theory about rationality as opposed 
to say, a theory about ethics.  At its most general level, economics gives to agents 
the  aim  to  maximize  their  economic  interests  by  optimally  applying  the  scare 
resources they control.  Open source software is a significant economic production 
method  that  raises  challenging  questions  about  the  overall  applicability  of  the 
motive of self-interest in economic theory as that term is generally understood.  - 2 -   
 
 
The question that Lerner and Tirole (2000, p.3) raised in one of the first papers on 
open source still stands: 
 
    “Why  should  thousands  of  top-notch  programmers  contribute  freely  to  the 
provision of a public good?” Any explanation based on altruism only goes so far. 
While users in less developed countries undoubtedly benefit from access to free 
software, many beneficiaries are well-to-do individuals or Fortune 500 companies. 
Furthermore, altruism has not played a major role in other industries, so it would 
have to be explained why individuals in the software industry are more altruistic 
than others." 
 
The answers provided by Lerner and Tirole to the issues they raise rest on the 
assumptions of standard economic theory.  The conclusions which they draw from 
the case of open source depend, and indeed support, their understanding of what it 
means to be economically self-interested.  Whether the motive of self-interest is 
sufficient to explain open source is an open question and will depend on one's 
understanding of what it means to be self-interested.  The question is not whether 
economic  theory  or  its  application  is  wrong,  that  would  be  presumptuous,  the 
question is  whether  the  assumptions  of  the  theory  are  sufficient  to explain the 
success of open source.  Ambiguities in the understanding of what it means to be 
self-interest have led to the belief that nearly all activities can be explained using 
the economic apparatus and its narrow definition of self-interest.  Self-interest is a 
powerful assumption; why would or should anyone choose to work against their 
own interests?  If a convincing argument can be made that open source contributors 
are  motivated  by  motives  other  than  narrow  self-interest,  then  perhaps  other 
important economic production methods are the result of similar motives. 
 
The  general  methodology  I  will  use  in  this  manuscript  is  to  compare  the 
explanatory  power  of  the  standard  economic  model  with  competing  models.  
According to Popper, almost every problem of explanation in the social sciences 
requires  an  analysis  of  the  social  situation.    He  writes,  (1994,  p.  166):  "The 
fundamental problem of both the theoretical and the historical social sciences is to 
explain and understand events in terms of human actions and social situations."  
Popper further states that the social situation and aims of agents under investigation 
need to be clearly stated and understood, they represent the initial conditions in the 
social sciences.  The general social situation in the case of open source is clearly 
the  competitive  software  market  widely  defined  to  include  its  accompanying 
institutions and history.  The market represents the parameters or constraints under - 3 -   
 
 
which  economic  agents  operate.    The  aims  that  are  assigned  to  open  source 
contributors  under  the  given  constraints  are  what  need  to  be  explored.  
Accordingly,  the  research  question  is:  Does  the  assumption  of  self-interested 
agents optimizing the use of their scarce resources adequately explain the success 
of open source in the software market or are there better explanations? 
 
My  aim  is  not  simply  to  define  a  better  definition  of  economic  self-interest.  
Although Popper's (1985, Chapter 6) argument on the futility of defining terms in 
the social sciences goes too far (agreement about the meaning of terminology at a 
general level can help to avoid misunderstandings and advance arguments despite 
what Popper writes), he is correct to warn that a fixation on getting the terminology 
right  can  lead  to  an  infinite  regress  as  the  terms  of  terms  need  to  be  defined.  
Refining  and  adding  nuance  to  the  term  “self-interest”  as  it  is  understood  in 
economics is only the starting point, the important step is to "test" how different 
interpretations of self-interest and other motives are able to explain and predict 
behavior.  If a better understanding of agent aims leads to a better model, then it 
should  be  used.    Self-interest  is  a  heavily  loaded  term  with  both  popular  and 
technical  meanings,  the  implications  of  these  various  definitions  need  to  be 
worked-out and alternatives need to be explored. 
 
Does it Matter? 
 
Practical and Theoretical Implications 
 
Does  it  matter  whether  an  act  that  is  motivated  by  something  other  than  self-
interest or self-interest broadly understood is taken to be motivated by a narrow 
interpretation  of  self-interest?    From  a  personal  standpoint,  probably  not.    If  I 
falsely believe that an act which I perform is done for altruistic reasons when in 
fact it is motivated by self-interest, then little damage is done other than the issue 
of living an unexamined life.  However, if a researcher presumes that the behavior 
he observes is motivated by self-interest when in fact it is motivated by something 
else, then problems can arise.  Self-interest is the basic behavioral assumption used 
in  economics.   If,  in  fact,  it  is  not  always  the  prime  motivator and alternative 
motives lead to substantially different behaviors, then the assumption should be 
adjusted or thrown out.  Motives are about why people do what they do.  If the 
belief is that people are self-interested, then the means used to motivate people will 
appeal to those interests, but if different motives are present, different incentives 
may  need  to  be  applied.    For  instance,  as  I  will  show  below,  if  open  source - 4 -   
 
 
contributors are assumed to be motivated by altruism, then appeals to self-interest 
may be counter-productive.  Economists, certainly the researchers I discuss in this 
manuscript,  and  researchers  in  many  other  disciplines,  presumably  use  the 
assumption of self-interest because it allows them to explain and predict behavior, 
they rightly go to great measures to justify their use of that particular behavioral 
assumption because assumptions matter when it comes to interpreting behavior and 
making practical recommendations. 
 
From the perspective of doing business, it is the practical implications of widening 
the scope of motives at work which, finally, matters.  If employees are motivated 
by  a  wider  set  of  interests  other  than  narrow,  economic  self-interest,  then 
employers should be aware of it.  For instance, the question of whether open source 
production methods can be incorporated within a firm or exploited from outside the 
firm, will depend on what motivates people to develop and contribute open source 
software.  If employees or potential employees are motivated by something other 
than the extrinsic interventions that standard economic theory prescribes, then it 
might be possible to change the nature of work by changing employee incentives.  
For instance, if intrinsic motives, such as altruism, are motivating behavior, then it 
might be counter productive to appeal to an employee's narrow self-interests (Frey, 
1997, Ryan and Deci, 2000).  Frey's idea, simply put, is that extrinsic, monetary 
rewards may crowd-out intrinsic motives.  If true, this may have direct implications 
for the use of open source software and production methods.  His starting point is 
that economics is concerned with external types of motivation, for example wages, 
as  opposed  to  internal  motivation  such  as  the  enjoyment  of,  for  example, 
performing the activity itself.  It is a well documented and robust finding that 
external  rewards  carry  a  hidden  cost  in  that  they  undermine  intrinsic  rewards 
(Lepper and Greene, 1978, McGraw, 1978).  Experiments conducted by Frey and 
his colleagues at the University of Zurich show that a subject's altruistic tendencies 
were undermined when they were forced to share with others (Frey, 1997, pp. 14-
16).    Therefore,  if  open  source  is  motivated  in  part  by  altruism,  firms  which 
attempt to use open source should be aware of these crowding-out effects. 
 
Firms are beginning to explore possible business links with open source production 
methods.  West and O'Mahony (2008) show how open source projects sponsored 
by proprietary firms have led to new methods of productions, while Dalle and 
Jullien  (2003)  explore  the  potential  of  creating  efficient  economic  institutions 
based on motives similar to those found in open source projects.  In addition, there 
is a growing body of evidence which suggests that firms in many industries benefit - 5 -   
 
 
from contributions from community members, a concept closely linked to open 
source (Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006; von Hippel, 2005; Franke and Shah, 2003; 
Lakhani  and  von  Hippel,  2003).    Other  firms  are  incorporating  community 
developed open source software in their products and services (e.g.  West and 
Dedrick,  2001),  and  there  are  many  examples  of  open  source  communities 
attracting donations of code and development participation from firms as well as 
individuals (O’Mahony, 2005; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005).  For example, 
virtually  all  of  the  large  software  and  hardware  computer  firms  including, 
Microsoft,  IBM,  Hewlett-Packard,  and  Sun  Microsystems  have  contributed 
software to open sources projects and some have issued software under their own 
open  source  licenses,  although  the  degree  to  which  such  licenses  fulfill  the 
requirements of open source as defined by the Open Source Initiative is a point of 
debate.    If  the  goose  that  lays  the  golden  egg  is  driven  by  intrinsic,  altruistic 
motives,  then  appeals  to  extrinsic,  self-interested  motives  may  be  counter-
productive. 
 
In general, ambiguous or vague definitions of self-interest can cause researchers to 
misidentify  the  motives  of  agents  which  can  then  lead  to  poor  theoretical 
understanding  and  misguided  policy  recommendations.  Economists  and  other 
social scientists need to be informed by a proper understanding of human nature.  
At the practical level, a basic question that needs to be addressed is whether every 
economic act is necessarily motivated by self-interest. Empirical evidence would 
seem to suggest that some acts with economic implications are not motivated by 
self-interest, for instance, anonymous gifts to charities, economic provisions for 
future generations, and the work of some non-profit organizations, are difficult to 
explain entirely with reference to the common understanding of self-interest.  Jon 
Elster (1989) has offered evidence against self-interest by observing that: "parents 
have a selfish interest in helping their children, assuming that children will care for 
parents in their old age - but it is not in the selfish interest of children to care for 
parents in their old age.  And many still do." Issues of fairness and justice have 
been offered as a constraint to profit seeking ((see e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler (1986a, b), Dawes and Thaler (1988)).  However, there are theories of self-
interest that claim that all acts are at core motivated by self-interest.  An example 
of  such a theory  is  psychological  egoism;  if  that  theory  is  accepted  as  a  good 
description of motivation, then, for example, policies aimed at deflecting behavior 
away from self-interest are at best likely to lead to only temporary changes in 
behavior.  In the case of open source, a psychological egoist would expect that a 
copyright  holder  who  decides  to  issue  his  code  under  an  open  source  license - 6 -   
 
 
expects to receive benefits greater than the costs of producing the software, where 
both  benefit  and  costs  should  be  widely  interpreted.    A  narrow  economic 
interpretation  would  understand  those  benefits  and  costs  to  be  financial.    A 
researcher who accepts psychological egoism would seek to explain anonymous 
gifts, provisions for future generations, non-profit activities and every other action 
in terms of how those acts serve the interests of those involved.  Accordingly, if 
psychological egoism is accepted, then it may be good business policy to promote 
certain forms of self-interest in favor of other forms rather than trying to appeal to 
non-interested motives. 
 
At the theoretical level, regardless of whether one is an instrumentalist or a realist, 
it is important to use unambiguous definitions of key assumptions.  Self-interest, as 
the term is used in economic and business analyzes, is often poorly defined and in 
need of clarification if only to conduct meaningful theoretical debates.  I will give 
numerous  examples  throughout  this  manuscript  of  important  business  models 
which  use  vague  definitions  of  self-interest  and  altruism.    For  example,  one 
particularly interesting example of an error in reasoning which is often heard in 
unthoughtful economic debates is called tautological egoism.  This is the idea that 
because agents act to satisfy their preferences, then those acts must necessarily be 
motivated  by  self-interest.  Such  reasoning  confuses  the  idea  that  an  act  is 
performed by an agent with the motives for performing the act. It is also quite 
common to hear economists say that a person who incorporates another person's 
well-being into his own utility function is acting in an altruistic manner.  However, 
utility  functions  tell  us  nothing  about  a  person's  values  and  motives,  a  self-
interested individual can also include the utility of others into his utility function.  
Theoretical debates about self-interest that are based on such reasoning are bound 
to be confused and largely unenlightening. 
 
Normative Significance 
     
Besides  the  practical  and  theoretical  implications  of  the  role  of  self-interest  in 
human  nature,  there  are  also  normative  issues  underlying  much  economic 
reasoning  in  regards  to  self-interest  and  selfishness.    For  instance,  many 
economists appear to promote rational or ethical egoism as theories of motivation.  
These theories claim that people should or ought always to seek opportunities to 
benefit themselves without necessarily considering the needs of others.  Normative 
positions need to be justified.  It is possible to ask, for instance, whether an agent 
needs to be self-interested in order to be rational or ethical as opposed to having - 7 -   
 
 
some other motive.  If, in contrast to rational or ethical egoism, a position such as 
predominant egoism or some other mixed theory of self-interest is accepted, then 
space is created for a variety of motives besides that of self-interest.  Consequently, 
if a mixed theory is accepted, then it is important for researchers to clarify the 
contexts in which the various motives are active. 
 
Proposed Motives of Open Source Contributors 
 
Many explanations have been offered as to why people contribute to open source 
projects  (FLOSS,  2002),  but  even  at  this  early  phase  in  the  manuscript,  it  is 
important to be clear about what the word contribution means in the open source 
context.  Contributions can take many forms, from coding and managing a complex 
open source project such as a part of the Linux kernel or the Apache server, to 
contributing pieces of code to projects, to answering user questions in newsgroup 
forums.    The  vast  majority  of  people  who  use  open  source  software  do  not 
contribute to open source projects in any way.  For example, there are millions of 
users of open source browsers, but no one argues that there are anywhere near that 
many open source developers.  I won't be primarily interested in the motives of the 
users of open source. 
 
The motives of those making relatively large contributions are likely to be very 
different than those making smaller contributions, although both are critical to the 
success of open source.  I wish to avoid making distinctions among the motives of 
the various subsets of contributors by focusing primarily on open source licensors 
for  reasons  that  I  will  soon  elaborate.    Briefly,  my  claim  is  that  the  choices 
licensors  make  about  the  conditions  contained  in  their  licenses  can  tell  us 
something important about their motives and in particular, the assumption of self-
interest as it is often used in economics.  An important question that I need to 
address is: What motivates the first owners of software, those exercising dominion 
over the software in question, whether they are programmers or the people who 
hire them, to distribute their software under liberal, open source licenses?  Or, 
inversely, what can open source licenses tell us about the motives of those who use 
such licenses? 
 
Several types of motives have been identified in the literature, in this section I will 
attempt to organize those motives into broad categories.  In general, there are many 
systems to organize motives, Maslow's (1943) hierarchy being the most famous.  
Motives identified as drivers of open source contributions are only slightly less - 8 -   
 
 
expansive than those proposed by Maslow.  For instance, in the introduction to 
their edited book, Feller et al. (2005) list the following four distinct clusters of 
reasons for contributing: enjoyment and learning; feelings of obligation to the open 
source community and the belief that software should be free; satisfy non-work-
related  user  needs;  and,  work-related  needs  and  concerns.    While  their  list  is 
helpful, it doesn't emphasize the motives behind the activities of contributors.  Hars 
and Ou's (2001) division of motives into external and internal lends itself better to 
the research question that I am addressing.  In addition to the theorizing that has 
occurred in literature, empirical studies have offered support for both the internal 
and  external  postulated  motives,  but  the  evidence  is  heavily  dependent  on  the 
meanings  attached  to,  at  times,  ambiguous  survey  questions  (Ghosh,  2005a; 
Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Hertel and Herrmann 2003; Lakhani and Von Hippel, 
2003); I will offer a critiques of these questions in the case study chapter, once I 




Ryan  and  Deci  (2000,  p. 70)  offer  the following  explanation  and  definition of 
internal motivation: "Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive potential 
of human nature as much as intrinsic motivation, the inherent tendency to seek out 
novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one's capacities, to explore, and to 
learn."  The conceptual framework developed by Deci (1975) and Ryan and Deci 
(2000)  supposes  three  innate  psychological  needs--competence,  autonomy,  and 
relatedness.  In the case of open source, Hars and Ou (2001, p. 2) interpret internal 
motivation to mean that open source participants are "selfless".  They claim that 
advocates of this position mean that open source programmers are not motivated by 
monetary incentives but by their own hobbies and preferences or that they receive 
rewards from increasing the welfare of others.  Hars and Ou (2001, p.2) claim: 
"Such  motivations  that  are  ultimately  rooted  within  the  individual  himself  are 
grouped under internal factors."  They suggest (2001, p. 3) that intrinsic motivation 
might  be  a disadvantage for  open  source  projects  in  comparison  to  proprietary 
software  because  open  source  participants  may  have  not  be  driven  to  serve 
customer needs because of their focus on their internal well-being.  Other motives 
mentioned  that  seem  to  fit  under  the  category  of  internal  motivation  include 
Lakhani and Wolf's (2005), in which they refer to "the intrinsic satisfactions of 
doing the work" as a motive.  Torvalds and Diamond (2001) book about the fun of 
open source programming fits neatly in this category.  Finally, Feller adds learning 




Hars and Ou (2001) categorize altruism as an internal motivator, which they define 
as a person seeking to increase the welfare of others.  As is common, they regard it 
as the opposite of selfishness and quote Ozinga's (1999 p.5) definition of altruism 
as: "doing something for another at some cost to oneself."  That is a good starting 
definition, but Ozinga later warns of the wastefulness of defining terms and settles 
on a definition of altruism as kindness.  Ghosh (1998) claims that altruism is a 
motive for open source developers, but that it plays only a minor part in their 
overall motivational set.  A more common belief is expressed by van Wendel de 
Joode (2005).  Van Wendel de (2005, p. 6), writing about open source, claims: "the 
focus of research on individual motivation has now shifted and is currently much 
more centered on an explanation based on rational and individual profit-seeking 
actors."  A theoretical argument against the motive of altruism in open source is 
made in Weber (2004), particularly chapter five. 
 
Hars and Ou (2001) name community identification as a variant of altruism.  This, 
they claim, is the need to be loved.  As von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) note: 
"Contributors to open source software projects may also get private benefits from 
participating  in  the  project  "community"  that  are  not  available  to  free  riders 
(Raymond 2001, Wayner 2000, Lerner and Tirole 2000, Moon and Sproull 2000)."  
Community identification is also apparent in "feelings of obligation to the open 
source software community" which Feller, et al. (2005) mentions and it is an idea 
emphasized  in  Barbrook  (1998,  2005).    Another  internal  motive  mentioned  is 





External factors are rewards and punishments induced from outside the individual 
(Ryan and Deci, 2000).  For open source developers these are generally taken to 
mean the direct and indirect rewards gained by increasing their marketability and 
skill  base  for  the  purpose  of  making  themselves  more  valuable  to  potential 
employers.  In general, these motives are called reputation or signaling effects, the 
idea is that working in an open source project provides prestige and visibility that 
gives developers a chance to be noticed by software companies (Bonaccorsi and 
Rossi, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002, 2002b, Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003).  In 
addition, it is generally recognized that developers also seek improved reputations 
and honor from their peers. This point is outlined by the open source movement - 10 -   
 
 
ideology (Raymond, 2001). Raymond believes that prestige is central in the hacker 
culture's reward mechanism (2001, p. 89) 
 
These  sorts  of  explanations  follow  standard  economic  methodology,  where  the 
belief  is  that  employers  attempt  to  induce  behavior  by  external  intervention 
(Becker,  1976;  Frey,  1992).    Employees  and  potential  employees  attempt  to 
increase their marginal productivity or the perception thereof in order to command 
a higher price in the labor market where, in its idealized form, the marginal value 
that an employee adds to the firm equals his wage.  Developers attempt to raise 
their value through visible, valuable contributions to open source projects.  In many 
cases, internal, "irrational" motives are used as a foil against the "rational" behavior 
offered by standard theory.  For instance, Lakhani and Wolf (2005, p. 3) write: 
"Many  are  puzzled  by  what  appears  to  be  irrational  and  altruistic  behavior  by 
movement participants: giving code away, revealing proprietary information, and 
helping  strangers  to  solve  their  technical  problems."    Their  own  position,  as 
mentioned above, is that while external motivational factors such as better jobs, 
career advancement have been the main motivational explanations of contributions 
to open source, they suggest that intrinsic, enjoyment-based motivations, namely 
creativity, are the strongest motivators.  Similarly, Ghosh (2005, p. 32), writes: "... 
hypotheses usually supposed largely rational, self-interested motives, among the 
most extreme being that open source is explained by the "simple economics" of 
signaling for better career prospects and hence monetary rewards."  Van Wendel de 
Joode (2005) claims that contributors: "want to maximize their utility and act in 
their own self-interest" (Joode, 2005, p. 23), this, according to van Wendel de 
Joode, is the state-of-the-art research in regards to people’s motives to participate 
in open source communities (van Wendel de Joode, 2005, p. 194). 
              
The direct software needs of contributors have also frequently been named as a 
motive to participate in open source projects (Raymond, 2001, von Hippel 1988; 
2001, 2005).  This point is related to the fact that developers are often also users of 
the code they develop, while Feller et al. (2005) sensibly divides this motive based 
on whether the contribution is made for work or non-work related reasons.  Other 
suggested motives are that open source is a gift economy (Barbrook, 1998, 2005), 
and what Ghosh (2005) calls "balanced value flow" in which rational self-interest 
is assumed, but self-interest can include a range of different types of rewards, not 
just monetary compensation (Ghosh, 2005b). 
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The number of motives attributed to open source contributors is diverse, they are 
rational and self-interested and/or irrational and altruistic.  They are motivated by 
their own "internal" interests and "external" incentives as well as by the norms of a 
greater community.  The meanings of these terms need to be clarified if motives 
are  to  be  properly  attributed  to  open  source  contributors  in  general;  proper 
attribution, in turn, will help to us in making predictions about the future of open 




Confusion at the theoretical level is mirrored in popular and academic discussions 
on  the  motives  of  open  source  programmers.    As  I  will  show,  neither  those 
explanations that attribute motives to a narrow, economic, interpretation of self-
interest  or  those  that  rely  exclusively  on  non-self-interested  (e.g.  altruistic) 
explanations  are  entirely  convincing.    Incorrectly  assuming  that  open  source 
programmers are driven by a base form of self-interest can have practical as well as 
theoretical implications.  My main contribution to the business literature will be a 
framework  for  understanding  the  range  and  types  of  motives  behind  economic 
behavior in general and open source in particular.  The framework adds to and 
qualifies the intrinsic, extrinsic divide used by Hars and Ou (2001) and Lakhani 
and Wolf (2005).  The framework is a starting point, it is meant to define the coarse 
boundaries of self-interest and other motives rather than be a complete description 
of all the facets of these motives.  This limitation is due to the extent of the subject 
matter rather than a lack of desire on my part to address those details.  A second 
contribution is to lend support to the empirical studies which show that motives 
other  than self-interest  influence important  economic  phenomena.   This  second 
contribution will, naturally, depend upon my ability to convince the reader that 
other motives play a significant role in the success of open source and that those 
lessons can be applied in other economic contexts. 
 
Accordingly, I have two goals in this manuscript which will help me to answer the 
main research question which is, once again: Does the assumption of self-interested 
agents optimizing the use of their scarce resources adequately explain the success 
of open source in the software market or are there better explanations?  The first 
goal will be to attempt to disentangle and clarify some of the confusing aspects of 
the motive of self-interest as it is used in the economic and business literatures.  
Once I have done that, I can categorize the motives offered in the literature on the 
basis of whether they are self-interested or non-self-interested.  The second goal is - 12 -   
 
 
to  provide  a  practical  framework  that  will  allow  researchers  to  systematically 
consider the various elements of what it means to be self-interested in order to use 
that behavioral assumption in a more precise, meaningful, manner.  The framework 
will provide a means to construct comparable, coherent, definitions of self-interest 
in place of the ambiguous and confusing terminology that allows economic self-
interest to be simultaneously interpreted as both highly restrictive and all-inclusive.  
To construct the framework I will need to investigate the different roles that self-




Ideally I would start my analysis by comparing the standard economic definition of 
self-interest to definitions used in other disciplines.  I could then perhaps test the 
economic  definition  against  the  presumed  motives  behind  the  hypothesized 
behavior of open source programmers in order to identify any weaknesses in the 
economic definition.  Unfortunately, as I have already hinted, there doesn't appear 
to  be  a  detailed,  standard  economic  definition  of  self-interest.    The  haphazard 
manner  with  which  such  an  important  assumption  is  made  (self-interest  and 
rationality  are  often  taken  to  be  the  two  characteristic  which  define  economic 
analysis), is surprising given that for thousands of years the extent to which self-
interest is presumed to play in human motivation, and the aims and goals at which 
it is directed, has been the topic of a continuous and sometimes intense debate 
within the field of ethics (see chapter four).  There are, in other words, guidelines 
available  to  help  explore  the  structural  and  external  dimensions  that  I  have 
identified. 
 
There is no good reason to use a vague definition of self-interest.  Historical and 
ongoing discussions within ethics have yielded a fairly precise understanding of the 
main issues involved in the motive of self-interest, if not always agreement on the 
answers to the issues raised (Griffin, 1988).  Therefore, as an alternative to the 
ideal case sketched above, I will selectively choose from among the ethical theories 
of self-interest that address issues relevant to building a practical framework of 
economic self-interest.  The amount of available material requires that I be highly 
selective, fortunately, two periods commend themselves to the case at hand.  The 
first is a dialog which took place in Scotland and England in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth centuries.  In particular, I will examine the positions of Thomas Hobbes 
(1588-1679)  and  Bernard  Mandeville  (1670-1733),  both  of  whom  advocated 
models of motivation that were based on the assumption that humans are at core - 13 -   
 
 
self-interested and are required by reason to seek their self-interest, in other words, 
they can be seen as defenders of the position known as rational egoism.  Their 
conclusions about motivation as it relates to self-interests resemble, in large part, 
both modern popular and academic understandings of the subject.  The next author 
I discuss is Joseph Butler (1692-1752), his critique of the positions represented by 
Hobbes and Mandeville provides the starting point for discussing the key issues 
that any modern theory of self-interest needs to address.  In his response to the 
positions of Hobbes and Mandeville, Butler raised nearly every major critique of 
the popular position known as psychological egoism, a position that formed the 
basis of Hobbes’s argument for rational egoism and still persists in many modern 
discussions  of  economic  motivation.    I  will  end  my  analysis  of  this  period by 
discussing self-interest as it appears in the two major works of Adam Smith (1723-
1790), namely, "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" 
and  "The  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments”.  Smith’s  work  has  had  obvious 
implications for economics and business studies, but his views of human nature, 
and the part that self-interest plays in that nature, have been badly misrepresented.  
Smith had a very complex, surprisingly rich and generous view of human nature in 
contrast to what passes as common knowledge concerning his advocacy of self-
interest.  There is still a lot to learn from Smith's view of human nature and the 
boundaries of self-interest. 
 
I should mention that although I will be using the writings of ethicists, Adam Smith 
was a moral philosopher as well as an economist, I will not be primarily concerned 
with  the  deeper  ethical  issue  of  the  place  of  self-interest  within  a  'good'  life, 
however good is defined if indeed it is possible to define it all (cf. Moore 1993).  
For instance, I won't be taking a stance on the issue of whether it is right or good 
for  people  to,  on  occasion,  be  willing  to  sacrifice  their  own  interests  for  the 
interests  of  others  or  attempt  to  defend  a  Utilitarian  analysis  of  self-interest.  
Although I do not intend to write a manuscript on the ethics of self-interest, the 
topics  of  self-interest  and  ethics  are  closely  related  because,  on  certain 
interpretations, they represent two sides of the same coin.  For instance, Bernard 
Williams takes altruism as a necessary feature of morality (Williams, 1973).  The 
fact that it is mainly ethicists that have developed the theory of self-interest should 
alone be enough to indicate the close link.  A large part of the debate on self-
interest in that field revolves around the issue of finding a convincing argument 
connecting self-interest to ethical behavior.  Finding such a connection would then 
give an agent a good, self-interested, reason to act ethically.  For instance, if a 
convincing  argument  could  be  made  that  living  a  good  life  means  that  people - 14 -   
 
 
should, under certain circumstances, be willing to sacrifice their own interests for 
the greater good, then this would imply that it might be in one's real, enlightened, 
interest, to on occasion sacrifice one's narrow interests.  This sort of argument is an 
indication  of  the  complexity  involved  and  precision  required  to  understand  the 
issues relevant to the ethical debate on self-interest and why it is still an intensely 
debated issue in that field.  Such issues are beyond the boundaries of the current 
manuscript.    However,  I  will  on  occasion  discuss  the  implications  that  certain 
forms of egoism popular in the economic literature have on ethical behavior.  For 
instance,  rational  egoists  claim,  simply,  that  self-interest  is  the  only  rational 
motive.  If the link described above between self-interest and ethics is accepted, 
then rational egoists are claiming that non-self-interested motives are irrational and 
thereby perhaps implicitly endorsing unethical behavior.  I will argue that such a 
normative claim then needs to be defended on ethical grounds and should not be 
taken lightly. 
 
Once I have dealt with what I take to be the historical foundations of the economic 
interpretation of self-interest, I will turn to the issue of building the dimensions of 
an  economic  definition  of  self-interest.    Accepting  that  self-interest  is  a  good 
description  of  human  nature  still  leaves  open  the  question  of  whether  it  is  an 
adequate assumption to explain and predict economic behavior.  This is a critical 
question  given  that  economists,  whether  they  are  instrumentalists  or  realists, 
presumably make the assumptions of self-interest and rationality in order to arrive 
at a better understanding of economic events and to make better predictions.  The 
authors whose work I will use to help me answer this question are the Hellenistic 
philosophers, in particular, the Cyrenaics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics.  I realize 
that these philosophical schools may appear to be unusual choices given that this is 
a manuscript written for a degree in business studies, but I have chosen them for 
several reasons.  First, these schools taught different forms of hedonism, meaning 
that  they  advocated  the  self-interested  pursuit  of  happiness.    Secondly,  these 
authors  were  the  first  to  see  individuals  as  independent  beings  as  opposed  to 
elements  of  a  greater  society.    They  were,  accordingly,  some  of  the  first  to 
approach the topic of self-interest from a perspective that modern readers would 
understand and appreciate.  Thirdly, they believed in living their lives according to 
their respective theories, in other words, they grounded their theories in practice.  
For them, living a good life was not an esoteric question, but a practical, open 
question with real implications for daily life.  Finally, these authors believed in a 
rational approach to living one's life.  By knowing themselves and their place in the 
natural scheme they believed that people, as opposed to outside forces such as the - 15 -   
 
 
gods or society, have the ability to control the level of happiness they experience.  
In summary, they argued that a self-interested, rational approach to life was the 
best  way  to  make  one's  life  go  well;  thereby  subscribing  to  the  two  basic 
assumptions of modern economics.  Because these authors attempted to live their 
lives according to their own theories, it is possible to ask whether the assumptions 
of self-interest and rationality alone are enough to describe and predict behavior, 
and if they are not, then we can ask why not, and adjust our theory accordingly.  In 
short, these authors provide a small test of the different types of behavior that 
follow from different conceptions of self-interest. 
 
The rest of my manuscript is divided into eight chapters; I will here briefly discuss 
the main themes of each chapter.  In general, given the diversity of uses of the term 
of self-interest in the economic and business literatures, I will, wherever possible, 
discuss specific, important, economic models or critiques of economic models.  I 
hope that this approach will allow me to avoid the charge that I am selectively 
choosing to discuss topics that no or very few economists defend.  The first chapter 
discusses the basics of the theory of self-interest and the difficulty of assessing 
motives base on observed behaviors.  The second chapter introduces economic 
models of self-interest and provides a brief discussion of the purpose of models 
within  economic  theory.    Discussions  of  Oliver  Williamson's  version  of 
Transaction Cost Economics and Meckling and Jensen's Agency Theory provide 
important clues to the actual use of the assumption of self-interest within two of the 
more  prominent  business  economic  models.    The  third  chapter  discusses  the 
structural and external dimensions of self-interest in detail, while the fourth traces 
the foundations of the economic approaches to self-interest.  Chapter six examines 
how the assumptions of self-interest and rationality were used by the Hellenistic 
philosophers  to  build  models  of  the  good  life.    The  seventh  chapter  takes  the 
essential features of the previous chapters and builds a practical framework of self-
interest.    The  last  chapter  examines  the  case  of  open  source  software  and 
demonstrates the need to clearly specifying what is meant by self-interest or face 
the risk of misidentifying motivation.  In particular, I ask whether the economic 
conception of self-interest as it is used by Lerner and Tirole (2001) can explain the 
willingness of programmers to contribute to open source projects.  A particularly 
interesting feature of the open source community is that there appears to be two 
principal  motives  at  work,  one  part  of  the  community  is  motivated  by  profit 
maximization, while the other is driven by a mixture of motives including a sense 
of duty to make and keep information freely available. 
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Before proceeding further, I need to give a rough indication of what I mean when I 
use the term self-interest if only to provide a basis for later comparisons.  I will 
discuss aspects of each of the following topics in greater detail in later chapters; the 
purpose of this chapter is to present a brief overview of the basic elements of self-
interest.  I put particular emphasis on setting the extreme boundaries of that motive 
before turning to some of the more subtle issues needed to develop a practical 
theory of self-interest. This approach will allow me to begin to remove some of the 
more  fundamental  misunderstandings  about  self-interest  and  facilitate  later 
discussions.  In keeping with my research question, I will emphasize those aspects 
of self-interest and altruism that appear in explanations about the motives of open 
source contributors, however, much of the discussion to follow has more general 
implications.  The chapter is broken down into several sections.  In the first  I 
discuss the main characteristics of self-interest and begin to build a more detailed 
picture  of  that  general  motive.    In  the  second  section  I  examine  some  of  the 
theoretical and practical alternatives to self-interest which may raise doubts about 
an exclusive reliance on that motive.  In the third section I discuss the problems of 
identifying  motives with special attention to the motive of altruism.  The final 
section offers a general discussion and some conclusions. 
 
Basics of Self-Interest 
 
I will presently introduce the basic issues involved in a proper understanding of 
self-interest  and  the  relationship  of  self-interest  to  the  domain  of  economic 
analysis. One simple message I wish to convey is that self-interest has never been a 
monolithic concept, it encompasses a large number of meanings which describe an 
equally large number of behaviors.  The definition of what is in a person's self-
interest has been the subject of debate for thousands of years, so it shouldn't be 
surprising  that  there  are  different  ways  of  interpreting  and  understanding  its 
meaning  (Parfit,  1984,  Dancy,  1997).    The  motive  of  self-interest,  broadly 
understood, has always been an accepted explanation of a large part of human 
behavior, therefore it is also not surprising that economists and many other social 
scientists  have  adopted  it  as  a  key  motivational  assumption  in  their  models.  
Having one standard assumption clearly has advantages in terms of parsimony. For 
example,  Gary  Becker's  (1976,  p.  112)  view  is  that  self-interest  should  be  the - 18 -   
 
 
default  position  and  when  behavior  seems  to  contradict  that  assumption,  the 
researcher should, nevertheless, stick with it even if it cannot be proved.  However, 
we  need  to  also  bear  in  mind  Hirschman's  (1992)  warning  that  if  self-interest 
explains everything, then it explains nothing. 
 
Claiming  that  people  are  primarily  self-interested  is  not  a  radical  position  that 
separates economic analysis from other social sciences or understandings of human 
nature.  The issue at hand is that although self-interest is the central assumption in 
many  important  economic  and  business  models,  it  is  seldom  clear  from  these 
models  what  sorts  of  actions  and  aims  that  term  is  meant  to  encompass.    For 
instance,  it  is  often  ambiguous  whether  economists  mean  to  imply  that  self-
interested agents are taken to be psychological, rational or ethical egoists, and in 
some cases it appears that agents are modeled as a confusing and incompatible 
mixture of these different types of egoisms.  As I will show, these three types of 
egoism, and others, represent very different assumptions and generally imply very 
different types of agent behavior.  To take just one small example, psychological 
egoism is meant to be a description of actual behavior, while rational and ethical 
egoism are normative positions telling people how they should behave in order to 
be  considered,  respectively,  rational  or  ethical.    For  instance,  as  previously 
mentioned, Ghosh (2005) and van Wendel de Joode (2005) respectively present 
and defend self-interest as a rational, utility, maximizing approach in contrast to 
other, by implication,  irrational motives.  The intentions and implications behind 
taking a descriptive versus a normative position are presumably very different and 
should  be  made  with  care--they  clearly  have  different  policy  implications.  
Therefore,  even  if it is  granted that  a  context is  economic  and  that  the  agents 
concerned are motivated exclusively by self-interest, such an assumption would 
still  leave  room  for  a  widely  divergent  set  of  interpretations  of  behavior  and 
implications for policy development. 
 
Another particularly important omission in many economic models is an explicit 
standpoint regarding the degree to which agent's interests are intertwined.  In broad 
terms, the interests of agents can be correlated or not.  For instance, it is widely 
accepted that certain relationships, for instance those among family and friends, 
often imply a dependence among interests--an agent's interests are affected by the 
interests of family and friends and vice versa.  In a business setting, the interests of 
colleagues  and  competitors  often  influence  perceptions  of  self-interest;  we 
generally want to see colleagues and friends succeed, and may feel a corresponding 
obligation to promote their interests on the basis of the relationship itself.  This - 19 -   
 
 
type of explanation can be seen in the arguments mentioned by Feller, et al. (2005) 
and  Barbrook  (1998,  2005).    Many  of  the  internal  motivators  previously 
mentioned, particularly those involving the beneficial aspects of being part of open 
source communities, attempt to make these relationships explicit. 
 
However, interests clearly are not necessarily positively correlated in the sense 
that, for example, one person's interests are served through the promotion of the 
interests of others, often the situation is quite the opposite.  Even within the open 
source  community  there  are  conflict  resolution  procedures  (Weber,  2004).  
Interests  may  be  negatively  correlated  as,  for  instance,  described  by  a  Pareto 
optimal situation in which an agent's utility can only be increased by harming the 
utility of one or more of the other agents.  A more interesting example that applies 
in both business and non-business settings is the motive of revenge.  A desire for 
revenge may cause agents to damage their own, informed, interests for some actual 
or  perceived  slight.    Revengeful  agents  may  be  willing  to  damage  their  own 
interests in order to damage the interests of wrongdoers or perceived wrongdoers. 
Revenge  may  be  too  strong  a  word  for  motivation  within  the  open  source 
community, but the motive of being the underdog against established, proprietary, 
software firms has been mentioned as a possible driving force behind open source 
contributions (Raymond, 1999).  Whatever the correlation, untangling the range of 
potential dependencies among interests will need to be addressed.  In addition, the 
overall  aims  or  goals  of  agents  are  often  left  open  in  economic  models,  for 
example, it is not always clear whether economic agents are taken to be aiming at 
maximizing or satisficing their happiness, preferences, desires, wealth, esteem or 
some other general objective; in fact, in some important economic theories no aims 
are specified.  The aims of an agent who desires to maximize his wealth are very 
likely  to  be  different  than  the  agent  who,  for  instance,  wants  to  maximize  his 
happiness or lead the best life possible. 
 
Although self-interest might be assumed to be a necessary component to achieve 
these different aims, such widely divergent aims will likely require considering 
very different, irreducible types of interests.  It is therefore necessary to investigate 
whether the economic interests of open source contributors differ from their non-
economic interests; if interests are found to vary then the appropriate tools used to 
identify those interests should vary as well.  A clearer demarcation of the different 
categories  of  interests  may  thereby  help  to  clarify  the  applicable  domain  of 
economic  analysis.    For  instance,  is  the  fact  that  Linus  Torvalds  enjoyed 
programming  an  economically  driven  interest  (Torvalds  and  Diamond  (2001)?  - 20 -   
 
 
Clarifying what it means to be economically self-interested will help to explain the 
actions of open source programmers, more generally, it will allow researchers to 
clearly  state  their  intentions  and  properly  use  this  most  basic  of  motivational 
descriptions. 
 
Dimensions of Self-interest 
 
For  expository  purposes,  self-interest  can  be  thought  of  as  varying  along  two 
principal dimensions, a structural dimension and an external dimension.  I use the 
term dimension for two reasons, the first being that the word calls to mind a sliding 
scale which is appropriate for the components of self-interest.  The interests of 
people can, for instance, be more or less self-directed and will vary according to 
the circumstances in which they find themselves.  The second reason I use the 
word dimension is that many of the components of self-interest overlap, by which I 
mean that identifying someone’s interests requires identifying their location along 
various independent dimensions.  The two dimensions I am using emphasize the 
difference between assumptions about the role of self-interest in an agent’s psyche 
versus  assumptions  about  what  objects  are  to  be  included  in  an  agent’s  set  of 
interests. 
 
The structural dimension is, simply, the way self-interest in general is taken to 
work within person’s psyche.  On the other hand, the external dimension, (I use the 
word external for historical reasons), is the objects at which self-interest is directed.  
Using  a  mathematical  analogy,  the  structural  concept  can  be  thought  of  as  a 
function  describing  how  a  person  is  taken  to  combine  his  desires  for  external 
objects,  while  instances  of  objects  are  the  variables  within  the  function.    For 
example,  as  previously  mentioned,  a  psychological  egoist  (the  structural 
component) claims that no matter what the goals or aims of an agent are, the agent 
uses the apparatus of self-interest to rank those objects (external concept), no other 
system  of  reasoning  is  allowed.    The  difference  between  these  two  concepts 
becomes apparent when I discuss the problem of identifying motivation.  In order 
to  facilitate  later  discussions  I  will  briefly  explain  the  basic  elements  of  both 
dimensions.  I will proceed by placing the elements of self-interest that I raised in 









The structural dimension is a modeling assumption about the manner in which 
agents combine the objects of their desire.  In regards to self-interest, it is used to 
define the different types of egoism that have been identified in the philosophical 
literature.    Categorization  of  the  different  egoisms  is  a  simplification,  from 
everyday experience we know that the capacity for egoistic behavior varies per 
individual and the contexts in which they operate.  For example, many economists 
seem to draw a distinction between agents acting in an economic context in which 
agents are motivated exclusively by a narrow, selfish form of self-interest, and 
other  contexts  in  which  other  presumably  non-self-interested  or  less  interested 
motives are operating (Williamson, 1998). Other economists, for example Gary 
Becker (1976), claim that economic reasoning, including self-interest, is applicable 
across  a  very  wide  range  of  social  settings  including,  famously,  the  marriage 
market and within family relationships.  On these views, the context determines, to 
an extent, the type of self-interested reasoning that is used.  However, the self-
interest that is expressed in stock market dealings is presumably very different 
from the self-interest expressed in social relationships.  People may be motivated 
exclusively by self-interest in both situations, however, not only the external aims 
and  goals  of  an  agent  may  vary,  but  the  reasoning  used  to  justify  an  agent's 
interests may vary as well.  It is therefore important to clearly state the degree to 
which the context under consideration affects the egoistic tendencies of an agent. 
    
I have previously mentioned a few of the structural dimensions of self-interest; 
including psychological egoism, rational egoism and ethical egoism.  The type of 
egoism that is taken to describe an agent in a context will have repercussions on the 
sorts of behaviors that an agent believes are appropriate.  Similarly, a researcher's 
beliefs about which structural dimension describe an agent's actions will influence 
his interpretation of the behaviors he observes.  For instance, a researcher who 
accepts psychological egoism may believe that people are programmed by nature 
to  act  from  self-interest  regardless  of  the  context;  accordingly,  even  acts  that 
appear to be altruistic should be understood to be, at their core, motivated by self-
interest  regardless  of  the  context.    As  a  consequence,  such  a  researcher  will 
interpret all behaviors as motivated by self-interest. In the specific case of open 
source software, a researcher who accepts psychological egoism as an accurate 
description of motivation will be inclined to reduce the motives of all programmers 
to self-interest.  In contrast, advocates of rational egoism claim that it is necessary 
and sufficient for an action to be rational that it contributes to the self-interest of an - 22 -   
 
 
agent.  On this normative view, acting for other than self-interested motives, for 
example altruistic motives, should be interpreted as irrational.  Researchers who 
hold the view that agents are rational egoists may interpret the actions of open 
source programmers as non-self-interested but, as a consequence, the programmers 
are acting irrationally.  Finally, proponents of ethical egoism take the normative 
position that people should or ought to pursue their self-interest, to do otherwise 
would be unethical.  In effect, ethical egoism claims that you owe it to yourself to 
be self-interested and any other motivation is probably disingenuous and certainly 
unethical.  In the case of ethical egoism, open source programmers, to the degree 
that they are not promoting their interests, are acting unethically.  Elements of each 
of these positions, and more, are found in the economic literature and need to be 
sorted out. 
 
Finally, the structural component of self-interest also relates to the time frame or 
intensity over which self-interest is expressed.  For example, even an agent acting 
as a psychological egoist, who by assumption is always maximizing or satisficing 
his interests, will have to have a means of incorporating the time frame over which 
his  interests  span.    The  point  of  interest  is  that  accepting  the  claim  that  all 
motivation is based on self-interest leaves open the question of the time frame 
under consideration.  Each of us has many different and sometimes competing 
interests.  For instance, a very intense form of self-interest, one in which an agent is 
exclusively  directed  at  his  own  interests  while  ignoring  the  interests  of  others, 
comes close to what is commonly called selfish or egoistic behavior and leads to 
actions  that  are  generally  met  with  disapproval.    Such  motives  may  be 
economically,  and  otherwise,  self-defeating  in  that  they  work  against  more 
important, perhaps longer-term, interests.  A selfish person will pursue his aims 
without considering the effects his actions have on others and perhaps even the 
effects those actions have on his own longer-term interests.  For instance, a selfish 
person may be indifferent between two acts each of which he finds equally worthy 
but each of which has different (positive or negative) effects on the interests of 
others.  In contrast, more inclusive forms of self-interest are, to various degrees, 
seen as more socially acceptable and may help agents to achieve their greater long-
term goals even at the cost of not achieving certain short-term interests.  The point 
is that interests have various time frames over which their costs and benefits should 
be, to the extent possible, calculated or considered. 
     
 





The  second  dimension  of  self-interest,  which  for  historical  reasons  I  call  the 
external dimension of self-interest, encompasses the objects at which agents aim to 
promote their interests and how agents incorporate the interests of others into their 
own interests.  Whether there are many irreducible aims or one common aim, e.g., 
happiness, will have to be explored.  Different basic aims and goals may lead to 
different sorts of behavior, for example, a person aiming at living a virtuous life or 
acquiring as much knowledge as possible may have an entirely different set of 
interests than a person who aims at maximizing his expected wealth.  The other 
important aspect of the external dimension is the degree to which people include 
the interests of others in their own interests.  I place this in the external dimension 
because it concerns how agents incorporate aims of others, aims external to those 
of  the  agent  under  consideration,  into  their  own  interests.    Both  extremes  (not 
including  the  interests  of  others  and  equating  one's  interests  entirely  with  the 
interest of others) are straightforward to understand, although equally unrealistic 
and probably self-defeating for their own reasons.  Pure egoists are defined as those 
agents who only think of their own needs, without reference to others even if, for 
example, others can help them to realize their interests. Of course, this would be a 
self-defeating, irrational, strategy to the degree that others are able and willing to 
promote the interests of the pure-egoist.  In other words, this sort of self-interest is 
frequently not really self-interested at all.  The other extreme is a type of altruism 
in which agents completely sacrifice their own interests for the interests of others, a 
self-defeating and self-destructive approach for obvious reasons.  Both of these 
extremes are often used as straw men by one side or the other to create a false 
dichotomy, but within these two extremes there are many possible combinations of 
overlapping motives which will need to be examined. 
 
I claim that both the structural and external dimensions are necessary in order to 
arrive at a proper understanding of what it means to be self-interested.  To its 
detriment,  economics  has  largely  failed  to  take  a  coherent  stance  on  either 
dimension.  The confusion over the meaning of self-interest is compounded by the 
increasing  range  of  activities  over  which  economic  analysis  is  held  to  apply 
including sociology, political science and law (Mansbridge, 1990).  In other words, 
the  difference  between  economic  and  non-economic  contexts  is  blurred.    For 
instance,  on  occasion  economists  appear  to  have  adopted  an  extremely  narrow 
definition of self-interest in which agents are modeled as solitary, non-social, non-
normative, calculators of net-interest where interests are defined in terms of wealth - 24 -   
 
 
or something similar.  Such a description may give a good account of agent activity 
in the stock or commodity markets, but will be less applicable the more that social 
interaction  or  aims  other  than  wealth  become  measures  of  well-being.    Other 
economic scholars appear to take a very broad view of self-interest in which nearly 
anything that an agent prefers or desires is in his interest, such an understanding 
can easily lead to tautological reasoning or confusion in terminology.  The wide 
range  of  behaviors  attributed  to  self-interest  has  led  to  a  confusing  range  of 
interpretations of 'economic' behavior.  On the one extreme, self-interest is seen as 
sort of a mean, aggressive motive, while at the other it is a catchall for all types of 
behavior. 
 
Characteristics of Self-interest 
 
Ignoring, for the moment, the structural dimension of self-interest, there are two 
basic  characteristics  that  need  to  be  kept  in  mind  when  analyzing  the  general 
motive  of  self-interest.    The  first  characteristic,  the  external  motive  mentioned 
above, is the aim or goal being analyzed.  As a default I will assume the aim is 
happiness, an assumption that greatly simplifies the discussion by removing the 
need to consider a nearly unending and sometimes incompatible list of possible 
aims that agents can have.  It also has well-known limits, namely, it rests on the 
shaky psychological foundation in which agents are assumed to pursue those aims 
that will make them 'feel' happiness.  It has been argued that, at times, people will 
prefer,  for  instance,  harsh  reality  to  happiness  based  on  false  pretenses.    For 
example, even if I expect the worse, I may prefer to know what a person really 
thinks of me rather than hearing the praise of a sycophant (Griffin, 1988).  That 
said, happiness plays an important role in any practical understanding of the aims 
of agents.  The second characteristic is what I call the focus of an action.  At one 
theoretical extreme an agent is exclusively focused on his own happiness while at 
the other extreme he is exclusively focused on the happiness of others.  The focus 
of  an  action includes the issue  of  whether  other  agents  are  considered ends  in 
themselves or the means to achieve an aim.  The majority of the discussion to 
follow  is  devoted  to  addressing  these  two  characteristics  with  only  a  passing 
reference to the issue of measurement.  I will begin by discussing three alternatives 
to typical theories of self-interest, hedonism, pure egoism, and altruism.  The intent 
of discussing the alternatives is to provide a stark point of contrast from which to 
view self-interest. 
 





Instant hedonism is at one motivational extreme.  A simplistic form of hedonistic 
theory  gives  people  the  aim  to  do  what  would  give  them  the  most  immediate 
happiness or pleasure or, most generally, do what leads to the most improved state 
of  mind.    These  aims  may  include  the  happiness  of  others,  by  far  the  most 
commonly accepted assumption, or not, that distinction is not relevant to the case I 
am now considering.  The important point is that an instant hedonist is focused on 
his instantaneous happiness, as opposed to say his net happiness over a lifetime.  
Immediate  hedonism  is  interesting  because  of  the  contrast  it  emphasizes  with 
generally accepted theories of self-interest. 
 
The instant hedonist assesses the available alternative set of actions, orders those 
actions  based  on  the  happiness  or  pleasure  that  he  expects  to  receive  at  that 
moment, and then pursues those acts accordingly. The happiness of the hedonist is 
confined to what he believes will make him most happy at the moment and is 
therefore a subjective measure.  Hedonism, like all egoisms, can be seen as a type 
of rationality that aligns a person's set of motives and aims.  Although the hedonist 
attempts  to  obtain  the  most  happiness  he  can,  he may  fail  to  achieve  his  goal 
because he is misinformed or because he makes poor decisions or something along 
those lines, nevertheless, the failure to obtain his goal does not detract from the 
validity of the theory, although a theory can be too demanding.  By valid I mean 
only  that  happiness  is  a  readily  achievable  goal  for  most  people  even  if 
circumstances, self-made or otherwise, occasionally prevent one from achieving it. 
The hedonist would not be satisfied with second best, he would not, for example, 
be content with being just happy when he believes that it is within his reach to 
obtain a state of greater net happiness, that is, after all, what it means to have the 
exclusive  aim  of  being  most  happy.    Similar  reasoning  holds  for  cases  of  less 
unhappy; the instant hedonist prefers those acts that he expects to bring him less 
unhappiness now. 
 
Is hedonism a self-defeating theory?  In other words, does the theory fail in its own 
terms?  No, hedonism gives a person the readily achievable aim of doing what will 
give him the most happiness at the moment.  In terms of acts, suppose a person is 
faced  with  the  choice  of  receiving  a  thousand  dollars  (or  units  of  happiness) 
immediately or foregoing the thousand dollars now and receiving a million dollars 
in a few years time, hedonistic theory says take the thousand dollars now.  Note 
that the immediate choice facing the hedonist is between receiving nothing or a - 26 -   
 
 
thousand dollars at this moment, simplistic hedonism says take the money now 
because  that  will  bring  the  most  happiness  at  this  moment.    In  a  sense,  the 
simplistic  hedonist  has  an  infinite  discount  rate  rendering  anything  beyond  the 
immediate  a  value  of  zero.    While  immediate  hedonism  isn't  self-defeating  or 
irrational, it is ludicrous.  In contrast to immediate hedonism, and the point of 
discussing it, is that any theory of self-interest needs to include the future interests 
of the individual, further still, excluding discount rates, a self-interested person 
needs to see all interests as equally valuable regardless of when they are realized.  
In other words, the interests I will have in ten years are just as important as the 




Pure egoists can be defined as those who only considers their own interests without 
reference  to  others;  they  are  completely  focused  on  their  own  interests  to  the 
exclusion of all else.  Unlike the instant hedonist, those interests will include future 
interests. The important feature of this motive is that a pure egoist's interests do not 
include the interests of others.  Clearly, pure egoism is generally a self-defeating 
strategy.  Whenever interaction among people is required to achieve one's aims, the 
pure egoist is unlikely to be successful. To the extent to which his happiness is 
dependent on interaction with others, his is a bad strategy.  The pure egoist may 
feel most at home as a lone trader in a stock or commodities market where the price 
is a sufficient statistic.  By fixating only on his own interests the pure egoists may 
be damaging those very interests and defeating his own goal of maximizing his 
aims.    Perhaps  only  a  completely  isolated  character,  such  as  Robinson  Crusoe 
(before Friday's arrival of course), could be successful following such a strategy.  
However, even a person in total isolation who focuses exclusively on his own 
happiness may be following a self-defeating strategy.  It has often been observed 
that trying to be exclusively happy (or any hedonistic aim) at all times and in all 
contexts may not be a good strategy to achieve happiness; at times distance from 
one's aims is required to achieve those aims (Sidgwick, 1981, p. 136,).  It is not 
difficult to imagine economic circumstances in which it may be self-serving to 
understand and accommodate the happiness of others--the example of international 
trade  comes  immediately  to  mind.    Economic  market  systems  are  successful 
precisely because agents intentionally interact with one another to achieve their 
individual goals, but it is not necessary to belabor this obvious point.  Pure egoism 
is  an  extreme  approach  that  probably  no  sensible  person  follows  in  reality;  it 
represents a boundary case that emphasizes the importance of understanding the - 27 -   
 
 
focus of an agent.  It also points out the importance of properly interpreting the 
motives of an agent in order to properly assess the value or goodness of an act. 
 
Prisoner's Dilemma and Pure Egoism 
 
One of the important implications of self-interest theory for the case of open source 
can be seen in game theory, particularly the prisoner's dilemma.  I take for granted 
that  the  reader  knows  the  basic  features  of  game  theory  and  will  immediately 
proceed to the point at hand (for an introduction see Gintis, 2000 or Osborne and 
Rubinstein 1994).  The prisoners in the prisoner's dilemma need not be instant 
hedonists, the game can and has been extended over time, most famously in the tit-
for-tat game by Robert Axelrod (1984).  However, it is possible to ask the extent to 
which the prisoners are pure egoists.  Given that the prisoners are aware of the 
choices they face and aware that the other is aware as well, they are not pure 
egoists.    The  point  of  game  theory  is  that  hypothesized  players  react  to  one 
another's expected decisions. 
 
The  prisoner's  dilemma  is  typically  represented  in  the  following  normal  form, 
where smaller numbers represent better outcomes.  I will assume that the game is 
played once and choices are made simultaneously. 
 
 
    You     
    B1  B2   










         
      
Fig. 1: The Prisoner's dilemma. 
 
The reasoning of each prisoner is that no matter what the other does it is better for 
me to choose A1.  So, if I assume you will choose B1 I will choose A1 because 3 is 
a better outcome than 4 and if I assume that you will choose B2 I will choose A1 
because 1 is a better outcome than 2.  Accordingly, it makes no difference what I 
expect your choice to be or the expected impact that those choices will have on 
your happiness.  In either case I make the same choice and you follow that same - 28 -   
 
 
strategy so we both land in zone 1, the third best alternative for us both.  This game 
makes  it  possible  to  construct  some  rather  unsettling  examples.    For  instance, 
imagine the situation in which I am nearly indifferent between alternatives A1 and 
A2, but the choice I make has a tremendous impact on your happiness or well-
being (Figure 2).  I will choose A1 no matter what you do, but by my choosing A2 
instead of A1 I would "save" you 200 units of happiness at a cost of only 0.01 units 
of my happiness.  Considerations for the effects of one's actions on another are not 
a consideration for the self-interested person.  Even knowing that he is causing the 
other person to suffer for a very small gain to himself does not offer the pure egoist 
a reason to suffer the smallest of losses.  The point of this example is to emphasize 
the independence of this type of self interested person; he simply chooses what will 
make him happiest in a given situation and the effects of his behavior on others is 
irrelevant  for  his  decision.    The  pure  egoist  is  not  malevolent,  he  does  not 
intentionally set out to damage or use others to achieve his goals, however, his 
callousness is disturbing and his complete detachment from the wider implications 
of  his  behavior  is  unethical  at  best  and  probably  dysfunctional  in  most  social 
settings.  He only sets out to do what is best for himself at that moment, while the 
consequences of his behavior for others, good or bad, are not his concern.  But this 
doesn't imply that this type of self-interest is irrational, only that it may be morally 
challenged. 
 
Prisoner's dilemma 2:  
 
 
    You     
    B1  B2   










         
 
Fig. 2: The Prisoner's dilemma 2. 
 
It might be argued that pure egoism is self-defeating because both prisoners would 
both do better if they cooperated.  In terms of Fig. 1, we would both be better by 
choosing A2 and B2 respectively, and landing in quadrant IV instead of quadrant I.  
That  argument  fails,  self-interest  theory  gives  people  the  aim  of  achieving  the - 29 -   
 
 
greatest expect benefits for himself, that is achieved by choosing A1 whatever it is 
you do.  "We" could do better by cooperating, but the self-interested person is not 
concerned with "we".  This issue is what makes common pool or open access 
resources  interesting.    For  instance,  it  is  common  knowledge  among  fisheries 
economists  that  open  access in the  North  Sea  has led  to  an  uneconomical  and 
unsustainable level of fishing of important species such as Sole and Cod (Daan, 
1997).  The fishery would be better off, more profitable, if fishing was restricted 
and  catch  was  significantly  reduced.    If,  for  the  benefit  of  the  group,  a  fisher 
chooses  not to  fish  while  others do  fish,  then the community  minded  fisher  is 
sacrificing  his  own  interests  from  which  others  gain.    The  reasoning  in  other 
prisoner's dilemmas is similar, from the perspective of the fisher or prisoner, the 
problem isn't that he's self-interested, the problem is that others are.  It’s interesting 
to note that several of the authors whom I have mentioned previously and I will 
again discuss in the last chapter view open source as a common pool resource, 
however, I believe that there are some problems with their approaches. 
 
The point is that while this form of self-interest is not individually self-defeating, it 
can be collectively self-defeating in the sense that if everyone is a pure egoist then 
all are worse off than if they would have had another disposition.  This is not the 
same as claiming that whenever interaction among people is required to achieve 
one's  aims  that  pure  egoism  is  a  collectively  self-defeating  strategy.  There  are 
many examples in which parties pursuing their own interests produce results which 
provide better outcomes for everyone.  For example, open source can be seen as a 
coordination game.  Coordination games illustrate situations in which all parties 
can  realize  mutual  gains, but  only  by  making  mutually  consistent decisions. A 
common application is the choice of technological standards and I believe that this 
type of game is an accurate representation of some types of open source licenses in 
which open source software is made incompatible with proprietary software.  For 
example, two players facing a choice between using open source as opposed to 
proprietary software will gain if they both use open source licenses and lose if their 
actions are uncoordinated. 
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Fig. 3: The coordination game. 
 
                                           
A cooperative game is a game in which groups of players may enforce cooperative 
behaviour, hence the game is a competition between coalitions of players, rather 
than  between  individual  players.    In  the  case  of  open  source  and  software  in 




A  popular  and  robust  theory  of  motivation  is  the  theory  of  self-interest.    The 
approach of self-interest has been the default position for most analysts of human 
behavior for thousands of years (Parfit, 1984, Rogers, 1997). Many philosophers 
and others have found it, for better or worse, to be a good guide to explaining and 
predicting all aspects of human and non-human behavior.  Although it is seldom 
explicitly stated, I believe that this motive, rather say than pure-egoism, is what 
well-informed economists have in mind when they use the term egoistic or self-
interested.  Purely self-interested persons, in contrast to pure egoists, attempt to 
achieve their aims within a much broader context, using the terminology above, 
their  focus  is  much  broader.    Whereas  the  pure  egoist  is  focused  on  his  own 
narrowly defined needs to the exclusion of all else and therefore generally fails to 
achieve his overall aims, the self-interested person orders and chooses his set of 
desires in such a way as to achieve those aims that will, for instance, make his life 
go best.  According to self-interest theory, the disposition that is supremely rational 
is that of someone who is never self-denying.  It gives to each person the aim of 
achieving those outcomes that will bring the greatest expected benefits for himself 
(Parfit, 1984).  The question that a purely self-interested person should ask himself - 31 -   
 
 
is whether his set of desires (or preferences) promotes his given lifetime aims as 
well as an alternative set of available desires or preferences.
1 
 
Several  questions  immediately  arise,  for  instance,  is  the  purely  self-interested 
person  interested  in  his  overall,  long-term,  happiness  or  in  his  immediate 
happiness?  The theory of self-interest clearly states that a person should maximize 
his interests over his lifetime, so in contrast to the instant hedonist, self-interest 
theory  is  forward  looking.    Self-interest  theory  requires  people  to  be  able  to 
evaluate the value of aims over a lifetime.  It doesn't require super-rationality, only 
that people do the best they can.  For instance, if a person could have made his life 
go better by being more reflective, then the person should become more reflective.  
And in contrast to the pure egoist, the theory of self-interest can include, and for 
most  people, almost  certainly  does  include  the  interests of  others.   The theory 
recognizes that the interests of people are often intertwined and a person is made 
better off when those close to him are made better off. I emphasize this point 
because in common language, and in some implicit definitions used by economists 
and business scholars, being self-interested often seems to exclude benevolent acts.  
Whether one is using the theory of self-interest or preference theory, this would be 
an  arbitrary  restriction  that  contradicts  everyday  experience.    For  instance,  a 
person's interests can and often do coincide and depend on the interests of others; 
when a friend's happiness increases, my happiness increases as well.  I then have a 
motive to make him happy if only because it will make me happy.  In contrast, a 
non-self-interested act would include the case in which I want my friend to be 
happy regardless of how his happiness impacts my own. 
 
The  theory  of  self-interest  is  a  very  inclusive  theory  but  not  as  inclusive  as 
preference theory.  Like preference theory, the subjective account of self-interest 
excludes little in terms of specific desires and aims that an agent can have. As long 
as it contributes to a person's subjectively determined aims then the theory allows 
it.  Aims can include the maximization, minimization, satisfaction, etc., of wealth, 
                                                 
1 Preferences and desires are not the same thing.  A preference in contrast to a desire is a 
relative concept.  However, having preference seems to presuppose having desires in that it 
is difficult to imagine preferring something that one doesn't desire.  It is, however, possible 
to imagine cases in which a person may prefer something he doesn't desire.  For instance, 
all else equal, a person may prefer a quick death to say a slow drawn-out illness followed 
by death, but he doesn't really desire either, at least in the immediate future.  That said, I 
will generally use preferences and desires inter-changeably. 
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power, happiness, pain or any other imaginable aim.  Aims such as maximizing 
pain  are  admittedly  odd,  but  I  see  no  reason  to  exclude  them  and  other  less 
conventional aims as a viable interest if they are assessed subjectively.  Viewed 
objectively, it is reasonable to conclude that a person maximizing the pain he feels 
is  working  against  his  own  interests.    Similarly,  a  person  interested  in,  for 
instances, hurting others, will face community sanctions, but such interests are not 
excluded by  the theory.   Despite their  apparent similarities, the  theory  of  self-
interest and preference theory are very different.  In the case of self-interest, the 
argument has to be made that the agent's interests, viewed either subjectively or 
objectively, are being served.  An aim has to be specified before we can determine 
whether an agent's set of desires will help him to achieve that aim.  In terms of 
happiness, the definition might be that the self-interested person adjusts, to the 
degree possible, his desires in such a manner that they will allow him to achieve 
the greatest amount of happiness or pleasure that he believes is possible over his 
lifetime.  The definition excludes acts that will intentionally work against one's net 
interests.    Preference theory,  in  contrast,  only  requires that  an  agent is able  to 
compare  two  objects  and choose  the  one he  most prefers  or  declare  that  he  is 
indifferent in regards to the objects.  It doesn't necessarily say anything about a 
goal or aim.  Preference theory is a much more general theory than the theory of 
self-interest.  However, if we want to be able to conclude that a series of preference 
are rational, we will also have to know or make an additional assumption about a 
person's aims.    In other words, we have to know  if the person is ordering his 
preferences in such a way as to achieve the maximum, minimum of whatever his 
aim  is  (if  he  has  an  aim  at  all).    To  conclude,  preference  theory  is  even  less 
restrictive than the theory of self-interest because it does not specifically state an 
aim or goal, while self-interest theory does. 
 
Practical Egoism and Altruism 
 
Taken together, these two features, the ability to incorporate benevolent acts and 
the broad reach of the theory, are what help to make the theory of self-interest such 
an enduring theory.  The theory also corresponds well with everyday experience.  It 
is difficult, although possible I hope, to make a convincing argument that a person 
may intentionally performs acts which damage his own interests.  However, given 
a broad enough definition of self-interest, it is possible to argue that every act is 
motivated by self-interest--a point to which I will need to return to in later chapters.  
The generality of the theory has one major drawback, namely, it faces the charge of 
emptiness as a guide to behavior in that it allows too much.  In order to be of - 33 -   
 
 
practical use as a modeling tool its scope needs to be restricted.  I will now discuss 
some  subtleties  to  the  definition  of  self-interest  in  order  to  emphasize  specific 





An  instrumental  egoist  differs  from  the  pure  egoist  in  that  he  is  capable  of 
considering and incorporating the expected effects of his actions on the happiness 
of other people.  He is no longer so exclusively focused on his own aims that he 
ignores  the  desires  of  others.    Although  the  instrumental  egoist  is  no  longer 
psychologically isolated, his consideration for the happiness of others extends only 
to the degree to which it impacts his own aims, say happiness.  Just as with the 
pure egoist, the focus of the instrumentalist is still on his own happiness, but he 
differs from the pure egoist in that he is able to use the happiness of others as a 
vehicle to achieve his own aims. Within instrumentalism egoism several types of 
behaviors can be contemplated including callousness, destructiveness and no-harm 
instrumentalism.  I will briefly discuss the first two types of instrumental egoism 
before turning to the more confusing case of the no-harm instrumental egoist. 
 
A  callous  instrumentalist  is  indifferent  as  to  the  impact  of  his  actions  on  the 
happiness  of  others;  he  doesn't,  for  instance,  care  whether  his  actions  have  a 
harmful,  beneficial  or  neutral  influence  on  others,  as  long  as  his  own  aim  of 
happiness is promoted.  For instance, taking some small act improves his own 
happiness he will do so, but not because the other person experiences happiness.  If 
the other person's unhappiness would make the callous instrumentalist happy and 
giving  conducting  some  act  would  achieve  that  aim,  then  the  callous 
instrumentalist would follow that path.  In a sense, he is the most general of the 
instrumentalists, anything goes as long as his happiness is increased.  The callous 
instrumental egoist's decision concerning an action is not directly dependent on the 
happiness or unhappiness of the other person as an end state; for instance, he would 
not perform an act for the other person (and improve that person's happiness) if 
doing so would reduce his own happiness by even a very small amount.  The 
difference between the callous instrumentalist egoist and the pure egoist is that the 
instrumentalist is now able to incorporate the happiness of the other person into his 
own decision making process, but that knowledge only makes a difference in his 
behavior via its impact on his own happiness.  For instance, he will be indifferent 
between a choice that improves or reduces the happiness of another person but - 34 -   
 
 
leaves  his  own  happiness  unchanged.    In  contrast,  given  the  same  choice,  the 
destructive  instrumentalist  will  intentionally  choose  the  option  that  reduces  the 
happiness of other person.  He is no longer indifferent in regards the impact of his 
actions on the happiness of the other person, in fact, the unhappiness of the other 
person or his being made less happy increases the instrumentalist’s happiness.  He 
looks for those opportunities that damage or reduce the happiness of others as a 
means to increase his own happiness.  The destructive instrumentalist will perform 
and act because he knows that the other person will be made unhappy or less happy 
which promotes his own happiness.  The important point for both the callous and 
destructive instrumentalist, and for that matter all instrumentalists, is that they see 
others  only  as  a  means  to  achieve  their  own  ends,  the  callous  instrumentalist 
doesn't care about the impact of his actions on the happiness of others beyond their 
impact  on  this  own  happiness  and  the  destructive  instrumentalist  will  seek  out 
opportunities to damage or reduce the happiness of others if it serves his needs. 
 
It  is  possible  to  imagine  some  disturbing  cases,  for  instance,  both  of  the 
instrumentalists mentioned above would be willing to cause immense damage to 
others as a means to achieve even a very small gain in happiness for themselves.  
They are both even more ethically abhorrent than the pure egoist because they are 
keenly aware of the effects of their actions on others, while the pure egoist is 
incapable of empathy given that his focus is assumed to be completely inwardly 
directed.  In effect, the pure egoist can’t be held accountable for actions he can’t 
help committing, while calculating instrumentalists can.  The difference is that the 
instrumentalist considers, for better of worse, the happiness of the other person 
while the pure egoist is by definition incapable of doing so.  Economists often 
appear to model agents as callous or even destructive instrumental egoists.  Agents 
attempt  to  maximize  their  happiness  even  if  it  comes  at  the  expense  of  the 
happiness of others and sometimes their happiness is promoted precisely because 
of a reduction in the happiness of others.  Economists, see for example the above 
prisoner's  dilemma  case,  generally  tend  to  shy  away  from  making  normative 
claims, by which I mean that they are not willing to take a stance on whether such 
instrumental behavior is unethical and/or repugnant.  As a consequence, they do 
not take a stance on whether it is ethically good, for instance, that a very small 
increase in the happiness for an agent is purchased at great cost in terms of the 
unhappiness of others.  To the extent that they purportedly (many economist, as I 
will show, often do in fact take a rather strong ethical stance by condoning self-
interest) ignore ethical issues, they are using an abstraction from real, observed, 
behavior in that people generally do use ethical reasons to condemn such callous - 35 -   
 
 
and destructive behaviors.  There may be good reasons for economists to model 
agent motives as instrumentalists, but those reasons need to be argued for. 
 
The case of the no-harm instrumental egoist is more subtle than the two cases 
discussed above, but understanding it is important to forming a proper conception 
of what it means to be an instrumentalist egoist.  The no-harm instrumental egoist 
specifically wants others to be happy, but only to the extent it serves to increase his 
own happiness.  He is no longer indifferent nor does he seek to reduce another 
person's happiness in order to achieve his aims.  In other words, the happiness of 
the other person is an aim for the no-harm instrumental egoist.  However, it is not 
an absolute aim as in the case of the altruist in that the no-harm instrumental egoist 
will  not  promote  the  happiness  of  the  other  person  if  it  means  that  his  own 
happiness is diminished.  The focus of the action remains squarely on the happiness 
of  the  no-harm  egoist,  but  the  assumption  in  this  case  is  that  the  no-harm 
instrumentalist has a reason to promote the happiness of the other person as a 
means to improve his own happiness and we can add the condition that he won't act 
if it means that the happiness of the other person is damaged.  This case differs 
from the case of the callous instrumentalist in that the no-harm instrumentalist is 
now  motivated  to  promote  the  happiness  of  the  other  person  rather  than  in 
promoting any state of the other person that will increase his own happiness.  In the 
previous two cases the instrumentalist could be happy because the other person was 
unhappy, while in the present case I am restricting the state under consideration to 
that in which it is the other person's happiness that adds to the instrumentalist's 
happiness.  Is such an act an act of self-interest on the part of the instrumentalist or 
something else?  I believe that this case also falls under the heading of self-interest 
because it is the instrumentalist's happiness which remains the focus of concern 
rather than the happiness of the other person.  The no-harm instrumentalist makes 
his  decision  to  forgo  a  benefit  because  he  is  concerned  primarily  for  his  own 
happiness;  the  point  of  reference  is  the  instrumentalist’s  own  happiness.    The 
happiness of the other person is important, but only as a vehicle to increase his own 
happiness.  This situation is in sharp contrasts with the case in which an agent 
wants the other person to be happy not as an instrument to fuel his own happiness, 
but because he simply wants the other person to be happy--a case to which I will 
soon turn. 
     
 
 




     
The situation becomes even more complicated in cases involving the sacrifice of 
interests.  In the case of the no-harm instrumentalist, the agent was not asked to 
sacrifice his own happiness for the benefit of the other person.  By definition, 
instrumentalists, no matter what sort they are, act only if they expect to improve 
their net happiness.  However, we know from experience that economic agents are 
accustomed to sacrificing short-term financial gains for long-term financial gains.  
Many other interests can be sacrificed for both personal reasons and for the benefit 
of  others.    An  obvious  example  of  the  first  case  is  the  sacrifice  of  immediate 
interests, generally defined, in return for greater expected interests in the future, 
assuming away the complication of finding an appropriate discount rate for future 
interests.  In the terms of happiness, we know that agents are willing to sacrifice 
short-term happiness for greater long-term expected happiness, although finding a 
precise measure of the resulting net sum of happiness is problematic.  Similarly, a 
no-harm instrumentalist may be willing to act to promote the happiness of someone 
else if it means that he expects to receive a greater amount of net happiness in the 
future. For purposes of the present discussion, the more interesting case involves 
the trade-off of interests that occurs among different people, a point I address in the 
next few paragraphs. 
 
Summarizing  some  of  the  cases  discussed  above  might  make  the  important 
differences easier to identify.  The callous instrumentalist is not concerned with the 
specific state of the other person, only that the state which is expected to improve 
his own happiness.  The destructive instrumentalist wants the other person to be 
unhappy because it will increase his own happiness.  The no-harm instrumentalist 
wants the other person to be happy only because his own happiness is thereby 
improved.  Complications discussed include cases in which trade-offs of interests 
occur and cases in which the happiness of others is seen as an end in itself and not 
a means to increase one's own happiness.  Taken together, these cases begin to 
demonstrate how broadly the term interest can be construed and why it is important 
to draw such distinctions between self-interest and non-self-interested motives and 
among different forms of self-interest.  Simply stated, most forms of self-interest 
do  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  promoting  the  happiness  of  others  either  for 
instrumental reasons or as ends in themselves.  Determining the focus of the act, 
whose interests are being served by an act, will be important to assessing whether 
an act is motivated by self-interest or something else. 
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Self-interest is as a  type of  rationality.    In  previous  discussions  I  have  set  the 
foundations upon which I can be more explicit about what I mean when I use the 
term self-interest.  In standard, everyday language, the term self-interest is used to 
describe a motive to act, a type of behavior, and an emotion, all of which are 
partially true.  However, I will follow Joseph Butler’s lead and take self-interest to 
be a general motive to act.  I will be more explicit about what I mean by general 
motive when I discuss Butler's: "Sermons on Human Nature", but for now I will 
say that self-interest should be understood as having an organizing function within 
human psychology.  By which I mean that it serves to align more basic motives, 
such as passions, appetites, desires, preferences and dispositions, with aims such 
as, for example, the aim to make one's life as happy or pleasurable or as excellent 
as  possible  .    In  this  sense,  the  definition  I  use  corresponds  well  with  Parfit’s 
(1984) claim that self-interest is a type of rationality.  I should stress that self-
interest is a way to align basic motives with aims; it asks if the set of motives a 
person has are the best set of motives he can have in order to achieve his specific 
aims. 
 
What does the previous discussion have to do with the case of open source?  In the 
introduction  I  provided  an  outline  of  some  of  the  motives  researchers  have 
attributed to open source contributors.  For instance, Hars and Ou (2001) interpret 
internal  motivation  to  mean  that  open  source  participants  are  "selfless".    They 
claim that advocates of this position mean that open source programmers are not 
motivated by monetary incentives but by their own hobbies and preferences or that 
they receive rewards from increasing the welfare of others.  However, now armed 
with the distinctions I have drawn above, it should be clear that the fact that open 
source  programmers  may  receive  non-monetary  rewards  or  rewards  from 
increasing the welfare of others in no way shows that they are non-self-interested.  
Claiming that someone is motivated by internal motivation says, by itself, little 
about whether that motivation is self-interested or not.  The brief outline of the 
types of self-interest and the range of behaviors that that motive can entail should 
serve as a warning to those attempting to categorize the behavior of open source 
programmers and other economic actors.  I will argue in the final chapter that Hars 
and Ou’s (2001) attempt to categorize the motives of open source programmers 
along external and internal lines and attempts by the other authors mentioned to 
distinguish between self-interest and non-self-interested behavior are largely over-
simplifications  based  on  misunderstandings  about  what  self-interest  implies  for 
behavior.   - 38 -   
 
 








In the previous chapter I showed the range of behaviors that can fall under the 
heading of self-interest.  However, if self-interest is assumed to be the exclusive 
motivational driving force, as many economists and others assume, then it becomes 
difficult to account for many commonly observed phenomena.  In order to find the 
limits of self-interest it might therefore be helpful to examine which actions an 
exclusive  dependence  on  that  motive  would  exclude.    In  other  words,  if  self-
interest is taken to be the only motive, which other motives are denied and what 
sorts  of  behavior  become  unintelligible?    I  will  first  discuss  some  relevant 
alternatives to self-interest before presenting a few practical examples that may call 
into  question  an  exclusive  reliance  on  self-interest  as  an  explanation  of  many 
everyday behaviors.  The alternatives are practically relevant in that they have been 
mentioned as motives for open source contributors and theoretically relevant in that 
they will help me to set the parameters of my proposed framework. 
 
There are many reasons why people may not act in their own interest, but given my 
research question I will limit my discussion mainly to what are known as particular 
affections, duties, and special obligations as examined by Samuel Scheffler (1997).  
I will then discuss whether the motive of altruism is as 'natural' a motive as self-
interest as discussed by Thomas Nagel (1986). I will have much more to say about 
particular affections when I discuss Joseph Butler; for the present, I will mention 
that  particular  affections  can  be  thought  of  as  certain  types  of  passions  and 
appetites that can be directed towards objects that favor or, more importantly for 
purposes of the current discussion, harm private or social interests.  It is important 
to  keep  in  mind  that  certain  motives  can  damage  as  well  as  aid  our  interests.  
Butler's insight was to argue that such motives at times drive or push people to 




     
I find everyday examples the most compelling, and the instance of overeating is 
something many people in richer countries face or will face at some point in their 
lives, but overeating is only one of many possible cases of weakness of will; feel - 40 -   
 
 
free  to  choose  an  example  that  you  find  most  convincing.    People  often  feel 
compelled to eat even when they know that it is not in their interest to do so.  For 
example, if someone is overweight, it is not a good idea to eat a big bag of chips or 
cookies in one sitting, people know it is unhealthy to do so, yet they do it anyway.  
In terms of desires, it can be said that they desire, at that instant, to eat the chips 
more than they desire to maintain a healthy lifestyle or in terms of preferences, 
they prefer to eat the chips, at that instant, more than they prefer the aim of a 
healthy lifestyle.  The assumption that people know that the act is unhealthy is 
important and critical to the argument.  There is an internal conflict that takes place 
at such moments, upon reflection people know (perhaps even at the moment that 
they are eating the chips) that it is not in their best interest to eat chips and damage 
their health, but they do it anyway.  Perhaps it is only a matter of separating the 
impacts of short-term versus long-term desires and preferences, but in any case, 
such examples then make it difficult to conclude that people always act in their best 
interest when they knowingly act against it.  Again, I will have much more to say 
about these types of cases in later chapters particularly as it relates to the decision 
to use an open source license, the important point is that a theory of motivation 
should account for such behavior.   
 
The motive of revenge raises similar issues, but the period over which the motive 
extends can be much longer than in the case of overeating or other urges and so 
may therefore be more convincing.  Leaving aside ethical issues, interests can be 
negatively  or  positively  served  by  the  desire  for  revenge  (Diamond,  2008).  
Although revenge can act as a sort of energy pushing people to do greater things to 
overcome or to 'get-back' at the object at which their revenge is directed, the focus 
here is on those cases in which revenge leads someone to a destructive fixation on 
the object inciting their revenge.  The motive of revenge can last an instant or a 
lifetime; those that last an instant can be very destructive for all parties concerned.  
However, revenge can also last a very long time; the lives that revengeful people 
lead may in great part be formed by the real or presumed slights they have suffered.  
The sometimes long duration of revenge means that reflective people have the time 
to consider the source of their motives.  They may know, just like the overeater, 
that  such  motives  are  destructive  and  counter-productive,  but  they  cannot  help 
themselves.  Once again, although revenge can lead to good outcomes, it can also 
lead to destructive behavior for both the person experiencing such desires and the 
persons to whom those desires are directed; desires that to an objective observer 
may appear out of all proportion to the original damage suffered.  Similarly, pity or 
sympathy  can  be  of  social  benefit  by  providing  comfort,  but  excessive  or - 41 -   
 
 
misdirected pity can be personally or socially damaging.  For instance, excessive 
pity can lead to self-neglect, while misdirected pity can mean that other equally or 
more deserving causes suffer. 
 
To  conclude,  particular  affections,  whether  for  food  or  revenge  or  pity  or 
something else, can damage what upon reflection the person himself and outside 
observers  know  to  be  in  a  person’s  real,  long-term  interests.    They  are  not 
necessarily urges or instincts to which people immediately, subconsciously, react, 
their  duration  can  last  a  lifetime.    An  advocate  of  the  purely  self-interested 
approach (e.g., an advocate of psychological egoism) would have the difficult task 
of bringing such motives under the umbrella of self-interest.  It has been suggested, 
although not thoroughly argued, that people contribute to open source projects as a 
mild type of revenge against proprietary software (Raymond, 1999).  We know, for 
instance, that a motivating factor for Linus Torvalds' decision to initially issue 
Linux free of charge was his disappointment at not being able to receive a UNIX 
type operating system for his desktop machine (Moody, 2001).  Whether revenge is 
a good reason to contribute to open source projects will addressed in the final 




Thomas Nagel mentions deontological reasons (duties and obligations) and special 
relationships as two categories that may give agents reasons to pursue goals other 
than their self-interest; I will very briefly discuss each of these in turn.  Duties have 
been mentioned as a motive to contribute to open source projects explicitly by 
Feller, et al. (2005) and Barbrook (1998, 2005) and implicitly by von Hippel and 
von Krogh (2003).  Many people take duties or obligations--whether they believe 
the  duties  are  derived  from  a  greater  being,  intuitions  or  rationality  (or  some 
combination thereof)--as fundamental, by which I mean that they are requirements 
that  precede  considerations  of  interest.    These  people  consider  duties  to  be 
intrinsically right or good and, by themselves, provide enough of a reason to act.  
For example, many people believe that telling lies is wrong and should be avoided; 
which is not to say that a person who believes that it is a duty to tell the truth will 
necessarily sacrifice everything or nearly everything to avoid telling a lie, it only 
says that the obligation gives a good reason by itself not to lie.  This point is 
perhaps easiest to see by comparing obligations to the case of an ethical egoist.  An 
ethical egoist might claim that it is wrong to tell a lie, but only in cases in which 
lying damages one's interests.  If lying damages a person’s interests, then the strict - 42 -   
 
 
ethical egoist will claim that it is not wrong to lie, while a person who believes that 
he has an obligation not to lie considers lying to be intrinsically wrong, whether it 
benefits or damages his interests.  Many other duties, including considerations of 
justice, good faith, and the necessity of treating people as ends rather than means, 
are considered to provide good reasons to restrain or even disregard self-interest.  
For  instance,  the  topic  of  justice  or  fairness  has  received  much  attention  from 
experimenters  in  economic  contexts  (see  e.g.,  Kahneman,  Knetsch  and  Thaler 
(1986a, b), Dawes and Thaler (1988)).  These experimenters have shown that a 
large minority of people appear to be willing to sacrifice their interests in support 




Some  relationships,  for  instance  those  involving  friends,  family,  citizenship  or 
trusteeship can be a source of duties that further restrain interests.  The issue at 
hand is more subtle than an economic obligation that results from some type of 
transaction.  Samuel Scheffler (1997) has captured the idea that I would like to 
convey  by  drawing  a  distinction  between  what  are  essentially  transactions  and 
those obligations that derive from the nature of the relationship itself.  In the first 
case we often feel that we have a special responsibility for certain groups of people 
because  of  shared  interaction  that  derive,  for  instance,  from  something  like 
receiving a gift or making a promise.  These are cases in which something was 
done by one of the two parties and that act is the source of a responsibility. The 
other obligation that Scheffler describes does not derive from a transaction, but 
from  the  relationship.    For  instance,  people  may  feel  that  they  have  special 
responsibilities  to  relatives,  friends,  neighbors,  or  even  co-workers  and  clients 
because  of  their  relation  to  those  people  or  groups.    It  may  be  the  case  that 
members of a collective never meet or interact with one another and yet still feel a 
mutual obligation.  For instance, people from the same country may feel a certain 
responsibility for the well-being of fellow citizens despite never having interacted 
or expecting to interact with them and perhaps sharing nothing else in common 
other than nationality.  I need to stress that these feelings of responsibility do not 
come  about  because  anything  was  done  to  incur  them;  nothing  was  given  or 
received  with  the  implicit  or  explicit  intention  of  getting  anything  in  return.  
Rather, such responsibilities often arise because one stands in a certain relationship 
to another person.  These duties may be very strong despite their involuntary nature 
as, for instance, in the case of the responsibility that many family members feel for 
the  well-being  of  relatives  even  in  those  cases  where  they  didn't  choose to  be - 43 -   
 
 
related.  As noted, in regards to open source, several authors have argued that 
membership  in  open  source  communities  may  create  a  duty  or  a  special 
relationship among members of the community.  If so, then Scheffler may argue 




Human  beings  are  by  nature  self-interested,  but  whether  all  human  activity  is 
motivated solely by self-interest has been a matter of debate for thousands of years 
and acceptance of the positions I outlined above would seem to raise some doubts 
about whether self-interest is an exclusive motive of behavior.  I now turn to the 
specific question of whether altruism is as natural an explanation of human activity 
as  self-interest.    My  point  is  to  show  that  altruism  or  other  non-self-interested 
motives  are  not  necessarily  any  less  rational  than  self-interest  as  has  been 
suggested by some researchers working on the topic of open source (van Wendel 
de Joode, 2005).  Accepting the theory of natural selection would seem to imply an 
acceptance, to some extent, that humans are hardwired to be self-interested in the 
sense that, at a minimum, they are in normal circumstances compelled to avoid 
injury, disease and death, and they actively seek to promote their own well-being 
through such activities as seeking food and shelter.  There are extreme cases that 
provide  exceptions to  these  rules,  but  they  are  rare  and  can  be  thought  of  the 
exceptions that 'prove' the general rule of self-interest.  However, does natural self-
interest necessarily exclude a natural form of altruism?  The question is whether 
altruism, like self-interest, can be shown to be an inherent part of our reasons for 
acting.  Where by altruism, following Nagel (1970, p. 79), I do not mean abject 
self-sacrifice, but a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of others 
without the need of ulterior motives and the possibility that one's own interests may 
be severely damaged. 
 
I  will  briefly  discuss two  approaches  that  ask  whether  altruism  is  as  natural  a 
motive  as  self-interest.    These  two  approaches,  one  empirical  and  the  other 
philosophical, capture the gist of their respective general categories (see Searle 
2001 or Kavka 1986 for other approaches).  I do not claim to solve the complex 
issues within these respective debates, my modest goal is to show that there may be 
a place for real altruistic behavior. 
 
The  first  approach  discuses  the  possibility  of  altruism  from  the  perspective  of 
socio-biology  (e.g.  Dawkins,  1989).    Defenders  of  the  position  known  as - 44 -   
 
 
behavioral  egoism  claim  that  truly  altruistic  acts  do  not  exist,  although 
instrumental, pseudo-altruistic acts may (Kavka 1986).  The theory predicts the 
elimination over time of genes that give rise to actions that sacrifice an organism's 
ability to pass on its own genes (Kavka 1986, p. 56).  Therefore, according to this 
theory, altruistic acts that expend energy and resources for the benefit of other 
organisms will gradually be eliminated to the degree that they reduce the altruistic 
organism's  viability.    The  validity  of  behavioral  egoism  has  been  called  into 
question on at least three accounts, the first is through the observation of animals 
and the second is its founding on a narrow form of genetic determinism.  Contrary 
to what the theory of behavioral egoism claims, many animals appear to engage is 
altruistic  acts,  e.g.,  they  share  hard-won  food  and  defend  co-species  by,  for 
example,  uttering  warning  calls  that  focus  a  predator's  attention  on  themselves 
(Kavka 1986, p. 57).  If true, then even creatures whose behavior is more tightly 
linked to instincts derived from their genetic make-up than that of humans would 
seem to have the capacity to perform altruistic acts.  More troubling for this theory 
is its narrowly defined genetic determinism.  Behavioral egoism rests on the claim 
that actions are determined by genes; a claim that at some level is obviously true. 
Absent superhuman intervention, all of our actions are genetically determined in 
that we operate within the limits of our genetically determined physical capacities--
our brains etc., are created from genetic blueprints. However, our genes have given 
us more than the ability to react in a purely instinctual manner, many believe that 
we  have  the  ability  to  reflect  and  change  our  behavior  within  limits.    As  a 
consequence,  our  genetic  code  may  allow  us  the  ability  to  choose  to  act 
altruistically.  The conclusion from Kavka's (1986) literature review indicates that 
altruism is not necessarily eliminated from the gene pool.  He provides evidence 
that seems to indicate that there is evolutionary space for at least some members of 
a group to be altruistic some of the time.  A third issue with this theory concerns its 
applicability to modern human life.  Although an exclusive reliance on self-interest 
may accurately describe existence on the Malthusian edge between life and death, 
modern  people  living  in  wealthy  nations  can  be  altruistic  without  necessarily 
endangering their ability to pass on their genetic material.  The degree to which one 
needs to sacrifice in order to be considered altruistic is a topic to which I will 
return.   
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Thomas Nagel's Possibility of Altruism 
 
The second approach that I discuss is based on Thomas Nagel's (1970) argument 
that altruism can provide a reason to act.  Nagel's argument is complex and I will 
only be able to sketch it here.  Nagel draws an analogy between prudential (self-
interested)  reasons  and  altruistic  reasons.  He  summarizes  his  approach  in  the 
following, "I will argue that our own future interests provide us, by themselves, 
with reasons for present action to secure them, and that motivation of this sort 
cannot and need not be explained by intermediate present desires, or any other 
intermediate motive" (Nagel, 1970: 16).  As I understand it, Nagel is arguing that 
we are able to place ourselves into our future selves because we are the same 
person through time; we are in a sense timeless.  The argument follows, "... that 
prudence is  not  fundamental, but  derives  from  the  requirement that  reasons be 
timelessly  formulable,  so  it  will  turn  out  that  altruism  is  not  fundamental,  but 
derives from something more general: a formal principle which can be specified 
without  mentioning  the  interests  of  others  at  all"  (Nagel,  1970,  87-88).    His 
argument is that just as we have no difficulties acting prudentially because what 
makes  us  what  we  are  is  timeless,  we  can  act  altruistically  because  of  the 
realization that we are one among many.  It is this recognition that provides a 
structural  reason  to  act  in  the  interests  of  others.    Searle  (2001),  I  believe 
accurately,  expresses  doubts  about  the  applicability  of  the  analogy  between 
prudence  and  altruism.    There  is  clearly  a  significant  difference  between  the 
prudential case, in which a person sees himself as timeless, and the altruistic case, 
in which he must see himself as one among many.  However, rejecting the analogy 
does not imply rejecting the rest of Nagel's argument.  The ability to, in a sense, 
disengage ourselves from time, may as well imply an ability to imagine the desires 
of others as providing sufficient reasons to act.  Nagel's attempt is not perfect, there 
is  the  problem  that  his  argument,  for  instance,  rests  on  a  somewhat  awkward 
differentiation between motivated and unmotivated desires.  However, I will have 
to leave the argument here, and only suggest that although Nagel's approach is not 
the final word on this subject, it raises the possibility that altruism is as natural a 
motive as self-interest (Searle 2001; Dancy 2000). 
 
To  conclude  the  previous  theoretical  sections,  there  appear  to  be  reasons  that 
people act in contrast to what they know to be in their self-interest, whether it is via 
particular  affections  or  beliefs  in  certain  duties  or  obligations  that  they  have 
towards other people.  In addition, there are also ongoing debates in genetics and - 46 -   
 
 
philosophy that leave open the possibility that people may be as naturally inclined 




The previous review of the motives of open source contributors raised two relevant 
issues in regards to altruism, namely, what is altruism and is it rational. Keeping in 
mind Popper's (1985) and Ozinga's (1999) respective warnings as to the limited 
value of defining terms in general and definitions of altruism in particular, I will 
develop a working definition of altruism that can be used as a guide to whether 
altruistic acts can be distinguished from other sorts of acts.
2  This will allow me to 
ask whether open source contributors are altruistic.  If it turns out they are, then 
perhaps altruism can be stimulated or facilitated or at least not hindered in playing 
a role in other economic processes.  If what is called altruism is in fact self-interest 
or pseudo-altruism, then the antagonism existing between motivating self-interest 
and  altruism  behaviors  can  be  ignored  (Frey,  1997).    Altruism  is  sometimes 
represented as an irrational alternative to self-interest, (van Wendel de Joode, 2005; 
discussion in Weber 2004). I will therefore also need to ask whether altruism is 
irrational in the sense of being a self-defeating theory. 
 
What is altruism?  I suggest that a good working definition of altruism is that it 
gives  to  each  person  the  aim  of  achieving  those  outcomes  that  will  bring  the 
greatest  expected  benefits  to  others  over  time.    A  distinction  has  to  be  made 
between  living  an  altruistic  life,  and  performing  an  altruistic  act.    A  person 
attempting to live an altruistic life will be charged with finding a balance in his 
intentions, a sort of weighing of intentions that together, over his lifetime, leads to 
the intention to perform a set of actions the provide the greatest expected benefit to 
others.  The intention of an altruist is to benefit others, whereas the intention of a 
self-interested person is to benefit themselves. In contrast, an altruistic act is simply 
an  isolated  action  performed  with  the  intention  of  helping  others.    I  will  be 
primarily concerned with understanding acts of altruism, but I will also discuss the 
                                                 
2 David Collard (1978) defines self-interest as the case in which the marginal weight that a 
person attaches to the welfare of others is less than that which he attaches to his own 
welfare. Collard's approach to building economic models of altruism is quite interesting, 
but it is in a sense one step beyond mine in that he is interested mainly in preferences and 
utility functions, while I am interest in what stands behind preferences.  Many of the 
articles in Mansbridge (1990) begin from a similar position. 
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more general case of living an altruistic life because it is often used as a scapegoat 
in the economic literature.  Altruism is by definition irrational if the self-interest 
theory  is  accepted,  however  it  might  also  be  argued  that  altruism  is  irrational 
because it is self-defeating by which I mean that it fails by its own terms.  This 
argument goes that by believing and acting  to provide the most benefit to others 
the altruist deprives himself to such an extent as to be unable to perform altruistic 
acts in the future.  For instance, an altruist living in the West sees the relative 
poverty  in  Africa  and  concludes  that  he  should  immediately  give  away  his 
resources to the point at which the marginal value of a dollar he faces is equal to 
the marginal value of a dollar for the recipients of his charity.  In this case, the 
actions  of  the  Westerner  might  be  self-defeating  in  that  he  damages  his  own 
interests to such an extent as to be unable to perform beneficial acts in the future.  
The actions of a self-defeating altruist, like the instant hedonist, are untenable over 
time.    A  person  who  is  always  willing  in  all  situations  to  sacrifice  his  own 
preferences and desires for the benefit of others will quickly exhaust his ability to 
help  himself  and,  as  a  direct  consequence,  others.    Instant  hedonism  and  self-
destructive altruism both fail because of their short-sightedness.  It is interesting to 
note that the actions of a self-defeating altruist, in contrast to the instant hedonist, 
are sometimes valued by society.
3  For example, a person willing to significantly 
sacrifice his own interests for a worthwhile cause, even at severe cost to himself, is 
often celebrated by society. 
 
Although the argument that altruism is self-defeating works against the sort of self-
destructive  altruism  outlined  above,  it  fails  to  work  against  altruism  as  I  have 
initially defined it.  The theory of altruism which I propose proposes that an altruist 
needs to look at the benefits he can provide over time.  If giving away all of his 
resources in a rash act of supreme sacrifice leads to the altruist's ruin then perhaps 
that act isn't the way to provide the most benefits over time and, as a consequence, 
not as heroic as it might first appear.  An altruistic act, like a self-interested act, has 
to be seen as one act within a set of actions over time.  This doesn't exclude the 
possibility  that  there  might  be  circumstances  when  a  great  sacrifice  is 
recommended (altruism must be voluntary), but those are the exceptional cases.  In 
                                                 
3 Although some individuals want to be known as altruists, that isn’t generally an 
acceptable role for publicly traded firms.  The role of for-profit firms is to maximize profits, 
a role that is in some cases legally enforceable.  The question of why we don't expect or 
want firms to behave altruistically is interesting, but one that I won't address.  My interest is 
in how the interests of individuals, not firms, should be modeled. 
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terms of open source and altruism, whether the act of contributing to open source 
projects is altruistic will depend on whether the altruist intends and expects his 
contributions to benefit others over time. 
 
Can an altruistic act be useless or unwanted?  For instance, is making a piece of 
code freely available an altruistic act if the code has no expected value?  Casson 
and Giusta (2006) define altruism in terms of the obligations that actors undertake.  
While  defining  an  altruistic  obligation  they  write:  "An  altruist  wishes  to  help 
another person whether or not that person's expectations have been disappointed, 
and whether or not they have a specific need for care."  This understanding of an 
altruistic obligation raises a general issue that will appear again when I discuss the 
work of Jensen and Meckling (1994) and Jensen (1994).  The definition doesn't 
mesh with altruistic theory, to be an altruistic act the intention of the action has to 
be of benefit others.  Helping those that do not need help should not count as an 
altruistic act.  However, if the code might be of use to someone in the future, and 
the contributor makes the code available for that reason, then the act is motivated 
by altruism.  Not everyone has to benefit from the act, but the intention is that 
someone will.  Although attempting to live an altruistic life implies that the lifetime 
set of outcomes should be directed at achieving the greatest benefit for others, an 
altruistic act doesn't require that the act is the most altruistic act available at a 
moment.  Given the choice between two action, an altruist isn't required to perform 
the act yielding the greater benefit, just a person acting for self-interested reasons 
isn’t required to perform the actions that is the most self-interested in order to be 
considered  self-interested.    As  with  any  approach,  one's  expectations  and 
calculations concerning an action might be wrong, but if an altruist intends that a 
certain act would provide benefit to another, all else equal, then the act should be 
performed. 
 
Does an altruistic act need to involve sacrifice on the part of the altruist?  Is an 
action altruistic only if it damages the actor in some way?  This is a common 
stipulation  in  many  definitions  of  altruism,  however,  an  altruistic  act  doesn't 
necessarily require a sacrifice on the part of the altruist.  The theory of altruism 
concerns the intention behind an action, whether the action involves a sacrifice is, I 
believe, largely irrelevant, given, as already discussed, that the altruist understands 
that he is charged with providing an amount of benefit to another.  If a person 
performs an act that is "costless" for the reason that he wants to provide benefits to 
others, then that act is altruistic.  Furthermore, it can be argued that all acts at some 
stage in their development or execution "cost" something, but what I have in mind - 49 -   
 
 
are  significant  costs  that  damage  the  altruist's  interests.    All  activities,  even 
thinking or writing a check, cost something, that alone doesn't make the action self-
interested.  A wealthy benefactor in the luxurious position of having the marginal 
value of an additional dollar close to zero can still perform altruistic acts by giving 
money  away  to  those  who  need  it.    For  instance,  an  altruist  with  the  general 
intention of benefiting others makes valued software freely available to others, the 
fact that there are no additional costs whether ten people use the code or thousands 
makes  no  difference.    The  marginal  cost  is  zero,  but  the  benefits  may  be 
substantial. 
 
Likewise, altruistic acts do not exclude the possibility that costs can be incurred by 
the altruist as Weber (2004) argues.  I will discuss Weber's argument in greater 
detail  in  the  case  study  chapter,  but  he  seems  to  argue  that  because  there  are 
conflicts among open source programmers, they cannot be contributing to open 
source  projects  for  altruistic  motives.    Because  programmers  are  incurring 
psychological  costs,  the  argument  goes,  they  must  be  receiving  compensation 
which  Weber  equates  with  improved  reputations.    The  theory  of  altruism  as  I 
understand it, does not exclude the possibility that altruistic acts cost something, in 
practice they frequently do.  Nor does an altruistic act need to be anonymous as 
Weber  implies,  it  only  depends  on  the  intent  of the  actor.    It  is  too  easy,  but 
common, to conclude that because a person receives some form of payment, an 
action cannot be altruistically motivated.  Clearly, it makes it more difficult to 
convince a skeptic that a compensated act was conducted for altruistic reasons, but 
if the act was conducted for altruistic reasons, then compensation is a by-product, 
not a reason.  Therefore, altruistic acts can even be profitable for the altruist.  I see 
no theoretical reason to assume that acts that yield net benefits to an actor are 
necessarily self-interested; although I concede that such acts make it more difficult 
to practically, convincingly, invoke altruism as the key motivator. 
 
Although the theory of altruism neither requires nor excludes costs on the part of 
the altruist, it is common that definitions of altruism contain some provision for net 
losses on the part of the altruist.  This is because these definitions are assuming that 
a decision maker is facing a choice between an altruistic and self-interested act.  
The choice is made explicit in Gintis (2000, p.34): "By definition an altruist is an 
agent who takes actions that improve the fitness or material well-being of other 
agents  when  more  self-interested  actions  are  available."    Given  that  choice,  a 
person who chooses the altruistic act is, by definition, sacrificing personal interests 
for the benefit others.  The situation Gintis draws is relevant in the case of open - 50 -   
 
 
source  and  most  practical  decisions.    However,  there  are  various  important 
distinctions which need to be draw between types of practical altruism, in other 
words, those situations in which a person is facing a choice between performing an 
altruistic act and a self-interested act. 
 
Many  practical  cases  of  altruism  involve  an  intentional  sacrifice  of  one's  own 
interest for the expected benefit of others.  The practical altruist doesn't act as a 
self-defeating altruist because there are limits to his willingness to sacrifice his 
own, for instance, happiness for the happiness of others.  I will leave open the types 
of trade-offs that the practical altruist is willing to make and only mention that 
there is probably some sort of nonlinear relationship at work.  For instance, an 
altruist is probably more willing to make small sacrifices to his own happiness if it 
means very large increases in the happiness of others and much less willing to 
make large sacrifices to his own happiness no matter what the gains are to others.  
The  issue  of  trade-offs  aside,  there  are  degrees  of  practical  altruism  that  are 
important to distinguish.  The first involves a reduction in the altruist's level of 
happiness,  while  the  second  concerns  the  case  in  which  the  altruist  becomes 
unhappy.  I call the first qualified altruism and the second unqualified altruism. 
 
It is not difficult to imagine cases in which an actor cares for the happiness of 
another person, we do it all of the time, the question is why an agent cares about 
the other's interests, in other words, what is the focus of the action.  Imagine two 
players trying to divide the contents of a fruit bowl.
4  The focus of the decision is 
on finding a method of sharing the fruit involving the influence of the altruist's 
actions on the happiness of the other person.  Say, for instance, that the altruist 
marginally prefers an apple in the bowl to the banana, orange and pear that are 
there, but he also knows that the other person strongly prefers the apple; ignore for 
the present the complication of effects of the happiness of the other person on the 
agent's  own  happiness.    In  such  circumstances,  the  agent  might  be  willing  to 
sacrifice his own preference for the apple for the less desirable banana because he 
knows that the act will improve the happiness of the other person.  In fact, as long 
as his own expected net happiness remains positive he might be willing to take the 
pear which he least desires as long as it will still give him some happiness.  The 
focus of his actions is split between his own happiness and the happiness of the 
                                                 
4 See Amartya K. Sen's article, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations 
of Economic Theory" for the fruit bowl example that inspired my own. 
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other person.  While he is still focused in part on his own interests (he will, after 
all, not act unless he expects his happiness to remain positive), he now considers 
the happiness of the other as well as an end in itself.  He is willing to accept a 
lower amount of happiness if it means the other person experiences an increase in 
happiness.  I think that this act can best be described as qualified altruism because 
the agent is willing to suffer a net-loss in happiness as long as his overall happiness 
remains positive and happiness of the other person improves. However, at the point 
at which a person is willing to reduce his net happiness for the benefit of another, I 
propose that we move to a different sort of altruism.  For instance, if an agent is 
willing  to  promote  the  expected  happiness  of  someone  else  while  suffering 
unhappiness, then he is, by many definitions, an unqualified altruist, if not yet the 
sacrificial altruist described above.  An unqualified altruistic agent gives the other 
person the apple even if it means that he has to eat the pear which he detests.  I 
would add the stipulation that the actor must intend, his reason for performing the 
act, is to benefit the other person. 
 
The next complication that I will examine is the case in which the happiness of an 
altruistic agent is influenced by the happiness of the other person.  This is a slight 
variation of the case of the no-harm instrumentalist which I will soon discuss and 
emphasizes the difficulty of identifying motives.  It might plausibly be argued that 
the altruist in the previous paragraph sacrifices the apple for the happiness of the 
other person and eats the pear because it makes him happy to know that the other 
person's happiness has increased.  It can be argued that the altruistic agent then 
experiences an increase in happiness despite having eaten a pear which he detests.  
If that is an accurate assessment, then even this apparently altruistic act might 
arguably be motivated by self-interest.  At this point the argument can become 
confused; the definition of interests is in danger of becoming over inclusive.  The 
above analysis fails to address an important aspect of the matter, which is why a 
person is made happier when someone else's happiness improves.  The agent might 
be pleased to see the other person's happiness improved because he cares for the 
other person, period.  It is not his own happiness that motivates the action, but the 
happiness of the other person.  I would call this an altruistic act; the focus is clearly 
on the other person.  However, an egoist might also want to improve the happiness 
of another person because of the feelings of happiness that he himself experiences, 
in which case the action is motivated by self-interest.  The focus in the first case is 
on the other person's happiness and is therefore altruistic, while the focus in the 
second case is on happiness that the egoist experiences which I would consequently 
label an act of self-interest.  The idea that people carefully calculate their expected - 52 -   
 
 
net interest may seem far-fetched; however, people daily perform rough estimates 
of  the  implications  of  their  actions  on  their  expected  interests.    The  ability  to 
correctly make important decisions depends on the ability to reflect upon the given 
options and arrive at a measure of their relative worth. Indeed, the relevance of the 
science  of  economics  depends  in large  part  on  people  exercising  such  abilities 
when making decisions.  People can be wrong about such calculations for a variety 
of reasons, but that is another matter. 
 
How  do  altruism  and  self-interest  differ?    It  is  often  difficult  in  practice,  and 
sometimes in theory, to distinguish between self-interested and altruistic acts.  The 
practical difficulties will be clear when I discuss the case study, here I will address 
some of the common theoretical understandings of altruism.  Elias L. Khalil (2004) 
provides  a  helpful  overview  of  how  altruism  has  commonly  been  used  in  the 
economic literature.  He divides the literature on economic altruism into egoistic, 
egocentric and alter-centric categories. 
 
Khalil  writes:  "The  egoistic  perspective,  best  expressed  in  the  work  of  Robert 
Axelrod (1984), maintains that altruistic assistance would be offered if one expects 
future benefit."  As Khalil (2004:100) explains, this view presupposes repeated 
games where beneficence is modeled as a non-myopic self-interested strategy to 
ensure future cooperation (e.g., Bergstrom and Stark, 1993, Kurz, 1978).  This type 
of altruism doesn't appear to differ from non-altruistic transactions. The conditions 
are  strong,  it  doesn't,  for  example,  explain  many  types  of  altruism  including 
anonymous gifts, and aid given to strangers one never expects to be see again.  It 
doesn't  explain  open  source  either--where  users  are  under  no  obligation  to 
reciprocate  if  they  only  want  to  use  the  code  for  private  consumption.    The 
"egocentric" view, according to Khalil, is associated with Gary Becker (1976), who 
argues that the donor's utility function includes the utility of potential recipients.  
That is, "the donor would give if the enjoyment of watching the pleasure of others 
exceeds his satisfaction of consuming said community."  The action, as its name 
implies,  is  not  motivated  by  altruism,  the  focus  of  the  action  is  on  the  actor's 
happiness; the reason the action is performed is to increase the actor's happiness.  
Finally,  Khalil  writes:  "The  "alter-centric"  approach  can  be  surmised  from  the 
works of Robert Frank and Herbert Simon.  It views the benefactor's actions as 
stemming  from  a  personality  trait  that  arises  from  artificial  selection.    Actions 
performed for alter-centric reason may not be altruistic acts because the intentions 
of the agent are unclear.  Is the actor free to make the altruistic choice or are his - 53 -   
 
 
action genetically determine like a bee's relationship to the hive?  Altruism requires 
free will while alter-centrism appears to take that trait away. 
 
Khalil's  nomenclature,  particularly  his  term  alter-centrism,  points  out  the 
importance  of  distinguishing  between  real  and  pseudo-altruism,  those  actions 
which appear to be altruistic but are not.  There are generally thought to be two 
types of pseudo-altruism.  The first, called hard-core or hard-wired altruism, is 
defined as altruism on behalf of kin (Wilson, 1975).  For instance, an individual 
may be genetically programmed to behave 'altruistically' toward his relatives in 
order to promote the continuation and dissemination of his own genes--bees, ants 
and termites being obvious examples.  This is a Darwinian approach that has been 
shown to predict certain human behavior (Trivers, 1974), and has had some success 
in explaining the extent to which certain insect cooperation is correlated to the 
degree  of  their  biological  relatedness  (Wilson,  1975).    These  cases  appear  to 
provide evidence for a sort of programmed, determined, drive to pass on one's 
genes.  They are pseudo-altruistic acts because although they appear to be altruistic 
they are, in fact, conducted to promote one's own genetic interests.  This approach 
is also controversial; many of us would like to feel that we have the free will to 
overcome natural programming, while the degree to which we are free to do so is 
precisely  the  debate.    A  second  form  of  pseudo-altruism  is  called  reciprocal 
egoism, it is exemplified by organisms that only cooperate with one another, for 
example in hunting together, sharing food, and grooming, because these acts serve 
their  own  self-interested  needs.    Such  acts  can  be  seen  as  beneficial  acts  that 
generally  'pay'  for  previously  received  benefits  or  'prepay'  for  future  expected 
benefits. This is clearly a type of instrumental altruism rather than a form of real 
altruism.  It is important to realize that not all behaviors that appear to be altruistic 
are indeed altruistic, but the fact that some behaviors are pseudo-altruistic does not 
detract from the observation that real altruism is possible even if it is not hard-




At this point, in terms of the overall purpose of my manuscript, it may appear as 
though I have painted myself into a corner.  I have expended quite some effort in 
the last paragraphs arguing that it is difficult, at times even for the agent himself, to 
identify the motivation or intentions behind actions.  This might be interpreted by 
an  advocate  of  self-interest,  say  a  psychological  egoist,  as  confirming  their 
position, and an indication that all acts are indeed at their core motivated by self-- 54 -   
 
 
interested.  However, this would be a misinterpretation, all motives, whether self-
interested or otherwise, face the same difficulties in regards to interpretation.  The 
general  historical  and  modern  acceptance  of  self-interest  as  the  default  motive 
means that a lack of conclusive evidence that other motives are at work is often 
interpreted as support for the belief that self-interest is the only or predominant 
motive.  As previously mentioned, Becker's (1976) recommends precisely such an 
arbitrary approach.  However, there are both extraordinary and mundane examples 
that might cause even a psychological egoist to pause and perhaps reconsider his 
position. 
 
The task at hand is not easy; even an extreme example, such as a soldier sacrificing 
himself for his comrades by diving on a hand-grenade can be construed as a self-
interested act.  The self-interest in the grenade example is sometimes explained by 
speculating that the soldier decides to sacrifice himself because if he chooses not to 
the guilt of knowing that he could have saved his buddies and did not will haunt 
him for the rest of his life and cause him only misery.  The soldier is presumed to 
perform something like a net present value of pleasure calculation and decide that 
it is better to sacrifice his life.  His decision to sacrifice himself is then presumed to 
be one of self-interest because he wants to save himself a lifetime of guilt.  In 
addition,  the  type  of  calculations  involved  depends  on  the  options  being 
considered, large sacrifices, say for instance those that involve risking one's life, 
probably involve a different sort of calculus than day-to-day calculations of net 
self-interest.  These points of calculation aside, I find that reducing all explanations 
of heroic events to cases of self-interest unconvincing.  It is possible to explain 
such events using self-interest, but in such cases Occam's razor might be called 
upon to do its business of paring down the explanation to the more parsimonious 
explanation that the soldier or Mother Theresa or some other hero is acting from a 
concern for others and simply disregards his own well-being.   There is equally no 
doubt that such extreme forms of altruism are the exception to the more common 
mix of motives found within the average person. 
 
A  more  mundane  example  that  is  difficult  to  explain  under  the  rubric  of  self-
interest is the case of life insurance.  Why would a strictly self-interested person 
buy  life  insurance?    For  example,  it  could  be  argued  that  a  parent  buys  life 
insurance for his family because it gives him a good feeling while he is alive to 
know that his family will be provided for upon his death.  However, a purely self-
interested person should not care whether the policy pays out or not upon his death.  
Say for instance that the parent is only presumed to be dead and is in fact safe on a - 55 -   
 
 
deserted island.  Would he be disappointed upon returning to civilization to find 
out that he had bought a bogus policy and that his family has been financially 
suffering?  If he is purely self-interested he should not, because while on the island 
he had been under the false impression that the policy was valid and received the 
psychological benefits of so believing.  In other words, he should be indifferent to 
whether the policy was valid or not, as long as he believed it was valid when he 
was alive. The thought experiment is admittedly a stretch, but I believe that most 
would agree that policyholders really do want their families to benefit from the 
life-insurance policies they buy for their families even when they are not alive and 
therefore unable to receive pleasure when the funds are dispersed.  They do not buy 
insurance for their own, self-interested pleasure, but with the thought that their 
families will benefit from the policy after their death.  In a similar vein, we may 
care about the interests of others we only briefly meet and would be disappointed 
to later learn that their interests had not been met.  In general, we do not want to 
experience  pleasure  or  happiness  which  is  based  upon  false  beliefs  and,  more 
generally, many do care and are moved to act by events that do not have a direct 
impact upon their interests. 
 
Many  people  clearly  do  care  about  their  legacies  and  such  interests  cannot  be 
derived from purely self-interested motives.  For instance, it is difficult to imagine 
how self-interest can explain anonymous gift giving to charities through provisions 
in wills.  Anonymity is an important qualification to control for those cases when 
people give to an organization for the psychological benefits that they receive from 
knowing that others are aware of and appreciate their activities, e.g., receiving 
esteem because of their donations.  However, once again, it could be argued that 
anonymous donators give because giving makes them feel pleasure today, although 
the recipients will not receive the benefits of the donation until after their deaths.  
At this point in the argument we return to the original question posed which is, why 
do acts of generosity give actors pleasure?  Do people give because it makes them 
feel  good  and  it  is  in  their  interest  to  feel  happiness  or  because  it  makes  the 
beneficiaries  feel  pleasure  regardless  of the  feelings  of  the  benefactor?    Henry 
Sidgwick (1981: 51) wrote that "... men have sacrificed all the enjoyments of life, 
and even life itself, to obtain posthumous fame: not from the illusory belief that 
they would be somehow capable of deriving pleasure from it, but from a direct 
desire  of  the  future  admiration  of  others,  and  a  preference  of  it  to  their  own 
pleasure."  The key to Sidgwick's claim is in the desire for future admiration, when 
the  donator  is  no  longer  present  to  experience  admiration.      The  case  of  the 
anonymous donator presents an even stronger case.  Why, if a donator is concerned - 56 -   
 
 
with his own interests, does he make his donations anonymously? The advocate of 
self-interest would have to argue that the anonymity somehow increases the well-
being of the donator.  The more parsimonious answer is the one suggested by 
Sidgwick, they donate because they want to improve the lives of future generations 
and not because they expect to derive pleasure for themselves. 
 
Besides making a case for real altruistic behavior, another point of these examples 
is to show how difficult it can be for outsiders to interpret the underlying motives 
of an individual, and in some cases even the individual concerned may not be able 
to completely identify his own motives.  The crux of the problem is that observed 
behavior  does  not  always  reflect  motivation  and  there  may  be  cases  in  which 
people intentionally hide their true motives.  So, while we observe behavior, we 
cannot directly observe motivation and the same action can be motivated by many 
different motives.  One person may give to charity primarily because it makes him 
feel good regardless of the effect that the gift has on beneficiaries, while another 
gives because it makes the beneficiaries feel good.  Identifying the motives that 
prompt action is difficult, but that is true of all motives whether self-interested or 
otherwise. 
 
Although  there  are  no  guaranteed  methods  to  identify  motivation,  several 
indicators of motivation are available.  Good indicators of underlying motivation 
might include repeated actions by an agent that have predictable consequences, and 
actions that require obvious, substantial commitments on the part of an agent.  A 
proper understanding of self-interest requires a thorough investigation of the role it 
plays in human nature.  Ethicists have spent thousands of years investigating what 
it means to be self-interested and so provide the appropriate questions that need to 
be asked if a more comprehensive and coherent theory of economic self-interest is 




Although the question of whether people are motivated by self-interest alone would 
appear to be one that could be solved empirically, I have demonstrated that that 
method always leaves room for skeptics to interpret what would appear to be non-
self-interested  motives  as  self-interested.    The  brief  discussion  in  previous 
paragraphs should provide some evidence of the difficulty of assessing what I am 
calling the focus of an act--whose interests are being served by an act.  In short, 
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other  than  self-interest,  just  as  there  is  no  way  to  prove  that  a  person  is  only 
motivated by self-interest, the important point is that the same reservations hold for 
any  motive.    The  question  that  I  address  in  the  following  paragraphs  is  why 
motives  are  so  difficult  to  identify.    I  mention  several  reasons  including:  the 
problem of identifying the true focus of an act; uncertainty on the part of the agent 
over the source of his own motivation due to self-deceit; and, social pressures to be 
self-interested.    I  also  examine  the  related  question  of  when  an  act  should  be 
considered  altruistic  as  opposed  to  self-interested.    This  is  an  important  issue 
because  a  wide  enough  definition  of  self-interest  can,  incorrectly,  be  made  to 
incorporate altruistic acts.  Therefore, I will attempt to define when an act should 
be  considered  altruistic  and  the  problem  of  confusing  altruism  with  pseudo-
altruism.  Finally, I mention several potential challenges to a narrow interpretation 
of self-interest. 
 
Focus of an Action 
 
As shown in previous paragraphs, it can be difficult to identify the motives that 
stand behind observed behaviors because doing so requires identifying the 'true' 
focus  of  an act.    Suppose  that  we  observe  or  read about  an agent  who  makes 
anonymous  donations  to  a  charity.  The  first  inclination  might  be  to  call  this 
behavior altruistic, in fact, it might be an altruistic act according to all of the agents 
involved.  However, if the donator experiences a feeling of pleasure by the act of 
donating it might be argued that the act is motivated, at least partially, by self-
interest.    The  argument  is  that  because  the  donator  expected  to  receive  the 
psychological  'payoff'  of  happiness  then  the  act  is  motivated  by  self-interest.  
However, such reasoning does not get to the important question of why the donator 
expects to receive pleasure from his act.  For instance, the donator might argue that 
he experiences pleasure from the belief that he has improved the well-being of the 
beneficiaries and not from the pleasure that he receives from giving the gift. His 
argument is not that he does not experience pleasure, but that the source of that 
pleasure is the belief that he has helped others.  Perhaps another donator derives 
pleasure from making a donation because it gives him a feeling of superiority over 
those who benefit from his donation.  The results of the donations may be the 
same, but the focuses of the actions are very different.  In the first case the focus is 
primarily on the happiness of the recipients and is therefore an altruistic act, while 
the focus in the second act is on the happiness of the donator and is therefore 
motivated by self-interest.  Becker (1976), as we have seen, clearly supports the 
second  view.      When  researchers  report  that  people  experience  feelings  of - 58 -   
 
 
happiness when they give to charities we have to know why they feel the happiness 
they  are  experiencing.    Do  they  experience  pleasure  because  they  are  helping 
others or are their pleasurable feelings an end in themselves?    Recent evidence 
seems to indicate that three areas of the brain are involved in altruistic decisions: 
the part of the brain associated with rewards associated with sex, money, food and 
drugs; the part of brain associated with the bonding of mother and child; and, most 
importantly for present purposes, the part involving conflicts between self-interest 
and ethical beliefs (Moll et al., 2006).  This research would seem to suggest that 
there are a mixture of motives involved in the decision to perform an altruistic act, 
only some of which can be traced to self-interest. 
     
Agent Uncertainty and Self-Deceit and Community Standards 
 
Another difficulty with assigning motivation to a behavior is that the underlying 
reasons that induce feelings of happiness may be ambiguous, even to the person 
performing such acts.  For instance, suppose that a donator experiences a feeling of 
happiness  when  he  makes  his  contribution  because  his  parents  used  to  reward 
similar  types  of  behaviors  when  he  was  young  or  perhaps  he  believes  he  will 
receive a better after-life if he does good deeds in this one.  In the first case the 
donator is motivated to make a donation because of the earlier rewards he received, 
while  in  the  second  case  the  donator  expects  to  receive  a  positive  payoff  for 
eternity for the good deeds he performs in this world.  The second case is clearly 
one  of  self-interest,  but  I  include  it  in  order  to  emphasize  that  self-interested 
motives can have beneficial outcomes.  The first case is the more interesting one 
because a proper assessment of the case requires an understanding of the intentions 
of the agent.  Suppose that the person is unaware that he is responding to previous 
incentives, in that case his action may be described as altruistic because he does not 
know, and perhaps cannot be expected to know, that he is responding to deeply 
ingrained  experiences.    However,  if  he  is  aware  that  he  makes  donations  only 
because of his past training, rather than a present concerns for the well-being of 
recipients, then I think his gift giving is a case of self-interest because his actions 
are motivated by the previous pleasure he received from making his parents happy, 
so his motives are internally focused, rather than focused on the well-being of the 
recipients.  The argument revolves around the motivation of the donator, and the 
question is whether the focus is on his interests or on the interests of the recipient. 
 
Another type of ambiguity is self-induced.  Attempts to be truthful to others about 
our motives may be spoiled by self-deceit or living an unreflective life.  We are all - 59 -   
 
 
victims (and beneficiaries) of self-deceit, Adam Smith regarded it as an important 
source of human misery: "This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the 
source of half the disorders of human life.  If we saw ourselves in the light in which 
others see us, or in which they would see us if they knew all, a reformation would 
generally be unavoidable.  We could not otherwise endure the sight" (Smith 1976: 
III.4.6).    Presumably  Smith  believed  that if  people could see their  behavior  as 
others  do,  they  would  change  for  the  better.    On  balance,  I  believe  Smith's 
assessment is correct, although there are cases in which people underestimate the 
social benefit of their behavior.  People may unintentionally deceive themselves 
into believing that they are behaving altruistically when in fact they are being self-
interested--making the proper assessment of such acts by outside observers all the 
more difficult. 
 
People may also be influenced by how altruism and self-interest are perceived in 
their communities.  For instance, if altruists are considered naive or 'soft-touches' 
to be taken advantage of, then there may be good reason for an altruist to under-
report his altruistic tendencies.  If, on the other hand, self-interest or selfishness is 
portrayed as being "realistic" and a sign of a shrewd business mind, then there may 
be a tendency to over-emphasize and glorify the role of that motive.  Self-interest is 
often portrayed as a source of economic good.  It is not an exaggeration to claim 
that the most powerful message that many people take from popular economics is 
that individual self-interest leads to economic benefits for the group as a whole and 
is therefore good.  As I will show, Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith are often 
said,  wrongly  in the  case  of  Smith,  to  have  argued  that individual  self-interest 
always leads to benefits for the society as a whole. Clearly many self-interested 
acts  improve  the  well-being  of  others,  however,  many  do  not.    Actions  by 
individuals motivated by self-interest can lead to socially beneficial outcomes, but 
self-interest is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to achieve beneficial 
economic outcomes.  That it is not a necessary condition should be obvious, there 
is  nothing  to  prevent  altruistic  individuals  from  performing  altruistic  acts  that 
benefit  society.    That  self-interest  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  socially 
beneficial acts can be seen in practice by the number of regulations controlling 
such  behavior.    For  example,  even  well  functioning  stock  markets  are  closely 
regulated to prevent abuses of power and information, thereby limiting the ability 
of individuals with such power and information to maximize their interests. The 
point is that there may be reasons to distort, intentionally or not, one's motives of 
which community norms is an important example. 
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When is an act altruistic? 
 
I  begin  this  sub-section  with  quotes  by  Adam  Smith  and  Thomas  Reid.    First 
Smith, from his book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments: "The only consequences 
for which he can be answerable, or by which he can deserve either approbation or 
disapprobation of any kind, are those which were someway or other intended, or 
those which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in the intention 
of  the  heart,  from  which  he  acted.    To  the  intention  or  affection  of  the  heart, 
therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the 
design, all praise or blame, all approbation or disapprobation, of any kind, which 
can justly be bestowed upon any action, must ultimately belong" (Smith 1976: 93).  
I believe that Smith has correctly identified the main issue at hand when assessing 
the motives behind an act, namely, the need to examine the intentions of the agent 
rather than the outcomes.  Similarly, Reid writes: "Some figures of speech are so 
natural and so common in all languages, that we are led to think them literal and 
proper expressions. Thus an action is called brave, virtuous, generous; but it is 
evident, that valour, virtue, generosity, are the attributes of persons only, and not of 
actions. In the action considered abstractly, there is neither valour, nor virtue, nor 
generosity. The same action done from a different motive may deserve none of 
these epithets. The change in this case is not in the action, but in the agent; yet, in 
all languages, generosity and other moral properties are ascribed to actions. By a 
figure, we assign to the effect the quality which is inherent only in the cause (Reid, 
1969, p. 773)." 
 
  As a consequence, an act should not be considered altruistic if it is motivated by 
self-interest.  This is not to say that actions motivated by self-interest cannot have 
beneficial effects for others, clearly in the case of trade they can, but in those cases 
the  act  should  not  be  called  altruistic.    On  the  other  hand,  acts  motivated  by 
altruism can have negative effects in at least two situations, namely, altruism can 
lead to a reduction in the agent's interests (a condition not, I have argued, required 
for an act to be altruistic), but it can also have negative implications for the well-
being of others.  For instance, should altruistic acts towards an individual who, 
perhaps foreseeable by the altruist, then goes on to perform heinous crimes still be 
called altruistic despite their consequences?  The quote above by Smith clearly 
needs some subtle adjustment.  Whether actions motivated by altruism that lead to 
negative outcomes should be labeled altruistic depends in part on whether the agent 
could have reasonably foreseen the implication of his actions.   If the resulting 
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these actions can be properly classified as altruistic.  To take another example, an 
altruist should have a reasonable understanding of the impact of his actions on 
expected recipients.  For instance, an altruistic act directed solely at persons who 
are in no need of altruism or inappropriate assistance to those in need is, at least, a 
less altruistic act, and perhaps not altruistic at all.  The qualification of reasonable 
is critical and what is reasonable will depend on such factors as the amount of 
information available to make a decision and the importance of the decision to be 
made.  If negative or positive effects could have reasonably been foreseen, then 
although  the  agent's  intentions  may  have  been  altruistic,  the  execution  of  the 
intentions was misguided--the agent should and could have known better so his act 
is not altruistic.  We should not label reasonably avoidable ignorance as altruism. 
Space  considerations  prevent  me  from  presenting  a  thorough  discussion  of 
reasonableness, but I use the term as it used in common language. 
 
The answer to the question, "Can an act be altruistic even if it is not motivated by 
altruism?", is no.  An altruistic act requires an altruistic intention and the agent 
must be informed to a reasonable degree.  At a minimum, the psychological state of 
an agent must be right, we would not, for instance, generally want to call acts that 
accidentally have altruistic repercussions altruistic.  The psychological approach 
outlined above is not without problems; a person may be completely committed to 
performing  altruistic  acts  but  incompetent  in  executing  those  commitments.  
However,  that  is  not  a  problem  with  the  definition  of  altruism,  but  with  the 
competence of someone in carrying out their intention to perform an altruistic act.  
In short, I believe that altruistic acts are dependent on the psychology of the altruist 
rather than the outcome achieved.  Altruism should be evaluated subjectively, by 




To  remind  the  reader,  my  intention  in  this  manuscript  is  to  provide  a  better 
understanding of self-interest, not to pass judgment on whether self-interest is a 
good or bad motive, clearly it can have both good and bad economic implications.  
However, at a practical level, it is interesting to note how pseudo-altruism can lead 
to beneficial results, where by pseudo-altruism I mean self-interested acts that are 
understood to be altruistic acts.  Although we would not want to call everyone or 
every firm that gives to a charity an altruist, perhaps the psychological state of their 
benefactor does not matter to the beneficiaries.  It might be enough that actions 
motivated by self-interest have beneficial implications.  Imagine the case of a self-- 62 -   
 
 
interested person who gives money to a charity for his own benefit, say in terms of 
the good publicity he expects to receive from the donation, yet claims to be an 
altruist.  From the point of view of those who know or presume to know the real, 
self-interested  motives  behind  the  contributor's  behavior,  such  acts  will  appear 
crass.  Recall that a dedicated psychological egoist will always be able to find the 
"real" self-interested motive behind every act.  From the point of view of those who 
benefit from the donator's gifts, if they properly perceive the donator's real motives 
then they may feel slighted and used by the pseudo-altruist.  They may accept the 
gift, but the resentment caused by the feeling of being used may not soon dissipate.  
There may also be cases in which the beneficiary does not care about the motives 
of his benefactor, the gifts are needed and gladly accepted.  Pseudo-altruism can 
clearly provide many benefits and although someone who gives to a charity for the 
benefits that he receives might be less worthy of approbation than someone who 
gives for the sake of the beneficiary, the net benefit from such acts can be positive.  
In addition, pseudo-altruism, may, as a byproduct, lead to more pseudo-altruism.  
Assuming that firms value their reputation and altruism is seen to enhance that 
reputation, making a public promise to perform altruistic acts may give them an 
added  incentive  to  carry  out  those  deeds  or  otherwise  risk  damage  to  their 
reputation if they fail to do so.  Furthermore, if consumers reward such acts, then if 
one firm performs altruistic or pseudo-altruistic acts, it may force its competitors to 
do likewise.  Finally, Robert Frank (1988) reports that repeated pseudo-altruistic 
acts may produce beneficial side-effects for some.  Although he goes on to say that 
if it is possible to distinguish between genuine altruists and pseudo-altruists, the 
genuine  altruist  will  have  an  advantage  over  the  pseudo-altruists  because  true 
altruism is generally more highly valued than pseudo-altruism.  Frank is not the 
first to observe this phenomenon; it has long been suspected that acting in the 
interests  of  others,  for  whatever  reason,  may  eventually  lead  to  real  altruistic 
behavior (e.g. J.S. Mill and Thomas Hobbes). 
 
The Duration of an Act 
 
The period over which the effects of an action are measured can be important in 
determining its status as being motivated by self-interested or another motive.  For 
instance, it is possible that acts that are motivated by altruism can lead to longer-
term, self-interested, benefits for an individual performing such acts. This would 
appear to contradict the definition of altruism which I gave earlier, but I do not 
believe it does.  Once again, the intentions of the agent are the important factors for 
determining the status of an act.  For instance, a friend of mine decided to donate a - 63 -   
 
 
photo to a charity that was raising funds for people with heart problems.  I believe 
that her intentions were purely altruistic, however, before she could auction her 
photo she needed to get permission from her gallery to do so.  The gallery agreed 
on the condition that they receive a quarter rather than their normal half of the 
proceeds from the auction.  An unanticipated result of the auction, at least to my 
friend, was that her work became better-known and her sales increased.  Perhaps 
she should have been able to foresee that her act might raise sales, in which case 
the act would be classified as self-interested with beneficial implications, but she 
did not.  Altruism, in her case, led to greater long-term benefits for both her and her 
gallery.    While  I  would  classify  my  friend's  actions  as  altruistic  because  her 
intentions were altruistic, the intentions of the gallery are more difficult to assess.  I 
presume that the gallery's overall policy is to promote its own interests, however, 
the specific decision to accept a reduced percentage might have been an altruistic 
act, but without knowing the true intentions or perhaps precedents of similar acts of 
the individual or individuals making the decision to accept a lower commission it is 
nearly impossible to determine their motives.  Determining or estimating whether 
an  act  is  motivated  by  altruism  or  another  motive  requires  determining  the 
intentions behind an individual act, a part of which is a determination of the time-
frame over which the agent measured the expected net results of an action. 
 
One final note of clarification before I end this section, it is important to keep in 
mind that even if an act motivated by pseudo-altruism results in an equal amount of 
net benefit, there is still an important difference between self-interested and non-
self-interested actions.  Self-interest and altruism are two different motives that are 
best kept separate.  It does matter if we call an act altruistic, pseudo-altruistic or 
self-interested.  This can be observed in the case of the pseudo-altruist.  A pseudo-
altruist will only act altruistically if doing so is in his self-interest.  If the situation 
changes and acting altruistically is no longer in his interest, then he will simply 
revert to self-interested acts based on his self-interested motives.  This shifting of 
actions may be of importance to policy makers.  One final remark related to this 
discussion is that if everybody “knows” that people are motivated only by self-
interest, then there would be no benefit in pretending to be altruistic--people would 
see  right  through  the  deception.    A  pseudo-altruist  must  believe  that  there  are 
advantages  to  appearing  to  be  altruistic,  however,  what  is  the  source  of  those 
advantages?  I believe it is simply that people respect and admire altruists--it is 
something many people admire and aspire to be, it is more than just shadow-play.  
On the other hand, there is little to recommend egoistic, selfish, self-serving or 
greedy behavior, as those terms are commonly understood.  On occasion, there - 64 -   
 
 
have been popular and academic advocates celebrating something similar to what I 
call pure self-interest, but in general, it is an attribute with which people would 
rather not be labeled.  Even the famous business catch-phrase of the 1980s, ‘greed-
is-good’,  achieves  its  limited  appeal  because  it  contradicts  the  common 
understanding  that  greed  is  not  good.    Again,  self-interest  can  be  good  for  an 
individual and society, but it is not necessarily good and may be unethical or non-
ethical and damage both the agent and society in general. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The  argument  is  sometimes  made  that  self-interest  must  be  the  basic  motive 
because altruism leads to self-destruction, but, as I  have shown, this is a false 
dichotomy.  An extreme form of altruism would have an agent sacrificing his own 
interests for the benefit of others at all times and in all circumstances.  This would 
clearly  be  a  self-destructive  and  an  ultimately  self-defeating  sort  of  behavior 
because an agent who is constantly sacrificing his own interests for the interests of 
others, without attending to at least a minimum level of his own needs, would 
quickly exhaust his ability to help anyone including himself.  This position is a 
straw man; no philosopher that I know of defends this view.  A more defensible 
form of altruism would allow an agent to make small self-sacrifices that yield large 
benefits to others.  For instance, most people would find throwing a life-preserver 
to a stranger who has fallen into a cold stream a small sacrifice for a potentially 
large  benefit  to  the  stranger.    To  make  a  more  convincing  argument  that  the 
example is one of altruism, we would also have to assume that the rescuer has no 
expectations of receiving a reward (psychological or otherwise) greater than the 
costs of throwing in a life-preserver.  In other words, the potential rescuer cannot 
expect to receive a net gain in well-being from his act; he would have to expect a 
net decrease in his well-being for an expected net increase in the well-being of the 
victim.    Even  if  the  victim  experiences  a  net  loss  in  happiness,  say  the  life-
preserver unintentionally lands on the poor man's head and causes him to drown, I 
believe that we should call this an altruistic act because the would-be altruist's 
well-informed intentions were altruistic.  We would expect that the same potential 
rescuer might be less willing to jump in the same stream to rescue the stranger if it 
meant a major self-sacrifice, for instance, maybe the rescuer is an only marginally 
good swimmer or the water is dangerously cold.  In other words, as the net costs of 
an altruistic act increase we would expect to see less altruism.  In contrast, a purely 
self-interested person would not be able to make even a small sacrifice for a very 
large benefit to a recipient if it meant reducing his own estimated net pleasure by - 65 -   
 
 
even a trivial amount.  The narrowly self-interested person believes that he is under 
no additional obligation to help friends or relatives, let alone strangers.  Everyone 
is an instrument of equal standing to be used as a vehicle to benefit his chosen 
projects.  In fact, all egoists, not just purely self-interested persons, may believe 
that they have no obligations to others.  Egoists other than those that are purely 
self-interested  can  consider  the  interests  of  others  for  other  than  instrumental 
purposes, but they do not feel that they are under any obligation to do so. 
 
In the preceding sections I have tried to raise theoretical and practical objections to 
an exclusive reliance on the motive of self-interest.  Many of these objections can 
be overcome by simply expanding the scope of self-interest to include an ever 
greater set of reasons to act.  I will emphasize in later chapters that such a strategy 
obfuscates an important difference that should be maintained between the motives 
of  self-interest  and  altruism.    I  have  shown  that  self-interest  is  a  very  general 
motive, it can incorporate many behaviors including selfishness and benevolence.  
However, that generality has the drawback that self-interest can become an empty 
concept; it needs to be properly specified if it is to be of practical use.  In addition, 
I have argued that altruism is a rational concept and there is no good reason why 
contributors to open source projects couldn't be motivated by that motive.  Other 
motives that may play a contributing role are special relationships and duties, both 
of which have been suggested by researchers.  The problem of identifying the 
motives of open source contributors is always going to be an issue as it is whenever 
the aim is to identify intentions.  Fortunately, open source licenses provide a good 
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The previous chapter was concerned with identifying the theoretical boundaries of 
self-interest and altruism and some of the problems associated with identifying 
those boundaries in practice.  In a similar vein, this chapter examines two extreme 
theoretical  views  of  self-interest  found  in  the  economic  literature  and  then 
discusses two practical examples of how that general motive is used in important 
business-economic models.  The purpose of this chapter is to identify significant 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the use of the assumption of self-interest in both 
economic theory and practice. 
     
The chapter is divided into five sections.  In the first section I examine the general 
role that self-interest is assumed to have in economic analysis.  I then attempt to 
locate  the  economic  definition  of  self-interest  within  the  more  general 
understanding of that term as discussed in the previous chapter; it turns out that the 
economic  self-interest  as  typically  defined  by  economists,  is  more  accurately 
labeled  as  selfishness.    Surprisingly,  self-interest,  despite  its  popular  and 
sometimes professional popularity, is not the basic behavioral assumption of every 
important economic model.  In the second section I turn to the related issue of the 
purview of economics.  Self-interest and rationality are often considered to be the 
distinguishing characteristics of “the” economic approach.  The range of topics that 
are assumed to be the subject of economic analysis is ever-expanding and includes 
sociology, law and political science. It is therefore of increasing importance to get 
the assumption of self-interest right, and ask whether economic self-interest has 
any particular characteristics that distinguish it from non-economic motives.  In the 
third section I briefly examine two views of the purpose of behavioral assumptions 
in economic models, namely, are they supposed to reflect the real motives and 
behaviors of agents or do they serve a merely instrumental purpose?  This is clearly 
an important issue, if the assumption of self-interest is supposed to represent real 
behavior, as I believe it does, then it is possible to ask under which conditions it is 
an accurate assumption and when other assumptions might be more appropriate.  If, 
however, self-interest is meant to serve an instrumental purpose, then the issue of 
accuracy is less important and under some interpretations of instrumentalism the 
degree  to  which  an  assumption  reflects  reality  is  largely  irrelevant.    Having 
discussed these important theoretical concerns, in the fourth section I address the 
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economics and agency theory.  The advantages of using these models is twofold; 
first, they are two of the more influential models in current business-economic 
theory and practice; and, second, the principal developers of these models have 
taken explicit positions concerning their understanding of self-interest and its part 
in the decision making process of the agents whom they wish to model.  In the fifth 
and last chapter I draw some general conclusions. 
 
Section One: The First Principle of Economics? 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the role of self-interest in economic 
analysis.    I  briefly  examine  some  historical  and  recent  understandings  of  that 
motive  before  comparing  the  economic  definitions  to  the  more  general 
understandings of self-interest.  The main question that I address in this section is 
the degree to which self-interest is an integral part of economic theory.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, preference theory, the core theory of economics, makes no claims 
about the motives of individuals. 
 
Self-interest in Economics 
     
A reader of economic history can be forgiven for concluding that economics and 
self-interest are essentially interlinked.  No less than F.Y. Edgeworth claimed that 
the first principle of economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest 
(Edgeworth, 1881).  Milton L. Myers (1983: 26), in his book The Soul of Modern 
Economic Man, nicely summarizes the place that self-interest is often awarded in 
the understanding of economic man.
5 
     
        
  "What is the universal or fundamental element in the personality of economic 
man?  What is it in his makeup that cannot be removed if he is to remain what he 
                                                 
5 Mr. Myers and I agree on the importance of the subject of self-interest and even the 
approach; he also uses some of the same philosophers to ground his position.  Our 
approaches differ in terms of their emphasis; his is to show how individual self-interest 
leads to the common good while I emphasize the importance of deriving a clear 
understanding of what self-interest is. Albert O. Hirschman's (1997) book, "The Passions 
and the Interests", is probably one of the more famous books on the subject of economic 
self-interest.  He develops the idea how economic self-interest came to still the more violent 
passions.  Both books offer interesting perspectives on how the perception of self-interest 
has changed through time. 
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is?  The answer is self-interest.  This is the one drive that is common to all our 
writer's depictions of economic man.  Whether economic man is the introspective 
Puritan,  the  extroverted  man  of  the  world,  the  cold  calculator  of  gain,  the 
conspirator, the manipulator, or even the primitive, his underlying motive is self-
interest.  Our writers have either placed this characteristic of economic man in the 
foreground of their comments or they have assumed it to be so obvious that they 
have handled it in an implicit manner.  In any event it is that feature of economic 
man which cannot be removed if he is to remain economic man." 
 
I believe that Meyer is correct in his description of the historical role that self-
interest  plays  in  economic  theory  and  popular  interpretations  of  economics; 
however,  the  very  generality  with  which  the  attributes  of  self-interest  can  be 
applied  should  give  pause.    Myers  identifies  many  types  of  economic  man 
including Puritans, extroverts, cold calculators of gain, conspirators, manipulators 
and  primitives,  all  of  whom,  according  to  Meyers,  share  the  attribute  of  self-
interest.    More  generally,  self-interest  is  an  important  characteristic  of  human 
behavior of which economic behavior is, presumably, a subset.  The importance of 
self-interest as a reason to act has long been recognized; Derek Parfit claims that: 
“The Self-interest Theory has been believed by most people for more than two 
millennia” (Parfit, 1984: 194).  Given its prevalence, it would be odd then if self-
interest was not taken to be an important motive of economic activity. 
 
The  interesting  issue  is  not  whether  self-interest  plays  an  important  role  in 
economic motivation, but rather how interests in economic contexts differ from 
interests in non-economic contexts.  This is not directly Myers' concern, his thesis 
concerns the interesting balance that many early economists tried to strike between 
the interests of individuals and the interests of the group as a whole.  Yet that 
balance, I believe, brings to the fore one of the dimensions of self-interest that I am 
addressing, namely, the various and sometimes incompatible interests that a person 
can have, only some of which are economic.  Utilitarians, for instance, despite the 
various forms that that theory takes, all agree that the interests of the individual 
must  sometimes  be  sacrificed  for  the  greater  good.    In  contrast,  the  modern 
economic interpretation of self-interest is now clearly set on the sovereign interests 
of the individual and the implicit acceptance of the assumption that what is good 
for the individual is good for the group.  Modern economic man is therefore never 
asked to sacrifice his interests for the interests of others. 
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What I take to be the modern, popular, economic understanding of the nature of 
economic agents is offered by Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit (2004: 18).  They 
claim that economics uses: "...an austere picture of human beings as centers of self-
interest that operate out of society, without normative expectations or evaluations 
of themselves or one another."  The point that I would like to make about Brennan 
and Pettit's description is that although they don't define self-interest, it appears 
from the above sentence, and the general theme of their book from which it was 
taken, to be used in a negative sense--self-interest is clearly not meant to be a 
flattering description of agent motives. The agents they describe are isolated from 
the rest of society and operate without reference to ethical guidelines suggesting 
how they should get along with others.  There is no place for objective evaluations 
of the actions of others because agents are driven exclusively by their subjective 
preferences.  In such a model, there is no reason to consider the interests of others 
expect perhaps as instruments to be used to achieve one's own aims.  Brennan and 
Pettit's definition fits well with the common understanding of self-interest; when 
we call someone self-interested in everyday language we are saying something to 
the effect that the person only considers his own desires or preferences--the person 
is purely self-regarding.  If the interests of others are considered, it may only be to 
the limited extent that their actions affect one's own interests.  The interests of 
other people, in other words, are not ends in themselves, but mere instruments to be 
used to achieve one's own interests.  In short, Brennan and Pettit's description, I 
believe, represents the standard understanding of self-interest in both economics 
and common speech.  However, self-interest has not always been given such a 
limited scope. 
 
In sharp contrast to many modern understandings of self-interest as a part of an 
immoral or non-moral character, ethics and the early history of economics assigns 
self-interest a much broader meaning.  Adam Smith, for instance, uses the term 
selfishness in a pejorative sense to mean harm or neglect of other people, and self-
interest to mean that which is a proper 'regard to our own private happiness and 
interest'  (Smith,  VII.ii.3.16,  pp.    20-25).    Using  Smith's  definition,  the  sort  of 
behavior that Brennan and Pettit describe as typical economic motivation is better 
thought of as selfish, rather than self-interested.  Describing someone as selfish (as 
opposed to self-interested) implies more than just an unflattering attribute, it can 
also be interpreted as indicating unethical behavior (Schlick 1939: 85).  Casson and 
Giusta (2006, p. 339), propose the following description of the unethical nature of 
neoclassical economic actors: "In standard neoclassical theory people are assumed 
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incentive  to  cheat,  so  sanctions  are  incorporated  into  material  gains."    The 
characterization of economic man provided by Casson and Giusta is extreme, and 
one that reflects the motive of selfishness rather than self-interest.  They claim that 
agents in neoclassical models are assumed to maximize material gains, however, 
this strikes me as an overly restrictive view of economic analysis which ignores 
much  recent  work.    At  a  more  basic  level,  I  believe  their  characterization  of 
neoclassical economics is false.   It is far more common to assume that agents 
maximizing their utility, where utility can include non-material gains.   In any case, 
Casson and Giusta do not substantiate their claim.  
This entire discussion may appear trivial, after all, I am writing about the meaning 
of  just  a  couple  of  words,  but  the  attention  is  justified  given  the  implicit  and 
sometimes  explicit  importance  that  the  assumption  of  self-interest  plays  in 
economic reasoning.  The point is that self-interest and selfishness are two very 
different  descriptions  of  motivation  with  important  implications  for  models  of 
behavior.  In addition, Casson and Giusta's claim also reemphasizes the need to be 
clear about the objects at which self-interest aims.   
 
Self-interest, as opposed to selfishness, is used in the ethical literature to describe a 
very general motive; interests can lead to good, bad or neutral behaviors; in any 
case, not necessarily socially destructive behaviors.  As I pointed out in the first 
chapter, a reliance on self-interest as an exclusive description of behavior would 
exclude some observed behaviors, but as a starting point it would seem to be a 
good description of most behaviors in most circumstances.  The point is that self-
interest can be used to describe nearly any sort of behavior.  It has traditionally 
been used to describe, literally, the interests of people, which can be directed at all 
sorts of aims.  As shown in the first chapter, a key to understanding motivation is to 
identify the focus of an action; in other words, does an agent have his interests in 
mind  or  the  interests  of  someone  else  when  he  acts?    Under  the  general 
understanding of the definition of self-interest, a person can be self-interested while 
incorporating the interests of others into their own interests.   For instance, it is 
expected that people have an interest in the well-being of loved ones and that they 
attempt  to  promote  those  interests.    An  important  stipulation,  one  made  to 
distinguish a real difference in motives, is altruism--altruistic acts should not be 
classified  as  self-interested.    Altruistic  acts  are  defined  as  those  that  are 
intentionally performed for the benefit of others while the agent may suffer an 
expected net reduction in their own interests.  In the case of altruistic acts, the 
focus  is  on  the  interests  of  other  agents  perhaps,  but  not  necessarily,  to  the 
detriment of the interests of the acting agent.  For instance, it is probable in normal - 72 -   
 
 
circumstances that we want to see loved ones do well and thrive even in cases in 
which our own interests suffer as a result.  Further still, people may promote the 
interests  of  others  without  reference  to  their  own  interests.    To  take  a  rather 
mundane example, when a couple is deciding on which restaurant to go to in the 
evening, it might not be a question of balancing interests at all; rather, the partner 
deciding will choose the restaurant that they think their partner will enjoy--without 
regard to their own interests.  I have mentioned other categories of actions that 
work  against  interests  in  the  previous  chapter,  including  particular  affections, 
duties and special relationships.  
 
If  this  were  the  extent  of  the  misunderstanding--that  economists  and  business 
scholars  incorrectly  use  the  general  term  self-interest  to  describe  selfishness 
motives and that there is confusion about the important real differences between 
benevolent, self-interested, acts and altruism--then the confusion could be easily 
rectified  by  simply  replacing  the  assumption  of  self-interest  with  the  term  of 
selfishness and clearly demarcating self-interested from altruistic acts.  However, 
that change would only serve to realign the economic usage with its traditional 
usage,  the  underlying  problems  would remain.    In  fact,  the  question  that  I  am 
addressing  would  remain  open  and  another  would  arise,  namely,  why  do 
economists make an assumption about human behavior (selfishness) that conflicts 
with every other previous attempt to describe self-interest?  Derek Parfit (1984: p. 
5) claims that no theory of self-interest has ever excluded the concept that the 
interests of friends and families are also a part of normal interests.  The degree to 
which the interests of others affect our own is a subject of intense debate and I will 
return to it in later chapters, but for current purposes it is important to remember 
that in the thousands of years in which self-interest has been studied, no major 
scholar has ever proposed that our interests excludes the interests of others (see 
chapter  5).    Selfishness  is  therefore  an  extreme  position  in that  it  restricts  our 
interests  to  a  very  narrow  sub-set  of  interests  and  conflicts  with  common 
experience and years of scholarly investigation.  The fact that selfishness is an 
extreme  assumption,  by  itself,  is  not  necessarily  a strike  against it,  but  such  a 
position needs to be justified if it is to be used in economic models.  The more 
general point I wish to make in discussing the differences between self-interest and 
selfishness is to begin to show that there are a wide range of interests that a person 
can have, all of which fall under the general heading of self-interest; therefore, 
even  if  we  accept  that  self-interest  is  an  accurate  description  of  behavior,  a 
comprehensive theory of self-interest will need to specify the boundaries of the 
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some economic contexts (however that is defined), but it is an extreme assumption 
that needs to be justified by a modeler.   
 
I need to emphasize that my argument is not that people are not self-interested.  I 
believe, as do all the scholars that I examine in this manuscript, that people are, in 
large  part,  motivated  by  self-interest.    People  are,  in  general,  naturally  self-
interested, to argue otherwise strikes me as naive and indefensible after even a 
cursory glance at human behavior and the presumed intentions that stand behind 
those behaviors.   As a practical matter, the burden of proof lies with those who 
claim that at least a part of human behavior is motivated by something other than 
self-interest.  My purpose, simply stated, is to suggest that self-interest admits a 
wide range of motives and aims that need to be specified in order for self-interest 
to be a meaningful and effective assumption.  Which dimensions of self-interest are 
appropriate to explain economic behavior will depend on what one takes to be the 
purview of economics; in other words, what interests are economic interests? 
     
Preference Theory 
 
I turn my attention from the very general theory of self-interest to another very 
general theory, namely, preference theory.  Self-interest has been called the first 
principle  of  economics,  however,  it  is  not  obvious  how  to  reconcile  it  with 
preference theory, which, in turn, has been called the core of economic theory 
(Broome, 1999:8).  In particular, revealed preference theory explicitly makes no 
assumptions  about  a  person's  motives.    Consequently,  the  first  principle  of 
economics appears to be incompatible with a basic premise of revealed preference 
theory.  In the next few paragraphs I will outline the basics of preference theory 
and offer a possibility to reconcile the assumption of self-interest and preference 
theory. 
 
The developers of revealed preference, the core of empirically based consumption 
theory, intentionally made no assumptions about the motives of agents.  Originally 
proposed by Paul Samuelson in 1938, the approach estimates consumer preferences 
by  observing  the  consumption  of  goods,  it  thereby  bypasses  the  issue  of  what 
economic  agents  believe  and  desire  and  purportedly  avoids  the  problem  of 
researcher subjectivity.  The basic idea is that by carefully observing and drawing 
conclusions  from  the  behavior  of  consumers,  researchers  can  avoid  their  own 
biases  about  what  consumers  prefer  yet  still  draw  conclusions  about  consumer 
demand  given  certain  minimum  assumptions.    The  approach  was  met  with - 74 -   
 
 
enthusiasm by many of the best economists of the time, for example, John R. Hicks 
was initially convinced of the advantages of studying economic agents: "only as 
entities having certain patterns of market behavior, it [revealed preference] makes 
no claim, no pretence, to be able to see inside their heads" (Hicks 1956).  The 
approach is designed to circumvent the problems of linking motives with behavior 
and is valued precisely because it avoids the issue of what motivates economic 
agents  to  make  the  choices  they  do.    An  advocate  of  the  method  of  revealed 
preference doesn't take a stance on whether an agent is an altruist or an egoist, 
either, for example, can prefer to give to charities for very different reasons, only 
behavior is observed.  Lionel Robbins put it best when he stated: “So far as we are 
concerned our economic subjects can be pure egoists, pure altruists, pure ascetics, 
pure sensualists or - what is much more likely - bundles of all these impulses” 
(Robbins, 1935). Preference theory is a position firmly based on the sovereignty of 
the individual and the belief that an agent is (or should be) completely free to 
decide what he prefers and not required to explain to anyone why he prefers it. 
 
The approach of revealed preference is valued precisely because it is a method of 
avoiding the issue of the motives and aims of economic agents.  It is important to 
recognize that the assumption of self-interest is just that, an assumption added to 
the core of consumer theory, it is not a part of the preference framework.  The term 
preference as used by economists simply indicates an ability to indicate whether 
one bundle of goods is preferred to another (e.g., Varian, 1999, 5ed.).  Because the 
approach says nothing about the inner workings of economic agents, it is often 
assumed that people are self-interested must come from somewhere else.  One 
possible explanation is that it creeps into the model of consumer preferences via 
the assumption of strong monotonicity which says that at least as much of every 
good,  and  strictly  more  of  some  good,  is  strictly  better.    However,  strong 
monotonicity is not a requirement of economic rationality, which only requires 
preferences to be transitive and complete (Hausman and McPherson, 1996, 27).  
Preferences are transitive if when x is preferred to y, and y is preferred to z, then x 
is preferred to z.  If someone prefers bananas to apples, and apples to oranges, then 
they  must  prefer  bananas  to  oranges,  according  to  the  transitivity  condition.  
Similarly, for the case of indifference, if x is indifferent to y, and y is indifferent to 
z, then x is indifferent to z.  Preferences are complete if for all x and y, either x is 
preferred to y, y is preferred to x, or the chooser is indifferent between the two 
options.    For  didactic  reasons  preferences  are  usually  represented  in  two 
dimensions with, for example, the amount of one bundle of goods is represented 
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and y are represented by points in the positive quadrant of the x-y graph.  Different 
combinations and amounts of x and y allow indifference curves to be plotted and 
the  typical  well-behaved  indifference  curve  is  represented  by  a  convex  curve.  
However, in keeping with the generality of the approach, indifference curves can 
have many different shapes representing, for instance, perfect substitutes or perfect 
complements.  'Goods', as opposed to 'bads', are defined by those things which are 
consumed.  Well-behaved indifference curves are also assumed to exhibit strong 
monotonicity which means that larger values of x (or y), all else equal, and given 
that the point of saturation for either good hasn't been reached, are preferred to 
smaller values of x (or y).  That more is preferred to less may be interpreted as 
supporting the belief that people are self-interested, but that would be a restrictive 
and arbitrary interpretation of the general model and of the model of self-interest.  
In  the  previous  chapter  I  mentioned  several  reasons  that  people  may  have  to 
damage their own interests.  For instance, I mentioned that they often prefer things 
that are not in their best interest.  Drug addicts, for instance, prefer more drugs to 
fewer, but few would argue that by doing so they are acting in their best interest.  
Drugs are goods in that addicts like to consume them, but they serve their interests 
in only the most general of interpretations.  The conclusion is that there are many 
things that people prefer that are not in their interest so that preference theory does 
not necessarily support the assumption of self-interest. 
 
Economics generally deals with first order preferences, that is, those preferences 
that are revealed by agents when they buy goods and services (Hirschman 1985; 
Sen 1978).  Higher order preferences, on the other hand, address the issue of why 
individuals prefer what they prefer and might include norms, values and beliefs.  
Higher  order  preferences  are  identified  through  reflection;  they  are  recognized 
when agents ask themselves why they prefer A to B whereas first order preferences 
can arise without reflection.  For instance, a person can prefer one thing to another 
because of instinct or habit; it is thereby possible to prefer things that are not in 
one's best interest.  First order preferences are not necessarily immoral and selfish.  
Although  Hausman  and  McPherson  (1996,  p.  52)  are  correct  to  conclude  that: 
"Moral and altruistic preferences are ruled out of many economic models not by 
axioms  of  rationality,  but  by  assumptions  that  the  objects  of  preferences  are 
bundles  of  commodities  to  be  privately  consumed  and  that  there  are  no 
interdependencies among the preferences of different individuals."  However, the 
assumptions  that  bundles  are  privately  consumed  and  that  preferences  are 
independent are not assumptions of preference theory in its most general form.  
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interested, all that is assumed is that agent preferences conform to a number of 
axioms, roughly, they simply need to be consistent.  They can conform to the core 
axioms without being self-interested. 
 
Clearly then, there is a potential contradiction between the narrow understanding of 
self-interest as it is commonly understood and represented in the Brennan and Pettit 
quote above, and the undefined and presumably irrelevant model of behavior found 
in preference theory.  Confusion can arise when a narrow definition of self-interest 
is combined with a very broad understanding of preference theory.  I contend that 
modelers of economic and business agents often implicitly assume both a narrow, 
selfish sort of self-interest, while simultaneously assuming that preference theory 
allows an agent to exhibit any sort of behavior--these two views may conflict.  As a 
result of holding and confusing both of these positions at the same time, I believe 
that such modelers often conclude that all acts can be taken to be motivated by 
selfishness.  The net of preference theory is cast very wide, while the term self-
interest is used in a very narrow, opportunistic, manner.  The result is that it is 
possible to conclude that the position of economics is that all motives are described 
by a narrow, aggressive form of self-interest and it is possible to conclude that 
nearly all behavior can be understood as economic. 
 
I was careful to qualify many of the above remarks with words like 'potential' and 
'may'  because,  perhaps  surprisingly,  there  is  not  necessarily  a  contradiction 
between self-interest and preference theory.  For example, psychological egoism, 
one of the more enduring theories of self-interest, claims that all motives are self-
interested.    It  is  a  descriptive  position  that  says  that  people  are  naturally  self-
interested.  Accepting psychological egoism would mean accepting that everyone, 
whether acting economically or not, is always motivated by self-interest, thereby 
creating room for a slightly refined version of Robbins' understanding of economic 
theory  as  stated  above,  and  the  narrow,  self-interest  assumption  to  coexist.  
Robbins claimed that an economic agent can be motivated by anything including 
altruism, but a proper understanding of those terms means that altruism and self-
interest are incompatible.  That qualification aside, Robbins' position, along with 
psychological  egoism,  can  be  combined.    To  see  this,  remember  that  under 
psychological egoism all actions are presumed to be motivated by self-interest and, 
thereby, all of an agent's preferences would be motivated by self-interest.  There 
could still be a difference between acting economically and acting in some other 
manner, but the difference would not detract from the fact that agents are always 
self-interested.  In short, the position is that all acts are motivated by self-interest - 77 -   
 
 
and therefore all preferences are motivated by self-interest and so the theories of 
self-interest and revealed preference are potentially compatible.  Similarly, models 
that assume that agents are rational only if they are self-interested can also be 
defended by advocates of a position known as rational egoism.  I have already 
hinted at the potential problems of this compatibility thesis, the first is that people 
often do not act from self-interest and, second, there are many different, sometimes 
incompatible aims associated with the general motive self-interest--I will explore 
these issues in greater detail in later chapters. 
 
I draw three general conclusions from the discussion thus far, the first is that there 
is a need for clarification in the economic and business usage of the assumption of 
self-interest in terms of both its structural, psychological aspects, and the external 
aims at which self-interest is directed.  Second, the boundary between economic 
and non-economic behavior is vague, but seems to be expanding to include many 
social relations beyond its traditional subjects of firms, consumers and markets.  
Self-interest is increasingly being taken as the default position for many disciplines 
and perhaps by society at large.  Rather than an assumption made in order to make 
parsimonious models, self-interest is taken a description of real behavior in an ever 
increasing number of social contexts.  This is not a surprising development given 
that  both the theory  of  self-interest  and  preference theory  can  be  very  broadly 
interpreted.  Third, there are many sorts of self-interest expressed in economic 
models as represented by the contradiction between a narrow interpretation of self-
interest and revealed preference theory.  The default position in many economic 
and business models and popular opinion is that economic agents are narrowly self-
interested, while the core of economic theory upon which many of those models 
rest, intentionally leaves the motives of agents undefined.  Self-interest is generally 
not a formal assumption, it has been largely implicitly accepted and where it has 
been explicitly defended, as I will show below, it has often been mis-defined or 
reduced to an unhelpful tautology.  Such a fundamental assumption needs to be 
clearly defined in order to properly understand its implications and limits. 
 
Instrumental and Scientific Realism 
 
Although the economic definition of self-interest or selfishness is seldom directly 
defended,  another  line  of  defense  could  be  offered  that  would  negate  the 
importance of much of the discussion thus far.  It could be argued that this entire 
issue of what sort of self-interest should be used to model the behavior of economic 
agents  is  irrelevant  because  self-interest,  or  any  other  assumption  concerning - 78 -   
 
 
motives  for  that  matter,  is  just  a  simplification  made  in  order  to  build  more 
tractable  models;  under  this  reasoning  whether  assumptions  reflect  reality  is 
irrelevant, the only measure of importance is whether the resulting model allows 
good predictions.  There are many viewpoints about the role of assumptions; I will 
limit my discussion to two extreme views that discuss the relevance of making 




At one extreme is the position that model assumptions are instrumental and do not 
need to reflect reality at all, the only measure of importance for models is the 
accuracy of their predictions.
6 Most economic and business students at some point 
in  their  training  have  heard  the  following  sort  of  reasoning:  "Assumptions  are 
simplifications, they are not meant to reflect reality and should not reflect reality; 
they are simplifications made to build models that are more tractable."  One of my 
instructors used the analogy of a road map to emphasize the point, he asked, "What 
would be the use of a life-sized road map which perfectly represents reality?".  No 
one  argues  that  assumptions  should  mimic  reality;  the  issue  is  finding  a  good 
balance  between  parsimony  and  realistic  descriptions  of  behavior.    An 
instrumentalist,  such  as  Bishop  Berkeley,  argues  that  the  function  of  scientific 
theorizing is not to explain but to organize our experiences into packages.  "On this 
view, theoretical terms are not abbreviations for observed ones, they are more like 
mnemonic devices, acronyms, uninterpreted symbols without empirical or literal 
meaning.  And the aim of science is constantly to improve the reliability of its 
instruments,  without  worrying  about  whether  reality  corresponds  to  these 
instruments when interpreted literally" (Rosenberg, 2000: p. 94).  Accepting this 
view would mean that the economic assumption of self-interest would not have to 
                                                 
6 Milton Friedman's 1953 article, "The Methodology of Positive Economics", contains the 
controversial claim that the validity of positive (as opposed to normative economics) 
economic theory should be based solely on the accuracy of its predictions rather than the 
realism of its assumptions.  However, even if we accept Friedman's advice that the test of 
whether one set of assumptions is better than another is in it is ability to improve the power 
of a model, then, at a minimum, the assumptions have to be well-defined.  See the last 
chapter of Mark Blaug's (1996) book and Daniel M. Hausman (1992), for just two of the 
many discussions of Friedman's claim.  If Friedman is correct, then there is no need to 
discuss assumptions at all.  However if assumptions are going to be made then, at a 
minimum, they need to be well defined.  Saying that someone is self-interested is too broad 
and ambiguous a claim. 
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reflect  “real”  motives,  assuming  one  could  determine  what  the  real  motive  is, 
rather, self-interest would only serve to symbolize the unobservable behaviors of 
economic  agents.    However,  the  overall  aim,  according  to  the  instrumentalist 
position just stated, is to improve the reliability of instruments over time.  Under 
this reasoning, it is still permissible to criticize the definition of economic self-
interest, or what self-interest is taken to mean, on the simple grounds that it is too 
vague to be of much use; it allows too broad a range of behaviors.  I have already 
given the example of the confusion that exists in economics between self-interest 
and selfishness, many more examples are to come.  In short, I do not believe that 
even a die-hard instrumentalist would condone using ambiguous definitions when 
better ones are available.  In the case of self-interest, better assumptions that can be 
used to develop more reliable instruments are available from ethics and should 




The other extreme position is known as scientific realism, it argues that model 
assumptions should be based on empirical observations that describe reality.  By 
building models based on realistic assumptions modelers hope to gain new insights 
into truths about the world in addition to making accurate predictions.
7  Economists 
and business scholars following this methodology are required to accurately define 
what  it  means  to  be  self-interested  and  rational.    Again,  I  will  argue  that  the 
economic  assumption  of  self-interest  is  ambiguous  and  may  not  reflect  many 
important  motives  driving  economic  behavior.    Therefore,  I  believe  that  both 
instrumentalist  and  scientific  realist  perspectives  justify  the  search  for  better 
(predictive or realistic) assumptions.  For the purposes of this manuscript, I am 
content  to  conclude  that,  for  all  but  the  most  extreme  views  of  scientific 
methodology, unambiguous definitions are required and the no view of science 
would condone making vague assumptions when better definitions are available.  
In addition, I will show below that many economists and business scholars appear 
                                                 
7  Adam Smith's view of science should be placed in the scientific realist camp.  Smith 
minimized the role of prediction in science, his view was that the main job of scientists was 
to resolve contradictions and tensions in past explanatory systems, rather than to learn new 
facts (Fleischacker, 2004, 34).  This view seems overly conservative, why should, for 
instance, new explanatory models be exclude simply because they don't address 
contradictions in existing models?  With that qualification in mind, I believe Adam Smith 
would argue that assumptions need to reflect reality. 
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to believe that the assumption of self-interest is meant, at some level, to describe 
real economic behavior and behavior in general. In other words, the assumption of 
self-interest is meant to be a description of reality, placing those scholars squarely 
in the realist camp. 
 
The desire to build parsimonious models is a good reason to make simplifying 
assumptions.  However, there are some obvious trade-offs between the simplicity 
of a model's assumptions and the value of its resulting descriptions and predictions.  
I  wish  first  to  emphasize  that  the  assumption  of  self-interest,  if  properly 
understood, does not go far in reducing the sorts of actions that a modeler is allows 
an agent to perform.  Again, self-interest is a very general motive that is often 
taken  as  the  default  explanation  of  human  motivation  across  many  activities.  
Selfishness,  on  the  other  hand,  if  properly  understood,  is  a  very  parsimonious 
description  of  motivation.    Whether  it  is  a  good  description,  in  terms  of  the 
purposes  that  a  model  is  meant  to  serve,  would  need  to  be  argued  for  by  the 
modeler.  In general, I find the modeling of economic agents as isolated, non-
interacting units in all but the most extreme contexts to be of dubious value, but 
only if there is  common understanding of the terms used, then the advantages and 
disadvantages of the assumed motives can be discussed. 
 
An analogy might help to clarify the point I wish to make.  The assumption that 
planets  move  in  perfect  circles  might  in  many  cases  lead  to  reasonably  good 
astronomical models, e.g., models that lead to good predictions.  In fact, in some 
circumstance models based on such ideal assumptions might initially yield better 
predictions than models with more accurate, but more complex assumptions.  It 
might  be  argued  that  self-interest  is  not  the  perfect  assumption,  but  it  allows 
modelers  to  build  parsimonious  models  that  yield  reasonably  good  predictions.  
The issue that I am addressing is that self-interest, as it is used in economics, is not 
an ideal assumption because, in part, it is not accurately defined.  In other words, 
we know the properties of an ideal circle, but economics and business models do 
not specify the properties of an ideal, self-interested, person.  The current situation 
in economics would be equivalent to the case in which astronomers used many, and 
in some cases conflicting, definitions of a circle.  A loose definition of a circle 
would mean that different astronomical models could not be compared and many 
shapes that are not circles would be called circles.  Finally, even if we could arrive 
at an ideal definition of self-interest, there still should be room for building models 
based on less ideal and more realistic assumptions.  At a minimum, we need to be - 81 -   
 
 
able to occasionally reassess the degree to which our assumptions deviate from 
reality and examine how people actually behave. 
    
The Purview of Economic Analysis 
 
The range over which economic analysis is taken to apply is ever increasing.  This 
is not a surprising development given the very general assumptions of preference 
theory; again, an agent only has to have the ability to compare different bundles of 
goods where goods are widely defined, and to be considered rational, he essentially 
only has to be consistent in his choices.  It follows that many economists take a 
very broad view of the scope of economic analysis.  For instance, in a typical 
textbook, Douma and Schreuder (2002: 1) claim the following: "The point is that 
an economist would identify an economic problem in any situation where needs 
would  not  be  met  as  a  result  of  scarcity  of  resources:  and  resources  are  quite 
broadly conceived as all means that may contribute to the satisfaction of human 
needs."  Given such a broad definition, it is indeed difficult to imagine situations in 
which economic analysis would not apply.  The authors unnecessarily constrain 
economics to cases in which needs are in question.  Economics concerns the aim of 
fulfilling preferences, not all of which are necessarily needs and it is probably 
better to think of them as desires.  Defining resources as all means that contribute 
to the satisfaction of human desires is a particularly ambitious goal for any social 
science to try to address.  There are significant differences among the many human 
needs and it seems unlikely that any one set of tools, particularly the standard 
economic tools of rationality and selfishness, would be equally applicable across 
the diversity of human desires.  If that diversity is granted, then such a set of tools 
would at best be necessary rather than sufficient to understand human behavior. 
 
Douma and Schreuder's definition of the scope of economics echoes that of Gary S. 
Becker, who is perhaps the best known advocate of an extensive definition of the 
scope of economic analysis.  Becker (1976) writes: "Indeed I have come to the 
position that the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all 
human behavior; be it behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow prices, 
repeated  or  infrequent  decisions,  emotional  or  mechanical  ends,  rich  or  poor 
persons,  men  or  women,  businessmen  or  politicians,  teachers  or  students."  
Accordingly,  Becker  has  applied  economic  analysis  to  discrimination,  crime, 
marriage and the family (see, respectively, G. Becker, 1957, 1968, 1974 and 1981; 
see Becker, 1996 for a summary of some of these findings).  In a discussion of why 
people give to beggars, Becker (1996), presents a good indication of his general - 82 -   
 
 
approach.  He writes: "A person makes contributions [to beggars] to add to his own 
utility--otherwise he would not part with any wealth" (p. 232).  The interesting 
question for the purposes of this manuscript, as always, is why does giving to a 
beggar increase the contributor's utility?  In other words, what is the aim of the 
contributor?  Two other notes in regards to Becker's approach already mentioned in 
chapter 1 are that not all reasons to act are based on "feelings" and people often 
prefer things that are not in their interest--both of which are significant problems 
for preference theory and therefore utility theory.  More generally, Becker may be 
right, to the extent that it is possible to rank objects within a preference function, it 
may be possible to use utility theory to address many important questions, but that 
theory does not help us to understand what motivates people to make the choices 
they  do.    Incidentally,  issues  of  comparability  and  commensurability  call  into 
question the ability to meaningfully compare relevant alternatives in many contexts 
thereby limiting the applicability of preference theory, but that issue is beyond the 
scope of the present discussion.  People who give to beggars have many reasons for 
doing so, some of which may be to increase their own utility, but many of which 
are  certainly  not,  and  equally  certainly  not  all  reasons  to  give  are  readily 
identifiable as economic. 
    
The critical point which I wish to emphasize is that both the theory of self-interest 
and  preference  theory  are  very  general  descriptions  of  motives  and  behaviors.  
Many, but by no means all, economic activities can be understood using these two 
theories, but so then can most human activities.  In most contexts people are self-
interested  and  they  can  prefer  one  object  to  another.    However,  interests  vary 
widely and I would contend that economic interests, properly understood, are but a 
small part of the many interests a person can have.  For instance, maximizing 
profits, a commonly accepted economic aim, is a very different aim from that of 
living  a  good  life  as  the  term  good  has  been  commonly  understood.    I  argue, 
therefore,  that  the  aims  of  an  agent  need  to  be  specified,  once  those  aims  are 
specified the argument over whether the analysis should be labeled as economic or 
something else can follow. 
 
Two Models That Assume Self-interest. 
 
In order to ground the previous discussion of economic self-interest and avoid the 
charge that I have created a straw-man, I will examine how self-interest is actually 
defined and used in business economic models.  Fortunately, there are two very 
influential,  modern,  models  that  I  can  use,  namely,  Oliver  Williamson's  (1975, - 83 -   
 
 
1985) version of transaction cost economics and Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency theory.  These authors are some of the few in the business and economic 
literature who explicitly address and defend their behavioral assumptions. 
 
The  ambiguity  with  which  the  assumption  of  self-interest  is  used  in  economic 
models means that almost any critique or defense of what self-interest is supposed 
to mean is supportable.  Motives in economic and business models are a moving 
target.    Revealed  preference  theory,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  intentionally  says 
nothing about the motives of agents, while popular and scholarly interpretations 
often  take  a  very  narrow,  almost  mean  definition  of  self-interest.    As  a 
consequence, economic and business models can be criticized for having both a 
very narrow, unrealistic, description of motives, and for having no stance at all on 
motives.  Likewise, models can be defended from the charge that their assumptions 
are too narrow by appeals to the fact that (some) economic models say nothing 
about motivation, while any support provided by models for the assumption of self-
interest can then be used as evidence that a narrow interpretation of self-interest is 
the proper interpretation for all economic models.  It does neither defenders or 
supporters  of  the  economic  approach  any  good  to  use  ambiguous,  undefended, 
assumptions.  To get around the problem of ambiguity, I will provided a detailed 
example  of  how  the  assumption  of  self-interest  is  used  in  transaction  cost 
economics  and  agency  theory,  two  of  the  more  influential  business  economic 
models of the last decades. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
The behavioral assumptions of business economic models vary considerably from 
model to model so it is important to specify which model one is criticizing.  In fact, 
many  economic  and  business  models  make  no  explicit  behavioral  assumptions 
beyond vague references to self-interest or selfishness.  One of the few modern 
business economists who explicitly states his assumptions is Oliver Williamson.  
Williamson (1975, 1985) is widely accepted as a leading scholar in the theory of 
transaction cost economics and is often credited with single-handedly reviving that 
theory which was originally developed by Ronald H. Coase (1937).  Williamson 
makes two behavioral assumptions that he claims are the most critical elements of 
his model.  Quoting Herbert Simon, he writes: "Nothing is more fundamental in 
setting our research agenda and informing our research methods than our view of 
the nature of human beings whose behaviour we are studying" (Simon 1985: 303).  
I  take  from  this  quote  that  Williamson  believes  that  a  study  of  economic - 84 -   
 
 
organization must begin with realistic (not purely instrumental) assumptions about 
the nature of human behavior.  Williamson (1993) makes two such assumptions, 
the first follows from Simon's (1961, xxiv) claim that human agents are assumed to 
be “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” and, second, that human agents are 
given to opportunism.  According to Williamson, "But for these two behavioral 
assumptions  -  both  individually  but,  especially,  in  combination  -  the  study  of 
economic organization would be vastly simplified" (Williamson, 1993, Chapter 7 
p. 93).  There is little disagreement about the first assumption, empirical studies by, 
among  others,  Kahneman,  Slovic  and  Tversky  (1982)  appear  to  confirm 
inconsistencies in human behavior under conditions of uncertainty and, generally, 
in the comparative assessment of alternative decisions.  I will therefore concentrate 
my efforts on explicating the second assumption. 
 
It  is  along  with  Williamson's  second  assumption,  opportunism,  that  bounded 
rationality contributes to his explanation of the existence of firms.  Williamson 
defines opportunistic behavior as a: "deep condition of self-interest seeking that 
contemplates guile" (Williamson, 1993, p. 458).  He identifies opportunism as an 
unflattering attribute but contends that it is: "basic to the logic of organization - in 
that,  absent  opportunism,  there  is  no  contractual  reason  to  supplant  market  by 
hierarchy"  (Williamson,  1985,  pp.  30-32,  64-67).    Williamson's  insight  was  to 
recognize that bounded rationality provides 'space' for opportunistic behavior.  His 
reasoning, if I have properly understood his argument, is that bounded rationality 
for economic organizations implies that even complex contracts are unavoidably 
incomplete  (Williamson,  1998  p:  31).    Therefore,  according  to  Williamson, 
contracts will contain gaps, errors, and omissions that are difficult to enforce in a 
court of law.  Mere promises, unsupported by credible commitments, will not be 
enough  to  ensure  that  parties  to  a  contract  behave  nobly  given  Williamson’s 
assumption that people may behave opportunistically.  In other words, there is a 
non-zero probability that one or both of the contracting parties will behave in an 
opportunistic manner, i.e., they will in some cases stick to the letter of the contract 
rather than the spirit of the contract when it is in their interest to do so.
8  When it is 
difficult to write contracts that closely approximate the spirit of the contract, parties 
will expect their opposites to act opportunistically and will opt for other ways to 
enforce agreements.  In short, bounded rationality ensures that contracts can never 
                                                 
8
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be complete, in addition, behavior is assumed to be opportunistic.  The result is that 
non-market hierarchies (e.g., firms) are created in order to forestall such behavior 
 
I  believe  that  there  are  four  important  concepts  missing  from  Williamson’s 
description  of  self-interest,  all  of  which  correspond  with  the  ideas  that  I  am 
addressing in this manuscript. First, as I will show, Williamson’s definition of what 
he calls ‘simple self-interest’ is weak, arbitrary and appears to be a straw-man, 
furthermore, the definition he uses clearly ignores the literature on self-interest.  
Second, Williamson never adequately addresses the question of which objects are 
included in the interests of an agent (what I am calling the external component of 
interest).  Third, Williamson doesn’t clearly specify his assumption about the role 
of  self-interest  in  the  human  psyche  (the structural component  of  self-interest).  
Finally, Williamson is ambiguous about the scope of economic analysis.  While he 
writes  at  the  beginning  of  his  most  complete  description  of  agent  behavior, 
“Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization” (1993), that he is interested 
in economic calculativeness, he subsequently extends the reach of calculativeness 
to include situations far removed from what I take to be economic, going so far as 
to include in his analysis on calculativeness the topic of love. 
 
A particularly unsatisfying feature of Williamson's approach, given his emphasis 
on the importance of good behavioral assumptions, is the lack of evidence that he 
provides  to  support  his  assumption  that  agents  are  self-interested.    In  fact,  his 
evidence amounts totoo little more than references to other authors who share his 
assumptions.  For instance, Williamson quotes H.L.A. Hart (1961, p. 193) who 
asserts that, "Neither understanding of long-term interest, nor strength of goodness 
of will ... are shared by all men alike.  All are tempted at times to prefer their own 
immediate interests... ."  Williamson offers another quote from Robert Mitchels 
(1966,  p.  370):  "[only]  a  serene  and  frank  examination  of  the  hazards  of 
opportunism will enable us to mitigate these hazards."  Such quotes do not amount 
to a coherent argument in favor of self-interest.  However, there is little argument 
that decision makers usually act in their own self-interest, no one is questioning 
that, but without knowing what the intentions of the agents are it is not possible to 
claim  that  agents,  even  in  economic  contexts,  are  motivated  exclusively  by 
economic self-interest.  Simply put, agents, even in economic contexts, as I will 
show in the final chapter, can have non-economic intentions.     However, if a 
definition  of  economic  self-interest is  not  offered  it  is  impossible to  provide a 
counter argument showing that people are not always economically self-interested.  
I believe that the mistake that Williamson and others make is to assume that self-- 86 -   
 
 
interest is a specifically economic motive.  By collapsing complex human motives 
into the one unfaltering dimension, opportunism, which he calls self-interest with 
guile, Williamson has oversimplified human nature. 
 
Simple  "Self-interest  seeking",  for  Williamson,  means  economic  agents  will, 
"continuously consult their own preferences but will candidly disclose all pertinent 
information on inquiry and will reliably discharge all covenants..."  (1993, 158).  
This  is  a  rather  unusual  interpretation  of  self-interest  because  while  there  are 
situations in which candidly disclosing pertinent information to others will damage 
an  agent's  ability  to  achieve  his  preferences,  there are  also  situations in  which 
revealing one's preferences will help an agent to achieve those aims.  Therefore, 
under the definition of simple self-interest offered by Williamson, self-interest can 
either help or hinder an agent to achieve his aims and, in cases in which one's self-
interests are damaged by candid disclosure, Williamson's definition would clearly 
lead  to  self-defeating  behavior.    I  believe  that  Williamson's  point  is  that  self-
interest seeking, without guile, is a naive approach.  Guile allows agents to use 
deceit and cunning to achieve their interests at the expense of others.  Guile is an 
admittedly  unflattering  qualification  that  Williamson  makes  to  the  general 
definition of self-interest.  For Williamson, self-interest along with guile, means 
that agents may realize their aims at the expense of other agents.  But again, it will 
often be in the interest of agents to reveal their preferences to one another in order 
to achieve their common goals, so a more general definition would be to leave the 
question of disclosure open rather than include it in a general definition. 
 
I presume that what Williamson means when he says the agents will "continuously 
consult their own preferences" is that agents will consult their preferences with the 
aim of realizing their most preferred choice.  Williamson may be implying that 
agents prefer those things that are in their self-interest, which, as I have shown, is 
not necessarily true; people often prefer those things that are not in their interest.  I 
have also shown that it is difficult to identify motives by observing behavior.  The 
task  of  deciding  what  one  prefers  is  often  influenced  by  one's  higher  order 
preferences  including  norms  and  values.  Observed  behavior  can  therefore  be 
motivated by quite different motives, only some of which may be reduced to self-
interest.    There  is  a  potentially  more  challenging  problem  for  Williamson  and 
others using the definition of preference.  It is not unusual to hear the claim that 
because people choose what they prefer they are, accordingly, acting in their own 
self-interest.  The idea is that because a person has chosen an object, it must, on the 
whole, improve their well-being and, therefore, must be in their self-interest.  The - 87 -   
 
 
claim is partially, trivially, true, people choose what they prefer, but this does not 
tell us why they prefer what they prefer, we have to dig deeper into the motives 
that define preferences.  For instance, people may prefer to do their duty even if it 
works  against  their  interests,  e.g.,  telling  the  truth  when  a  lie  would  be  more 
advantageous or helping someone in need if the costs to ourselves are not too high.  
An outsider viewing such benevolent behavior might reasonably conclude that the 
agent prefers to tell the truth and help others because it improves the recipient’s 
well-being and not because it is in the agent's self-interest, it may in fact detract 
from the agent's interests.  Agents do regularly consult their preferences, but they 
do not always choose what is in their self-interest.  As a final minor point, I use 
“regularly” where Williamson uses continuously because in many situations people 
make their choices without actively appraising their preferences.  I suggest that the 
act of consciously ranking preferences only takes place in extreme situations and 
that many preferences are the result of habits and the like. 
 
Although Williamson's failure to provide an adequate definition of what he means 
when he claims agents are self-interested is odd given his strong emphasis on the 
importance of making accurate behavioral assumptions, in his favor he does give 
some  hint  of  a  difference  between  economic  and  non-economic  motivation.  
Williamson distinguishes between benign "frailty of motive" which describes day-
to-day activities, and opportunism (1998, p. 31).  As I understand it, frailty of 
motive for Williamson, describes what people do most of the time, namely, they 
usually  do  what they  say they  are  going  to do  without self-consciously  asking 
whether  the  effort  is  justified  by  expected  discounted  gains.    However,  if  the 
relationship  involves  not  day-to-day  affairs,  but  long-term  contractual 
relationships,  then,  according  to  Williamson,  people  switch  to  making 
opportunistic calculations.  It is clear that Williamson is right that not all activities 
involve  calculation  of  expected  discounted  gains,  but,  importantly,  Williamson 
doesn't  specify  what  role  self-interest  plays  in  day-to-day,  self-conscious, 
decisions.    He  seems  to  imply  self-interest  is  present  only  during  important 
economic calculations, while its role in day-to-day decisions is left undefined.  The 
distinction  between  day-to-day  and  important economic  activities  strikes  me  as 
arbitrary,  there  are  undoubtedly  many  non-economic  decisions  in  which  self-
interest plays an important role; an advocate of psychological egoism would claim 
it plays a leading role in all decisions.  More importantly, by limiting self-interest 
to  important  economic  calculations,  Williamson's  view  would  contradict  the 
common belief that self-interest is a very common motive in all activities.  If that is 
Williamson's position, then he has greatly underestimated the role of self-interest in - 88 -   
 
 
daily life. In fairness, this is not Williamson's concern, perhaps he has something 
like  selfishness  in  mind  when  discussing  important  economic  events  and  self-
interest in other situations, but his position has implications for the issues in this 
manuscript.  It confirms the ambiguity with which self-interest is used and raises 
the  corresponding  issue  of  how  economic  behavior  differs  from  non-economic 
behavior. 
 
In contrast to Williamson, Amartya Sen contends that the economic conception of 
self-interest encompasses non-economic activity as well.  Sen believes that a good 
deal of economic theory, to its detriment, assumes that agents identify only with 
themselves:  "Indeed,  this  assumption  has  often  been  seen  as  adequate  both  in 
explaining human behaviour and in explaining the efficient operation of market-
based economies" (Sen, 1999: p. 2).  The importance of Sen's comment is that he 
believes that the assumption of self-interest is more than just an assumption made 
for the sake of building tractable economic models, rather, it is taken as a true 
representation of all human behavior.  Again, the economic position of self-interest 
is nothing new, the assumption that people are primarily self-interested has been 
the default position since people have raised the issue of motivation.  Sen's concern 
for the misuse of self-interest and rationality is exacerbated by the extent to which 
the “economic” assumptions of self-interest and rationality have been exported and 
adopted by a number of other social sciences including, law, political science and 
sociology, thereby, incidentally, compounding the problem of using an ambiguous 
definition  for  such  a  key  assumption.    The  extension  of  these  economic 
assumptions to other disciplines further blurs the understanding of what it means to 
act  economically  and  further  confuses  the  issue  of  the  boundaries  between 
economic and non-economic motives.  Whether Sen is referring to self-interest or 
selfishness in the above quote is unclear.  For instance, benevolent persons may 
identify only with themselves (their interests), but those interests include the well-
being of others.  He is much more explicit about his position in the following 
quote:  "Universal  selfishness  as  actuality  may  well  be  false,  but  universal 
selfishness as a requirement of rationality is patently absurd" (Sen, 1987, p. 16).  I 
suppose that by "universal selfishness" Sen refers to the position of psychological 
egoism and thereafter he is clearly referring to rational egoism.  However, the 
relationship between psychological egoism and rational egoism is probably more 
complex than Sen suggests.  For example, if people are motivated as psychological 
egoists believe they are, then they cannot help but be self-interested, rationality and 
self-interest would therefore always go hand-in-hand.  On this view, rationality 
might influence the choice of acts but not the motivation behind those acts which - 89 -   
 
 
would always be one of self-interest.  If there is a choice about whether to act from 
self-interest  or  not,  then  psychological  egoism  is  no  longer  an  option  as  a 
description of all acts on all occasions.  The important point is that Sen suggests, 
and I wholly agree, that self-interest for economists is more than just a simplifying 
assumption, it is taken to be a description of real behavior.  Such a claim is, despite 




In  many  respects  Jensen  and  Meckling's  agency  theory  provides  the  clearest 
statement in the field of business economics on the economic interpretation of self-
interest.    The  authors  explicitly  address  both  the  structural  (they  are  rational 
egoists) and external (“almost everything” is an aim) dimensions of self-interest 
and they take a clear position on the scope to which their model is meant to apply 
(Jensen and Meckling 1994, Jensen, 1994).  The purpose of agency theory is to 
describe how conflicts of interest can arise between the owners and managers of a 
firm and to suggest methods to control such conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Although agency theory was originally directed at understanding and overcoming 
conflicts within corporations, the authors have since attempted to generalize their 
findings to all situations involving conflicts, including conflicts between members 
of families and other social organizations.  In their general model, which they call 
the resourceful, evaluative, maximizing model of human behavior, they make a 
number of claims that are relevant to the issues at hand. 
     
Their  model  consists  of  four  propositions  each  of  which  I  will  briefly  discuss 
(Jensen  and  Meckling,  1994).    The  first  proposition  consists  of  three  sub-
components:  a.  Agents  care  about  "almost  everything"  including  knowledge, 
independence,  the  plight  of  others,  the  environment,  honor,  interpersonal 
relationships, status, peer approval, group norms, culture, wealth, rules of conduct, 
the weather, music, art and so on; b. An agent is always willing to make trade-offs 
and  substitutions  among  goods;  c.  Preferences  are  transitive.    The  second 
proposition describes the self-interest assumption of the model, and amounts to the 
assumption that the desires of agents are unlimited.  Those things that agents want 
are defined as goods, so that agents always want more goods.  The third postulate 
says that although agents wants to enjoy the highest level of value possible, they 
are  constrained  by  limits  on  such  things  as  wealth,  time  and  laws.    The  last 
postulate  says  that  agents  are  resourceful  and  able  to  foresee  changes  to  their 
environments and respond by creating new possibilities. - 90 -   
 
 
      
Each  of  the  propositions  raises  a  number  of  questions.    For  instance,  the  first 
proposition, sub-component “a”, states that agents care about almost everything, 
which,  given  the  diverse  list  of  goods  that  the  authors  mention,  leaves  one 
wondering  what  the  "almost"  refers to.   The  model  appears  to be  a somewhat 
restricted version of preference theory.  However, while preference theory makes 
no constraints on what is preferred, Jensen and Meckling specify that their model 
refers to “goods” which are defined as those things that people want.  However, 
this is an odd restriction given that agents also care about avoiding “bads”.  For 
instance, given two bad outcomes, an agent will presumably prefer the outcome 
that causes the least harm.  A theory that only looks at what agents want will 
“miss” much of what drives human behavior. 
 
A more substantial problem, especially given that almost everything is a good that 
is wanted and given the authors' transitivity assumption, is that there are bound to 
be  comparability  and  commensurability  problems.    For  instance,  how  much 
freedom is someone willing to give-up for what amount of wealth?  What is the 
unit of measure of a norm or honor?  For instance, duties are obligations that agents 
generally are not readily willing to negotiate away.  This is not to say that a person 
who  believes,  for  instance,  that  telling  lies  is  wrong,  will  not  lie  under  all 
conceivable conditions.  At some point, for instance, on pain of death, people can 
be made to do almost anything.  However, the authors specifically state that an 
agent is always willing, as opposed to forced, to trade goods.  That assumption 
raises the issue of what the authors mean by willing, but even if we ignore that 
complication,  we  can  certainly  ask  whether  all  goods  should  be  tradable.    For 
example, should we accept someone selling their freedom for a loaf of bread even 
if they willingly chose to do so?  By increasing the scope of goods to include 
“almost everything” and by their claim that agents are always willing to trade and 
substitute all goods, the authors have raised fundamental normative issues.  In that 
respect the model appears to be fundamentally flawed. 
 
In terms of the dimensions that I defined at the beginning of this manuscript, the 
authors defend the structural assumption that agents are rational egoists while the 
aims of agents are "almost anything".  The authors thereby reject what they call the 
economic  notion  that  agents  are  only  interested  in  money  income  or  wealth 
maximization, while accepting what they claim is the economic assumption of self-
interest maximization.  I do not believe that most economists claim that people are 
only interested in money and wealth, certainly those who follow preference theory - 91 -   
 
 
do not make such a claim.  Furthermore, preference theory says nothing about the 
motive of self-interest; however, I have already extensively discussed both of those 
objections and won't repeat them here.  The claim that I would like to address is the 
one that people maximize their self-interest.  It is not obvious to me that people 
maximize "anything" as the authors claim. It could (incorrectly) be claimed that no 
matter  what  people  do,  they  are  maximizing  something.    For  instance,  while 
deciding whether to choose cola A or cola B, at some point a person might decide 
that he is wasting his time and it really doesn't matter which cola he chooses given 
their similarity.  So, the argument might go, the person has included the value of 
his time by deciding not to decide and simply taking the cola closest at hand.  This 
would  be  an  unusual  definition  of  maximization.    Maximization,  on  my 
understanding,  involves  a  certain  level  of  psychological  commitment  or 
involvement in arriving at a decision, while many daily decisions involve only a 
very  low  level  of  intention  or  are  arrived  at  by  habit.    The  point  is  that 
maximization, to be somewhat meaningful, requires a certain amount of vigor--
vigor that is frequently lacking in daily decisions.  I thereby reject as unrealistic the 
assumption that people are self-interested maximizers. 
 
That agents in Jensen and Meckling's model are rational egoists is not surprising 
given the definitions they use.  The authors claim that anything that a person wants 
is a good and that they attempt to maximize their good.  Putting aside the problem 
of maximization, it would be difficult for anyone accepting the author's assumption 
to argue that it would be rational for agents to prefer those things that do not give 
them the maximum good. The main problem with such an argument is that by 
including almost everything as a part of self-interest, and by not specifying what 
“almost” entails, the terminology becomes confused.  As I have stated previously, 
not everything that an individual prefers is preferred because it is in their interest, 
for instance, people may prefer things because it improves the well-being of others, 
despite the impact of that choice on their own interests.  Take for instance the case 
of a preference for altruistic acts, a person cannot be an altruistic, self-interested, 
maximizer without hopelessly muddling the language.  Altruism and self-interest 
are  not  the  same  things  and  their  different  meanings  should  be  preserved.  
Furthermore, the authors do not offer any evidence that altruistic motives or actions 
motivated  by  duties  or  any  other  motive  that  works  against  one's  interests  are 
irrational--why should we assume they are? 
     
In  their  model,  Jensen  and  Meckling  allow  that  people  have  the  capacity  for 
altruism which they confusingly define as: "They (people) care about others and - 92 -   
 
 
take their interests into account while maximizing their own welfare" (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1994, p. 18).  This is a very loose definition that places the focus of an 
act clearing on the agent's own interests rather than the interests of those who are 
the beneficiaries of their altruistic actions.  I suspect that their definition is too 
inclusive; for instance, even using a very generous interpretation of Jensen and 
Meckling’s definition, instrumental self-interest is not ruled out.  For instance, an 
agent might express an interest in the well-being of others only to the extent that it 
maximizes their own interests, allowing the possibility of actions that are closer to 
enlightened self-interest than altruism.  Their definition, in short, allows many acts 
that are motivated by self-interest to be called altruistic, thereby, again, confusing 
two  concepts  that  should  be  kept  separate.    Finally,  the  authors  criticize  an 
altruistic position that they call the perfect agent.  Perfect agents are defined by the 
authors as people who maximize the public good as opposed to their own welfare.  
What appears to make agents perfect is their indifference to the type of altruistic 
acts  they  perform.    According  to  the  authors,  since  agents  have  their  own 
preferences  they  cannot  be  perfect  agents.    "Perfect  agents  would  be  equally 
satisfied working to save the whales, feed the poor, make computers, or care for the 
musical interests of the rich through the local symphony orchestra at the bidding of 
their employees.  Altruist that she is, Mother Teresa's devotion to caring for the 
poor of Calcutta does not make her a perfect agent."  I find this a convincing 
argument.  Although it is possible to imagine individuals who are motivated to act 
altruistically whatever the cause, it is more likely that people have some preference 
ranking among the sorts of projects that they support.  In fact, a “perfect” altruist 
would, in my opinion, prefer to perform those acts that provide the greatest net 
benefit rather than haphazardly choosing altruistic projects.  However, I do not 
know anyone who defends the perfect altruist position, being an altruist does not 
exclude the possibility of having preferences as the authors propose. 
 
Conclusions Chapter Three 
  
For  the  most  part,  economists  and  those  scholars  using  the  ”economic” 
assumptions  of  self-interest  and  rationality  appear  to  take  both  of  these 
assumptions for granted.  While the understanding of what economists mean when 
they use the term rationality has been thoroughly scrutinized, few economic or 
business  models  that  I  know  of  offer  more  than  superficial  argumentation  in 
support  of  the  assumption  of  self-interest.    The  evidence  that  agents  are  self-
interested  often  boils  down  to  the  claim  that  others  have  made  the  same 
assumption.  However, the assumption of self-interest, at least in purely theoretical - 93 -   
 
 
contexts,  is  not  a  requirement  of  economic  theory.    That  said,  self-interest  is 
generally accepted, and defended, by economists and business scholars.  They are 
by no means alone in making either the assumption of self-interest or rationality, 
some form of these assumptions have been, more or less, the default positions since 
philosophers in Athens first began discussing how to live a good life.  Although the 
dominance of self-interest as a description of motivation has occasionally been 
challenged, it has always been, and will always be, an accurate description of a 
large part of what motivates human action.  The trend in economics is now towards 
a very narrow understanding of self-interest.  This narrow definition is taken by 
modern scholars, and a large part of the general public for that matter, as such an 
obviously and naturally true description of motivation that it does not appear to 
even warrant comment among scholars.  In fact, it so widely adopted that it appears 
to be accepted as a description of actual behavior rather than an assumption made 
in order to build more tractable models.  The current situation makes the opening 
remarks of Joseph Butler's "Eleventh Sermon" of his book, Sermons on Human 
Nature,  as  applicable  today  as  they  were  when  they  were  written  in  the  early 
eighteenth century: "... that vice and folly takes different turns, and some particular 
kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than in others; and I suppose it 
may  be  spoken  of  as  very  much  the  distinction  of  the  present  to  profess  a 
contracted spirit and greater regards to self-interest than appears to have been done 
formerly."  (Butler,  1986,  p  46).    In  short,  self-interest  as  a  default  position  is 
nothing new, forms of self-interest have been taken as prima facie explanations of 
human nature for thousands of years.  What I believe is unique is the very narrow 
form  that  has  been  attributed to the term  and the  degree  to  which  it  has  been 
casually adopted and applied, largely implicitly, by economists and other scholars.  
These  scholars  have  neglected  the  many  subtle  differences  in  theories  of  self-
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In previous chapters I have outlined some of the sources of confusion surrounding 
the economic and business assumption of self-interest, much of which is caused by 
an overly simplified and ambiguous understanding of self-interest.  I have also 
claimed  that  the  general  motive  of  self-interest  allows  a  very  wide  range  of 
behaviors, in this chapter I will provide specific evidence supporting that claim.  I 
believe that a finer demarcation of the different sorts of self-interest will allow 
modelers to build less ambiguous models which, in turn, will yield results that are 
easier to interpret and more illuminating.  In the first two sections of this chapter I 
will provide the fundamental elements of a system for organizing the motive of 
self-interest along what I have called its structural and external dimensions.  The 
separation  that  I  draw  between  structural  and  external  is  made  partially  for 
expository purposes; the two dimensions are often linked in the sense that, for 
instance, a person's overall aims, those objects that a person uses as guideposts 
from  which  to  subjectively  measure  his  performance,  may  often affect  how he 
orders his preferences or desires.  However, in order to clarify the main issues at 
hand, I will discuss the two dimensions as if they were independent. 
 
Structural Dimension Of Self-interest 
 
To remind the reader, the structural dimension is an assumption about the manner 
in which an agent combines aims and goals.  I have chosen to limit my analysis to 
those  types  of  reasoning  that  appear  to  represent  positions  expressed  in  the 
economic and business literatures.  Although the terminology related to this topic is 
subtle  and  dense,  two  categorizations  are  helpful  in  emphasizing  important 
differences in the various approaches.  The first category divides what I will call 
pure theories of self-interest from mixed theories of self-interest.  The theories of 
psychological egoism, rational egoism and ethical egoism are pure and therefore 
parsimonious in the sense that they are generally taken to describe what people are 
or  should  be  in  all  contexts,  namely,  self-interested.    Mixed theories  are those 
approaches that allow motives other than self-interest to be expressed in certain 
contexts.  The trade-off between pure and mixed theories may be described in 
terms of the greater accuracy that many believe mixed theories provide, but they 
provide that accuracy at the cost of greater complexity.  I have mentioned several 
examples of both pure and mixed strategies that the reader may want to keep in - 96 -   
 
 
mind when reading this chapter.  For instance, Gary S. Becker and many other 
economists have a very expansive understanding of the range of actions over which 
the motive of self-interest applies.  Meckling and Jensen, developers of Agency 
Theory,  believe  that  the  pure position of rational  egoism  describes  behavior in 
almost all contexts.  On the other hand, Oliver Williamson, a primary developer of 
Transaction Cost Economics, at times claims that a narrow type of self-interest 
called  opportunism  operates  when  significant  economic  decisions  are  under 
consideration  and  another  type  of  motivation,  which  is  left  undefined  but 
apparently is non-interested, operates in everyday contexts. 
 
The second category concerns positive versus normative theories of self-interest.  
This categorization is important because economists and others who assume self-
interest  may  not  realize  that  certain  forms  of  that  motive  have  normative  and 
specifically ethical implications.  Rather than being a norm free assumption, as I 
believe it is often taken to be, the assumption of self-interest, at a minimum, has 
ethical implications.  Consequently, if self-interest is understood to be a position 
with  ethical  implications  then  it  needs  to  be  defended  against  other  ethical 
positions.  To take a highly relevant example, if an economic researcher's message 
to his audience is that they should be narrowly self-interested, then that researcher 
has opened himself to the basic question of why.  For example, Meckling and 
Jensen  believe  that  agents  should  be  modeled  as  rational  egoists,  which  is  a 
normative position that implies that agents should act from self-interest if they 
want to be rational.  Their position raises the obvious question of why an agent 
should act from self-interest as opposed to acting, for instance, as duty demands.  
For instance, a person can ask whether acting from self-interest necessarily makes 
his life go best or in what dimension of his life will being self-interested make his 
life go best.  The answer to those questions will depend on one's aims, the topic of 
the  section  to  follow;  in  this  section  I  will  confine  my  analysis  to  the  ethical 
implications of the different types of self-interest under consideration.  Economic 
and business scholars should be aware of whether they are taking a stance that has 
normative implications and, if so, they should be prepared to defend their position 
against other norms of behavior. 
I  should  stress  that  the  fact  economists  and  business  scholars  make  normative 
statements is not the issue, that, after all, is a large part of the entire economic 
exercise.    The  ultimate  goal  of  normative  economics  (as  opposed  to  positive 
economics) and business research, is presumably to derive a better understanding 
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practices.  Economics, and more importantly business studies, is concerned with 
the positive study of how markets and organizations work, but also with how firms 
should operate in order to raise profits or share price or some other objective.  The 
point at issue, however, is not the best procedures to reach an objective, but the 
normative assumption that economics makes about the aims of agents.  Economics, 
rightly or wrongly, is often taken to advocate a very narrow set of norms centered 
on egoistic behavior.  The message is that agents should be and ought to be selfish 
or  at  least  should  not  feel  inhibited  from  so  acting.    I  am  not  suggesting  that 
economic  audiences  are  merely  passive  recipients  to  economic  propaganda, 
however, there is evidence that by repeating a message enough times it becomes 
true or believable to some.  According to Jane Mansbridge: "Interpreting all non-
egoistic  behavior  as  egoistic  reduces  the  degree  to  which  the  readers  of  those 
interpretations  are  exposed  to  unselfish  behavior.    Therefore,  interpreting  non-
egoistic behavior as egoistic diminishes a powerful incentive to unselfish behavior.  
This in turn reduces the likelihood of human cooperation" (Mansbridge, 1990; see 
also, Dawes et. al, 1990, and Marwell et al. 1981, Frank, et al., 1988). Although I 
do not agree with Mansbridge's claim that egoism and cooperation are necessarily 
opposed to one another (instrumental egoists for instance may work together to 
achieve their individual goals), her more modest claim that misinterpreting non-
egoistic behavior as egoistic can lead to more egoistic behavior seems reasonable.  
More importantly, as I will show in this chapter, there is a strong link between self-
interest and ethics, so by advocating the position that people are or should be self-





Given that it appears to be the default position for many economists and people in 
general, I will begin by discussing the position of psychological egoism before 
turning to some of the other theories of self-interest.  Psychological egoism has 
some interesting and unique features, namely, it is a descriptive position that says 
that  people  are  motivated  purely  by  self-interest  so  that, in turn, all  actions or 
behaviors  are  at  their  base  motivated  by  self-interested.    Advocates  of 
psychological egoism argue that even those acts that appear to be motivated by 
some other motive are, if one digs deep enough, really motivated by self-interest.  
This position is meant to describe the motives behind all actions in all contexts, as 
a result, it is open to refutation by counter-example, although I have shown in - 98 -   
 
 
previous  chapters  that  discovering  the  motive  or  motives  behind  a  behavior  is 
easier said than done. 
 
There are several reasons that psychological egoism is a particularly interesting 
topic for discussion in this manuscript.  An obvious reason is that the standard 
behavioral assumption made by many economists and business scholars seems to 
reflect a belief that all “economic” reasoning is based on self-interested.  And, 
since it is becoming increasingly unclear how economic reasoning differs from 
non-economic reasoning, and the trend is to extend the range of subjects to which 
economic analysis applies, psychological egoism then appears to be an accepted 
description of all facets of life.  It follows from this line of reasoning that to the 
extent that activities are based on the motive of self-interest and rationality, then 
they are potential subjects of economic analysis.
9  Second, as previously discussed, 
an  acceptance  of  psychological  egoism  would  have  the  benefit  of  aligning  the 
assumption of self-interest with preference theory.  Although preference theory 
says nothing about motives, the belief that all actions are motivated by self-interest 
would  imply  that  all  preferences  are  motivated  by  self-interest  as  well.    An 
acceptance of psychological egoism would therefore mean that the assumption of 
self-interest and preference theory would no longer potentially be at odds.  Third, 
an acceptance of psychological egoism would open the way for an acceptance of 
rational egoism, a position that has many adherents in economics; I will discuss the 
relationship  between  psychological  egoism  and  rational  egoism  in  a  separate 
subsection below.  Finally, if the arguments for psychological egoism are found 
convincing,  then  motives  other  than  those  based  on  self-interest  are  implicitly 
rejected, if not, then the assumption of self-interest in particular contexts needs to 
be defended or face the charge of arbitrariness.  In other words, if psychological 
egoism  is  accepted,  then  there  would  be  no  reason  to  differentiate  between 
different contexts in terms of their motivation because all actions in all contexts 
would be motivated by self-interest.  If it is rejected, then those who assume that 
self-interest is the motive behind behavior will need to defend that assumption. 
 
                                                 
9 See Brennan (1994) for the negative implications that some economists make by equating 
self-interest and rationality.  Within economics it is often taken for granted that self-
interested (or prudent) behavior is rational, while the argument that ethical behavior can be 
rational is often met with skepticism. That's my starting point as well, it should be 
emphasized that self-interested behavior can be irrational, and altruistic motives, which I 
believe to be a necessary condition for an act to be ethical, can be rational. 
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I need to be more careful about the basic claim of psychological egoism.  I do not 
believe  that  a  defender  of  psychological  egoism  has  to  believe  that  people  are 
somehow bound or required to act from self-interest alone; there is no law which 
forces an agent to always be motivated by self-interest, by which I mean that an 
agent  always  has  the  choice  to  act  from  a  non-self-interested  motive.    The 
argument, I believe, is that it is “natural” to be motivated by self-interest and acting 
from a motive other than self-interest is therefore ”unnatural”.  The term “natural” 
(like the term rational) is one of the more abused terms in philosophy and social 
sciences.  I use it in a biological sense, that people are genetically inclined to be 
self-interested.  Therefore, people are able to act from a non-self-interested motive, 
but doing so goes against their true inclinations according to this position.  Perhaps, 
along similar lines, a psychological egoist might argue that there is no good reason 
to act from other than self-interest, thereby, a person can act altruistically, but there 
is no good motivating reason to do so.  The second line of reasoning begins to 
express the view of rational egoism to be discussed below. 
 
Psychological egoism, just as with all of the theories of self-interest that I discuss 
in this section, doesn't tell people which external objects to aim at, rather, it says 
something about how self-interest is presumed to function in human psychology.  
Psychological  egoism  differs  from  rational  and  ethical  egoism  in  that  it  is  a 
descriptive, non-normative, approach that holds that people can naturally pursue 
only what they take to be in their self-interest.  In addition, because all motivation 
to act is taken to be self-interested, it also implies that all behavior is at base self-
interested.  However, as shown in chapter two, accepting psychological egoism 
would mean rejecting what many would find to be essential human characteristics, 
for example, there would be no place for truly altruistic acts, sympathy, duties and 
particular  affections  that  damage  one's  interests,  and  special  relationships  that 
provide good reasons for a person to make self-sacrifices for others based on the 
relationship alone.  In keeping with my previous attempts to define the boundaries 
of self-interest, psychological egoism can perhaps best be understood by examining 
the sorts of behavior an acceptance of that position excludes.  Shaver (1999) has 
compiled just such a list which includes the following items: a. harm to the agent's 
own interests; b. doing what is morally right; c. and, promoting the well-being of 
others.    These  three  acts  are  excluded  because,  respectively,  they  are  self-
destructive, morally motivated, or altruistic.  As I will show, I do not entirely agree 
with Shaver's analysis, but his list brings to fore many important issues that need to 
be addressed if psychological egoism is to be understood.  The procedure I will 
follow in the next few subsections is to examine and challenge each of Shaver's - 100 -   
 
 
points in turn, emphasizing their respective shortcomings; by this method I hope to 
give an impression of the facets and potential limits of psychological egoism. 
 
According to Shaver, a theory of self-interest needs to exclude the possibility of 
intentionally harming one's interests.  On the surface this seems like a reasonable 
requirement;  it  would  be  odd  to  argue  that  someone  who  intentionally  harms 
himself is acting in his interest.  However, people frequently, knowingly, harm 
their own interests.  The psychological phenomenon known as weakness-of-will is 
a common occurrence, it describes those situations in which a person performs an 
act even though the person believes, even at the point of acting, that it is not in 
their interest to do so.  An example is the case in which a person succumbs to a 
momentary urge to eat a bag of cookies even when they simultaneously believes 
that they need to lose weight to remain healthy.  Many consumers feel a strong 
impulse to buy things that deep down they know they really don't need or even 
want.  Supermarkets, for example, know that it is hard to resist the impulse to buy 
small trinkets and snacks and intentionally place those items near the checkout 
counter  hoping  that  shoppers  will  succumb  to  a  momentary  urge  to  buy  those 
items.  In fact, many people go to great lengths to avoid temptation--to put it into 
familiar terms--they intentionally restrict their preference set.  But that explanation 
is  not  quite  right,  because  what  seems  to  be  a  better  description  of  what  is 
happening at such moments is that a person has an immediate preference to eat a 
handful of cookies, although they simultaneously have a longer-term preference 
not to.  I propose, in keeping with precedent, to call such immediate preferences 
urges, impulses or passions.  The difference between these drivers of action and 
preferences is critical. Preferences, I believe, are informed by careful reasoning, 
while urges and passions may cause a person to temporarily bypass reasoning; they 
thereby represent a potential source of internal conflict between immediate and 
longer-term interests.
10  Succumbing to an urge means doing what you believe is 
not in your long-term interest.  You have no good reason to eat that bag of cookies, 
and you aware of that fact, but you do it anyway.  People appear to simultaneously 
have at least two conflicting sets of interests, one set based on good reasons and 
another not. 
  
                                                 
10 See Amartya Sen (1978) for a discussion of meta-preferences. 
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What  makes  weakness-of-will  cases  particularly  interesting  is  that  there  is  no 
confusion or lack of information about what is in one's interest; again, momentary 
urges overcome what people believe is in their best interest.  It is not the case that a 
person exhibiting weakness-of-will isn't aware or has forgotten that their actions 
are harmful to their interests.  Weakness-of-will is also not the same thing as taking 
an interest in activities that, perhaps objectively, may not be in one's best interest.  I 
believe that the difference in these cases relates to the reasons that an agent uses to 
justify their actions.  For instance, a person may gamble even though they believe 
that gambling is not in their long-term financial interest; however, they expect the 
short-term  pleasure  received  from  gambling  to  outweigh  the  expected  future 
displeasure from being a little bit poorer.  The gambler in this case believes that it 
is probably not in their best financial interest to gamble, but the pleasure derived 
from gambling overcomes the reduction in pleasure they expect to suffer from a 
reduction in wealth.  They are aware of the calculation, proceeds to gamble, and 
have good reason to do so.  This case differs from weakness-of-will because the 
expected pleasure of gambling overrides, for the person in question, the expected 
displeasure  from  losing  some  money.    In  contrast,  cases  of  weakness-of-will 
involve  internal  controversies;  for  the  gambler  described  above  there  is  no 
controversy because they expect to receive an increase in net pleasure.  Contrast 
the  foregoing  case  with  the  case  of  a  person  addicted  to  gambling.    Addicted 
gamblers believe that gambling will leave them worse-off.  Put in terms of the aim 
of pleasure, they believe that their overall expected pleasure will be diminished by 
gambling but they do it anyway.  They are aware that the momentary pleasure that 
they expect to derive from gambling will not be greater than the displeasure that 
they will experience from lower wealth, yet they continue to gamble.  They don't 
have a good reason to gamble, in fact they have a good reason not to, but they do 
so anyway. 
 
The relevance of this issue should be apparent: immediate interests, whether they 
are called urges, impulses or passions, don't necessarily reflect a person's wider 
interests.  People have immediate interests that they correctly believe will damage 
their long-term interests and, although their reasons for performing such acts might 
not be good, that doesn't stop them from acting upon them.  Weakness-of-will is an 
empirical strike against any theory of self-interest, including psychological egoism, 
which claims that people always do what they believe to be in their interest.  As a 
descriptive position, psychological egoism is therefore flawed.  It might be possible 
to modify psychological egoism to claim that, for instance, rational or reasonable 
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would  mean  that  psychological  egoism  is  no  longer  a  descriptive  position 
representing real motives.  Rather, it would be a normative position that claims to 
tell people what they should do if they want to live, for instance, a rational life.  To 
conclude, a theory of self-interest should perhaps exclude acts that harm's one's 
interests, but such a theory will thereby exclude some observed behaviors. 
 
The second exclusion mentioned by Shaver, that psychological egoism bars doing 
what is morally right, is more problematic.  Many ethicists propose that ethical 
behavior can't  be  motivated  by  self-interest, thereby  making  this  claim  true  by 
definition (Sidgwick, 1981, Williams, 1973).  I agree, ethical behavior has to be 
predominately  motivated  by  altruism  and  cannot  be  motivated  by  self-interest 
alone.    However,  contrary  to  Shaver's  claim,  it  is  possible  that  someone  can 
perform acts that meet with moral approval while being self-interested.  This point 
turns on the issue of what it means to be ethical.  If a person is required to be in an 
ethical psychological state of mind in order to perform ethical acts, then behaviors 
that meet with ethical approval but are not based on moral reasoning, for example 
altruism, are not ethical.  However, this doesn't necessarily exclude the possibility 
that behavior that is motivated by self-interest can result in acts which are ethically 
approved.  For example, self-interested people and corporations often donate to 
charities because it is good for their respective images.  If we take the aim of 
improving one's image to be exclusively motivated by self-interested, then these 
individuals and corporations are not acting ethically.  However, the actions of these 
donators  may  meet  with  ethical  approval.    I  have  previously  discussed  the 
difficulty  of  determining  the  degree  to  which  an  act  is  altruistic  or  pseudo-
altruistic, but the point remains that it is certainly possible to perform acts that have 
beneficial effects, without being an altruistic person or company.  Psychological 
egoism  excludes  the  possibility  of  being  altruistic  and  therefore,  by  some 
definitions, morally right, but it doesn't prevent performing acts that meet with 
moral approval.  In short, theories of self-interest bar a person from being ethical, 
but do not bar them from doing what is morally right. 
 
An interesting twist on this issue which is sometimes heard is the argument that 
someone  can't  reasonably  be  held  accountable  for  what  he  should  do  if  he  is 
incapable of doing otherwise.  It is not, for instance, reasonable to tell someone that 
they should be willing to sacrifice their own interests for the interests of others if it 
is believed that people can only naturally be self-interested.  It is always possible 
that  some  people  might  be  able  to  suppress  their  natural  inclinations  and  act 
according  to  some  other motive  than  self-interest,  but  such  behavior  would be - 103 -   
 
 
beyond the reasonable limits of most people.  Telling people that they should act 
altruistically would be asking them to perform acts that are known to go against 
their  true  nature.    If  this  argumentation  is  accepted,  then  an  acceptance  of 
psychological egoism thwarts any discussion of ethical norms.  Not all of which is 
necessarily a strike against psychological egoism; rather, it has often been used as 
an argument against the unrealistic requirements of many ethical systems. 
 
In  addition,  'original'  self-interested  motives  can  be  manipulated to  conform  to 
standards of ethical behavior.  For instance, incentives can be offered to bring self-
interested  motives  into  line  with  what  appears,  but  of  course  isn't,  ethically 
motivated behavior.  In such cases, even granting that people are psychological 
egoists doesn't imply that self-interest can't be used to promote ethically approved 
actions.    For  example,  many  governments  offer  taxpayers  incentives  for 
contributing to charities.  The idea being that if the reward is big enough, self-
interested people will contribute to benevolent causes.  In effect, a tax deduction 
transforms self-interest behavior into ethically approved activities.  Even though 
psychological egoism may describe the motives behind original behavior, it doesn't 
necessarily  describe  the  resulting  actual  behavior  because  self-interest  can  be 
manipulated to conform to ethically commendable behavior.  One last comment on 
this subject, the case of tax incentives implies that at some point someone may 
have decided that benevolent, pseudo-altruistic, acts were worth supporting, which 
raises  the  issue  of  whether  the  psychological  state  of  the  person  (or  persons) 
making such a decision was altruistic.  The issue then becomes whether an act with 
ethical implications is ethical if the state of mind of the person who induced such 
an act was ethical, but I'll leave the answer to that discussion to braver souls. 
     
I  disagree  with  Shaver's  third  exclusion  that  states  that  psychological  egoism 
forbids promoting the well-being of others.  I believe that it is often quite the 
opposite, a psychological egoist who refuses to promote the well-being of others 
would in many cases be damaging his own interests.  I will give two examples that 
demonstrate this idea; the first is the qualification that a person's interests often 
include the interests of others if only for instrumental reasons, the second is an 
empirical exception involving special relationships. 
 
Self-interested  motivation,  for  most  people,  almost  certainly  includes 
considerations for the interests of selected others.  To take a simple and obvious 
example, people's interests often include the well-being of their family, friends and 
other relations.  This is not the same as arguing that people are altruistic in that - 104 -   
 
 
they are willing to make a net sacrifice of their own interests to promote the well-
being of others, rather, this is the much weaker claim that people are at times 
willing to include the well-being of others in their own interests. A person can most 
certainly include the well-being of others in his own interests if only for his own, 
instrumental, reasons.  To use the terminology of the previous chapter, while the 
focus of the action is on the interests of the agent and not on the interests of other 
person, the interests of the other person promotes the agent's interests.  In short, a 
person can be self-interested and promote the well-being of others if only for self-
interested  reasons.    There  are  many  economic  examples  of  cases  in  which 
promoting the well-being of others is a necessary component in promoting one's 
own interests.  For instance, many economic trades, excluding those made under 
duress, are expected to promote the well-being of both parties.  In such situations 
we expect that the focus of each of the trading partners is centered on promoting 
his own interests.  However, an enlightened agent will realize that his own interests 
and the interests of others are often intertwined.  One example should be more than 
enough to convey this simple idea; an employer attracts employees to his firm by 
offering  incentives  that  promote  an  employee's  well-being,  the  employee  then, 
presumably, helps the employer to achieve his aims.  In well functioning labor 
markets,  the  employer  must  account  for  and  promote  the  interests  of  potential 
employees if he wants to realize his own interests. 
     
I will make two final comments on psychological egoism before discussing the 
relationship of self-interest to ethics, one involving its execution and the other its 
extent.  Even psychological egoists would have to admit that at times people don't 
achieve  their  interests  due  to  such  things  as  accidents  or  misinformation  or 
ignorance.    Although  clearly  true, this  admission doesn't  damage  their  position 
because a psychological egoist only claims that people are motivated to act by self-
interest, not that they always achieve those interests.  There are many factors, both 
within and beyond a person's control that can cause him to fail to achieve his aims 
and goals.  For instance, people often make decisions that conflict with their best 
interests due to poor information or an improper use of information, but this is not 
a point against the theory of psychological egoism, only against its execution.  Of 
course, a theory must take into account whether the goals and aims it sets are 
achievable, but under most circumstances this charge cannot be leveled against 
theories of psychological egoism.  In other words, it is usually possible to act from 
self-interest alone. 
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Finally,  it  is  unclear  whether  a  psychological  egoist  would  have  to  argue  that 
people are required to attempt to maximize their self-interest or if a marginal or 
minimum increase in well-being is enough to motivate an action.  One could argue 
that as long as an agent's interests are promoted, then that is enough to motivate a 
psychological egoist to act, but this would seem to go against the spirit of the 
approach.  Faced with two alternatives, one of which does more to further his 
interests than the other, it seems reasonable to require that the psychological egoist 
choose, within reason, the one which yields the greatest net benefit or causes the 
least net harm.  A complete definition of psychological egoism would have  to 
distinguish between these different sorts of approaches to self-interest. 
 
To summarize this long sub-section, there is empirical evidence in the form of 
weakness-of-will and special relations that call into question whether psychological 
egoism is a good description of all behavior.  What psychological egoism probably 
does  exclude  is  the  reasonable  or  rational  harming  of  one's  interests,  ethical 
motivation and the sacrifice of one's own interests for the well-being of others.  
The major benefit of assuming that people are psychological egoists is parsimony; 
all motivation is taken to originate from self-interest and therefore, to the degree 




In this subsection I purpose that to the extent that economists and business scholars 
claim that agents should or ought to be self-interested they are taking an ethical 
stance or a stance that at a minimum has ethical implications.  Mine is not a new 
observation, for instance, Henry Sidgwick (1981) rhetorically questioned whether 
he should include the topic of egoism in his famous book, The Methods of Ethics. 
While initially offering arguments against including it because, "... there are strong 
ground(s)  for  holding  that  a  system  of  morality,  satisfactory  to  the  moral 
consciousness of mankind in general, cannot be constructed on the basis of simple 
Egoism" (Sidgwick, 1981, p. 119). Sidgwick decided to include a discussion of 
egoism in his book because, there is "wide acceptance of the principle that it is 
reasonable for a man to act in the manner most conducive to his own happiness."  
Indeed, he notes that self-interest is expressly admitted into the systems of leading 
representatives of both Intuitionism and Universalistic Hedonism.  More forcefully, 
Sidgwick notes that: "[it is] hardly going too far to say that common sense assumes 
that 'interested' actions, tending to promote the agent's happiness, are prima facie 
reasonable:  and  that  the  onus  probandi  lies  with  those  who  maintain  that - 106 -   
 
 
disinterested conduct, as such, is reasonable" (Henry Sidgwick, edition 1981, p. 
120).    There  are  a  couple  of  points  to  note  in  Sidgwick's  statements.    First, 
Sidgwick is not claiming that egoism is an ethically defensible position, only that 
many people take what is in their self-interest as offering a good reason to act.  I 
believe that Derek Parfit (1984) echoes Sidgwick's statement when he makes the 
claim that egoism has ethical implications.  Simply stated, as I have alluded to on 
numerous occasions, acting exclusively from the motive of self-interest potentially 
crowds out the possibility of exercising ethical motives.  The second point to note 
is that Sidgwick is drawing a relationship between self-interest and rationality.  He 
claims  that  the  burden  of  proof  lies  on  those  who  claim  that  actions  that  are 
disinterested are rational as well.  Therefore, following Sidgwick, economists and 
business scholars who assume rational egoism are in line with “common sense” 
understanding when they link rationality and self-interest. 
 
Self-interest and Ethics 
     
The relationship between ethics and self-interest is as old as ethics itself.  In this 
paragraph I will briefly discuss two general approaches that typify this relationship; 
the point being to demonstrate the flexibility with which the term self-interest has 
been  used,  a  flexibility  that  allows  confusing  and  ambiguous  descriptions  of 
behavior.  On the one hand, a great deal of effort has been expended by ethicists to 
attempt to show that self-interest, if properly understood, includes acting ethically.  
In other words, one line of reasoning used by ethicists is to show that a well-
informed, knowledgeable, reflective person will act ethically because he properly 
understands  that  doing  so  is  in  his  enlightened  self-interest.    For  instance,  the 
reasoning may go as follows, what may objectively appear to be altruistic behavior 
is, in fact, self-interested behavior because it is in a person's interest to behave 
altruistically.  A person who acts unethically has an improper understanding of 
where  his  interests  lie,  but  once  the  misunderstanding  has  been  addressed,  the 
miscreant is expected to amend his behavior and act as ethics would have him 
behave.    This  strategy  involves  the  difficult  task  of  finding  convincing  links 
between what are considered ethical actions and self-interest.  The second approach 
follows  the  opposite  course  by  disassociating  self-interest  from  ethics.    Many 
ethicists  contend  that  an  act  motivated  by  self-interest  can't  be  ethical.    The 
argument  is,  in  order  to  be  ethical,  an  action  must  be  motivated  by  altruism, 
although altruism alone is not sufficient to make an action ethical.  I have followed 
a path in this manuscript analogous to the second approach (that of separating 
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between the motives of self-interest and altruism.  I define an altruist as someone 
who intends to help others.  Admittedly, an act is easier to identify as altruistic if an 
actor knowingly sacrifices his own net interests for the interests of others, but it is 
not a necessary condition of an altruistic act.  The danger that I am attempting to 
avoid is that of collapsing all behaviors, including those motivated by altruism, into 
the motive of self-interest, as is the case in the first approach described above.  
That approach incorrectly muddles the important, real, distinction between these 
two very different motives; in short, a person can't be, as I understand the terms, a 
self-interested altruist. 
 
If the distinction I have outlined is accepted, then economists and business scholars 
who tell people that they should be motivated by self-interest are taking an ethical 
stance.  By telling people that they should act from self-interest, they are, in effect, 
telling people that they shouldn't act ethically, while in some cases they are telling 
people  that  it  is  irrational  to  act  ethically.    Such  an  important  normative  step 
shouldn't be taken lightly by scholars and requires justification.  If the argument is 
that people can only be self-interested, then we are once again back to the less than 
completely satisfying case of psychological egoism.  However, if psychological 
egoism is rejected, then the argument for normative views of self-interest seems to 
be that people have the ability to choose whether to be self-interested or not, and 
given that ability, they should choose for the motive of self-interest.  This raises the 
issue of what makes self-interest a superior choice over other motives.  Several 
important questions naturally follow.  Why, for instance, should a person believe 
and act as if their interests are more important than the interests of others?  Are all 
of  one's  interests,  no  matter  how  trivial,  more  important  than  any  of  another 
person's interests?  Are there circumstances in which the interests of others have 
priority?  These are questions with important practical implications and the list of 
potential questions that arise is nearly endless, but a proper discussion would take 
me too far into the field of ethics. My point, however, is that there is a relationship 
between self-interest and ethics that needs to be considered by those who promote 
the motive of self-interest. 
 
Another idea that often accompanies economic discussions of self-interest is the 
argument that self-interested actions by individuals are justified because they lead 
to  greater  good  for  the  group  as  a  whole;  an  ends-justifies-the-means  type  of 
argument.  Note that it wouldn't be possible to argue that a person who is aware 
that  his  self-interested  acts  are  leading  to  benefits for  the  group  as  a  whole is 
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own  well-being.    However,  the  “invisible  hand”  argument  has  the  effect  of 
rationalizing  self-interested  behavior  by  which  I  mean  that  it  offers  people  a 
justification to act from self-interest.  The argument might go as follows, even if 
acts motivated by self-interest are unethical, they lead to beneficial results for the 
group as a whole, and should therefore be considered ethical.  The argument is not 
convincing from an ethical standpoint for what should now be obvious reasons; 
although a self-interested action by an individual group can have beneficial effects 
for a larger group, the important thing to consider are the intentions of the agent.  A 
self-interested act can clearly have beneficial effects, but that's not the reason why 
the act was executed.  The benefits to the group are not the motivating factors, they 
are a happy coincidence, and a truly selfish person will be indifferent between 
those acts that benefit the group and those that don't.  Actions motivated by self-
interest can undoubtedly have beneficial effects for the group, but they do not 
necessarily have such effects.  Adam Smith, in fact, gives several examples in, An 
Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations  in  which  self-
interested acts have led to negative consequences for the economy in general.  In 
fact, it is so obviously true that self-interested acts can lead to a reduction in overall 
economic  well-being  that  it  shouldn't  need  to  be  said;  the  papers  are  full  of 
examples in which such motives have damaged the lives of others and the overall 
economy. Altruistic acts, on the other hand, are intended to benefit others.  This is 
not to say that altruistic motives always result in benefits for the wider group; it is 
also possible to be entirely other-regarding and still perform acts that damage the 
interests of the group.  For instance, a man who sacrifices his own interests to free 
a  dangerous  criminal  from  prison  would  not  be  acting  for  the  benefit  of  the 
community  at  large--he  might  be  motivated  by  altruism,  but  his  actions  have 
negative consequences for the greater group.  However, in practice, such cases are 
probably the exception, altruistic motives are intended to benefit others, as opposed 
to self-interested motives that are intended to benefit the individual alone. 
 
To conclude, although acts motivated by self-interest can be beneficial for others, 
that is not the intention of the agent; his intention is clearly to promote his own 
interests.  Acts motivated by altruism, on the other hand, are intended to benefit 
others.  To the degree that people are successful in achieving their intentions, and 
supposing that people are as likely to achieve their altruistic intentions as they are 
their  self-interested  intentions,  altruistic  acts  promote  the  well-being  of  others.  
Whether there is  a  net  benefit  for the  entire  group (including  the  altruist)  will 
depend on such issues as the marginal returns of actions and multiplier effects.  For 
instance, if an act yields great benefits for the rest of the group at a small cost to the - 109 -   
 
 
altruist, then there will be a net benefit to the group as a whole; I will return to the 




Although rationality is not the main subject of this manuscript, the relationship 
between self-interest and rationality in economics is a close one, so close that the 
two taken together are often identified as the foundations of economic and business 
analysis.  Some economists argue, but usually just claim, that rationality and self-
interest go hand-in-hand.  For instance, advocates of the position of rational egoism 
claim  that  it  is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  an  action  to  be  rational  that  it 
contributes to the well-being of the agent.  In other words, agents should or ought 
always to seek their interests; in fact, the claim is that it would be non-rational for 
someone to pursue any other course of action other than that which promotes his 
self-interest.  In contrast to psychological egoism, which is supposed to describe a 
real psychological phenomenon and is not meant to advocate a normative position, 
rational egoism describes how people should act.  However, as shown above, it is a 
small, although not necessary, step from the acceptance of psychological egoism to 
the acceptance of rational egoism.  If people are only naturally motivated by self-
interest  then  they  pursue  only  those  actions  that  they  expect  will  yield  a  net-
increase in their well-being.  It is then possible to conclude that those activities that 
intentionally  damage  one's  interests  are  not  natural  and  therefore  are  not 
reasonable.  The drawback of linking rational egoism so closely to psychological 
egoism is that rational egoism is then susceptible to the same empirical deficiencies 
that plague psychological egoism.  It is possible of course to base rational egoism 
on something other than psychological egoism, Thomas Hobbes, to whom I shall 
return,  is  often  taken  to  have  advocated  rational  egoism  on  the  basis  of  the 
fundamental right to preserve and promote one's life. 
 
Following the reasoning outlined several paragraphs above, the position of rational 
egoism clearly raises the issue of the relationship between economics and ethical 
norms.  I believe that, in general, economists, particularly neoclassical economists, 
are wary of making normative statements.  Advocates of modern axiomatic utility 
theory largely disqualify themselves from making normative claims other than their 
unwavering support for the objective of personal autonomy to the exclusion of all 
other values.  Autonomy is the only value that the theory implicitly addresses and 
although autonomy is certainly an important value, for instance, few would want a 
benevolent  dictator  defining  our  lives  even  if  he  made  our  lives  go  better.  - 110 -   
 
 
Economic  autonomy,  by  which  I  mean  having  the  means  and  ability  to  make 
meaningful choices in regards to one's economic interests, is an important sub-set 
of autonomy, but it is most certainly not the only thing that people value.  For 
instance, in many countries people are quite happy to give-up a degree of their 
economic autonomy to the government in exchange for national health insurance 
and a smoothly working pension system.  By relying on utility theory, economists 
largely forfeit the right to make value judgments.  I believe that this is the price 
paid for the benefits of Hicks' remark, quoted above, of not wanting to see inside 
people's  heads.    Should  economists  be  willing  to  forfeit  the  right  to  say,  for 
instance, these acts will maximize profits, but are nevertheless wrong and should 
be avoided?  Utilitarians were willing to make the claim that, on occasion, the 
rights of individuals need to be sacrificed for the greater good.  Modern Utilitarians 
(the ethical school) and their opponents continue to argue over issues such as what 
is a right, the conditions under which a person should be willing to sacrifice his 
rights, and whether it is possible to compare and exchange rights.  Should, for 
instance, a person ever be made to sacrifice his life or is that a basic, irrevocable 
right?  The approach of modern economic utility theory avoids these issues and 
places autonomy as the central value. 
 
An often heard analogy is that economists are interested in growing the size of the 
cake and not in the issue of its distribution.  I take this to mean that economics, like 
baking, is taken to be a technical skill, while deciding who gets what share is a 
normative issue which positive economics doesn't claim to address.  However, of 
course, economists and especially business scholars do make normative statements.  
For instance, they build models that tell people what they should do in order to 
maximize their profits or share value or some other objective.  However, I believe 
that  most  economists  would  claim  that  they  do  not  make  ethical  normative 
statements, in other words, they are in principle opposed to telling people how they 
should live their lives.  However, given the close link between ethics and self-
interest which I have outlined above, it is easily possible to stumble into making 
ethical  statements.    For  instance,  Meckling  and  Jensen's  agency  theory  clearly 
advocates rational egoism, a position that has ethical implications. 
     
To conclude this subsection, to the degree that economists subscribe to rational 
egoism,  they  are  taking  a  stance  that,  at  a  minimum,  has  ethical  implications.  
Psychological egoism, on the other hand, removes the ethical stance by all claiming 
that all behavior emanates from self-interest.  An advocate of psychological egoism 
removes the normative element by claiming that people are self-interested, leaving - 111 -   
 
 
no place for the claim that they should act in one way or another.  In short, you 
can't tell people how they should act when you believe that they can't help but act 
from self-interest.  Rational egoism can't take this approach because its advocates 
are  telling  people  that  if  they  want  to  behave  rationally  then  they  should  be 
motivated by self-interest.  Therefore, to the degree that self-interest and ethics are 
correlated, rational egoism has ethical implications.  The claim that people are 
rational egoists shouldn't be taken lightly because it places economics squarely 
within a thousand year old ethical debate.  Not to be flippant, but economists who 
make such claims should be able to defend their “should” against other “shoulds”; 
they need to be able to argue why and in which contexts people should act from 
self-interest as opposed to some other motive (Hausman et al. 1994). 
 
Uninformed Instrumental Egoism 
 
An  alternative  theory  to  both  psychological  egoism  and  rational  egoism  is 
instrumental egoism.  It claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be 
rational that it best contributes to the satisfaction of the agent's desires (Shaver, 
1999, p. 39). By stipulating that rationality is based on “an agent's desires”, as 
opposed  to  “the  well-being  of  the  agent”  as  in  the  case  of  rational  egoism, 
instrumental egoism avoids some of the pitfalls of rational egoism.  In particular, it 
avoids the empirical problems of that theory because an agent has only to pursue 
his desires to be rational.  This theory would seem to fit well with what I presume 
most  economists  mean  when  they  use  the  term  self-interest;  however,  even  a 
glance at this theory reveals some major practical problems.  Note that Shaver's 
definition  allows  for  other-regarding  actions.    For  instance,  suppose  a  person 
desires that others do well and is willing to sacrifice his own net well-being for 
their well-being.  The first thing to note is that accepting the instrumental theory 
would mean explicitly rejecting psychological egoism because it allows for the 
case  that  the  well-being  of  others  can  alone  motivate  one  to  action.    An 
instrumental egoist can desire to be an altruist, in other words, he can be a self-
interested altruist, a conclusion that hopelessly confuses the terms self-interest and 
altruism.  Secondly, an instrumental egoist doesn't need to benefit from his actions, 
he may in fact be harmed by them, as long as the action is desired it can fit within 
this theory.  Instrumental egoism thereby rejects each of the conditions of self-
interested listed by Shaver.  An instrumental egoist can harm his own interests, do 
what is morally right, and promote the well-being of others.  One final note, by not 
ruling out malevolent acts this theory has severe ethical implications.  According to 
instrumental  egoism,  a  person  who  desires  to  enslave  or  destroy  the  world  is - 112 -   
 
 
rational.    I  suspect  that  even  the  most  liberal  economist  might  have  troubles 




Another normative position that some influential authors have argued for is ethical 
egoism.    Advocates  of  this  position  claim  that  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
condition for an action to be ethically right is that it maximizes one's self-interest.  
A nice example of this view is offered by Ayn Rand (2007) in her book, Atlas 
Shrugged: "Accept the fact that the achievement of your happiness is the only 
moral  purpose  of  your  life,  and  that  happiness--not  pain  or  mindless  self-
indulgence--is the proof of your moral integrity, since it is the proof and the result 
of your loyalty to the achievement of your values."  Although happiness has often 
been equated with self-interest, Rand goes one step further; it is her opinion that 
pursuing happiness is a moral (or ethical) duty.  Although she sets boundaries on 
self-interest,  arguing  that  it  shouldn't  include  “mindless  self-indulgence”  nor 
should it include pain, she offers no argument for these constraints.  There are 
many  problems  with  Rand's  approach,  her  terminology  is  vague  and  she  often 
attacks positions that nobody defends.  However, Rand makes two major mistakes.  
The  first  is  the  by  now  the  familiar  refrain  that  she  conflates  self-interest  and 
ethics.  To see this, take the example of a person who experiences the feeling of 
happiness  while  conducting  acts  based  on  altruistic  motives.    That  person, 
according  to  Rand,  performs  acts  which  are  motivated  by  altruism  for  self-
interested reasons; thereby mixing two motives that should remain separate.  Her 
second mistake is to equate feelings of happiness with ethical behavior.  Although 
it is reasonable to argue that people do those things that will bring them happiness 
(who  would  argue  otherwise?),  it  is  absurd  to  claim  that  all  acts  that  bring 
happiness are ethical.  If I have correctly interpreted and represented Rand's claims, 
then it is perhaps best to move on. 
 
A  subtle  but  important adjustment  might  be  to  add  to  the  definition  of  ethical 
egoism  the  condition  that  people  should  follow  their  enlightened  self-interest.  
Accepting this position would mean that a person should or ought do a specific 
action, all things considered, if and only if that action is in that person's overall, 
enlightened, self-interest  (Kalin,  1968:  66).   This  approach  follows  the  general 
strategy of broadening the definition of self-interest to include those things that 
people  should  know  are  in  their  best interest  where  the  word  enlightened  now 
carries a heavy burden.  The advantage of this and other similar approaches is that - 113 -   
 
 
it is possible to then claim that a person should have known, for instance, that 
drinking too much alcohol or eating too many french-fries is not in his best interest, 
while giving to charities promotes interests because part of being happy is showing 
a proper concern for the well-being of others.  The problem in broadening the 
definition to include what people should know is in their best interest is that the 
theory  of  self-interest  may  lose  the  advantage  of  subjectivity,  one  of  its  more 
appealing  points.    Many  theories  of  self-interest  contend  that  a  person  should 
pursue their desires or preferences as they see fit.  By adding the stipulation that 
people should know what's in their best interest, objective evaluations of actions 
may be implied.  Who, for instance, decides what a person should know?  Does the 
theory only apply to those with the proper knowledge and ability to reason?  While 
the maneuver of adding the stipulation of enlightenment of appeals to common 
sense, there may be a basic set of norms to which most of us could agree, the 
potential loss of subjectivity is a heavy price that runs against the grain of much 
liberal economic reasoning. 
     
Strategic Egoism 
 
Strategic egoism is similar to what I have previously called instrumental egoism 
but  with  the twist  that  it is  a  position  which  specifically  tries to  reconcile  the 
demands of self-interest with ethical attitudes.  It is an enlightened, instrumental 
approach in which people come to realize that it is in their advantage to develop, 
maintain and act on other regarding attitudes.  It is described as an enlightened 
position  because  people  are  taken  to  realize  that  while  their  interests  are 
conceptually distinct they are causally interdependent.  Once people realize their 
mutual dependence, the argument goes, they reason that it is in their advantage to 
cooperate with one another and restrain from particular activities; the result is the 
development of ethical systems of behavior.  This is clearly an instrumental (non-
realist)  understanding  of  ethics  in  that  ethical  behavior  is  used  as  a  vehicle  to 
realize one's own interests.  People may behave in an ethical manner, but by the 
reasoning of strategic egoism they are not motivated by ethical concerns and so 
such behavior is better labeled as pseudo-ethical rather than ethical.  There are 
some other problems with this approach.  The model stipulates that agents must 
come  to  realize  that  the  compliance  of  others  is  conditional  on  one's  own 
compliance.    As  an  ethical  system  this  position  is  thereby  troubled  by  the 
possibility  that  it  is  dependent  on  an  agent's  belief  that  others  are  helpful  to 
achieving his own projects, beliefs that might be missing.  For instance, if agents 
do not believe that others can help their cause, then they have no reason to act - 114 -   
 
 
ethically.    For example, there  will be  no  ethical  reason for  strategic  egoists to 
consider the effects of their actions on future generations.  In addition, people who 
are  powerful  enough  can  simply  opt-out  of  this  pseudo-ethical  system.    These 
shortcomings call into question whether strategic egoism is an ethical system at all.  
Strategic  egoism  may  be  a  good  description  of  how  pseudo-ethical  systems 






With the discussion of predominant egoism I turn to mixed as opposed to pure 
theories of self-interest.  The appeal of mixed strategies is that they provide a 
potentially  better  reflection  of  reality  in  that  they  can  accommodate  both  self-
interested and non-self-interested motives--those who base their understanding of 
human  nature  on  psychological  egoism  would  undoubtedly  disagree  with  this 
position.  The corresponding down side of such approaches is that they are less 
parsimonious.    I  have  previously  shown  examples  of  mixed  theories,  Oliver 
Williamson,  for  instance,  differentiates  between  opportunistic  behavior,  which 
dominates in periods in which important economic consequences are contemplated, 
and  what  he  calls  the  benign  day-to-day  periods  when  "frailty  of  motives" 
dominate.  An important requirement of mixed theories, one that Williamson fails 
to adequately address, is a clear specification of the conditions under which a given 
motive is relevant.  The theory proposed by Meckling and Jensen doesn’t suffer 
from this problem to the same degree as Williamson’s theory because they argue 
that rational egoism is appropriate in almost any context.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
Gary Becker (1976), despite his advocacy of the general applicability of preference 
theory and self-interest, distinguishes between family contexts, when disinterested 
concerns  dominate,  and  non-family  contexts,  in  which  self-interested  motives 
dominate.    In  doing  so,  Becker  appears  to  recognize  the  existence  of  special 
relationships, although limiting such relationships to just families strikes me as 
arbitrary.  Specifying the contexts in which the motive of self-interest is expected 
to apply is only the first step, the next step is to specify which type of self-interest 
is applicable.  Given the many understandings of the meaning of self-interest it is 
not enough to label motives as merely self-interested, more subtle descriptions are 
necessary in order to build an economic theory of self-interest. 
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Gregory  S.  Kavka  (1986)  describes  predominant  egoism  as  being  a  Hobbesian 
position. As the name implies, predominant egoism is the view that human action 
is  predominately  motivated  by  self-interest,  although  there  is  room  for  other-
regarding  motives.    Kavka  confusingly  distinguishes  between  self-interest  and 
other-regarding  behavior,  but  as  I  have  previously  shown,  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent a self-interested person from incorporating, to an extent, the interests of 
other people.  That issue aside, Kavka describes the position by referring to the 
following four propositions (Kavka, 1986: 64-65) which I paraphrase: 
 
    1. For most people in most situations, the motivation to act altruistically is only 
triggered if the gains to the benefactor are much larger than the costs to the altruist. 
     
    2. There are only a small number of people who are normally motivated by 
altruism as opposed to self-interest. 
 
    3. There are only a small number of situations in which the average person is 
motivated by non-self-interested motives. 
 
    4. The number of relations that motivate people to act altruistically is small and 
may include friends, relatives and close associates. 
 
Although there is room  for  debate  about  the  number  of  people to  which  these 
propositions apply, they appeal to common sense ideas about the rarity of altruism 
and emphasize the mix or distribution that self-interest has both within a person 
and across people.  It is important to recognize that this position leaves open the 
question about the conditions under which a person is more or less willing to act 
altruistically.    So  while  it  is  perhaps  a  more  realistic  position  than  say 
psychological egoism, it forces modelers to be more explicit about their behavioral 
assumptions.  In particular, an economist adopting this position would have to take 
into account and specify when egoism is expected to predominate as opposed to 





The last type of egoism that I will discuss is tautological egoism, which is the 
argument that because people always act to satisfy their own desires or preferences 
they  are  thereby  always  motivated  exclusively  by  self-interest.    Tautological - 116 -   
 
 
egoism is a nagging problem that has a tendency to creep into discussions of self-
interest.  The problem is that if desires or preferences are interpreted in a broad 
enough sense, so that they refer to whatever motivational feature within an agent 
that produced an action, then it is expressing a truism without empirical content.  
The reasoning incorrectly assumes that whatever it is that people desire or prefer 
they do so because it is in their self-interest.  It assumes, in other words, that the 
only  motive  behind  an  action  is  the  motive  of  self-interest.    An  altruist,  for 
instance, desires or prefers placing the needs of others before his own, a motive 
that  is  not  intelligibly  labeled  as  self-interested.    Clearly,  an  advocate  of 
psychological egoism wouldn't label this argument as empirically empty, but he 
would be equally unable to intelligibly use it as evidence to support his position.  
Tautological  egoism,  as  I  have  shown  in  the  case  of  both  the  theories  of 
Williamson  and  Meckling  and  Jensen,  is  still  heard  today  in  defense  of  self-
interest.  Their arguments run something along the following lines: agents prefer 
whatever it is that they choose (trivially true) and they chose whatever it is that is 
in their best interest (not necessarily true), therefore they are always motivated by 
self-interest (not necessarily true). 
 
External Dimension of Self-interest 
 
A  source  of  much  of  the  confusion  concerning  self-interest  is  the  failure  to 
distinguish between the structural aspects of self-interest, and the aims of self-
interest.  Previous sections of this chapter have dealt with the different ways that 
can be used to understand and explain the rationality of self-interest.  For instance, 
an ethical egoist orders his desires or preferences based on his belief that it is 
ethical for him to pursue his interests in a manner that promotes his designs.  The 
structural component doesn't address the different types of aims or goals that an 
agent can have.  The confusion rests with the knowledge that agents with different 
structural orderings can have the same external aims or vice versa.  For example, 
an altruist and an egoist can both have the goal of maximizing wealth, while the 
first intends to promote the happiness of others, the second intends to promote his 
own interests. 
 
The external component of self-interest concerns the aims or goals of agents.  In 
previous  chapters,  for  simplicity,  I  mainly  assumed  that  the  pursued  goal  was 
happiness or pleasure, but the number of aims that an agent can have is large.  In 
addition, aims can have different time frames which may conflict with one another.  
For instance, a long-term aim might be to live a cerebral life, while a short-term - 117 -   
 
 
aim might be to read the latest Nicci French novel or listen to the newest Madonna 
CD; two sets of goals that clearly conflict.  The general motive of self-interest, 
once again, is one method of reasoning or rationality that a person uses to link his 
motives  with  his  overall  aims.    While  the  structural  dimension  represents  the 
rationality  aspect  of  self-interest,  how  preferences  and  desires  are  ordered,  the 
external  component  represents  the  general  aims  that  are  preferred  or  desired.  
Separating the reasons or rationality that a person uses from the aims he pursues is 
a simplification, but I hope a helpful one.  It is a simplification because what a 
person aims at is likely to influence how he tries to achieve it.  For instance, as I 
have discussed previously, a person whose primary aim is to improve the well-
being of others will probably use a different sort of reasoning or rationality than a 
person whose aims to maximize his own well-being.  Vice versa, the rationality 
that a person uses may partially determine the aims of the person.  In all likelihood, 
neither component of the relationship is fixed and one influences the other.  That 
said, the message I wish to convey in this section is simple: the aims or goals that 
agents have affect the type of reasoning or rationality that they use to achieve those 
aims.  It is important to remember that self-interest is a means to achieve an aim, it 
is not itself an aim.  People do not attempt to maximize (satisfice, etc.)  their self-
interest,  they  attempt  to  maximize  certain  objects  that  they  take  to  be  in  their 
interest.  Popular use of the term self-interest may cause people to overlook the 
idea  that  self-interest  doesn't  specify  a  particular  aim.    I  suggest  that  different 
irreducible aims are likely to result in different types of reasoning and rationality, 
implying that modelers of human behavior need to specify the aims of agents if 
they wish to draw conclusions about the rationality of their subjects.  Claiming that 
an agent is self-interested, but not specifying the aims of that agent, may lead to 
ambiguous  interpretations  of  the  agent's  rationality.    Even  if  one  accepts  self-
interest  as  the  only  type  of  rationality  organizing  motives,  the  breadth  of  that 
assumption is so extensive that its use as the sole assumption of a model is of 
limited value. 
 
For reasons of simplification, in the following discussion I take for granted that 
self-interest, as opposed to some other motive, is the sole aim of the agents under 
consideration.  Therefore, the external dimension of the general motive of self-
interest concerns the various aims or goals of self-interest.  Whatever the type of 
self-interest one assumes, the aims of agents are undefined.  For instance, an agent 
can be self-interested and aim at leading a happy or pleasurable life, an academic 
life  or  a  life  full  of  experiences.    Being  exclusively  self-interested  probably 
prevents pursuing some aims, for instance living an ethical life or a godly life, but - 118 -   
 
 
the list of general aims that self-interest allows is nearly endless and so a method 
will have to be found in order to keep the discussion tractable.  The procedure I 
will follow in the subsections to follow is to first discuss Derek Parfit's (1984) very 
general categorization of the objectives of self-interest before turning to a more 
specific  list  of  objectives  compiled  by  C.D.  Broad  (1930,  1952)  and  others.  
Finally, I will examine some of the default aims that economics is commonly taken 
to specify. 
     
Parfit's Objectives of Self-interest 
 
Derek Parfit provides an outline of the different objectives of self-interest in his 
book, Reasons and Persons, (1984, appendix I).  Although he doesn't use the same 
terminology that I do, his review of the different sorts of self-interests coincides 
well with what I call the external dimension of that motive.  Parfit identifies three 
kinds  of  theories  of  self-interest:  hedonistic  theories,  desire-fulfillment  theories 
and, objective list theories.  In the terms I have been using, claiming that someone 
is self-interested leaves open the question of whether that person is attempting to 
aim at what will make their lives happy or pleasurable, or to fulfill their desires, or 
an objectively compiled list of objects that will make their lives go best.  I will 
briefly  discuss  each  of  these  theories  and  show  how  they  demarcate  different 
external aims. 
 
Hedonistic theories say that what is best for someone is what will make their lives 
happiest or most pleasant.  Henry Sidgwick has called these approaches prima facie 
reasonable, accordingly, in pervious chapters I have been using happiness as the 
single goal pursued by agents, however, there are some well-known problems with 
hedonistic theories.  The three I discuss are: immediate versus overall happiness, 
aberrant behavior and superficial happiness. 
 
An obvious flaw with the hedonistic definition above is that what makes someone 
happiest at a moment in time may not bring them long-term happiness.  A solution 
to this problem would be to amend the definition with the proviso that the aim in 
question  is  total,  life-time,  happiness.    This  solution,  however,  raises  some 
problems of its own in that it is possible to imagine some troublesome cases.  For 
instance, a person experiencing just a minimum of happiness, but living a very long 
life would, under the hedonistic definition, be living a better life than someone who 
lives a life of average length, but one which is intensely happy.  Although the first 
person, given his very long life, experiences a higher total amount of happiness - 119 -   
 
 
over the course of his life, the second person has, by most accounts, led a better, 
although  shorter,  life.    In  other  words,  the  definition  doesn't  account  for  the 
intensity  of  happiness  during  a lifetime,  in  a similar  vein,  this  position  doesn't 
address how to balance short-term versus long-term happiness or how to balance 
happiness and unhappiness.  What, for example, are the respective discount rates of 
happiness and unhappiness? 
 
Hedonistic theories also do not account for aberrant behaviors.  For instance, a 
person  who  is  made  happy  by  causing  misery  to  others  or  by  restraining  the 
possibility of others to achieve happiness may be leading the best possible life 
under this definition.  A hedonist isn't required to take into account the happiness 
or well-being of others unless it affects his own happiness.  He only has reason to 
consider the well-being of others to the degree that their well-being affects his 
own--in short, in this respect he is an instrumental egoist.  For example, a dictator 
may be very happy and living the best life he can while causing his subjects great 
harm.    Although  he  may  believe  that  he  is  living  the  best  life  possible,  most 
observers would find his life repugnant and would believe that he too should see 
that his aim is flawed.  Incidentally, the dictator might disagree, he might, for 
example,  argue  that  special  circumstances  entitle  him  to  his  position  and  he 
therefore has no cause to show remorse for his behavior.  In that case, there is 
nothing more that can be said to such a person under this theory.  One could try to 
find  the  source  of  the  dictator's  belief  that  his  life  entitles  him  to  particular 
privileges  and  attempt  to  demonstrate  to  him  that  his  belief  is  (presumably) 
incorrect, but there is no guarantee of success given his ilk.  Convincing someone 
that a particular act is right or good can be difficult, and can't be the standard for 
judging the rightness or wrongness of an act; even knowing that an act is right or 
good may not give some people a reason to do it.  It is impossible to prove that all 
lives are of equal worth or that some interests outweigh others unless some basic 
measure of comparison is adopted.  Whether there are right and wrong, and good 
and bad ways to act, and how and if we are able to perceive them is, of course, at 
the core of ethics.  I will leave this discussion to others, my simple claim is that a 
theory of self-interest that doesn't take into account the basic implications of the 
effects of one person's actions on another is seriously flawed.  A practical theory of 
self-interest needs to set certain limits on the types of behaviors within its purview 
if it hopes to reflect observed behavior.  This doesn't have to be a complicated task, 
it may mean specifying, for instance, that anything that is legally permitted or is a 
part of the generally accepted behavioral norms in a community is an allowed 
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relativism versus moral realism), they merely shift the point of scrutiny to the legal 
system and norms of a community, but they do help to specify the limits of self-
interest. 
   
Hedonistic  theories  do  not  account  for  qualitative  differences  in  happiness.    A 
famous  example that  emphasizes  this shortcoming  is  the  case  of the happiness 
machine.  The idea is to imagine a situation in which someone is connected to a 
happiness machine his entire life.  The machine keeps the agent alive and provides 
every  conceivable  need  and,  additionally,  provides  a  drug  from  which  they 
experience  an  intense  state  of  happiness.    The  agent  is  never  allowed  to  be 
unplugged from the machine, and may not even know that they are attached to the 
machine.  Under the definition of hedonism this person would be living a best life, 
in fact, under the condition set by hedonism, such a life could be considered the 
best of all imaginable lives.  However, many would consider such a life a very 
shallow sort of existence, not worthy of being called a life at all, and certainly not 
the best life possible.  The point is that many believe that there is, or should be, 
some purpose or objective to life other than happiness.  Happiness should be based 
on something worthwhile, but this admission allows for the possibility that there is 
an objective element to self-interest.  In other words, being happy is not enough, a 
person  should  be  interested  in  leading,  for  example,  a  fulfilling  life  full  of 
experiences  some  of  which  may  bring  temporary  unhappiness.    An  economic 
theory which claims that people should only be interested in their own happiness 
leaves open the possibility that people may choose to live lives that are shallow and 
unworthy.    There  should  be  some  good  method  of  comparing  the  quality  of 
economic lives. 
 
Incidentally, the same three critiques discussed above, immediate versus overall 
happiness,  aberrant  behavior  and  superficial  happiness,  can  also  be  applied  to 
preference theory with one major stipulation.  Preference theory, to remind the 
reader, in its most general form only requires an agent to be able to make pair wise 
comparisons of objects and choose those objects which they prefer.  The theory 
intentionally leaves open questions such as what it is that agents prefer and why 
they prefer them.  In other words, no objective stance is taken on what a person 
prefers, the model is entirely subjective.  The major difference with hedonistic 
theories is that preference theory doesn't require that an agent choose what will 
make their life go best, in fact, they are free to choose what will make their lives go 
worst or to first choose what will make their lives go best and then go worst or any 
other conceivable aim or set of aims.  This difference in the theories is important - 121 -   
 
 
and a strike against preference theory.
11  Hedonistic theories may be criticized as 
too liberal in that they allow behavior that is inconsistent, ambiguous and unethical, 
but at least they contain an internal measure of success, i.e., doing what will bring 
about the most happiness.  Preference theory lacks any such  measure with the 
result that although the model is of nearly unlimited applicability, its generality is 
its  downfall.    Such  a  general  theory  may  be  necessary  to  explain  observed 
behavior, but it cannot be a sufficient explanation of the behavior of agents; other 
restrictions need to be added to the theory if it is to provide a helpful guide to 
human behavior.  Economists choose to add the stipulation that agents are self-
interested, but, as I have shown, that too is a very liberal assumption which allows 
nearly any sort of behavior.  To conclude, the combination of preference theory 
and self-interest is too general to be of much use. 
 
The second category discussed by Parfit is desire-fulfillment theories.  The idea 
behind these theories is that what would be best for someone is what, throughout 
this  life,  would  best  fulfill  his  desires.    This  is  a  more  general  theory  than 
hedonistic theories because happiness is only one of many possible desires an agent 
can have.  However, the theory suffers from some of the same flaws as hedonistic 
theories, for instance, it also has the disadvantage that it makes no distinction as to 
the quality of the desires; a desire to rule the world is on equal footing as a desire to 
eliminate  hunger.    An  argument  against  these  theories,  analogous  to  that  of 
weakness-of-will, is the claim that they may be self-defeating because they make 
the assumption  that  getting  everything  one  wants  will  make  one's  life  go  best.  
Many, including Adam Smith, the Cyrenaics, the Epicureans and the Stoics, have 
argued  against  the  benefits  of  pursuing  all  but  the  most  basic  desires.    The 
argument is that once basic human needs are satisfied, anything over that level can 
be  a  source  of  unhappiness  and  should  be  avoided.    Desires  beyond  what  is 
necessary to lead a modest, comfortable life, the authors above argue, can never 
really be fulfilled and can lead to entanglements and frustrations.  In a related 
concern, the Stoics argued that as knowledge grows desires change.  The desires of 
                                                 
11 Hausman and McPherson (1996, p. 5) make a different claim about the role of self-
interest in preference theory: "Moral and altruistic preferences are ruled out of many 
economic models not by axioms of rationality, but by assumptions that the objects of 
preferences are bundles of commodities to be privately consumed and that there are no 
interdependencies among the preferences of different individuals."  I do not believe that 
there is any rule in utility theory which restricts preferences to private consumables.  If 
there is, then Hausman and McPherson have identified a serious limit to the applicability of 
preference theory. 
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a child are different from those of an adult, while a sage's desires are more rational 
and virtuous and therefore lead to greater happiness than those of a “normal” adult.  
Similarly, the desires of a conscientious, reflective adult are different from those of 
an adult that follows his base instincts.  Therefore, desire-fulfillment theories need 
to account for the "value" of a desire.  These differences will be important when I 
discuss Joseph Butler's idea of the role of reflection.  Briefly, Butler argued that 
there is a hierarchy among the things that motivate a person to act.  For instance, 
impulses and certain passions may lead a person to desire objects that are not in his 
best  interests.    The  desire  fulfillment  theory  makes  no  distinction  between  the 
sometimes self-destructive desires a person has as a child and those he has as a 
mature, reflective adult.  We can also ask of this theory what happens if desires are 
not fulfilled.  For instance, aiming for too much and missing doesn't necessarily 
mean that an outcome is not in one's interests.  For example, trying to be the best 
person one can be and failing to achieve that desire may still mean achieving a high 
level of satisfaction.  The process followed to fulfill a desire may be as important 
or more important than getting what one desires.  However, failure to achieve some 
aims  can  have  devastating  implications,  many  lives  have  been  ruined  through 
dedication  to  an  unachievable  goal.    In  short,  the  choice  of  desires  can  have 
implications for the state of well-being is cases in which desires are not fulfilled.  
Finally, there is some ambiguity in the definition about the type of desire under 
discussion.    Throughout  this  manuscript  I  have  been  using  desires  to  mean 
relatively short-term objectives, as opposed to aims and goals that are longer-term 
in nature.  If that categorization is accepted, then the phenomenon of weakness-of-
will raises obvious implications for this theory in that people often desire things 
that make their lives go worse. 
 
And,  once  again,  there  is  a  similarity  between  desire-fulfillment  theories  and 
preference theory.  Preferences, in common speech, are not the same as desires.  
For instance, a person can prefer a quick death to a long drawn out death, other 
things more of less equal, but not desire either.  In addition, preferences are a 
relative concept, whereas desires are not.  A person can desire an object without 
reference to another object, although in practice we often desire one thing more 
than another.  These qualifications aside, in general, the critiques mentioned in 
relation to desire-fulfillment theories appear to equally apply to preference theory. 
 
The  third  theoretical  aim  of  self-interest  that  Parfit  discusses  is  objective  list 
theories.  The idea is that certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we 
want to have the good things or to avoid the bad things.  We should, according to - 123 -   
 
 
this theory, attempt to aim at those objects that are good for us and avoid those that 
are bad.  This theory obviously avoids the problem of the subjectivity of the two 
previous theories, but presents the problem of deciding what goes on the list and of 
who makes that decision.  Although I believe it is possible to find agreement on a 
list of certain basic aims that most mature, reasonable people would agree are good 
for everyone in most circumstance, and another list of those things that are bad for 
most people most of the time in most contexts, the mechanics of developing a 
complete list that covers all possible things that are good and bad for people in all 
circumstances is too odious to contemplate--although I will mention a few general 
aims in the next paragraph.  The complete guide to the goodness or badness of an 
act would, for instance, need to include the future repercussions of each alternative 
under discussion and have a mechanism for comparing alternatives.  An alternative 
possibility, no less ominous, would be to develop a list of procedures for deciding 
what is good and bad for a person, but this too suffers from intractability.  Another 
alternative, a sort of anti-list tack, is to use a particularist approach which doesn't 
try to create a list of goods and bads or procedures for determining what is good or 
bad but, instead, recognizes the uniqueness of many situations.  A particularist 
approach explicitly recognizes the belief that general rules cannot be applied to 
every situation.  Such an approach, by definition, cannot be modeled and so is of 
limited  value  to  economists  and  business  scholars.    In  any  case,  objective  list 
theories have some appeal, but at the cost of the loss of individual sovereignty that 
marks many economic approaches.  Whether that price is worth paying will depend 
on the context under consideration; for instance, while some behavior is influenced 
by an explicit or implicit “list” of approved objectives, other contexts allow a more 
open, liberal pursuit of preferences and desires.  In practice, there are very few 
situations in which preferences are given totally free reign.  Agent preferences are 
internally constrained by, for example, the norms of the community in which they 
matured.  They may additionally be constrained by external forces in the form of 
laws that are not necessarily unanimously agreed upon and thereby create objective 
constraints on the preferences of some individuals. 
 
Some General Aims 
   
I will now turn to the task of listing some more specific, but still very general aims 
and goals as compiled by C.D. Broad (1930).  The generality of many aims can be 
seen  by  their  repeated  appearance  in  history.    For  instance,  the  Hellenistic 
philosophers typically referred to the goals of wisdom, temperance and justice, all 
of which are likely to appear on modern lists of worthwhile goals (Cicero, On - 124 -   
 
 
Duties, translated by Grant, 1971).  While all of the aims discussed in this sub-
section can be pursued for self-interested reasons, they are not necessarily pursued 
for that reason.  The pursuit of happiness, for instance, doesn't exclude performing 
benevolent acts in that people can derive happiness from performing such acts.  
While the  standard,  prima  facie  goal  of  self-interest  is  happiness  or a  pleasant 
feeling, other goals and aims have been suggested.  For instance, while Sidgwick 
(1988) took happiness as a prima facie end, he also accepted excellence of human 
nature as a strongly supported prima facie end.  Where excellence is "not primarily 
superiority to others, but a partial realization of, or approximation to, an ideal type 
of human Perfection."  Under excellence falls aims such as doing god's will, self-
development or realization, and living one's life according to nature.  Few of these 
goals are necessarily associated with feelings of pleasure and fewer still are made 
more accessible by increases in wealth.  However, all of them can rest safely under 
the umbrella of enlightened self-interest.  The point, once again, is to argue that 
even if the claim that agents are exclusively self-interested is accepted, that claim 
alone doesn't significantly limit behavior. 
 
An important point of consideration when modeling aims is their reducibility.  C.D. 
Broad  (1952)  argues  that  there  are  many  aims,  some  of  which  are  irreducible 
including:  pleasure,  pain,  wealth,  power,  security,  liberty,  glory,  possession  of 
particular objects, fame, health, longevity, status, self-respect, self-development, 
self-assertion, reputation, honor, and affection.  For Broad then, wealth, power, 
etc., are not reducible to pleasure  or  happiness  or anything  else.    Rather, they 
provide unique, separable goals, each of which can be in a person's interest.  Broad 
supports his claim that not all aims are reducible to a common value or good by 
observing that some aims are relative in that they require the presence of other 
people, and some are absolute in that they can be realized in isolation.  Power, for 
instance, is a relative concept, while self-preservation can be an aim in isolation.  
Therefore, following this argument, at least two types of distinctive aims can be 
identified.  Another argument that some of the aims of agents are distinct rests on 
feelings.    The  argument  is  that,  for  instance,  the  feeling  one  has  while  acting 
honorably is fundamentally different than the feeling one has, for example, upon 
winning the lottery. 
 
If Broad is correct in that there are different distinct aims, then any theory based on 
the motive of self-interest should specify the aims the modeler has in mind for the 
agents  he  is  modeling  because  different  aims  will  likely  be  pursued  for 
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of liberty will likely behave differently than those aiming at the maximization of 
wealth.  These two aims might be correlated, but not necessarily.  To the degree 
that aims are unique and uncorrelated and have different implications for behavior, 
they need to be specified by a modeler hoping to analyze or predict said behavior.  
In short, modelers need to be explicit about the aims of agents to the degree that 
different aims lead to significantly different behavior. 
 
What is the aim that economics specifies?  As we've seen, axiomatic preference 
theory says nothing about aims, but the historical aim of economics has often been 
taken to be the maximization of wealth.  In other words, what makes an economic 
agent's  life  go  economically  best,  according  to  many  economic  models,  is  the 
maximization of wealth.  J.S. Mill's definition of political economy recognized 
wealth  as  a  key  variable,  but  also  its  limits  as  a  motivating  force.    Political 
economy is, according to Mill: “The science which traces the laws of such of the 
phenomena of society as arise from the combined operations of mankind for the 
production of wealth, in so far as those phenomena are not modified by the pursuit 
of any other object” (J.S. Mill, 1994, p. 54).  Mill was also aware that: "... the 
conduct of mankind in the pursuit of wealth is under the collateral influence of any 
other  of  the  properties  of  our  nature  than  the  desire  of  obtaining  the  greatest 
quantity of wealth with the least labour and self-denial, the conclusions of Political 
Economy will so far fail of being applicable to the explanation or prediction of real 
events, until they are modified by a correct allowance for the degree of influenced 
exercised by the other causes" (J.S. Mill, in Hausman, 1994, p. 54).  Mill's message 
is that reliance on the assumption of wealth as the principal economic objective 
may have to be modified to account for the influence of other motives to act if it is 
to allow for accurate explanations and predictions. 
 
Wealth as an aim is not as restrictive as it would appear to be at first glance.  It too 
doesn't, for instance, exclude the possibility of other-regarding motives.  Except in 
the case of misers who acquire wealth as an end in itself, economic agents acquire 
wealth as an instrument to realize, to the extent that it is possible, other objectives 
including, power, prestige and security.  Wealth can also be pursued to improve the 
well-being of others such as family members and friends, but it can also be pursed 
to improve the lives of people unknown by way of donations to charities and other 
aid organizations.  Wealth doesn't necessarily restrict the description of economic 
man  to  egocentric  self-interest  as  described  or  presumed  in  many  economic 
models, it only restricts agents to those objects that can be realized through wealth.  
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a  certain  minimum  amount,  is  not  a  necessary  component  to  acquiring  these 
objectives.    In  addition,  agents  can  be  self-interested  and  egocentric  without 
necessarily  being  driven  by  wealth  alone.    In  short,  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  the 
historical aim of agents in economic analysis, is not equivalent to self-interest. 
     
Regard for Others 
 
One  of  the  more  important  external  elements  is  the  degree  to  which  people 
consider the interests of others within their own interests.  I am considering regard 
for others to be the aim of influencing the well-being (for better or for worse) of 
others.  Economic models of self-interest that portray agents as isolated and non-
interacting will likely yield a different set of results than those in which people's 
interests  are  taken  to  interact.    This  is  not  a  new  idea  in  either  economics  or 
philosophy, both of which recognize that people often consider the well-being of 
others  in  their  decisions  (see  e.g.,  Francis  Edgeworth,  Alfred  Marshall,  David 
Hume).  Rather than offering what can only be a cursory review given the immense 
amount  of  research  conducted  in  this  area,  I  will  attempt  to  define  cases  that 
explore the boundaries of interests among people.  The false dichotomy that is 
often portrayed of either absolute, isolated, self-interest or self-destructive altruism 
isn't subtle enough to account for the many different points at which the interests of 
people can interact. 
 
The emphasis in this subsection is on the manner in which people incorporate the 
interests of others into their own decisions.  I am not claiming that the interests of 
others are the only consideration when making a decision, however, the approach 
will allow me to concentrate the discussion on demarcating the different sorts of 
self-interested relationships.  I have mentioned some of the following examples in 
previous  chapters,  my  purpose  in  this  section  is  to  provide  a  more  systematic 
categorization of those and other examples. 
 
    a. The first case, an admittedly extreme one, says that the interests of others are 
of no concern; the interests of people are completely independent of one another.  
For such agents, the focus is exclusively on realizing their own interests which 
don't include the interests of others.  People are completely isolated, they do not 
interact  and  they  expect  to  remain  isolated.    They  choose  what  is  best  for 
themselves without reference to the impact that their choices will have on others 
and the impact that the choices of others will have on their own well-being.  This is 
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situation economic or otherwise.  This assumption is perhaps a good description of 
Robinson Crusoe's situation before Friday's arrival and before he was aware of any 
potential interaction with other, hostile, invaders.  Crusoe's aims probably included 
self-preservation and happiness although he wouldn't have had to be concerned 
with issues like power, esteem, or wealth, which are relative concepts.  Crusoe also 
seems to have been concerned with the aims of living a virtuous life and self-
development,  although  these  had  to  take  a  secondary  position  to  the  goal  of 
survival.  This is an extreme situation, later in the story, even Crusoe had to be 
concerned with others to the degree that he expected that people might invade his 
island. 
     
    b. The second case says that an agent includes the interests of others only to the 
degree it affects their own interests, they are indifferent to the interests of others as 
ends in themselves.  Again, the focus of this model is exclusively on the aims of 
the agent and not on the interests of those who are impacted by his actions.  The 
sole  focus  that  an  agent  is  taken  to  have  is  on  realizing  his  well-being.    In  a 
competitive economic setting the reasoning might run something like: My well-
being is inversely dependent on your well-being, so I'll try to reduce your well-
being in so far as it promotes my well-being, otherwise I am indifferent to the 
impact that my actions have on you.  This is a strictly instrumental approach and 
under most definitions of ethics such behavior would be considered wrong.  The 
model has some disturbing implications that would test the resolve of even the 
most fervent instrumentalists.  For instance, the relative degrees of gains and loses 
is not important, any small gain by the agent outweighs the interests of others 
regardless of the size of those loses.  If, for example, a person stands to gain one 
dollar by causing others to lose everything they own, then such behavior is not 
ruled out under this model.  There is room for right and wrong behavior in the 
model, but only as it has implications for the interests of the agent.  For instance, if 
acting against the norms of a community damages the ability of an agent to achieve 
his interests, for instance because people disapprove of an act and therefore refuse 
to provide the things that the agent needs to achieve his aims, then the norms won't 
be broken. 
 
    c. A third case says, once again, that an agent includes the interests of others 
because those interests are expected to have implications for the agent's well-being, 
but in this case he's no longer indifferent to the well-being of others as he was in 
the second case.  However, it is important to clarify the focus of the agent's actions.  
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case of altruism, I have set a limit on the 'net-interest' that an agent expects to 
receive.  For instance, if the aim is happiness, the net amount of happiness that an 
agent expects to receive from a given act must be positive.  For example, I am 
willing to promote your happiness because your happiness makes me happy, but 
only as long as I expect to receive a net increase in my happiness from making you 
happy; I am not willing to accept a net loss in happiness to make you happy. 
 
In  all  of  the  following  cases  an  agent  expects  his  net-happiness  to  increase, 
therefore, others are used instrumentally.  To make the examples clearer I will 
assume that the aim of the agent is his happiness. 
 
  i. In the first case, the focus of the action is mainly on the implications for 
the agent's interests and not on the overall net-happiness of others.  For example, I 
am  happier  because  you're  happier,  but  I  am  focused  exclusively  on  my  own 
happiness.  In this case a person gives to a charity because it gives him pleasure, 
he's glad the beneficiaries are happier (their happiness may be the source of his 
happiness),  but  that's  not  the  main  motivating  factor  behind  his  charitable 
contribution.  The relationships between people may now become important.  If the 
relationship between people is valued, a person may be willing to give to those 
with whom he has a special relationship despite the possibility that others may 
have a greater need.  Simply, it brings the agent the most pleasure to give to those 
with whom he has a special relationship (friends, family, etc.).  The overall net-
happiness obtained for the community as a whole is not relevant in this case, the 
focus is on the happiness of the agent and he acts accordingly.  If relationships 
were not important, then if a person could get the same amount of pleasure by 
giving the same amount or less to someone else or some other group, then he 
would do it. 
 
  ii. In the next case, the focus is on the interests of the other party (or 
parties), but the agent's interests are also important in that he still requires a net 
increase in his expected happiness in order to act.  For example, an agent acts 
primarily because he expects the act will make others happier.  Although he still 
expects to receive a net increase in his happiness, the focus is on the happiness of 
others.  For example, an agent gives to a charity primarily because it makes others 
happier, but he won't give unless it makes him happy as well.  The relationship 
between the agent and others is less important in this case.  Given a choice between 
conducting an act that is expected to provide an equal or greater happiness to those 
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of happiness to strangers while providing him with the same expected net increase 
in happiness, the agent will still chose the first option, otherwise he's indifferent.  
In short, the relationship among agents is less important than the overall well-being 
achieved. 
   
  iii. In the final case, the agent attempts to maximize the total well-being of 
others, given the constant stipulation that his own expected net happiness increases.  
The  relationship  between  the  agent  and  others  is  not  important,  the  goal  is  to 
increase overall net happiness. 
 
    d. The case of altruism can be defined as those acts in which there is an expected 
net reduction in the agent's well-being for an expected net increase in the well-
being of others.  As previously argued, this is a strong form of altruism in that it 
makes  altruistic  acts  easier  to  identify.    Following  Kavka's  understanding  of 
predominant egoism, it is possible to create gradations of altruism by specifying 
limits  of  the  expected  net-interest  loss  that  an  agent  is  willing  to  accept.    For 
instance, a person might be more willing to accept a net reduction in his own well-
being if the payoffs to others are expected to be large than if the expected gains to 
others are expected to be small.  The relationship between losses of an agent and 
gains to others is probably not linear or continuous.  For example, there may be a 
discontinuity if the loss to an agent includes the possibility of bodily injury or 
death.  He will not, in that case, be willing to risk bodily injury even if acting 
would greatly promote the well-being of others.  The problem of determining net 
payoffs is particularly acute in this category.  For instance, does a person give 
money to a charity because it makes the benefactors better off and even though it 
means he expects to suffer a net loss in happiness or because his own net happiness 
is increased by the good deed?  I have discussed this problem at the end of chapter 
2 and won't repeat it here. 
    
    e.  A  non-instrumental model  says  that  the  agent  cares  about the interests of 
others regardless of, or perhaps without reference to, his own well-being.  In this 
model of behavior there is no place for a net-interest calculation.  An example 
might be the case of a parent's actions when the well-being of his child is in danger.  
The parent largely acts to save the child without reference to his own well-being.  
Alternatively, in the case of revenge, a person might be willing to damage another 
person's  interests  regardless  of  the  impact  that  such  actions  have  on  his  own 
interests.  This category must be adjusted to account for a wide range of behaviors.  
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probably come into play.  There are cases, revenge comes to mind as do certain 
core beliefs, when calculations of net-interest seem to be ignored for good or bad.  
However, these are the exceptions that prove the general rule that most activities 
involve some sort of calculation of net-benefits or losses. 
 
    f. In another extreme position, the interests of people are taken to be completely 
dependent on one another.  In a sense, there is no difference between people’s 
interests--people share a common interest or common mind.  An agent measures 
his  own  well-being  completely  with  reference  to  the  sum  of  well-being.    For 
instance, an agent is happy when others are happy.  Both extreme positions are 
practical impossibilities in  most  contexts,  however, recent  work  in  the  field  of 
philosophy, and particularly philosophy of mind, has explored the possibility of a 
common mind.  That work has provided a methodology that helps to clarify some 
of the issues linking individual agents to groups (Tuomela, 1995; Gilbert, 1989; 
Pettit, 1993).  Pettit (1993), in particular, makes an important distinction between 
the influence of aggregate or structural factors and relations between individuals 
themselves, what he calls vertical versus horizontal factors.  The emphasis in all of 
these models is to show how the pluralistic "we" can replace or complement the 
atomistic  "I".    Unfortunately,  I  will  have  to  leave  that  discussion  to  another 
occasion. 
    
Conclusions 
 
In  the  first  section  of  this  chapter  I  reviewed  the  structural  dimension  of  self-
interest.  I provided several categories of reasoning or rationality that agents use to 
pursue their interests.  There are many sorts of self-interest that can be used to 
model agent behavior, each with its own limits.  For instance, while the parsimony 
of psychological egoism is appealing, the extent to which it is a good description of 
all motives on all occasions, as it claims to be, is doubtful.  Predominant egoism 
has some interesting characteristics that make it a good candidate for economic 
models, but it is far less parsimonious than psychological egoism.  It explicitly 
recognizes that although people may act altruistically, such behavior is taken to be 
the exception both across people and within a person.  A researcher that chooses 
this description of motivation needs, at a minimum, to specify the conditions under 
which altruistic behavior may be present.  Rational egoism, a position taken by 
some economists, is usually taken to rest on psychological egoism.  If it doesn't, 
then another basis needs to be specified on which to support the claim that only 
egoism is rational.  Although ethical egoism still finds some adherents, claiming - 131 -   
 
 
that  an  act  is  ethically  right  only  if  it  maximizes  one's  self-interest  hopelessly 
confounds the meaning of the terms ethics and self-interest.  The type of egoism 
that best describes an agent's motives will depend on the modeler's beliefs about 
the role that self-interest plays in a person's psyche at a moment of decision.  The 
message of the section on the external dimensions of self-interest is that the aims or 
goals of an agent are linked to the type of rationality used to achieve a set of aims.  
In  short,  the  successful  pursuit  of  different  aims  may  influence  the  type  of 
rationality an agent uses.  An agent can believe that his interests are best served by 
pursuing  his  own  happiness,  or the  fulfillment  of  his  desires,  or living  his life 
according to an objective list of aims. General aims, in turn, may give a clue as to 
the rationality used by the agent to achieve his given set of aims.  I use the term 
may, because, as I have previously argued, the same aim can be pursued by those 
with very different sorts of rationality.  In short, it is necessary for a modeler to 
explicitly  specify  both  the  structural  and  external  dimensions  of  the  assumed 
motivation of agents.  Once the dimensions are specified, it becomes possible to 
argue whether they are good assumptions or whether some other rationality or aims 
could better explain observed or predicted behavior.  The final message of this 
chapter is that the general assumption of self-interest leaves open the possibility of 
a nearly endless variety of behaviors.  Its value as an assumption is limited by its 
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CHAPTER  FIVE:  TRACING  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF SELF-INTEREST 
 
Introduction 
The philosophers I discuss in this chapter set the foundations of modern theories of 
self-interest.    Thomas  Hobbes  and  Bernard  Mandeville  initiated  a  discussion 
among philosophers about the role that self-interest plays within human nature and 
the  benefits  and  costs  that  it  brings  to  society.    Some  of  the  basic  concepts 
advocated  by  Hobbes  ([1651],  1996)  and  Mandeville  ([1732],  1988)  are  still 
recognizable in modern economic discussions of self-interest, for instance, the role 
that self-interest plays in making society possible and prosperous.  In addition, 
Hobbes is often taken to promote rational egoism and Mandeville can be read as 
promoting  psychological  egoism,  positions  which  find  adherents  in  modern 
economic theory.  A careful analysis of these two authors will therefore allow a 
better understanding of the possible sources of modern economic interpretations of 
self-interest.    Joseph  Butler  ([1725],  1986,  1983),  responding  to  the  ideas  of 
Hobbes and Mandeville, wrote a rejoinder that can only be described as brilliant; 
any modern theory of self-interest needs to respond to Butler's critiques.  Butler's 
work is the focal point of this chapter and his ideas stand behind many of the 
concepts  I  have  been  discussing  in  previous  chapters.    His  most  important 
contribution was to place the motive of self-interest within a greater psychological 
framework.  In short, he believed that in order to understand the role of self-interest 
in human nature the entire psychological framework needs to be examined.  The 
last author whose work I will discuss is Adam Smith.  Smith, in part responding to 
the previous authors and generally inspired and influenced by the debates on the 
benefits and disadvantages of self-interest for society, launched modern theoretical 
economics by publishing An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (WN) in 1776.  The relationship between Smith's economic theory and his 
ethical theory, as found in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), has been a 
source  of  confusion  because  the  works  appear  to  some  readers  to  contain 
diametrically opposed descriptions of human nature and the role of self-interest 
therein.    Some  authors  have  incorrectly  claimed  that  WN  should  be  read  as  a 
defense of egoism and TMS as a defense of altruism.  Others, including Ronald H. 
Coase whose position I will discuss at the end of this chapter, see complementary 
messages in the two books.  In particular, Coase claims that an important message 
that can be drawn from the two books is support for narrow economic self-interest 
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should not be read in isolation and are complementary accounts of human nature.  
However,  I  will  offer  an  alternative  account  of  Smith's  works  that  challenges 
Coase's specific arguments and suggests that the purposes of the two books were 
quite different and the ideas represented should only be mixed with care.  Self-
interest plays a role in both accounts, but the types of interests under consideration 
are very different. 
 
Volumes, particularly in the cases of Hobbes and Smith, have been written about 
the  views  of  the  authors  under  discussion.    Fortunately,  I  can  concentrate  my 
efforts  on  a  relatively  small  topic,  namely,  my  analysis  will  be  limited  to  the 
questions of how each of the authors viewed the role of self-interest within human 
nature  and  how  they  derived  those  views.    My  aim  is  to  show  how  an 
understanding  of  the  motive  of  self-interest  has  developed  from  a  relatively 
simplistic,  all-encompassing,  explanation  of  behavior,  to  a  more  complex  and 




The idea that economic self-interest by individuals leads to general benefits for the 
wider community  as  a  whole,  via a  mechanism  which  is  sometimes  called  the 
invisible hand, is often incorrectly attributed to Adam Smith, it more accurately 
represents the views of the benefits of self-interest as extolled by the Dutch born 
Bernard Mandeville.  I begin with Mandeville because his colorful book, The Fable 
of the Bees, along with the earlier but more refined works of Thomas Hobbes, 
elicited such a strong reaction from later writers and initiated an important and still 
ongoing debate.  Mandeville's views are not philosophically sophisticated, there are 
many questions his approach leaves unanswered and his argumentation is often not 
strong, but he forcefully articulated a view that struck a chord with advocates and 
critics of a certain narrow form of self-interest.  The discussion which Mandeville 
started eventually helped to clarify what it means to be self-interested, lessons that 
are still relevant today given current economic and popular conceptions of human 
nature.  In the following paragraphs I will offer an account of Mandeville's position 
and brief previews of the critiques of that position which I will discuss in detail in 
the sections on Butler and Smith. 
 
The thesis of Mandeville's book, The Fable of the Bees ([1732], 1988), is that vice, 
which for Mandeville is a self-interested desire for luxury and happiness, benefits 
society by creating a higher standard of living by offering means of employment - 135 -   
 
 
for people who would otherwise be idle (ed. Beauchamp, p. 20 in Hume, 1998).  
Mandeville's view can be summarized as: since we are wicked (self-interested) by 
nature in any case, we might as well accept our wickedness and be honest and 
thankful for the prosperity it brings.  It is important to note that Mandeville wasn't 
advocating self-interest as a normative position--he didn't claim that is was good 
that people are self-interested; rather, self-interest should be seen as a necessary 
evil of human nature that should be accepted for what it is and celebrated for the 
benefits it provides. 
 
Mandeville's evidence that people are primarily or exclusively motivated by self-
interest rests on what he takes to be a realistic observation of human behavior.  He 
tells the reader that his concern is telling things as they really are rather than as 
they should be.  He, like Ayn Rand, is concerned that moralizers are preaching the 
wrong message when they tell their audiences that they should sacrifice their own 
interests for the interests of others, an often repeated message of dubious worth, but 
one worth examining because of its prevalence.  Mandeville prefaced his book with 
the following charge directed at moralists: "One of the greatest Reasons why so 
few People understand themselves, is, that most Writers are always teaching Men 
what they should be, and hardly ever trouble their Heads with telling them what 
they really are" (Mandeville, 1988, p. 39).  On its surface, this is an unusual charge, 
ethicists and those from many other disciplines including economics, do tell people 
what they should be or do, and I suppose that that is precisely their task.  A more 
interesting  charge,  the  one  I  believe  Mandeville  had  in  mind,  would  be  that 
ethicists and others tell people that they should be something which they can't be.  
Mandeville, like so many before and after him, takes the empirical high ground and 
accordingly  proclaims  that  people  are  self-interested  and  those  who  preach 
otherwise are naive or self-serving.  In this regard, Mandeville followed in what 
Joseph Butler described as a secret prejudice and open scorn of all talk of public 
spirit and real goodwill in our fellow creatures.  However, as I will show, other 
observers of human behavior often come to very different conclusions about what 
is real in human nature. 
 
Mandeville performs the following thought experiment to demonstrate his view 
that self-interest is a beneficial motive: "If all actions were to cease except those 
due to unselfishness, the pure idea of good, or the love of God, trade would end, 
the arts would be unnecessary, and the crafts be almost abandoned."  All these 
activities,  (trade,  arts  and  crafts),  exist  only  to  supply  purely  mundane  wants, 
which,  according  to  Mandeville's  analysis,  are  all  at  bottom  driven  by  selfish - 136 -   
 
 
desires for happiness and luxury (1988, Mandeville, p. xlviii).  In short, his claim is 
that  unethical  individual  behavior  leads  to  a  better  material  world  and  greater 
happiness for all.  Accordingly, he implies that ethical behavior would imply living 
in a poorer material world with less happiness.  These claims are unsubstantiated 
by Mandeville, it is not obvious, except for in the case of ascetics, how living an 
ethical life necessarily excludes the desire for trade, arts and crafts.  It is even 
possible to imagine sustainable cases in which non-self-interested behavior leads to 
economic  prosperity,  although  in  reality  such  cases appear  to be  the  exception 
rather than the rule.  Despite such glaring defects, and perhaps because of the 
simple  manner  in  which  they  were  proclaimed,  Mandeville's  views  meet  with 
popular approval at the time that they were written and they formed a central point 
of attack in the discussions which followed. 
 
In  Mandeville  it  is  possible  to  see  two  important  themes  which  I  have  been 
emphasizing throughout this manuscript, the first, in his favour, is that Mandeville 
has explicitly defined his view about the objects of self-interest (happiness and 
luxury goods), and the second is that he is clear about the context over which the 
motive of self-interest is expected to prevail, namely, he claims that self-interest is 
a part of human nature in all contexts.  Although his concern is explaining the 
benefits of self-interested behavior in economic markets, he rests his conclusions 
on the theory of psychological egoism applied generally. 
 
An interesting feature of Mandeville's argument on the prevalence of self-interest, 
and one later addressed by Adam Smith, is the link he attempts to make between 
ethical  behavior  and  self-interest  via  the  principle  of  pride.    He  claims  that 
moralists appeal to our pride to make us better people: "Thus Sagacious Moralists 
draw Men like Angels, in hopes that the Pride at least of Some will put 'em upon 
copying  after  the  beautiful  Originals  which  they  are  represented  to  be"  (ed. 
Beauchamp, Hume, 1998, p. 52).  But pride, Mandeville tells us, is in fact a form 
of self-interest, "we may discover no small Symptoms of Pride, and the humblest 
Man  alive  must  confess,  that  the  Reward  of  a  Virtuous  Action,  which  is  that 
Satisfaction  that  ensues  upon  it,  consists  in  a  certain  Pleasure  he  procures  to 
himself by Contemplating on his own Worth..."  (ed. Beauchamp, Hume, 1998, p. 
57).    So  pride,  the  weapon  that  moralists  use to  make  us  more  like  angels is, 
according to Mandeville, a self-interested motive ultimately based on the desire for 
pleasure.  Pride is an important motive in the lives of most people, but the claim 
that people are virtuous only because it serves their pride is too bold a claim.  The 
argument, as I understand it, is that people seek pleasure and they receive pleasure - 137 -   
 
 
when they experience pride.  Therefore, by appealing to pride, moralists can get 
people  to  act  according  to  an  ideal.    A  belief  in  the  virtuousness  of  an  act, 
according  to  Mandeville,  offers  no  reason  to  perform  the  act,  only  hedonistic 
reasons are accepted as reasons to act. 
 
There are several things that should be observed in Mandeville's reasoning on self-
interest and pride.  The first is that pride can be taken in performing either self-
interested or non-self-interested actions.  A feeling of pleasure is felt by the agent, 
but the action may be directed towards others and may be benevolent or altruistic.  
Therefore, there is nothing in Mandeville's explanation that prevents feeling pride 
for performing virtuous acts whether moralists approve of them or not.  Second, 
suppose  that  people  perform  virtuous  acts  only  for  the  reason  of  feelings  of 
pleasure as Mandeville suggests they do.  Does the feeling of pleasure detract from 
the virtuousness of a virtuous act?  The answer to that question closely parallels 
previous  discussions  on  the  difficulties  of  properly  identifying  altruistic  acts 
versus, say, pseudo-altruistic acts, and I won't repeat those discussion here in their 
entirety.    The  basic  idea  is  that  if  a  person  performs  acts  that  have  virtuous 
consequences but is motivated to do so for non-virtuous motives, then such acts 
should be called pseudo-virtuous.  Truly virtuous acts are motivated for virtuous 
reasons; the motives behind such acts should therefore be non-self-interested.  This 
doesn't imply that virtuous acts have to cause displeasure in order to be virtuous, 
although they may.  The ultimate question, one that Mandeville doesn't address, is 
why a person receives pleasure from performing virtuous acts.  It is possible that 
the agent does so for the parsimonious reason that he enjoys the effects that his 
virtuous actions have on the well-being of others rather than for his own pleasure.  
Certainly there are other, perhaps easier ways to derive pleasure other than by 
acting virtuous? 
 
The shortfalls in Mandeville's work shouldn't discourage reading his texts.  What 
Mandeville lacks in rigor he more than compensates for with bravado.  I include 
the following section from Mandeville, (ed. Beauchamp, Hume, 1998, p. 43), if 
only to show the righteous indignation and accompanying enjoyment he must have 
felt writing his book: 
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"To  introduce,  moreover,  an  Emulation  amongst  Men,  they  [Moralists  and 
Philosophers  of  all  Ages]  divided  the  whole  Species  into  two  Classes,  vastly 
differing from one another: The one consisted of abject, low-minded People, that 
always hunting after immediate Enjoyment, were wholly incapable of Self-denial, 
and without regard to the good of others, had no higher Aim than their private 
Advantage; such as being enslaved by Voluptuousness, yielded without Resistance 
to every gross desire, and made no use of their Rational Faculties but to heighten 
their Sensual Pleasure.  These vile grov'ling Wretches, they said, were the Dross of 
their Kind, and having only the Shape of Men, differ'd from Brutes in nothing but 
their outward Figure.  But the other Class was made up of lofty, high-spirited 
Creatures,  that  free  from  sordid  Selfishness,  esteem'd  the  Improvements  of  the 
Mind to be their fairest Possessions; and setting a true value upon themselves, took 
no Delight but in embellishing that Part in which their Excellency consisted; such 
as despising whatever they had in common with irrational Creatures, opposed by 
the Help of Reason their most violent Inclinations; and making a continual War 
with themselves to promote the Peace of others, aim'd at no less than the Publick 
Welfare and the Conquest of their own Passions." 
 
In this quote it is possible to see the straw man argument in all its glory.  The 
contrast Mandeville draws between the 'vile grov'ling Wretches' and 'lofty, high-
spirited Creatures' is a false dichotomy, one that is not defended by any scholar that 
I know of, but it is also clear as well that Mandeville is reveling in hyperbole rather 
than engaging in a serious debate.  As a philosophical treatise, Mandeville's work is 
weak.  There is little argumentation about rival positions and his evidence that 
people are self-interested amounts to utterances.  We would have to, as previously 
stated, accept Mandeville's important claim that people act virtuously only because 
moralists and philosophers appeal to their pride.  Yet, Mandeville set the stage for 
an important debate which was to follow.  Mandeville represents a position that 
does have a certain appeal in terms of its simplicity, although we have to look to 
Thomas Hobbes for a more thoughtful position. 
     
Thomas Hobbes 
 
Thomas Hobbes is interesting for the purposes of this manuscript for three reasons: 
first, he is often taken to defend rational egoism, a position that still finds support 
among  some  economists  including,  as  I  have  shown,  Meckling  and  Jensen. 
However, in contrast to many modern advocates of rational egoism, Hobbes bases 
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people is self-preservation.  Hobbes’s starting point is that, "the natural state of 
man is non-moral, unregulated; moral rules are means to the end of peace, which is 
a means to the end of self-preservation."  Human nature, according to Hobbes, 
needs to be viewed as ultimately deriving from the need for self-preservation.  His 
view of human nature is closely aligned to that described by Brennan and Pettit in a 
previous quote, namely, economic agents as envisioned by economists are selfish, 
isolated and unethical.  Fortunately, for the people in Hobbes’s imagined world, 
their rationality saves them by allowing them to see the necessity of forming a 
powerful central government which will force them to control their base instincts.  
Second,  Hobbes  holds  the  position  that  human  conduct  results  from  whatever 
desire or aversion is strongest in a person at a given time (Darwall, intro. to Butler, 
1986 p. 1), a position which can in some respects be likened to a naive version of 
desire-fulfillment or preference theory.  Third, Hobbes offers a sophisticated model 
of human nature which, from his understanding, justified his belief in the central 
role of egoism within the human psyche.  Hobbes, in contrast to Mandeville, took a 
strong position that required a sophisticated response rather than an off-handed 
dismissal. 
     
Hobbes, as I have noted, is often taken to advocate a position known as rational 
egoism, although there is some debate on this matter (see Shaver, 1999).  Rational 
egoism is a normative position that claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an 
action to be rational that it contributes to the well-being of the agent.  This is an 
understandably  controversial  position  that  causes  a  nearly  visceral  response  by 
opponents, as I have previously mentioned, one such opponent is Amartya Sen who 
writes:  "Universal  selfishness  as  actuality  may  well  be  false,  but  universal 
selfishness as a requirement of rationality is patently absurd" (Sen, 1987, p. 16).  
However, I believe that Sen's outright dismissal of rational egoism may be too 
harsh and needs to be examined.  First, a small qualification needs to be made to 
Sen's remark.  By stipulating selfishness rather than self-interest Sen has taken an 
unnecessarily restrictive view of rational egoism, rational egoism is based on self-
interest not selfishness, but Sen's intention is clear and I'll leave this point aside.  
Sen's  comment  exposes  an  important  link  between  psychological  egoism  and 
rational egoism.  I believe that Sen is referring to psychological egoism when he 
mentions universal selfishness.  He leaves open the possibility that people may be 
psychological egoists in which case they are, in a sense, bound to act only from the 
motive  of  self-interest--to  act  otherwise  would  be  unreasonable  or  unnatural.  
Clearly, psychological egoism and rational egoism are linked; claiming that people 
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their actions on some other motive is inconsistent.  In short, by leaving open the 
possibility that people may be psychological egoists I believe that Sen has left open 
the  possibility  that  people  can  only  behave  as  rational  egoists.    However,  if 
psychological  egoism  is  refuted,  then  rational  egoism  is  likely  to  fall  as  well, 
because allowing motives other than self-interest to motivate actions would seem 
to allow the possibility that it is reasonable to act from those other motives.  For 
instance, accepting that altruistic reasons are good reasons to act would mean that 
self-interest is no longer a necessary condition for a rational act.  Although I would 
agree with Sen's comment that it does seem absurd to claim that someone should 
be  considered  rational  only  if  they  motivated  by  self-interest,  as  I  will  show, 
Hobbes’s position is not absurd given his assumptions regarding human nature. 
     
Hobbes builds his position upon empirical observation and an important thought 
experiment  meant  to  describe  man  in  a  primitive  state  of  nature  before  the 
development of institutions and other social organizations.  What makes Hobbes’s 
analysis so powerful is that the parts of his system all appear to be self-evident.  
His argument rests on six features, the first five of which are: an aversion to death, 
concerns for reputation, forward-lookingness, conflicting desires among people for 
limited  resources,  and  rough  equality  among  people  (Kavka,  1986).    I  will 
concentrate on the sixth assumption of egoism, the most controversial assumption 
he makes.  Hobbes grounds his egoism on the view that people have a fundamental 
right  to  self-preservation.    According  to  Hobbes,  people  have  good  reason  to 
protect, and, importantly, to do what they can to make their lives livable.  Because 
all people are taken to be essentially equal, competition for limited resources will 
often  lead  to  violent  conflicts  that  reasonable  people  would  like  to  avoid.    Of 
course, Hobbes tells us, if someone is significantly more powerful than the rest 
then he would have no need to compromise and he could just take what he wanted.  
According to Hobbes, a reputation for aggressiveness is helpful because, among 
other  things,  it  can  deter  potential  attackers.    Fortunately,  because  people  are 
forward looking, they can see that there is a high probability of an unwinnable state 
of war of all-against-all developing.  That state can be avoided if people submit to a 
powerful  government  that  is  able  to  enforce  order.    In  short,  people  use  their 
reason,  in  the  form  of  enlightened  self-interest,  to  justify  to  themselves  that 
submitting  to  a  powerful  government  is  in  their  interest.    Ethical  concerns  for 
Hobbes, by which I mean disinterested concerns, are merely tools of the state, there 
is no inherent reason to be ethical in his model. 
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Hobbes’s argumentation doesn't always support a rational egoistic interpretation--
in some passages he argues that self-interest is sufficient to make an act rational, 
but not necessary for an action to be rational (see Shaver, 1999, p. 7).  However, 
many of the phrases for which he is most famous do confirm him as a (limited) 
rational egoist; for instance, "A Law of Nature, (Lex Naturalis), is a Precept, or 
generall Rule, found out be Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which 
is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to 
omit,  that,  by  which  he  thinketh it  may  be  best preserved" (Leviathan,  14/91).  
People, according to Hobbes, are forbidden by reason from doing what will detract 
from their self-preservation and, importantly, they are forbidden from doing what 
they think will detract from what best preserves their lives.  The importance of this 
last idea is that many actions can be and have been filed under the rubric of “best 
preserving”.  For instance, best preserving has been interpreted by some rational 
egoists as advocating a general form of rational egoism in which any activity that 
improves one's life is rational.  This strikes me as an overly broad interpretation, 
Hobbes’s chief concern was the motive of self-preservation, and unless motives 
can be closely linked to that motive, then they are not a part of the rational domain 
that Hobbes was defending.  For instance, it would be difficult, I believe, to link 
the general desire for wealth or power with the need for self-preservation.  In other 
words, although people need a certain amount of wealth or income or some other 
economic aim for survival, it is difficult to argue that anything beyond that small 
amount  is  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  life.    However,  the  ambiguity  in 
Hobbes’s remarks has left open the possibility of giving “best preserving” a broad 
interpretation that supports rational egoism. 
 
Another point of interest is how Hobbes arrived at his egoist view of human nature.  
Sidgwick (1988, p. 163), explains that it is a result of Hobbes’s materialism, by 
which  he  means  that  for  Hobbes  the  sensations,  imaginations,  thoughts  and 
emotions of people are mere appearances of motions in the interior parts of the 
body.    This  perception  leads  Hobbes  to  give  special  attention  to  bodily  wants 
(Sidgwick,  1988,  p.  164).    It  is  not  a  large  step  for  Hobbes  to  then  conclude 
(correctly  or  not)  that  appetites  and  desires  are  thereby  naturally  directed  to 
preserving life and making life bearable through pleasure and the avoidance of 
pain.    In  addition,  because  Hobbes  doesn't  distinguish  between  reflective  and 
instinctive desires, all motives are self-interested and directed at preserving life and 
making it bearable.  In short, Hobbes bases his rational egoism on the belief that 
the material requirements of people direct their behavior.  Fortunately, according to 
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to survive with his equally egoistic, unsociable, and materialist fellow humans and, 
given that others are willing to submit their sovereignty to a powerful government, 
he too is willing to do so.  Hobbes’s material views strike the modern reader as 
odd, but they are not necessary to the rational egoist argument.  In other words, a 
person can be a rational egoist without holding a materialist perspective, nor does 
holding  a  materialist  position  necessarily  imply  rational  egoism,  it  just  makes 
rational egoism appear to be a natural choice.  In short, arguing against materialism 
doesn't  necessarily  argue  against  rational  egoism--modern  rational  egoists,  for 
instance, don't follow Hobbes on this point. 
 
The natural law of preservation as outlined by Hobbes can be seen as a sort of 
contract that people voluntarily enter into with others.  The laws require: a. That an 
individual  should  not  render  unreciprocated  obedience  to  ethical  rules  in  the 
interest of others, and so "make himself prey to others";  and, b. That they should 
refuse to observe such rules when there is insufficient security that they will be 
observed by others, and so "seek not peace but war" (Sidgwick, 1988, p. 167).  The 
first point is that ethical rules are at best instrumental; a person should obey them 
only if it helps their cause and only if there is a strong guarantee that others will do 
likewise, otherwise a person is under no obligation to follow them.  In fact, it 
would be irrational to do so because doing so would be intentionally harming one’s 
interests.  Self-preservation in Hobbes’s model is prior to ethics and ethics only 
serves to secure self-preservation.  The second point is that there are no ethical 
obligations to act, the only obligation that needs to be observed is doing what is 
best to preserve one's life.  For example, if others will provide for a common good, 
then I am under no ethical obligation to assist. 
 
Similar natural laws are expressed in some economic models of the relationships 
among  agents  with  the  key  exception  that  Hobbes  was  referring  to  self-
preservation, while economists are presumably referring to economic survival.  For 
instance,  Oliver  Williamson's  idea  of  opportunism  makes  essentially  the  same 
claim as the first natural law above: if we can't agree to a contract then I should 
assume that you are actively going to seek advantage over me.  The market, for 
Williamson, is a place of war of all against all, agents should, accordingly, expect 
others to behave opportunistically.  Recall that for Hobbes ethical behavior is an 
instrumental convenience to be followed only as a second best solution.  Similarly, 
for Williamson, economic contracts are an expensive alternative to the market; it 
would be preferable to use a well regulated market and most preferable to have the 
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one sees fit.  In a similar vein, the logic of Mancur Olson (2000) parallels and 
extends the second law of preservation in that it predicts that public goods will be 
difficult  to  provide  in  large  groups  where  there  is  no  possibility  of  coercion.  
Olson's main argument is that it does not logically follow that even when all of the 
individuals in a collective realize that they would gain if they were to achieve a 
common  objective  that  they  should  pursue  that  objective.    The  essence  of  his 
argument  is  contained  in  the  following  two  sentence:  "...it  is  now  generally 
understood that if the firms in an industry are maximizing profits, the profits for the 
industry as a whole will be less than they might otherwise be" (Olson, 2000, p.10).  
From which he argues: "The important point is that this [the conclusion in the 
previous quote] is true because, though all the firms have a common interest in a 
higher price for the industry's product, it is in the interest of each firm that the other 
firms pay the cost-in terms of the necessary reduction in output-needed to obtain a 
higher price" (Olson, 2000 p. 10).  By the same reasoning, namely, it follows that 
although agents may realize that by working together they could be better off, it 
does  not  necessarily  follow  that  cooperation  will  occur.    Olson  extends  his 
argument  to  include  other  types  of  organizations  that  have  a  strong  economic 
component,  such  as  countries,  labour  unions  and  political  parties.    Economic 
reasoning  in  these  models,  in  part,  parallels  Hobbes’s  war  of  all  against  all.  
Nothing is prior to one's self-interest and everything needs to serve that interest or 
be rejected. 
 
To summarize, Hobbes’s materialist understanding of human nature leads him to 
an acceptance of rational egoism.  The argument is that behaviors can be traced to 
some physical need that requires satisfaction.  It is rational to seek to fulfill those 
needs in order to preserve one's life and to do what one can to make it livable, all 
other considerations are irrational.  They are irrational because any other course of 
action would lead to a diminishing of one's right to self-preservation.  Therefore, it 
is necessary and sufficient that an act contribute to agent's subjective understanding 
of his own well-being, all other acts are irrational under this reasoning.  Hobbes 
arrives at rational egoism via a psychological egoism based on his materialistic 
understanding of human nature. 
 
Bishop Joseph Butler 
 
Psychological  egoism,  if  true,  would  make  the  assumption  of  self-interest 
redundant;  it  would  simply  be  the  case  that  agents  are  naturally,  at  all  times, 
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reasonably act otherwise.  There might still be differences between economic and 
non-economic self-interested motivation, but those differences can't be based on 
motives  other  than  self-interest  since  all  reasonable  motives  are  self-interested.  
However, is psychological egoism a good description of the motives behind actual 
behavior, and if not, why not?  Joseph Butler, writing a short time after Hobbes and 
Mandeville, mounted forceful arguments against psychological egoism and self-
interest in general.  C.D. Broad, perhaps slightly over-stating his case, wrote: "As a 
psychological theory it [psychological egoism] was killed by Butler; but it still 
flourishes, I believe, among bookmakers and smart young business men whose 
claim to know the world is based on an intimate acquaintance with the shadier side 
of it" (Broad, 1930, p. 55).  Whether one agrees with Butler's arguments depends 
critically  on  whether  his  view  of  human  nature  is  accepted.    In  the  next  few 
paragraphs I will summarize several key features of Butler's complex argument 
against psychological egoism, while paying special attention to the role that self-
interest has in Butler's understanding of human nature. 
 
Butler's Hierarchy of Motives 
 
Butler's conceives human nature as consisting of a system composed of sub-units 
which, like the pieces of a watch, cannot be fully understood unless the sub-units 
are put together or imagined to be working together.  There is nothing particularly 
unique about this aspect of Butler's theory, Mandeville, for instance, also imagined 
people  to  be  composed  of  various  passions.    However,  Mandeville  viewed the 
governance relationship among the different motives as random in that dominance 
of a passion at a given moment was determined by outside forces: "... that all of 
them, as they are provoked and come uppermost, govern him by turns, whether he 
will or no" (Mandeville, 1988, [1732]) Introduction, “Enquiry Into the Origin of 
Moral  Virtue”).    Under  Mandeville's  system  there  is  no  room  for  reflection, 
humans are at the mercy of their various passions that are triggered by outside 
forces.  Butler, in contrast, envisioned a hierarchy among the motives and an ability 
to  exercise  reason  that allows  people to reflect and  adjust their  behavior.    For 
instance, in the case of reflection Butler wrote: "It is from considering the relations 
which the several appetites and passions in the inward frame have to each other, 
and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or consciousness, that we get the idea of 
the system or constitution of human nature" (Butler, 1986, 14, 14).  The human 
ability to reflect upon actions means that, unlike inanimate systems and animals, 
people are responsible for any disorder in their “system”.  For Butler, in contrast to 
Mandeville  and  many  others,  people  are  not  passive  vehicles  at  the  mercy  of - 145 -   
 
 
external forces that activate and manipulate various internal passions; they have 
rationality or reason that allows them to reflect upon and adjust their motives.  
Butler's  approach  has  obvious  implications  for  the  rationality  of  Hobbes’s 
materialist  understanding  of  human  nature.    Under  Butler's  understanding, 
behaviors, whether or not they are physically motivated, must pass through the 
filter of reflection.  Behaviors therefore reflect not only immediate physical needs, 
but, at times, can be modified by reflection as well. 
 
People have the rational ability to reflect, and part of what they reflect upon is their 
“lower” or more basic motives, what Butler calls particular motives.  In Butler's 
system  there  are,  roughly,  rational  or  regulating  motives  and  non-rational, 
regulated motives.  The regulating, rational motives are conscience (reflection), 
benevolence  and  self-interest.    The  non-rational,  regulated  motives  are  desires, 
passions and appetites.  They include such things as habits and instincts which are 
automatic and operate without reference to reason.  They also include "animal" 
instincts  that  affect  our  intentions,  but  don't  suppose  any  operation  of  reason 
(Sidgwick, 1988, p. 226-229).  Appetites are periodical, e.g., hunger, while desires 
are things like power, esteem, knowledge and superiority.  Taken together, desires, 
passions and appetites are called particular motives because they are directed at 
particular external objects, for example, food or persons.  "All particular affections 
whatever, resentment, benevolence, love of arts, equally lead to a course of action 
for  their  own  gratification,  that  is,  the  gratification  of  ourselves;  and  the 
gratification of each gives delight; so far then it is manifest they have all the same 
respect to private interest" (Butler, 1986, p. 132). 
 
The importance of the non-rational, particular motives in Butler's system can't be 
over-stated, his insight was to recognize that they can be directed either towards 
self-interested or social (benevolent) objectives.  According to Butler, we have 
particular inclinations that compel us to perform social as well as self-interested 
acts.  For example, when we see somebody or hear of somebody in need many 
people experience a natural reaction to help.  For instance, many feel an immediate 
reaction of sympathy for someone in pain.  It is difficult to explain sympathy in 
terms of self-interest.  It could be argued that we sympathize with others because 
we have an expected hope to receive sympathy in return when we require it, a sort 
of sympathy account that we can call upon when necessary.  This explanation fails 
to explain sympathetic feelings towards people and causes with whom we can in all 
likelihood never  expect  to  repay  our  sympathy.    Take  for  instance  the  case  of 
feelings of sympathy towards animals other than pets, no one reasonably expects to - 146 -   
 
 
receive repayment from baby sea lions or whales, yet our instincts are to help 
suffering animals.  Not all sympathy can be explained by reference to the happiness 
or  pleasure  it  brings  because  feelings  of  sympathy  are  often  accompanied  by 
feelings of sadness--when we see or hear of a person suffering a terrible loss we 
don't experience happiness, but sadness.  The point is that it appears to be a natural 
instinct that motivates us to help, just as natural as those instincts that lead us to 
perform acts of self-interest.  Of course, not everyone feels sympathy and people 
have different levels of sympathy towards different objects, but the same can be 
said for self-interest.  What is important is that sympathy, like self-interest, is a 
natural  reaction  to  some  events  for  a  large  majority  of  people.    From  this 
observation, Butler argues that people are as naturally benevolent as they are self-
interested.  Particular affections can result in behaviors that have interested as well 
as disinterested outcomes. 
 
In contrast to the particular affections, self-love (self-interest), according to Butler, 
is  a  cool,  rational  principle.    For  Butler,  self-interest,  as  with  conscience  and 
benevolence, is a regulating motive; it is a general desire that most people have for 
their own happiness.  People don't aim at happiness or pleasure, rather, they have 
particular desires, passions, appetites, etc., which are directed at external objects.  
Self-interest  acts  as  a  regulator  of  these  more  basic  affections,  passions  and 
appetites: "Self-love does not constitute this or that to be our interest or good; but, 
our interest or good being constituted by nature and supposed, self-love only puts 
upon obtaining and securing it" (1986, p. 48, 9).  Therefore, the particular motives 
are more basic than self-interest because if they didn't exist, then there would be 
nothing for the general desire of self-interest to aim at.  Pleasure is not the primary 
aim of self-interest, but is a result of achieving the objects which are the aims of 
particular desires, passion and appetites.  My interpretation of the foregoing is that 
there is nothing  outside  of  us  that  we  would call  happiness.   We  don't  pursue 
happiness, rather, our happiness is realized when our particular passion, etc. are 
realized.  Regulated or specific motives are directed at obtaining those external 
objects.  Thus, e.g., the object of the appetite of hunger is the eating of food, not 
the pleasure of eating it; hunger is therefore, strictly speaking, no more "interested" 
than benevolence.  This means that our particular appetite for food to satiate our 
hunger is separate from our motive of enjoyment.  Pleasure comes from eating the 
food, not the appetite for that food. 
 
Butler offers a compelling piece of evidence to demonstrate that particular desires, 
passions,  and  appetites  are  not  always  in  our  self-interest;  he  observes  that - 147 -   
 
 
particular motives can often make our lives go worse.  He identifies the problem as, 
"the confusion of calling actions interested which are done in contradiction to the 
most manifest known interest, merely for the gratification of a present passion" 
(Butler, 1986 19, 35).  The pursuit of external objects is no otherwise interested 
than every action of every creature must from the nature of the thing be; for no one 
can act but from a desire or choice or preference of his own (Butler, 1986, 19, 35).  
In this paraphrase Butler does two things, first, he points out that our particular 
desires can be directed at objects that are in our interest, but also at objects that are 
not  in  our  interest.    Second,  he  addresses  the  position  known  of  tautological 
egoism.  As previously mentioned, this is the idea, still heard today, that because 
people make a choice, i.e. prefer one thing to another, it must be their interests that 
are being served.  This reasoning confuses the decision maker with the motivation.  
Simply,  a  person  chooses  what  he  prefers,  but  what  he  prefers  isn't  necessary 
motivated by self-interest.  For example, I can be motivated by benevolence to help 
someone in need despite whatever impact it has on my own interests.  I prefer 
benevolence, and choose it, but benevolence isn't necessarily in my self-interest.  
By  not  understanding  the  idea  that  self-interest  is  composed  of  many  diverse 
motivations, authors have fallen into the trap of identifying every action as self-
interested. Interpreting desires or preferences in too broad a sense so that they refer 
to whatever motivational feature within the agent produces an action, means that 
such desires and preferences become truisms without empirical content.  Of course 
agents prefer whatever it is they choose, but their reasons for choosing what they 
choose are not necessarily based on their self-interest (see Butler 1986, Shaver 
1999; Kavka, 1986 for a discussion of these topics).  By not distinguishing between 
particular motives that are directed at specific objects and the general motive of 
self-interest  which  seeks  happiness  or  pleasure,  previous  authors,  according  to 
Butler, confound specific desires, passions appetites with the general motive of 
self-interest. 
 
Butler is not claiming that people are not motivated by self-interest, rather, he 
observes that people frequently act against their self-interest: "Men daily, hourly 
sacrifice the greatest known interest to fancy, inquisitiveness, love or hatred, any 
vagrant inclination.  The thing to be lamented is not that men have so great a regard 
to their own good or interest in the present world, for they have not enough; but 
that they have so little to the good of others."  (Butler, 1986, 21, 40).  Therefore, 
the particular passions can be directed at objects that are good or bad for us and 
therefore, according to Butler, they are not necessarily in one's self-interest.  In 
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already discussed extensively in previous chapters and won't repeat in detail here.  
The point is that immediate passions for food, sex, etc., can lead people to actions 
that are clearly not in their best interests.  Subjectively, upon cool reflection, the 
individual may know that what they desire is not in their best long-term interest, 
but at the moment of action, such desires, passions and appetites can lead people to 
perform acts which are self-destructive. 
 
If Butler's hierarchy of motives is accepted, then it is possible to understand how 
benevolent  passions  and  self-interest  can  be  correlated.    The  argument  is  that 
particular  passions  can  work  against  our  best  interests,  but  they  can  also  be 
benevolent or what Butler calls social or community acts.  Just as people can be 
guided  by  their  particular  desires  for  food,  they  can  also  be  guided  by  other-
regarding desires.  For instance, sympathetic or compassionate desires can be just 
as natural as the desire for food.  Therefore, benevolence, according to Butler, is 
not  necessarily  incompatible  with  self-interest  and,  in  fact,  it  may  be  in  one's 
interest to be benevolent.  Butler argues that a part of man's constitution, like those 
of 'brutes', is made-up of instincts and principles of action, those that lead to the 
good of the community and those that are mostly directed to private good (Butler, 
1986 p. 16, 18-21).  He notes: "Now there have been persons in all ages who have 
professed that they found satisfaction in the exercise of charity, in the love of their 
neighbor, in endeavoring to promote the happiness of all they had to do with, and 
in the pursuit of what is just and right and good, as the general bent of their mind 
and end of their life; and that doing an action of baseness or cruelty would be as 
great a violence to their self as much breaking in upon their nature as any external 
force"  Butler,  1986,  (p.  52,  15).    Butler  thereby  concludes  that  social  and 
community acts can be aligned with one's self-interest: "Therefore it is not a true 
representation of mankind to affirm that they are wholly governed by self-love, the 
love of power and sensual appetites; since, as on the one hand, there are often 
actuated by these, without regard to right or wrong, so, on the other, it is manifest 
fact that the same persons, the generality, are frequently influenced by friendship, 
compassion, gratitude; and even a general abhorrence of what is base, and liking of 
what is fair and just, takes its turn amongst the motives of action" (Butler, 1986, p. 
16, 21). 
 
My interpretation of the above quote is that people are composed of a mix of 
motives, some of which are called unreflective or instinctual (sensual appetites) 
and others which might be called intuitions (fairness and justice).  The unreflective 
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social or benevolent as they are self-interested.  It could be argued that Butler has 
simply assumed away the problem of psychological egoism, but that would he 
incorrect.    Butler  has,  as  I  have  shown,  separated  self-interest  from  particular 
passions, he then claims that those more basic motives can lead to self-interested 
acts which are at times self-destructive, but they can also lead to benevolent acts.  
He summarizes his claim: "The most intelligible way of speaking of it seems to be 
this:  that  self-love  and  the  actions  done  in  consequence  of  it  (for  these  will 
presently appear to be the same question) are interested; that particular affections 
toward external objects, and the actions done in consequence of those affections, 
are not so" (Butler, 1986, 51, 11).  Since affections toward external objects can 
lead us in either a good or bad direction, they are not necessarily in line with our 
interest. 
 
If Butler's claims are accepted, then people are as naturally benevolent or social as 
they  are  self-interested.    In  addition,  there  is  no  necessary  conflict  between 
benevolence and self-interest.  Butler makes a similar argument in favor of the idea 
that self-interest and moral behavior can be correlated.  "The chief design of the 
eleventh discourse is to state the notion of self-love and disinterestedness, in order 
to  show  that  benevolence  is  not  more  unfriendly  to  self-love  than  any  other 
particular affection whatever" (Butler, 1986, 18, 35).  His argument is that if his 
idea that the general motive of self-interest has a controlling function is accepted, 
then it is possible to conclude that self-interest doesn't exclude goodwill or love of 
the arts or reputation or any other particular motive.  "The short of the matter is no 
more  than  this:  happiness  consists  in  the  gratification  of  certain  affections, 
appetites, passions, with objects which are by nature adapted to them.  Self-love 
may indeed set us on work to gratify these, but happiness or enjoyment has no 
immediate  connection  with  self-love,  but  arises  from  such  gratification  alone.  
Love of our neighbor is one of those affections.  This, considered as a virtuous 
principle, is gratified by a consciousness of endeavoring to promote the good of 
others; but considered as a natural affection, its gratification consists in the actual 
accomplishment  of  this  endeavor"  (Butler,  1986,  53,16).    Therefore,  motives 
directed towards benevolent actions and the pursuit of the public good are as much 
a part of self-love and the pursuit of private good as any other particular passions 
and their respective pursuits.  In short, there is no necessary contradiction between 
other-regarding motives such as goodwill and self-interest because conducting acts 
of goodwill can also yield pleasure and happiness. 
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There needs to be an authoritative voice in Butler's system that allows people to 
determine right from wrong behavior.  Butler has shown that self-interested and 
social inclinations are equally natural, but he also wants to show how people decide 
what is the right thing to do.  Butler summarizes the problem as: "Now all this 
licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition that men follow their nature in the 
same sense, in violating the known rules of justice and honesty for the sake of a 
present  gratification,  as  they  do  in  following  those  rules  when  they  have  no 
temptation to the contrary.  And if this were true, that could not be so which St. 
Paul asserts, that men are ‘by nature a law to themselves’.  If by following nature 
were meant only acting as we please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of 
nature as any guide in morals, nay, the very mention of deviating from nature 
would  be  absurd;  and  the  mention  of  following  it,  when  spoken  by  way  of 
distinction,  would  absolutely  have  no  meaning"  (Butler,  1986,  II;  4).    The 
observation that we sometimes violate, for example, rules of justice, and sometimes 
don't, and that we know that the first is a bad thing to do and the second a good 
thing, means that there must be some mechanism within us telling us what is bad or 
good.  This, according to Butler, is the principle of reflection or conscience: 
 
   "But there is a superior principle of reflection of conscience in every man which 
distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart [the natural disposition to 
kindness and compassion] as well as his external actions, which passes judgment 
upon himself and them, pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves 
just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust, which, without 
being  consulted,  without  being  advised  with,  magisterially  exerts  itself,  and 
approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly; and which, if not forcibly 
stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more 
effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and affirm its own.  It is by this 
faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself; by this 
faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a principle in his heart, which is to 
have some influence as well as others, but considered as a faculty in kind and in 
nature supreme over all the others, and which bears its own authority of being so" 
(Butler, 1986, II: 8). 
 
At this point in the argument Butler appears to have created a problem for himself 
in that if the faculty of reflection is supreme and directs us to do the good, why do 
people do bad things?  In fact, if it is a superior motive, then there could be no 
wrong actions.  Butler clearly understood the dilemma: "Man may act according to 
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act in a way disproportionate to, and violate, his real proper nature" (Butler, 1986 
II: 10).  "Passion of appetite implies a direct simple tendency toward such and such 
objects,  without  distinction  of  the  means  by  which  they  are  to  be  obtained.  
Consequently, it will often happen there will be a desire of particular objects in 
cases  in  which  they  cannot  be  obtained  without  manifest  injury  to  others.  
Reflection of conscience comes in, and disapproves the pursuit of them in these 
circumstances;  but  the  desire  remains.    Which  is  to  be  obeyed,  appetite  of 
reflection?"  (Butler, 1986, II: 13).  Butler uses an analogy to suggest a solution; 
desires,  passions  and  appetite  may  on  occasion  win  out  over  the  good,  but 
reflection is always the superior in kind.  The distinction Butler draws is between 
mere power and authority and what is possible versus what is lawful.  It is possible 
to break the law, but the law remains the law.  Where does the law come from and 
how do we recognize it?  For Butler recognition is not the problem, he claims we 
have an internal gauge that lets us determine right from wrong.  That gauge, like 
the law itself, is a natural part of ourselves: "Conscience does not only offer itself 
to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with 
it; that is our natural guide, the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature; it 
therefore belongs to our condition of being, it is our duty to walk in that path and 
follow  this  guide,  without  looking  about  to  see  whether  we  may  not  possibly 
forsake them with impunity" (Butler, 1986 III: 5).  Incidentally, it is not necessary 
to believe in a higher being to share Butler's viewpoint, some Intuitionists, for 
example, claim that some moral truths are non-inferentially known and do not rely 
on the existence of a god to supply that knowledge. 
     
In his thin but dense book Butler raises several other issues of relevance to the 
topic of this manuscript; I will mention just a few of them that still have resonance 
in modern discussions of self-interest.  The first relates to the form of egoism that 
Butlers adopts, namely, veto egoism.  A complete discussion of this topic would 
lead me too far off-topic, so I will present an abbreviated discussion of the relevant 
issues.  The second topic concerns the paradox of hedonism, which is an argument 
against an exclusive concern for self-interest which is still heard today. 
 
Butler's view of the role of happiness or pleasure in human nature is complex but 
informative.  In the Eleventh Sermon he writes: "Let it be allowed, though virtue or 
moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and 
good, as such; yet that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to 
ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our 
happiness,  or  at  least  not  contrary  to  it."    H.A.  Prichard  argues  that  Butler  is - 152 -   
 
 
maintaining that, in the final analysis, an action is only right if it is in an agent's 
interest (H.A. Prichard, 2002 [1928]).  Duties then, according to this interpretation, 
have  no  moral  authority,  only  our  interests  make  an  action  right.    A  more 
problematic interpretation is that even if a person knows an act is right, his interests 
may determine another course of behavior; an agent won't be motivated to do it 
unless it serves his interests.  Butler has already shown that benevolent acts are not 
necessarily contrary to happiness and therefore a person's interests can coincide 
with the interests of others.  However, the deciding factor in his system is which 
act will promote one's self-interest.  Butler admits reasons for action grounded in 
something other than self-interest, yet gives self-interest a veto over those reasons.  
In short, Butler appears to be what is called a veto egoist, which is a normative 
position that claims that it is necessary but not sufficient for an action to be rational 
that it contributes to the well-being of the agent (Shaver, 1999).  In other words, an 
act has to be motivated by self-interest to be rational, but it also needs other things 
as well, namely, it has to be right or good. 
     
Butler anticipates an important paradox that Sidgwick (1981) later identifies as the 
Fundamental Paradox of Hedonism.  This is the idea that a person can be so fixated 
on his own pleasure that the fixation hinders him from achieving his aim.  It says 
that a person can be so obsessed on, say, his own happiness, that he is less happy 
then he would be if he had another aim.  For instance, having the sole fixation of 
being the most popular person in a room is likely to result in the failure to achieve 
that aim.  The result, according to Butler, is that: "People may love themselves with 
the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable" (Butler, 
1986, 48, 9).  A similar, but more general idea was expressed by the Epicureans 
who, as I will show, taught that the pursuit of all but the most basic desires and 
needs only leads to frustration.  Greater happiness, according to the Epicureans, 
can  thereby  be  achieved  by  intentionally  restricting  one's  desires.    The 
Fundamental Paradox is a further strike against psychological egoism because it 
means  that  an  exclusive  reliance  on  the  motive  of  self-interest  can  be  self-
defeating.  In other words, it may be in one's best interest to have some other 
motive than self-interest. 
     
Finally, I wish to reemphasize that Butler never claims that people are not self-
interested, rather, he claims that self-interest is a rational choice (or a choice about 
rationality)  that  people  make.    Butler's  argument  is  that  there  are  a  variety  of 
particular affections, passions, and appetites that are directed towards particular 
external  objects.    These  particular  motives  are  directed  at  specific  objects, - 153 -   
 
 
particular  things,  and  are  not  directed  at  obtaining  feelings  of  pleasure  or 
happiness.    Simply  put,  psychological  egoism  fails  because  it  assumes  that  all 
motives are self-interested which is clearly not the case because particular motives 
can  work  against  one's  interests.    Furthermore,  there  is  no  necessary 
incompatibility  between  self-interest  and  benevolence  because  self-interested 




In Adam Smith's work it is possible to see the refinement of the approach first 
articulated  by  Butler.    Smith's  view  of  human  nature  is  complex  and  can't  be 
understood solely in terms of self-interest, however that term is understood.  I will 
begin this section by examining one of the more misunderstood aspects of Smith's 
work  if  not  one  of  the  most  misunderstood  ideas  in  all  of  economics  as  it  is 
popularly understood, namely, Smith's view of self-interest and the so-called Smith 
problem.  I will then turn to the issue of Smith's general view of human nature and 
the role that self-interest plays within it. 
 
Adam Smith is often misrepresented as advocating the position that self-interested 
behavior by the individual leads to general benefits for all; a belief, as I have 
shown,  that  accurately  reflects  Mandeville's  position.    Smith,  in  fact,  rejected 
Mandeville's  restricted  definition  of  self-interest  and  argued  that  a  proper 
understanding of that term would undermine Mandeville's position (Fleischacker, 
2004, p. 46).  As I will show, Smith, a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow 
University, had a rich and complex understanding of the relationship of people to 
one another.  In addition to having an expansive view of human nature, Smith also 
warned against making overly simplistic assumptions and attempting to explain too 
much with one theory.  Both Smith's view on the diversity of human nature and his 
warning  against  theories  that  are  overly  parsimonious  have  been  largely 
disregarded in the economic and business literatures in regards to the topic of self-
interest. 
 
I suspect that some of the inclination towards self-interest as a default position 
among  economists  and  others  may  be  due,  in  part,  to  the  false  belief  that 
economists  have  always  made  the  assumption  that  people  are  by  nature  self-
interest.  The quote at the beginning of chapter 3 by Milton L. Myers emphasizes 
the importance that self-interest has been given in modern conceptions of economic 
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economic man.  For instance, many of the early economists were Utilitarians, the 
central tenant of which is the greatest good for the greatest number of people.  
Utilitarianism thereby implies that individual interests may in some circumstances 
need to be sacrificed for the good of the community at large; in other words, the 
interests of the community, in some cases, outweigh the interests of the individual.  
Utilitarianism  is  not  without  its  fair  share  of  problems,  for  instance,  modern 
Utilitarians and other consequentialists are still struggling with issues such as when 
and for whom we should be willing to sacrifice our interests (Mulgan, 2001; Smart 
and Williams, 1973; Griffin, 1988).
12 Modern economics largely avoids these and 
similar issues by placing an extraordinarily heavy weight on the value of individual 
autonomy.  Under the approach of Utilitarianism, individuals were not seen as 
sovereign beings existing outside society, but members of a greater whole.  Smith, 
although generally not considered to be a Utilitarian, expressed an appreciation of 
at least the sacrificing aspects that society may place on an individual: "man ought 
to regard himself, not as something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the 
world, a member of the vast commonwealth of nature", and "to the interest of this 
great community, he ought at all times be willing that his own little interest should 
be  sacrificed"  (Smith,  1993,  p.  140).    Smith,  as  I  will  show,  may  have  been 
influenced in this regard by the Stoics who expressed similar sentiments.  Smith 
then, doesn't accept the very basis of Hobbes’s argument that people are forbidden 
by  reason  from  doing  what  detracts  from  their  lives.    There  can,  according  to 
Smith, be good reasons to sacrifice one's interests for the good of the community. 
 
However, there is room for different interpretations of Smith's ideas on human 
nature as it appears in his two great works.  The “Smith Problem” has occupied 
scholars for some time and largely concerns attempts to reconcile the largely non-
moral  view  of  human  nature  found  in  The  Wealth  of  Nations  (WN),  and  the 
message found in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS).  A cursory look at the 
two books appears to confirm a fundamental incompatibility; after all, one of the 
                                                 
12  The difficulties I have touched on here are just a small sample of the issues that 
consequentialists have been facing ever since Utilitarianism was first proposed as an ethical 
theory.  While many such issues in consequentialism concern how to balance the rights of 
individuals with the need for the greater good, many theories of self-interest have the 
dubious advantage of denying that the needs of others place any demands on us at all.  Still, 
individual egoists have to be able to find a balance among their various interests or face the 
consequence of failing to achieve their best interest.  See, for instance, Tim Mulgan's 
(2001) The Demands of Consequentialism or Darwall (2003) for a review. 
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most famous quotes in all of economics is: "It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from the regard for 
their own interest" (WN, 1993: 22).  While the first sentence in the TMS is, "How 
selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature,  which  interest  him  in  the  fortune  of  others,  and  render  their  happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it" (TMS I.i.1.1).  The second quote is somewhat ambiguous, people undoubtedly 
derive pleasure from making others happy, but the by now familiar question could 
be raised: Why does it make people happy to see others happy?  Whose interests 
are  being  served  by  making  others  happy?    As  I  have  attempted  to  show  on 
numerous occasions, this question is really at the heart of the topic of self-interest.  
I suggest that in the quote above Smith leaves open the possibility that there is 
some principle in our nature that gives us pleasure from seeing others happy which 
doesn't  rely  on  self-interest.    In  other  words,  the  happiness  of  others  gives  us 
pleasure as an end in itself and not because we derive pleasure from performing the 
act.  I believe this is the correct interpretation because in the quote Smith seems to 
be  contrasting  selfishness  and  interests  with  something  else--I  claim  that  the 
something  else  is  disinterested  or  non-self-interested  motives.    However,  my 
interpretation is admittedly open to debate, the quote leaves open the possibility 
that people won't make others happy unless their own happiness is increased as 
well.    In  other  words,  making  others  happy  is  a  self-interested,  instrumental, 
endeavor.  In addition, even accepting my view of this quote, we're still left with 
the problem of reconciling it with the “butcher” quote. 
 
Samuel Fleischacker, in what he claims is the first philosophical analysis of the 
Wealth  of  Nations,  convincingly  argues  that  there  is  no  Smith  Problem.    His 
analysis of the butcher quote is typical of Fleischacker's approach, which is to place 
Smith's ideas in their proper context.  Reading Smith is a pleasure partly because of 
his meticulous organization.  For example, at the beginning of each chapter in his 
books, Smith clearly specifies the structure and the main points he wishes to make.  
He then proceeds to meticulously discuss each point in the order in which they 
were originally raised in his introduction to the topic.  A cursory reading of Smith 
can  lead  to  problems,  because  he  often  introduces  counter-examples  which 
challenge  his  own  views.   However,  if  thoroughly  read, there is little room  to 
misinterpret the main point of each chapter and the reasoning Smith uses to support 
his position. 
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Keeping Smith's methodology in mind, it is possible to interpret the importance 
that he attaches to the story of the butcher.  The first thing to notice about the quote 
is that no one expects the butcher, brewer or baker to provide their products out of 
kindness.  The butcher expects to be paid for the goods and services he renders and 
likewise, we expect to be paid for the goods and services we provide.  Only a 
beggar, whom Smith mentions in his discussion of the butcher, brewer and baker, 
expects or hopes to receive things from kindness alone--but he's the exception to 
the rule which Smith mentions precisely to emphasize the point that people expect 
to be rewarded for the goods and services they provide.  Smith is addressing a very 
specific issue in the second chapter of the book from which the butcher quote is 
taken, namely, the division of labor.  In the first paragraph of the chapter, Smith 
writes that the division of labor is not a matter of considered human design, but: "It 
is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity 
in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another" (WN, I.ii; p. 21).  Rather than 
appealing  to  benevolence,  Smith  argues  that  people  will  be  more  successful 
achieving their aims if they can rally the interests of others in their favor. 
 
Why,  Smith  asks,  does  the  situation  occur  that  we  need  to  appeal  to  the  self-
interests of others?  He tells us in the same chapter that it is not due to the natural 
talents of people, which: "...is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the 
very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, 
when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the 
effect of a division of labour" (WN, I.ii; p. 23).  Smith explains that the difference 
"between a philosopher and a common street porter arises not so much from nature, 
as from habit, custom and education" (WN, I.ii; p. 23-24).  Just as with Hobbes, for 
Smith people begin with more or less the same talents but, in contrast to Hobbes, 
Smith believes that as they mature, habits, custom and education make each of 
them efficient producers in different areas.  Our specialization and the fact that 
others are specialized as well means that we are required to truck, barter and trade 
in order to get the things we need and want.  The critical point is that although we 
expect to pay and be paid for the things we buy and sell, this doesn't require us to 
be exclusively self-interested.  The division of labor means that people have to buy 
and sell their goods and services in the market, and they will do so as their interests 
dictate.  Nevertheless, there is no requirement in Smith's explanation that people 
have to be exclusively self-interested in all aspects of life.  As I will begin to show 
in the next paragraph, even within the market, there is room for the expression of 
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now be a another familiar refrain, interests need to be interpreted within a given 
context.  For Smith, the context is clearly economic.  Finally, it is important to 
keep in mind Smith's reasons for publishing the Wealth of Nations, which were to 
describe the general workings of a large economy and to argue against the policy of 
mercantilism.  For those tasks he didn't need a complete model of human behavior; 
for that we need to examine his Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
 
What motivates an individual to act in Adam Smith's system?  It is clearly not just 
the  accumulation  of  material  goods  or  wealth.    In  the  following  quote  Smith 
argues,  perhaps  again  reflecting  his  Stoics  influences,  that  once  basic  material 
needs are met, the reasons that people desire material goods shifts from one of 
needs to superfluities: "For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world?  
what is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and 
preeminence?  Is it to supply the necessities of nature?  The wages of the meanest 
labourer can supply them.  We see that they afford him food and clothing, the 
comfort of a house, and of a family.  If we examined his oeconomy with rigour, we 
should find that he spends a great part of them upon conveniences, which may be 
regarded  as  superfluites,  and  that,  upon  extraordinary  occasions,  he  can  give 
something even to vanity and distinction" (TMS, I.iii.2.1).  Smith further argues 
that once basic needs are fulfilled, anything beyond that amount will not make 
people happier or better, in fact, experience shows, according to Smith, it will 
make them worse off.  Rather than goods or wealth, he argues the following: "It is 
the  vanity,  not  the  ease,  or  the  pleasure,  which  interests  us"  (TMS,  I.iii.2.1).  
Wealth, for Smith, is a means to acquire the attention, sympathy and approbation 
that in turn feeds our vanity; it is not an end in itself once basic needs are satisfied.  
Vanity,  in  turn, "is  always  founded upon the belief  of  our  being  the  object of 
attention and approbation" (TMS, I.iii.2.1).  Simply, we care about what others 
think of us, we want them to sympathize with our plight where sympathy is used by 
Smith to denote, "... our fellow feeling with any passion whatever" (TMS, I.i.1.5). 
 
If I have properly understood Smith's argument, people want to acquire wealth 
because it feeds their vanity and vanity is a part of a need for sympathy from 
others.  If Smith's argument is accepted, a narrow, economic interpretation of self-
interest as an isolated individual in pursuit of wealth is a poor description of human 
motivation.  In the terms defined by Broad, sympathy is a relative concept and its 
value requires the presence of others.  This is because sympathy, according to 
Smith, affects both the giver and receiver; it is not a one-way transaction, a person 
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alone or with an imaginary person, sympathy requires some sort of connection with 
another person.  Through sympathy, "we enter as it were into his body, and become 
in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
sensations,  and  even  feel  something  which,  though  weaker  in  degree,  is  not 
altogether unlike them" (I.i.1.2.).  "Sympathy, however, cannot, in any sense, be 
regarded  as  a  selfish  principle.    When  I  sympathize  with  your  sorrow  or  your 
indignation, it may be pretended, indeed, that my emotion is founded in self-love, 
because it arises from bringing your case home to myself, from putting myself in 
your  stances.    But  though  sympathy  is  very  properly  said  to  arise  from  an 
imaginary  change  of  situations  with  the  person  principally  concerned,  yet  this 
imaginary  change  is  not  supposed  to  happen  to  me  in  my  own  person  and 
character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize" (TMS, VII.iii.1.4).  
Smith's theory of sympathy, his view of human nature, is clearly expressing an 
entirely different sentiment than a simple reliance on a self-interested pursuit of 
wealth and happiness. 
 
Perhaps sympathy plays the same role that pride plays in Mandeville's scheme, 
namely, perhaps it is just disguised self-interest?  Smith explicitly argues against 
this interpretation, speaking of "Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments 
from  certain  refinements  of  self-love..."    (I.i.2.1),  he  writes,  "Man,  say  they, 
conscious of his own weakness, and of the need which he has for the assistance of 
others, rejoices whenever he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he 
is then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he observes the contrary, 
because he is then assured of their opposition" (I.i.2.1).  Smith is here arguing 
against the instrumental position that we have a positive response to the reactions 
of  others  because  we  desire  their  support  or  a  negative  response  because  they 
oppose us.  His argument against this understanding of sympathy is: "... pleasure 
and pain is felt so instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous occasions, that it 
seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such self-interested 
consideration"  (I.i.2.1).    For  Smith,  our  instantaneous  reactions,  (the  desires, 
passions and appetites of Butler) represent our true response, not a response due to 
a calculation of the net benefits or harms that the reactions of others perhaps imply.  
While this argument isn't entirely convincing because it doesn't account for the fact 
that  many  of  our  reactions  are  learned  responses  or  habits,  to  the  degree  that 
instantaneous reactions represent unchecked motives, they do indicate an ability to 
sympathize with both the plights and pleasures of others.  Although some of our 
sympathetic responses are undoubtedly learned responses, some may not be.  For 
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others,  well  before they  have  been  taught  to  do  so.    Individuals  often  react in 
extraordinary  circumstances  to  what they  perceive  as  acts  of injustice  or  when 
heroic acts are called for.  The point, for the purposes of this manuscript, is that 
while there is room in Smith’s system for instrumental self-interest, there is also a 
place for selfless acts. 
 
Like all of the authors I have discussed, Smith believed that people are motivated 
by both self-interest and benevolence. Self-interest plays an important although 
limited role in Smith's system.  To explain its role Smith employs an approach to 
which I alluded to before, a  methodology which can cause some problems for 
unwary readers, namely, he often describes an ideal (read unlikely) state and then 
presents  a  more  realistic  position  which  he  in  fact  advocates.    Using  that 
methodology Smith first describes a world based purely on benefice, "It is thus that 
man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by nature to that situation for 
which he was made.  All the members of human society stand in need of each 
other's  assistance,  and  are  likewise  exposed  to  mutual  injuries.    Where  the 
necessary  assistance  is  reciprocally  afforded  from  love,  from  gratitude,  from 
friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy" (TMS, II.ii.3.1).  So, 
contrary to Hobbes and Mandeville, Smith argues that, at least in an ideal state, 
benevolence could provide the means to a flourishing society.  However, Smith 
explains that even a less than ideal state, one without the guarantee of mutual love 
and affection, will not necessarily collapse.  This comes about because, according 
to Smith as with Hobbes, members of a society realize that for their own well-
being  they  are  dependent  on  each  other.    Where  people  in  Hobbes’s  system 
rationally concluded that they have to submit their will to an all powerful state in 
order  to  escape  mutual  destruction,  people  in  Smith's  system  use  their rational 
faculties and decide that they have to depend on one another to prevent society 
from  collapsing.    Enlightened  self-interest  allows  people  to  conclude  that  they 
require the cooperation of others in order to fulfill their own aims.  While narrow 
self-interest  can  be  overcome  through  enlightened  self-interest,  misplaced  self-
interest can be destructive: "Society, however, cannot subsist among those who are 
at all time ready to hurt and injure one another" (TMS, II.ii.3.3).  It is not benefice 
that holds the society together, that feeling is too weak, but justice that, "is the 
main pillar that upholds the whole edifice" (TMS, II.ii.3.4).  Our naturally given 
conscience drives us to seek justice, a drive that compels us to take care of the 
needs of others.  For Smith, the need of people to be worthy of sympathy drives 
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of conscience.  Human conscience, as in Butler's model, plays a reflective role 
allowing people to choose between good and bad actions. 
 
Unmitigated self-interest is contained by a stronger force: "It is a stronger power, a 
more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions [of restraint].  It is 
reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great 
judge and arbiter of our conduct.  It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as 
to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the 
most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no 
respect  better  than  any  other  in  it;  and  that  when  we  prefer  ourselves  so 
shamelessly  and  so  blindly  to  others,  we  become  the  object  of  resentment, 
abhorrence, and execration" (Smith, TMS, III.iii.3.4).  Smith believed that people 
are motivated by both self-interest and benevolence and that they are capable of 
reflecting upon and controlling their actions and taking account of the feelings of 
others through, in Smith's case, the faculty of sympathy. Smith, like Butler, saw a 
hierarchy among the motives.  For Smith it is the intellectual virtue of prudence 
through which one judges the appropriateness of an action.  Finally, Smith believed 
that an over-reliance on self-interest could lead one to go astray of what is in his 
best enlightened interest. 
 
How then is it possible to account for the idea of the invisible hand?  The invisible 
hand is a powerful, gripping image; it is the idea that it is economically good that 
everyone  pursues  their  own  narrow  self-interests  because  doing  so  has  the 
unintentional side-effect of increasing the well-being of the group as a whole.  The 
results of the invisible hand are not a good from the subjective perspective of any 
person--people don't pursue the good of the group as an aim--but good results as 
viewed by an objective observer.  The motives of people in capital markets are 
focused on increasing their own wealth: "Every individual is continually exerting 
himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can 
command.  It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he 
has in view" (WN, IV.ii: p. 289).  Smith repeats the claim that in the capital market 
people are motivated by wealth: "But it is only for the sake of profit that any man 
employs  a  capital  in  the  support  of  industry;  and  he  will  always,  therefore, 
endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of which the produce is 
likely to be of the greatest value..."  (WN, IV.iii: p. 291).  We're not surprised when 
the butcher asks us to pay for his products, likewise, we shouldn't be surprised that 
when investors choose to attempt to maximize their profits.  Profits are a part of 
one's self-interest, not the only thing, and certainly not the major aim of leading a - 161 -   
 
 
good life if we take TMS as a guide to Smith's understanding of human nature.  
Smith’s point expressed in the above quotes is the simple idea, just as it was with 
the example of the butcher in the meat market, that people try to do what is best for 
themselves in the narrow confines of the marketplace--no one, except perhaps a 
beggar, expects any other sort of motivation in the market.  I will provide evidence 
in the eighth chapter that raises doubts even about this last claim; an economic 
context  doesn’t  necessarily  exclude  the  possibility  of  benevolent  motivation.  
Smith recognized, like Butler, that the pursuit of private advantages can often lead 
to outcomes that coincide with what is advantageous for the group as a whole.  
Often, but not always, a person, by pursuing what is in their best interest promotes 
the interests of the group without intending to do so; the invisible hand guides him 
to do what is potentially good for the group.  While the invisible hand can yield 
benefits for the group as a whole, Smith also recognized that it can also lead to 
decreases in the well-being of the group (WN, Smith, II.ii).  That the invisible hand 
is not always benevolent and sometimes malevolent should be obvious.  Modern 
markets are highly regulated entities that curtail the interests of individuals for the 
benefit of the group as a whole.  Smith often expresses beliefs that go against the 
idea of giving self-interest carte blanche, "The wise and virtuous man is at all times 
willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to the public interest of his 
own particular order or society" (TMS, p. 235). 
 
An important feature of Smith's argument for the purposes of my manuscript is that 
when he refers to the butcher or the invisible hand, he is referring to a specific 
economic context.  He is not, as is so often the case modern economics, implying 
that such reasoning extends to non-market situations.  Economics, for Smith, is a 
clearly delineated aspect of human life, it is not, as in much modern economic 
theory, any situation in which resources, broadly defined, are used to fulfill human 
needs.    The  Wealth  of  Nations  concerns  a  specific  context  in  which  specific, 
narrow,  self-interested  motives  are  appropriate,  while  The  Theory  of  Moral 
Sentiments is a more general account of how people arrive at ethical judgments of 
their own and other's behavior. 
 
Ronald H. Coase's Analysis of The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 
Ronald Coase's (1994 [1976]) analysis of what he takes to be Adam Smith's beliefs 
about human nature and the role that self-interest plays in that nature is typical of 
Coase in that it is incisive and novel; however, I believe it maintains a bias towards 
self-interest that is not contained in either of Smith's two books.  Coase draws two - 162 -   
 
 
conclusions from his analysis of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS); the first 
is that there is no essential difference between the views of human nature expressed 
in TMS and those found in The Wealth of Nations (WN).  His second conclusion is 
that Smith's views of human nature as expressed in TMS strengthen the advantages 
of  the  market.    Coase  concludes,  correctly  I  believe,  that  self-interest  is 
“everywhere evident”, but that is not a unique observation, Smith, like Hobbes, 
Mandeville, Butler and virtually every other scholar recognizes that self-interest is 
everywhere or nearly everywhere present (1994, p. 111).  However, not all interests 
are necessarily reducible to economic interests.  I will explore this basic idea as I 
discuss each of Coase's arguments. 
 
Self-interest in TMS and WN 
 
Although  I  believe  that  Coase  is  correct  in  concluding  that  self-interest  is  an 
important element in both TMS and WN, I believe that in the case of TMS, Coase 
has,  despite  his  numerous  qualifications,  over-emphasized  its  importance.  
Nowhere is that over-emphasis more apparent than in Coase's analysis of Smith's 
key concept of sympathy.  I will address some of the limits of Coase's analysis, but 
before doing that, it is important to understand the general difficulties of comparing 
TMS and WN. 
     
That self-interest plays an important role in both books is not surprising given the 
importance self-interest in human psychology; I have expended quite some effort 
in the preceding chapters demonstrating the prevalence of that motive.  Therefore, 
it shouldn't be surprising that whether the issue is explaining how people form 
moral judgments, as is the purpose of TMS, or explaining the functioning of an 
economy, the  main purpose of WN, self-interest is an important component of 
Smith's analysis.  However, the two very different purposes for which the books 
were written means that applying the conclusions of one book to the other must be 
done with care.  There are several methods that could be used to bring together the 
findings of both books.  One method would be to argue that moral judgments play 
an important role in the functioning of an economy. 
 
Although Smith doesn't address the influence of moral judgments on economic 
activity in WN, he does discuss attempts to set a limit on the economic benefits of 
self-interest  in  TMS.    The  overall  message  is  that  a  proper  regard  for  one's 
economic  self-interest  is  expected;  self-interest  in  terms  of  profits  motivates 
economic agents, but: "To be anxious, or to be laying a plot either to gain or to - 163 -   
 
 
save a single shilling, would degrade the most vulgar tradesman in the opinion of 
all his neighbors."  A proper regard for one's interests is expected and respected, 
but needs to be controlled: "Those great objects of self-interest, of which the loss or 
acquisition quite changes the rank of the person, are the objects of the passion 
properly called ambition; a passion, which when it keeps within the bounds of 
prudence and justice, is always admired in the world, and has even sometimes a 
certain irregular greatness, which dazzles the imagination, when it passes the limits 
of both these virtues, and is not only unjust but extravagant" (WN, p. 173).  Self-
interest, within bounds, is clearly an important element of WN, but what isn't clear 
is  the  degree  to  which  moral  judgments  are  a  part  of  the  functioning  of  an 
economy; in other words, it is not clear how moral judgments influence economic 
behavior and drawing any such conclusions from either text on this issue would be 
speculative.  Coase uses another approach to draw his conclusion that self-interest 
plays an important role in both TMS and WN.  He correctly takes for granted that it 
is an integral part of WN, but then argues that it is an important element in making 
moral  judgments.    That  conclusion  is  controversial  and  one  that  needs  to  be 
defended; I do not believe Coase has succeeded. 
 
Adam  Smith  wrote  the  TMS  in  order  to  explain  how  people  arrive  at  moral 
judgments; the book concerns the issue of how we judge our own behavior and that 
of others.  Sympathy is an important component in Smith's approach where it is 
defined as the sharing of any fellow-feeling with any passion whatever (TMS, p. 
10).  Sympathy is not confined to benevolence, we can, for instance, share feelings 
of  anger.    In  short,  TMS  is  not  exclusively  about  benevolence  or  altruism.  
According to Smith, our imagination allows us to put ourselves in the place of 
others, wherever that place may be.  The match between people with whom we 
sympathize can never be perfect, our understanding of the motives of others is 
limited and it follows that our ability to sympathize, to imagine ourselves in the 
place of others, is correspondingly limited.  Sympathy “enlivens joy and alleviates 
grief” (TMS 14).  It enlivens joy because we are pleased when others share our 
feelings,  and  it  alleviates  our  grief  by  allowing  us  to  share  the  burden  of  our 
misfortunes with others.  A central component of Coase's (1994 [1976], p. 100) 
argument of the prevalence self-interest in TMS is his contention that Smith argues 
that people form their moral sentiments for self-interested purposes: "It will be 
observed that Adam Smith's account of the development of our moral sentiments is 
essentially self-centered.  We care for others because, by a sympathetic response, 
we feel as they feel, because we enjoy the sharing of sympathy, and because we 
wish to appear admirable in our own eyes; and we conform to the rules of conduct - 164 -   
 
 
accepted in society largely because we wish to be admired by others."  Coase is 
only partially correct, although at first glance his claim seems entirely reasonable 
given some of Smith's comments.  For instance, at the beginning of the third part of 
his discourse, Smith (TMS, p. 109-110) summarizes what he's done to that point in 
his book: 
 
      "The principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove of our 
own conduct, seems to be altogether the same with that by which we exercise the 
like judgments  concerning  the  conduct  of  other people.   We  either approve  or 
disapprove of the conduct of another man according as we feel that, when we bring 
his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the 
sentiments and motives which directed it.  And, in the same manner, we either 
approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we 
place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his 
eyes  and  from  his  station,  we  either  can  or  cannot  entirely  enter  into  and 
sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influence it.  We can never 
survey  our  own  sentiments  and  motives,  we  can  never  form  any  judgment 
concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural 
station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us.  But we can 
do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other 
people, or as other people are likely to view them." 
 
By observing the conduct of others we acquire an understanding of that conduct 
with  which  we  sympathize  and  which  we  can  then  use  to  scrutinize  our  own 
behavior.  By means of imagination we learn, as it were, to disengage ourselves 
from  our  actions  and  observe  those  actions  from  an  impartial  perspective.  
However, Coase has only partially followed Smith's argument when he claims that 
“we conform to the rules of conduct accepted in society largely because we wish to 
be admired by others.”  While it is true that Smith does argue that our conscience is 
a product of social relationships, it is more than that.  Our behavior is judged by 
others, but we have an ability to reflect upon our behavior as well.  Reflection is 
the  capacity  to  see  our  actions  not  from  the  perspective  of  others,  but  from  a 
detached, idealized person within.  Neither view is perfect, the view of an external 
person is obscured by a lack of information about someone's true motives, while 
our internal view can be obscured by self-deceit in which we see ourselves in a 
better light than reality judges us. 
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Although Coase and others can be forgiven for interpreting the beginning of the 
third part of Smith's discourse as an argument for the position that we form or 
adjust our sentiments based on how our conduct will be interpreted by others, it is 
more difficult to understand how later sections of that chapter can be similarly 
misinterpreted.  For instance, on (TMS p. 116-117) Smith argues: 
 
  "Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original 
desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren.  ...  But this desire 
of the approbation, and this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would 
not alone have rendered him fit for that society for which he was made.  Nature, 
accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but 
with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself 
approves of in other men. The second was necessary in order to render him anxious 
to be really fit.  The first could only have prompted him to the affection of virtue, 
and to the concealment of vice.  The second was necessary in order to inspire him 
with real love of virtue, and with the real abhorrence of vice.  In every well-formed 
mind this second desire seems to be the strongest of the two." 
 
And later on the same page Smith writes: "To desire, or even to accept of praise, 
where no praise is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible vanity."  
The wise man, “stands in need of no confirmation from the approbation of other 
men.  It is alone sufficient, and he is content with it.  This self-approbation, if not 
the only, is at least the principal object, about which he can or ought to be anxious.  
The love of it, is the love of virtue.” 
   
Smith explicitly moved away from the view that conscience is formed exclusively 
from popular opinion in later editions of his book because he was acutely aware 
that if conscience was taken to be only a product of society, then it couldn't be 
better or worse than that of given society at a point in time.  Rather, it is Smith’s 
view that it is our imagination that allows us to build a more objective, impartial 
view of our behavior.  Therefore, while the judgment of the real, outside spectator 
depends on the desire for actual praise, that of the impartial spectator depends on 
the  desire  for  praiseworthiness  (Raphael,  1976,  p.  16).    According  to  Smith, 
enlightened people seek to be praiseworthy rather than praise: "Some splenetic 
philosophers, in judging of human nature, have done as peevish individuals are apt 
to do in judging of the conduct of one another, and have imputed to the love of 
praise, or to what they call vanity, every action which ought to be ascribed to that 
of praise-worthiness" (TMS p. 127).  The two can be in concert, but, Smith argues, - 166 -   
 
 
people are unsatisfied if they are praised for unpraiseworthy intentions and actions.  
Likewise,  praiseworthy  intentions  can  be  misinterpreted.    (TMS,  p  130)  "But 
though  man  has,  in  this  manner  [from  the  “man  without”],  been  rendered  the 
immediate judge of mankind, he has been rendered so only in the first instance; and 
an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their 
own consciences, to that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to 
that of the man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct." 
 
Coase's argument that a person shows sympathy because it gives them pleasure to 
perform virtuous acts is also at best partially correct and applies more to David 
Hume's position than Smith's.  Smith's argument is that people derive pleasure 
from the observation that there is correspondence between their feelings and the 
feelings of others.  We're happy when people share our pleasures and displeasures.  
However, Smith clearly states, and it is certainly true, that feelings of sympathy can 
be  either  pleasurable  or  painful.    According  to  Smith,  we  first  respond  to  the 
pleasure or pain of the situation, and then we feel the pleasure of discovering that 
our sentiments coincide.  In short, the first reaction can be either pleasure or pain 
so our sentiments are not necessarily triggered by feelings of pleasure. 
 
I end this section with a final quote from Smith.  In it, Smith clearly states that 
sympathy is not based on a regard for one's selfish desires (TMS p. 317). 
 
   "Sympathy,  however,  cannot,  in  any  sense,  be  regarded  as  a  selfish 
principle.  ... When I condole with you for the loss of your only son, in order to 
enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and 
profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was unfortunately to die: 
but I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change 
circumstances with you, but I change persons and character.  My grief, therefore, is 
entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own.  It is not, therefore, 
in the least selfish.  ...  That whole account of human nature, however, which 
deduces all sentiment and affections to self-love, which has made so much noise in 
the world, but which, so far as I know, has never yet been fully and distinctly 
explained,  seems  to  me  to  have  arisen  from  confused  misapprehension  of  the 
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Self-interest and the Advantages of the Market 
  
Coase's second conclusion is that the arguments in TMS strengthen the advantages 
of market.  Markets, according to Coase, function primarily because people are 
self-interested,  those  interests:  "...offset  the  weakness  and  partiality  of 
benevolence,  so that  those  who  are  unknown,  unattractive,  or  unimportant  will 
have their wants served" (p. 115).  This strikes me as a very cynical conclusion for 
three reasons.  The first is that is rests on the belief that benevolence is a partial 
motive; people are only benevolent towards those they know, find attractive and 
important.  Coase has chosen a non-standard definition of benevolence which is 
usually understood to be a general desire to perform charitable acts.  Benevolence 
would have us treat everyone, no matter what his characteristics, equally.  The 
second reason is that it assumes markets are impartial in their consequences for 
agents.  To the degree that market prices approach the ideal of being sufficient 
statistics, I suspect Coase is correct.  In those situation prices contain all of the 
information necessary for an agent to decide whether to buy or not; buyers and 
sellers have no reason to interact other than through the price so there is no room 
for prejudices.  If this is the situation which Coase has in mind, then he is closely in 
line with the conclusions found in Albert O. Hirschman's (1997) justly famous The 
Passions and the Interests.  However, to the degree that prices are not sufficient 
statistics, I would suggest that the motive of self-interest is just as likely to admit 
prejudices  as  benevolence.    The  final  reason  that  I  find  Coase's  explanation 
unconvincing is more fundamental.  Coase appears to believe that TMS supports 
benevolence alone, however, Smith was adamant in his belief that sympathy is the 
sharing  of  any  fellow-feeling  and  is  not  confined  to  benevolent  or  altruistic 
feelings.  Therefore, Coase may be correct that markets overcome the prejudices of 
benevolence, but benevolence is not the only reason people sympathize with others 
and benevolence is not the message of TMS.  Coase's conclusion may be correct, 
but his reasoning is wrong. 
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How can studying the systems of the Hellenistic philosophers help to clarify the 
two general goals that I have set for myself in this manuscript?  Namely, how can 
they  help  to  clarify  the  dimensions  of  self-interest  and  how  do  their  various 
approaches help in building a coherent, systematic framework of economic self-
interest?    I'll  first  offer  a  general  answer  to  these  questions  before  presenting 
specific examples from Hellenistic philosophers.  Two widely accepted reasons to 
develop economic models are that they allow researchers to make more accurate 
predictions about economic events and that they provide descriptive insights into 
the workings of an economy.  The two key economic assumptions, self-interest and 
rationality,  are  presumably  meant  to  add  to  the  predictive  and  explanatory 
capacities of such models.  In previous chapters I have argued that the economic 
understanding  of  self-interest  is  underdeveloped,  while  the  extent  of  economic 
rationality has long been a topic of debate.  In this chapter I attempt to narrow in on 
a better understanding of what an effective, practical, definition of self-interest 
should  entail.    By  examining  historical  examples  of  models  that  assumed  self-
interest and rationality I can, in a loose sense, “test” the effectiveness of these 
assumptions  in  applied  models.    In  other  words,  I  can  examine  how  the 
assumptions of self-interest and rationality have been used previously in models of 
human  behavior  and  practice,  and  assess  how  they  affect  the  explanatory  and 
descriptive capacities of those models.  Taking a narrow definition of self-interest, 
as  do  the  Hellenistic  philosophers,  it  is  possible  to  ask  whether  self-interest, 
together with the assumption of rationality, provides the basis of a model of human 
nature that helps to predict and describe behavior. 
 
There are several particular reasons that recommend the Hellenistic philosophers 
for  helping  to  answer  the  general  question  posed  above.    The  Cyrenaics, 
Epicureans and Stoics were all hedonists and supremely confident in the rationality 
of individuals to understand, with effort, what it takes to live a good life.  The 
initiators of each of these philosophical positions all lived at around the same time 
in the city of Athens and they or their advocates competed with one another for 
adherents.  In a sense, Athens was a market place of ideas in which these and other 
approaches  competed  for  a  limited  audience.    As  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
interactions and reactions of the various positions, it is possible to see progress in 
the understanding of what it means to be self-interested.  All of these groups were - 170 -   
 
 
concerned with how to live in order to have a happy life as individuals rather than 
being good parts of a greater social order.  Anyone, from any social class including 
slaves, could follow, for example, the Stoic ideals of a good life.  In addition, these 
philosophers  actually  lived  the  lives  that  they  recommended  to  others  and 
disseminated their views in language that was clear and precise.  For instance, 
Epicurus, probably in response to earlier, idealistic, philosophical systems, asserted 
that words should be used in their immediate and most obvious sense (Sharples, 
1996, p.6).  A review of the Hellenistic philosophers gives a good indication of the 
basic characteristics that a theory of self-interest should address.  Their views on 
what  it  means  to  be  self-interested  anticipate  many  of  the  modern  debates  or 
potential debates on that topic.  The strong emphasis placed on the individual and a 
common nature shared with everyone is characteristic of these philosophers, and, I 
would add, is apparent in some of the writings of Joseph Butler and Adam Smith 
(see Long, 1986 2nd ed.).  The Hellenistic writers also emphasized the power of 
rationality and the idea that inner resources alone can provide the foundations for a 
happy,  stable life.   A  proper discussion  of  the entire  systems  of  each of  these 
philosophical approaches is not possible given limited space, therefore, I will limit 
my discussion to two topics directly related to the main research question of my 
manuscript.  The first topic is an examination of the various Hellenistic definitions 
of self-interest or happiness given that all of the systems were based on hedonism.  
The second is an examination of how these philosophers arrived at their various 
definitions  of  self-interest;  what,  in  other  words,  were  their  assumptions  about 
human nature.  I will discuss each school in the order of their historical appearance 
in Athens. 
     
The Cyrenaics 
 
The Cyrenaics were very clear in regards to what I have labeled the external and 
structural dimensions of their definition self-interest.  They, along with the other 
Hellenistic philosophers I will discuss, were hedonists, meaning that they believed 
that the pursuit of happiness or pleasure provides a good reason to act as opposed 
to  some  other  aim  such  as  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  or  pursuit  of  justice, 
although pursuing one doesn’t necessarily exclude pursuing the other.  The focus 
of their behavior was egoistic and centered on promoting their own happiness and 
not, for instance, promoting the overall level of happiness in the wider community.  
However, the Cyrenaics had a very specific form of happiness in mind. Aristippus 
of Cyrene (c. 435-355 B.C.E) is famous for making the intriguing claim that a state 
of pleasure, specifically bodily pleasure, is the goal of life.  While both the external - 171 -   
 
 
and structural dimensions of the Cyrenaic system were clear, an important and 
telling  question  that  needs  to  be  answered  is  what  prompted  the  Cyrenaics  to 
conclude that bodily pleasure should be the goal of life. 
 
The Cyrenaics were a loosely knit group of philosophers who taught in Athens.  
They didn't start a school, such as Socrates, Aristotle, the Epicureans or the Stoics, 
and their teachings don't form a uniform body of work.  However, although there 
were many splits and sects among the Cyrenaics, they all agreed that the supreme 
goal of life was bodily pleasure: not the accumulation of pleasure over a lifetime, 
but the bodily pleasure that a person experiences at present (Tsouna, 1998: 15).  In 
short, they accepted a rather unusual form of hedonism in that they believed that 
people should follow their immediate desires.  By immediate I mean that they did 
not consider the historical causes or future implications of their acts, only their 
current desires were of importance; clearly, the issue of weakness-of-will wouldn't 
present a problem for the Cyrenaic approach.  However, because of their modest 
approach to life, the desire for immediate satisfaction didn't lead to an intensely 
happy, but short life.  Their approach may appear strange, even irrational by today's 
standards, but they had what they believed were good reasons for their beliefs.  
Given  their  overall  epistemology,  which  I  briefly  outline  below,  they  made 
reasonable  conclusions  about  how  to  lead  a  good  life.    The  Cyrenaics  were 
hedonists whose view of the best manner to live one's life can be summarized as, 
live for the moment, but live modestly.  How did they arrive at that view? 
 
The Cyrenaics were the intellectual heirs of the Sophists (Watson, 1895).  The 
Sophists,  through  rhetoric  and  casuistry,  challenged  popular  Athenian  belief  in 
divine authority and were critical of the unchangeability of morality.  They based 
their challenges on the diversity of customs that they observed while teaching in 
various Greek city-states.  Laws, customs and morality varied across these cities, 
and appeared to the Sophists to be based on conventions that were agreed upon for 
mutual advantage; Hobbes and many others would undoubtedly agree with this part 
of their analysis.  The newly found mobility of these scholars meant morality and 
religious  beliefs  were  not  taken  as  absolutes  but,  for  the  first  time,  open  to 
comparison  and  critique.  The  diversity  of  morality  and  religion  which  they 
observed led the Sophists to the belief that knowledge was impossible and that 
morality is nothing but laws imposed by rulers on others for their own selfish 
needs.  According to the Sophists, there were no absolute rules of right and wrong 
because right and wrong couldn’t be known.  Other conclusions could obviously 
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a relative concept, but the Sophist reasoned that knowledge itself was impossible.  
They didn't take the next step and build a new model of human behavior based on 
their observations, rather, it was the Cyrenaics who made that leap by assuming 
that there had to be one single end to which all human actions refer. 
 
Both the Sophists and Cyrenaics recognized that the societies of Greek city-states 
were changing due in part to the increased mobility of people; individuals too were 
believed to be constantly in a state of flux.  The epistemological framework of the 
Cyrenaics held that individual experiences are isolated in the sense that what one 
person felt couldn't be entirely understood by anyone else or even necessarily by 
the same person at another time in their lives.  To take a common example, what 
feels hot to me may feel cold to you and may even feel cold to me at another time, 
what is hot or cold depends on the context.  Our sensations, then, determine what is 
real  at  any  given  moment.    Aristippus  therefore  argued  that  what  we  call 
knowledge is reducible to the immediate convictions or feelings of the individual at 
the time it is experienced.  His argument rests on the belief that language is unable 
to convey general ideas.  I cannot, for instance, prove to you or vice-versa that we 
both mean the same thing when we describe how we feel about something.  We can 
both agree that a pot of coffee tastes bitter, but we cannot prove to one another that 
we are referring to the same thing when we use the term bitter.  Since we cannot 
understand the feelings and experiences of others, it is impossible, according to 
Aristippus, to study nature.  There are some obvious problems with the Cyrenaic 
idea of knowledge, for example, although some sensations like color, taste, sound, 
etc. are relative, other properties, like weight, length and motion are objective.  The 
problems in the Cyrenaic approach won't be addressed here, it is their solution to 
what they saw as the limits of knowledge that are interesting for the purposes of 
this manuscript. 
 
The rejection of empirical knowledge and of knowledge of other minds caused the 
Cyrenaics to look internally in search of certainty.  The solution that Aristippus 
arrived at was to reduce knowledge to each person's immediate understanding of 
his  own  feelings  of  pleasure.    In  other  words,  the  Cyrenaics  concluded  that 
hedonism was the one thing at which we can all aim because it is the only thing we 
can know, but what sort of pleasure?  They distinguished between mental pleasures 
that ultimately depend on bodily pleasures and those that don't, and believed that 
pleasures having to do with the body pertain exclusively to oneself, in contrast to 
say pleasures that are independent of the body and which focus on objects other 
than  one's  self.    An  example  of  pleasure  derived  from  an  object  according  to - 173 -   
 
 
Diogenes Laertius is when, "... we feel joy merely on account of the prosperity of 
our country as if it were our own prosperity" (Tsouna, 1998: 15--quoting Diogenes 
Laertius).    In  order  to  maintain  the  certainty  that  they  were  looking  for,  the 
Cyrenaics expressly omitted the feelings of pleasure derived from external objects 
and meant by pleasure only those feelings which are personally experienced.  In 
short, they argued that people are unable to understand the feelings of others or the 
nature of things and their solution was simply to fall back onto the one thing that 
we can all know, namely, our own experiences.  The experiences we want are, 
according to the Cyrenaics, pleasant experiences and so maximizing the pleasant, 
personal, experiences should be the goal of life. 
 
In contrast to the Epicureans, a school to which I will soon turn, the Cyrenaics 
claimed that the absence of pain cannot be a part of the moral end for the reason 
that pleasure and pains are related to motions and since the absence of pain is not 
associated with movement it cannot be a part of the moral end (Tsouna, 1985: p. 
13).  Movement is associated with an “active” engagement with a sensation, as 
opposed to a passive or indifferent state.  The basic idea is that the pleasure that 
people  experience  is  unrelated  to  other  times  present  or  future:  it  has  no 
prospective or retrospective value, and can only be enjoyed while it is actually 
occurring.  If we accept the Cyrenaic view, then we can ask, what is the best way to 
obtain maximum happiness?  This is where the Cyrenaic view takes what from a 
modern perspective is an unusual but, in light of their empirical stance, reasonable 
twist.  We aim, they claim, not at our overall happiness through time, but at those 
things which we know for sure, namely, bodily pleasures which are immediately 
apparent.  Their message was to forget the past because it is gone and forget the 
future because it cannot be accurately predicted.  Immediate pleasure is always and 
for everyone a good and always desirable. 
 
There  are  two  things  to  note  about  the  Cyrenaic’s  approach.    The  first  is  that 
individualization in the Cyrenaic model is explicit and absolute; others are to be 
used  as  instruments  to  promote  one's  pleasure.    There  are  obvious  ethical 
implications for the Cyrenaic thesis; for example, a person shouldn't steal or lie, not 
because it is intuitively or rationally wrong, but only because it would or could 
detract  from  their  pleasure  if  they  were  caught  and  punished.    The  Cyrenaic 
position  towards  others  is  an  example  of  the  perfectly  instrumental  approach  I 
discussed in chapter 4 as it applies to the aim of happiness.  Actions are only 
motivated by the desire to attain agreeable feelings and others are mere instruments 
useful in achieving those feelings.  The second thing to note is that the Cyrenaics - 174 -   
 
 
posited pleasure as the supreme good of human life (see Tsouna, 1998).  Positing 
pleasure  as  a  supreme  goal  is  a  problematic  approach  for  the  reasons  I  have 
mentioned  in  previous  chapters,  but  what  makes  their  position  particularly 
interesting is that they were not motivated by the accumulation of pleasure over a 
lifetime, but immediate bodily pleasures.  They didn't, in other words, consider 
their actions in light of their overall happiness, but only in light of their immediate 
interests.  Their reasons for doing so may appear odd to us, but that is precisely 
what makes it is such an interesting approach for the purposes of this manuscript in 
that  it  emphasizes  the  importance  of  understanding  and  making  clear  one's 
underlying assumptions about human nature.  The Cyrenaics had good reasons for 
promoting their own interests, which they, at least, found convincing.  By explicitly 




"The  beginning  and  root  of  every  good  is  the  pleasure  of  the  stomach.    Even 
wisdom and refinements are referable to this" (Uncertain Fragments, 59 in Inwood, 
Gerson and Hutchison, 1994).  In modern terminology an epicurean is someone 
devoted to the pursuit of pleasure, he is someone with refined tastes especially for 
food.    The  modern  understanding  of  the  term  epicurean  is  ironic  given  that 
Epicurus wrote: "Plain dishes offer the same pleasure as a luxurious table, when 
the pain that comes from want is taken away.  Bread and water offer the greatest 
pleasure  when  someone  in  need  partakes  of  them.    Becoming  accustomed, 
therefore,  to  simple  and  not  luxurious  fare  is  productive  of  health  and  makes 
humankind  resolved  to  perform  the  necessary  business  of  life"  (translated  by 
O’Connor, 1993, p. 66).  It was the opponents of Epicureanism who vilified the 
founder as a libertine and voluptuary, but those descriptions are inconsistent with 
both his teachings on pleasure and with his own lifestyle (Long, 1986: 16).  For 
Epicurus and his many followers, leading a tranquil, good life meant fulfilling the 
basic  desires  rather  than  aiming  at  luxuries  which  could  lead  to  unnecessary 
exposure to potentially disruptive experiences. 
 
Epicurus, although a citizen of Athens, was born on the island of Samos in 341 
B.C.E.    He  taught  in  Colophon,  Mytilene  and  Lampsacus,  in  Asia  Minor,  and 
eventually settled with his students in Athens in 306 B.C.E. and began to teach in 
his kitchen-garden to anyone, whether men or women, slaves or free persons.  The 
Garden, as his movement was known, was a society of friends who were devoted to 
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tranquility  and  living  life  without  attracting  attention  (Fragment  86  in  Inwood, 
Gerson and Hutchison, 1994).  Epicurus wrote over three hundred books on topics 
ranging  from  science  to  love  and  the  gods,  unfortunately,  few  of  his  writings 
survived.  However, two secondary sources are particularly helpful when read with 
care.  The first is the famous poem, "On the Nature of the Universe", by Lucretius 
(ca. 100-55 B.C.E.).  Lucretius was an Epicurean whose didactic and epic poem of 
around  seven  thousand  five  hundred  lines  praises  Epicurus  and  the  Epicurean 
system of life with an almost religious fervor (translator M. Smith, 2001).  The 
second  source  is  probably  one  of  the  more  unique  acts  of  devotion  to  any 
philosopher.  In the town of Oenoanda, in the middle of modern Turkey, Diogenes 
Flavianus (Long cites Diogenes of Oenoanda) erected a large stonewall inscribed 
with some of the teachings of Epicurus.  The degree to which these secondary 
sources represent the ideas of Epicurus or the authors of these works is at times 
difficult to discern, so whenever it is possible I will keep to Epicurus’s original 
works. 
 
The range of topics that Epicurus wrote about is impressive, but it is important to 
keep  in  mind  the  purpose  to  which all  of  his  studies  were  directed.    Epicurus 
explains his goal in a letter written to Pythocles. In the letter, Epicurus prefaces his 
remarks on natural science with the following: "First of all, we must not think that 
there  is  any  other  aim  of  knowledge  about  the  heavens,  whether  treated  in 
connection with other doctrines or seperately, than peace of mind and unshakeable 
confidence, just as it is our aim in all other pursuits" (85-86).  By unshakeable 
confidence Epicurus may be referring to his belief that nearly everything can be 
known  through  observation  and  use  of  the  senses;  if  modern  terminology  is 
appropriate,  Epicurus,  like  the  Cyrenaics,  was  generally  an  empiricist.    His 
message to Pythocles is that all other pursuits are secondary to the pursuit of a 
peaceful, tranquil, mind. 
 
Epicurus was also a hedonist, and his evidence that people are hedonistic was, 
unsurprisingly,  empirically  based:  "Therefore,  we  declare  that  pleasure  is  the 
beginning and the goal of a happy life.  For we recognize pleasure as the first good 
and as inborn; it is from this that we begin every choice and every avoidance" 
(translated  by  O’Connor,  1993,  p.  65).    Epicurus'  starting  point  is  therefore 
different from that of, for example, Hobbes who, as we saw, believed that the 
fundamental principle guiding people is self-preservation.  However, the message 
of Epicurus is slightly more complicated than the simplistic idea that people should 
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only a wise person will be able to determine those things that are truly in his 
interest.  In a "Letter to Menoeceus", Epicurus makes a distinction between natural 
and idle desires: "of the natural desires, some are necessary while others are natural 
only" (128 in Inwood, Gerson and Hutchison, 1994).  "Of the necessary desires, 
there are those that are necessary for happiness, those that are necessary for the 
body's  freedom  from  disturbance,  and  those  that  are  necessary  for  life  itself."  
Understanding  these  differences  allows  people  "to  refer  every  choice  and 
avoidance to the health of the body or the calm of the soul, since this is the goal of 
a happy life."  According to Epicurus, we have an ability to reflect on the choices 
we make and decide according to how they promote the goal of life, which is to be 
happy, but happy in terms of correctly selecting to act upon those modest desires 
that produce a calm soul.  The approach thereby anticipates the concept which is 
now called enlightened self-interest. 
     
In  contrast  to  the  common  modern  understanding  of  happiness,  for  Epicurus 
happiness  meant  the  removal  of  all  pain  and  fear.    This  subtle  difference  has 
profound  implications  for  the  model  of  the  good  life  that  Epicurus  constructs.  
Once the removal of pain and fear is achieved nothing else is needed.  The idea is 
not to then search for things that will make one happy, but to remove extraneous 
desires.  Experiencing pleasure, for Epicurus, is an indication that something was 
previously lacking: "For we have need of pleasure at that time when we feel pain 
owing to the absence of pleasure.  When we do not feel pain, it is because we no 
longer have need of pleasure" (translated by O’Connor, 1993, p. 65).  Take the 
example of a hungry person, the initial pain that a hungry person feels on account 
of their hunger, according to Epicurus, is satisfied when they eat from which they 
derive  immediate  pleasure.    However,  from  the  satisfaction  of  eating  a  second 
pleasure  arises,  a  sort  of  static  pleasure  of  a  complete  absence  of  pain  (Long, 
1986).    Once  a  certain (minimum)  level  of  desires  have  been  fulfilled,  desires 
should  be  curtailed:  "For  it  is  not  continuous  drinking  and  revels,  nor  the 
enjoyment of women and young boys, nor of fish and other viands that a luxurious 
table holds, which make for a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, which examines 
the motives for every choice and avoidance, and which drives away those opinions 
resulting  in  the  greatest  disturbance  to  the  soul"  (131,  in  Inwood,  Gerson  and 
Hutchison, 1994).  "We esteem self-sufficiency not so that we may always prefer 
the  cheap  and  frugal,  but  so  that  we  may  feel  no  dread  regarding  them"  (Ep. 
Fragments 29 in Inwood, Gerson and Hutchison, 1994).  We've previously seen 
this idea of the advantages of living moderately also expressed in the works of 




It is not that Epicurus was opposed to luxury and physical indulgences because 
they are inherently bad, he wasn't a prude, rather, the problem is that they may lead 
to a net increase in pain.  For example, he accepts the pleasurable experience of 
drinking alcohol, but says that the pleasure should be balanced with the pain of the 
morning after.  Just because something is pleasurable doesn't mean is should be 
pursued, and just because something is painful doesn't mean it should be avoided.  
We  often  pass  over  small  pleasures,  "whenever  greater  difficulty  follows  from 
them"  (translated  by  O’Connor,  1993,  65).    Sometimes  pains  are  better  than 
pleasures, "since a greater pleasure will attend us after we have endured pain for a 
long time."  "Every pleasure, therefore, because of its natural relationship to us, is 
good, but not every pleasure is to be chosen.  Likewise, every pain is an evil, but 
not every pain is of a nature always to be avoided."  This is a familiar sort of 
hedonistic calculation that has to be conducted to in order to determine the net 
happiness of an act and clearly conflicts with the Cyrenaic view that immediate 
pleasures are to be preferred. 
 
Epicurus' view of happiness was most certainly influenced by his belief that people 
should live a trouble free, tranquil life.  In fact, his primary concern was to show 
how a tranquil life could be obtained (Long, 1986, p. 62).  It is informative to 
compare Epicurus' views with those of Plato and Aristotle, to whom he may have 
been replying.  For Plato and Aristotle, some pleasures are good and contribute to 
happiness while others are bad (Long, 1986, p. 62).  Good and happiness don't 
always  correspond  in  the  systems  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  while  for  Epicurus 
pleasure  is  always  good,  since  the  good  is  defined  as  that  which  is  or  causes 
pleasure.  However, as I wrote in the immediately above paragraph, just because 
something is good doesn't mean that it has to be pursued in the Epicurean system.  
Regardless, the Epicurean position that happiness and good are different names for 
the  same  thing  might  be  interpreted  as  a  form  of  ethical  egoism.    Under  this 
interpretation, a person should (in order to be ethical) perform those acts that make 
them happy, acting for any other reason would be non-ethical or unethical.  But in 
contrast to Ayn Rand's understanding of happiness, happiness for Epicurus had a 
much  more  modest  meaning.    Although  Epicurus  can  be  understood  to  a 
hedonistic, ethical egoist, the sort of life he recommended was the very modest aim 
of leading a tranquil life. 
 
What  does  Epicurus  say  about  relationships  among  people?    By  all  accounts 
Epicurus was much loved and, according to Diogenes Laertius, his friends were so - 178 -   
 
 
numerous "that they could hardly be counted by entire cities" (Laertius, "Lives of 
Eminent  Philosophers").    However,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  an  Epicurean 
would want to become entangled in personal relationships because of the potential 
disruption  that  those  relationships  might  cause  to  the  Epicurean’s  carefully 
constructed  equilibrium.    Nonetheless,  if  Diogenes  Laertius  can  be  believed 
(10.117-121 in Inwood and Gerson, 1997), a wise man, according to Epicurus, is 
reasonable but feeling.  The basic message is to maintain an equilibrium that allows 
the Epicurean to use his reason unhindered to contemplate those things that really 
matter.  The Epicurean view of relations reflects this belief and can be seen in the 
following maxims.  The wise Epicurean will be affected by his feelings as long as 
they don't hinder his progress toward reason.  He will not fall in love or pretend to 
be in love, presumably because doing so would lead to entanglements that might 
upset his tranquil state.  His reason allows him to overcome the hate and envy of 
his enemies and prevents him from taking the opposite dispositions nor feign it 
willingly.  "Sexual intercourse", the Epicureans said, "never helped anyone, and 
one must be satisfied if it has not harmed."  However, the wise man will marry and 
father children (despite the harm), but only if it is indicated by the circumstances of 
his life.  He will earn money when he is in dire straights, but only by exploiting his 
wisdom.  While friendship comes into being because of its utility, it is also an end 
in itself.  Although he may have to make a preliminary sacrifice to gain friends, it 
is then sustained by shared reciprocated pleasures.  He will even sometimes die for 
a friend. 
 
The list of do's and don'ts collected by Diogenes, of which the previous were just a 
small sample, is a rather odd mixture.  However, the overall message seems to fit 
well with Epicurus's recommendation to satisfy one's  minimum, natural desires 
which reason tells us are in our best long-term interests.  Some advice, such as not 
to  be  a  good public  speaker,  not  to  rant and rave when  drunk  or  write  poetry 
(whether drunk or not), but to erect statues and leave written treatises, strikes the 
modern reader as a curious mixture, some of which even appear to be self-serving.  
For instance, the rich members of his movement were expected to give money to 
the poorer members; Epicurus received a stipend.  However, the overall message is 
one of self-sufficiency.  Don't, for instance, depend on the gods, they exist but they 
don't care about people because to do so would disturb their state of happiness.  
Epicurus regarded self-sufficiency as "a great good, not that we may always have 
the enjoyment of but a few things, but that if we do not have many, we may have 
but few enjoyments in the genuine conviction that they take the sweetest pleasure 
in luxury who have need of it, and that everything easy to produce is natural while - 179 -   
 
 
everything difficult to obtain superfluous" (131 in Inwood, Gerson and Hutchison, 
1994). 
 
It is also helpful to understand Epicurus' ideas in the context of other approaches of 
the time.  Diogenes Laertius writes the Epicurus disagreed with the Cyrenaics on 
the question of pleasure.  "For they do not admit katastematic [stationary] pleasure, 
but only kinetic pleasure, and he admits both types in both body and soul ..."  (136 
in  Inwood,  Gerson and  Hutchison,  1994).   "For  freedom  from  disturbance  and 
freedom from suffering are katastematic pleasures; and joy and delight are viewed 
as  kinetic  and  active"  (136  in  Inwood,  Gerson  and  Hutchison,  1994).    The 
katastematic  pleasures  are  those  that  are  not  actively  related  to  a  feeling  of 
happiness.  This idea is expressed in English when we say that someone enjoys 
good health, where we don't mean to say an active state of pleasure, but a neutral 
state that we wouldn't want to change for the worse.  This happy, neutral, state is 
defined  as  pleasurable  by  the  Epicureans  and  reflected  in  their  desire  for 
tranquility.  Epicurus also disagreed with the Cyrenaics about which pains were 
worse, he believed "pains of the soul are worse since the flesh is only troubled by 
the present, but the soul is troubled by the past and the present and the future" (137 
in Inwood, Gerson and Hutchison, 1994). 
 
Epicurus’  views  can  also  be  seen  as  a  response  to  the  epistemological  and 
ontological  positions  of  Plato and  Aristotle.   Where  Plato  had  his  ideal  forms, 
Epicurus accepted atomism.  Atomism is a complex position, here I will note only 
that, for an atomist, all things are in a state of flux, moving from one state to 
another and thereby negating the possibility of ideal forms and opening room for 
the position that the search for pleasure, rather than ideals, was the way to live a 
good life.  Where Plato and Aristotle used logical analysis, Epicurus relied on 
immediate  sensations,  particularly  the  sensation  of  touch,  again  implying  the 
importance of pleasure in his system.  He was generally an empiricists but not 
everything in his system could be observed, for example, the existence of the soul 
was argued by induction.  Finally, he rejected the view that linguistic analysis by 
itself can tell us anything relevant to achieving a happy life.  Rather than words 
alone, sensations were relayed upon to get to the truth of the matter.  All of these 
positions emphasized the need to seek pleasure, but the Epicurean view of pleasure 
strikes the modern reader (at least this one) as somewhat sterile, overly cerebral 
and standoffish; all of which reinforces the need to specify the general aims and 
assumptions  in  order  to  assess  the  reasonableness  of  specific  actions  within  a 






Like the Cyrenaic and Epicureans, the Stoics too were hedonists, but that label 
doesn't do justice to their sophisticated ethical system.  Stoic philosophy developed 
over hundreds of years, starting at around 300 B.C.E. when Zeno of Citium began 
to pace the Painted Colonnade (Stoa) in Athens and officially ending in 529 when 
Justinian  closed  four  philosophical  schools  in  Athens.    Early  and  middle  Stoic 
philosophy is marked by its rigor; studies on the topics of logic, nature and ethics 
intertwined to form a complex picture of the place of humans within the whole of 
nature.  A well-known quote celebrates this cohesion: "The remarkable coherence 
of the system and the extraordinary orderliness of the subject-matter have made me 
prolix.  Don't you find it amazing, in heaven's name?  ... What is there that is not so 
linked to something else that all would collapse if you moved a single letter?  But 
there is nothing at all which can be moved" (Spoken by 'Cato' in Cicero, Fin. iii 
74).  Within the limits implied by Cato's quote, I will attempt to draw out three 
relevant points.  The first is the practical form that hedonism takes in the Stoic 
system.  When reading the Stoics it is easily possible to confuse the ideal state 
which the Stoics set for sages, (the Stoics themselves doubted whether such an all-
knowing person had ever existed), and the stages to which a mere mortal should 
aspire to live according to the Stoic system (Hankinson, 2003, p. 59).  Examining 
the more modest goals of the Stoic system gives an indication of what leading a 
good, happy, life meant to them.  Happiness, for the Stoics, is broadly defined and 
emphasizes  the  diversity  of  aims  and  goals  that  people  can  have.    I  will  then 
discuss an important component of the external dimension of self-interest, namely, 
I will address the Stoic view of the interrelations of human interests.  Finally, I will 
briefly  note  the  Stoic  influences  in  the  works  of  some  of  the  authors  I  have 
previously discussed. 
 
According to the Stoics, all adult humans have the rational capacity to be happy, 
unfortunately, that same rational capacity means they can make unwise choices, 
that is, choices that will make them unhappy.  Happiness for the Stoics meant to 
follow one's nature, but the happiness that results from following nature doesn't 
necessarily correspond to modern ideas of happiness.  According to the Stoics, 
plants, animals and children all follow their respective natures and are therefore 
“happy” without reference to higher forms of reason.  On the other hand, adult 
humans are the only creatures capable of using reason to understand their proper 
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actions to what nature prescribes.  Superhuman sages have complete understanding 
of nature and always act according to what nature prescribes and are, as a result, 
always happy.  A sage’s understanding of nature and his place in it is absolute, bad 
things (or what non-sages would call bad), can happen to him, but everything in 
nature serves some greater purpose and so all things are inevitable and therefore 
nothing really deserves the title of good or bad, things are just the way nature 
intended them to be.  This view of life produces a sort of comforting detachment in 
the  sage.    The  goal  that  normal,  fallible  humans  should  strive  towards  is  to 
constantly  add  to  their  understanding  of  their  place  in  nature  and  reform  their 
actions to fit their evolving understanding of nature.  However, the ability of adults 
to reason is a two-edged sword in that although they are the only creatures capable 
of adjusting their activities to fit nature, the freedom that reason gives means that 
adults can work against their nature.  In contrast, plants and animals are in a sense 
programmed  to  follow  their  respective  natures,  while  humans,  by  using  bad 
reasoning, can go “off-course”.  The role of nature is critical in the Stoic system.  
All particular things can be analyzed in terms of their specific natures--the nature 
of a plant, the nature of an animal and so forth (Long, 1986: p. 189):  "The nature 
of anything is simply that structure and pattern of behavior which universal Nature 
has ordained as appropriate or in the interests of the creature concerned" (Long, 
1986: p. 189).  The value of anything in Stoicism is defined by reference to nature 
in its universal sense.  As a human being acquires rationality their nature prescribes 
new  modes  of  appropriate  behavior.    Rather  than  following  base  instincts  the 
function, the nature, of mature humans is to follow their reason. 
 
Given this background, it is now possible to explain how the Stoics and Epicureans 
clashed on the important point of pleasure.  Epicurus claimed that there was no 
need to argue or discuss why people pursue pleasure and avoid pain, he felt that is 
was sufficient merely to point it out as an obvious fact of human nature.  The 
Stoics, to the contrary, argued that it wasn't pleasure, but self-preservation that is 
the primary impulse that people pursue.  Therefore, happiness for both schools, in 
contrast to its modern usage, is not necessarily equivalent to pleasurable feelings.  
As I have shown, for Epicureans, freedom from pain is a happy state, while for 
Stoics it is living or attempting to live according to one's nature or, what amounts 
to the same thing, to living virtuously.  Just as with Hobbes, the Stoics believed 
that  all  creatures  begin  life  with  the  primary  impulse  to  preserve  themselves.  
However, the goal of self-preservation for Stoics is variously described as: life 
according  to  reason,  life  according  to  virtue,  happiness  and  the  attainment  of 
happiness (Long, 1996, chap. 6).  All of these ideas are linked for the Stoics, which - 182 -   
 
 
can lead to some confusion in regards to why they deserve the modern label of 
hedonistic. 
     
The  Stoics  claimed  that  happiness is  wholly  dependent  on  virtue  (Long,  1996, 
p.184).  For the Stoics, the state of the soul constituting virtue is treated as an 
essential instrument of happiness, but not as something desirable as such or as part 
of the content of happiness.  There are base instincts which compel plants and 
animals  (including  humans)  to  pursue  some  things  (including  the  appropriate 
foods, shelter, parental affection) and avoid other things in order to preserve life.  
However, humans are capable of developing affiliations towards a wider range of 
things than irrational animals.  "In a list of things according to and contrary to 
nature we find technical competence, health, beauty, wealth, high repute, nobility 
of birth and their opposites" (SVF iii 127 in Long, 1986: p. 190).  It is these wider 
affiliations that can lead people astray.  The point to remember is that although 
these affiliations are preferable to their opposites, they are not a part of Stoic virtue 
or  happiness.    For  example,  health  is  preferable  to  sickness,  but  neither  is  a 
requirement of virtue; a sick or poor person can be just as virtuous as a healthy and 
rich person.  This idea is expressed in several of Seneca's Letters (II, 4).  Seneca, 
referring to “the enemy” Epicurus, writes: " 'A cheerful poverty,' he [Epicurus] 
writes, 'is an honourable state.'  But if it is cheerful it is not poverty at all.  It is not 
the man who has too little who is poor, but the one who hankers after more."  In 
Seneca's  letter  we can see  the idea  that a  person  can  and  probably  will  prefer 
wealth to poverty, but a wise person would see that neither really matters to living 
a virtuous life or, what amounts to the same thing, living according to one's nature.  
Later writers, including Adam Smith, repeat the idea that unconstrained desires are 
a source of unhappiness which need to be controlled.  An exclusive fixation on 
fulfilling one's desires or preferences is not the means to living and achieving a 
happy life. 
 
How, according to Seneca, do we know what to do in order to follow our nature 
and be virtuous and thereby happy?  The short answer seems to be that we need to 
selectively  look  around  us  and  see  what  wiser  people  are  doing.    The  Stoic 
Epictetus's repeatedly stressed the importance of examining one’s impressions and 
recognizing what is and is not up to us, his advice should be understood in the light 
of Stoic view of nature.  Epictetus uses the following formula to help the novice 
towards a virtuous life: (1) reexamine the overall goals of one's desires; (2) adjust 
impulses to action and views of one's social commitments in the light of thought 
about goals; and (3) aim at complete consistency in belief, attitude, and state of - 183 -   
 
 
mind (Gill, 2003 p. 43). Epictetus wrote that happiness is within our reach (Long, 
1996 p.196): 
 
        God [another term for nature] made all human beings with a view to 
their happiness, their good condition.  To this end he gave them means, giving each 
person some things that belong to himself and others that do not.  The things that 
are liable to frustration, removal, and compulsion are not his own, but those which 
are not liable to frustration are his own.  As was right in one who cares for us and 
protects us like a father, he included the essence of good and evil among the things 
that are our own.  (Epictetus, III.24.3). 
 
The practical advice directed at people who want to become  more sage-like is 
centered on determining what types of actions are, indeed, “appropriate” and in 
determining  in  one's  life  the  right  relationship  between  gaining  preferable 
advantages and acting virtuously or at least making progress toward virtue (Gill, 
2003 p. 41). 
 
The Stoics used the prevailing concepts of virtue to define the things that are good, 
a list which included, prudence, justice, courage, and temperance.  Things that are 
bad are the opposites of the good, accordingly, imprudence, injustice and so forth.  
"Prudence is knowledge of what one is to do and not to do and what is neither; or 
knowledge in a naturally social (and rational) animal of good things, bad things and 
what is neither (and they say that this [definition] is to be understood [to apply] in 
the case of the rest of the virtues too.  Temperance is knowledge of what is to be 
chosen and avoided and what is neither.  Justice is knowledge of the distribution of 
proper value to each person.  Courage is knowledge of what is terrible and what is 
not terrible and what is neither" (John Stobaeus Anthology 2, 5b1 in Inwood and 
Gerson,  1997).    So  far,  the  Stoics  list  of  goods  and  bads  seems  reasonable  if 
somewhat difficult to implement in practice.  However, the Stoic idea of indifferent 
needs some explanation.  Things that are neither good nor bad are, for the Stoics,  
those things which neither benefit nor harm, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, 
strength, wealth, good reputation, noble birth, and their opposites death, disease, 
pain,  ugliness,  weakness,  poverty,  bad  reputation,  low  birth  and  such  things 
(Diogenes Laertius 7.102 in Inwood and Gerson, 1997).  How is it possible to 
reconcile this list of indifferent objects with the idea that the Stoics were hedonists?  
A  clue  to the  answer  can  be  found  in  the following:  "For just  as  heating,  not 
cooling, is a property of the hot, so benefitting, not harming, is a property of the 
good; but wealth and health do not benefit any more than they harm; therefore, - 184 -   
 
 
neither wealth nor health is good" (Diogenes Laertius 7.103 in Inwood and Gerson, 
1997).   The  reasoning  behind this  argument  is similar  to  that found in  Butler.  
Whereas Butler was referring to desires, passions and appetites, the Stoics applied 
similar reasoning to the objects or aims that people may have.  The objects are not 
important because they can lead to either a good or bad life, it is how a person 
views those objects that is important. 
 
The Stoics use similar reasoning to argue that performing an appropriate act doesn't 
imply  that  it  is  right  according  to  one's  nature.    It  is  rational  to  perform  an 
appropriate act, but rationality admits both 'good' and 'bad' acts.  For the Stoics 
there is more to being a good person than following one's rationality.  Rationality, 
in short, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to being good.  The good man is 
in complete, continuous agreement with nature: "The ever-growing consistency of 
his  selection  of  natural  advantages  (performance  of  appropriate  acts)  brings  a 
recognition that there is something of far greater worth than any of these objects, 
singly or collectively" (Long, 1986: 192).  For example, the sage will make good 
use of poverty if it comes his way while a foolish man may use wealth badly.  This 
does  not  undermine the  objective  fact  that  wealth  is  preferable to  poverty,  but 
wealth is not a constituent of virtue.  The moral value of selecting wealth depends 
upon the agent's principles and manner of acting" (Long, 1986: 192).  
 
According to Stoics, people are mistaken to follow their emotions and passions.  
These are understood in Stoicism as products of a specific kind of error; namely, 
that of treating merely “preferable” advantages as if they were absolutely good, 
which only virtue is (Gill, 2003, p. 41).  Intense reactions (passions) constitute a 
disturbance  of  our  natural  psychophysical  states  which  should  be  seen  as 
disturbances and treated as “sicknesses” that need to be “cured” by analysis of their 
nature and origin and by advice.  Seneca offers the following threefold pattern of 
ethical guidance which is similar to that of Epictetus listed above: (1) assessing the 
value of each thing; (2) adopting an appropriate and controlled impulse toward 
objects pursued; (3) and, achieving consistency between impulse and action (Gill, 
2003,  p.  42).    The  satisfaction  or  frustration  of  desires  leads  to  production  or 
avoidance of the passions so controlling desires will lead to fewer disturbances and 
a more balanced life.  Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics thought of emotions as 
a part of a person's rational faculty which makes them responsible for actions base 
on  emotional  responses  (Cooper  and  Procope,  1995).    Contrary  to  common 
understanding,  the  Stoics  did  not  wish  to  eradicate  all  emotions,  only  those - 185 -   
 
 
emotions  which  are  excessive,  after  all,  emotions  are  a  part  of  rationality  and 
therefore necessary in order to make rational decisions. 
 
The issue of the relationships among people is typical of the Stoic approach.  The 
social principles of the Stoics derive from the impulses implanted by nature to form 
familial and extra-familial relationships (Long, 1986: p. 191).  "But the principle 
determining such behavior is not regarded as different in kind from that which 
prompts more obviously self-regarding actions" (Long, 1986: 191).  This principle 
can  be  traced  back  to  the  Stoics  belief  that  self-love  is  the  primary,  natural 
motivation.  Equally innate to the primary motivation of self-love, but developing 
later, is the secondary motive of appropriation to a creature's offspring, which the 
Stoics  took  to  be  the  foundation  of  human  sociability  (Long,  2000  in  Inwood, 
2003).    The  two  instinctual  motives  that  Butler  makes  primary,  self-love  and 
benevolence, are prefigured in the self-directed and other-directed objects of Stoic 
motives.  Both motives, according to the Stoics, are equally natural, suitable and 
mutually compatible.  For the Stoics, instincts towards self-preservation lead to 
natural inclinations to care for our offspring which then serves as the foundation 
upon which wise people can understand the unity of mankind.  The Stoics saw the 
world  as  a  single  great  community  in  which  all  men  are  brothers,  ruled  by  a 
supreme  providence  which  could  be  spoken  of,  almost  according  to  choice  or 
context, under a variety of names or descriptions including divine reason, creative 
reason, nature, the spirit or purpose of the universe, destiny, personal god, even the 
gods (Seneca in Campbell, 2004, p. 15).  These same views are echoed by Adam 
Smith in a quote I previously mentioned: "man ought to regard himself, not as 
something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the world, a member of the 
vast commonwealth of nature", and "to the interest of this great community, he 
ought at all times be willing that his own little interest should be sacrificed" (Smith, 
1790, p. 140). 
     
The Stoic position has been attacked along two lines.  The first is that is leads to 
emotional impoverishment.  This can be seen in the following advice given by 
Epictetus (III 24: 84-87): "Whenever you are getting attached to someone, don't let 
it be as though they're something undetachable--but more as if you had a jar or 
crystal goblet, so that when it breaks, you'll remember that it is that sort of thing 
and not be upset... ."  It is this disengagement with life that marks the Stoic system.  
The argument is that Stoicism leads to a sort of fatalism.  Imagine, for instance, a 
wise Stoic walking along a street and noticing a burning house.  He runs into the 
house  and  does  everything  he  can  to  save  some  children  trapped  inside  but  is - 186 -   
 
 
unsuccessful.  He has done everything he can to help and even risked his own life, 
but without success.  A proper Stoic will reflect and conclude that the death of the 
children was an inevitable event ordained by deterministic nature.  An emotional 
response by the Stoic would be out of place and unnecessarily troubling; he has no 
reason to feel bad, stronger still, he would be wrong to feel bad.  For a non-Stoic, 
the Stoic's indifferent reaction would appear cold and heartless.  Although reason 
might tell the Stoic that an emotional response doesn't do anything to improve the 
situation, many would find that the Stoic's limited understanding of what reason 
excludes unacceptable.  The second attack claims that happiness is used by Stoics 
in a very loose, disingenuous manner.  On this interpretation, the Stoics are not 
really offering a method to happiness, but rather moral guidelines that are quite 
independent of happiness.  Certainly many modern readers wouldn't find much 
happiness in living the disengaged, over-intellectualized life of a would-be sage--
frankly, it would seem to be quite boring.  Life might go smoother under such a 
regime, but actively experiencing the highs and lows of life are part of what makes 
life interesting. 
 
Along with their influence on Adam Smith, the Stoics influenced the views of 
Joseph Butler.  Butler writes in the preference of the "Fifteen Sermons" that “the 
ancient moralists had some inward feeling or other” corresponding to his thesis, 
which they expressed by saying that “man is born to virtue, that it consists in 
following nature, and that vice is more contrary to this nature than tortures or 
death” (Butler, 1986, Preface p. 8).  According to Long (2000), Butler and the 
Stoics agreed on two things: 1. Nature, with respect to human beings, is a term that 
has multiple references.  One meaning is that following nature means that humans 
have the capacity to reflect upon their actions and adjust them to what is good; 2. 
There is no basis in our given nature for any necessary conflict between self-love 
and benevolence.  Following nature for Butler meant: 1. Acting according to any 
psychological  propensity;  2.  Following  whatever  passion  happens  to  be  the 
strongest;  and,  3.  Following  the  principle  of  reflection  which,  in  term  of  his 
teleological argument, is superior to all our other faculties (Long, 2000: 384 in 
Inwood, 2003).  In both the Stoics and Butler, reflection is an important component 
separating  base  instincts  from  more  the  developed,  better,  desires.    As  I  have 
shown, Butler claims, like the Stoic Cicero, that animals start with instincts of self-
preservation  and  proceeds  to  the  thesis  that  honourableness  is  the  goal  and 
fulfillment of a fully mature and rational human being.  Butler would presumably 
fully agree with the following sentiment expressed by Seneca: "Those who make 
pleasure  supreme  hold  that  the  good  is  perceptible,  but  we  on  the  other  hand - 187 -   
 
 
attribute it to the mind and hold that it is intelligible.  If the senses made judgments 
about the good, we would not reject any pleasure; for no pleasure fails to attract us 
and every pleasure pleases us; conversely, we would not willingly suffer any pain; 
for every pain hurts our senses" (Seneca, in Inwood and Gerson, 1997, p. 249).  
Reason makes a decision good or bad: "But [the hedonists] let the lowest part [of 
man] make the decisions about what is better, so that judgment is pronounced good 
by sense perception, which is blunt and lazy, and slower in men than it is in beasts" 
(Seneca, in Inwood and Gerson, 1997, p. 250).  In the previous quote, Seneca 
seems  to  be  rejecting  the  hedonistic  roots of  Stoicism,  but  what he is  actually 
rejecting is the idea that base, animal, instincts should be allowed to determine 
what will make one happy.  He and Butler would both argue, I believe, that a wise 
person would see that what makes someone truly happy is revealed through reason, 
and doesn't depend on sense perceptions alone. 
     
Conclusions 
 
Although all of the schools of thought I examine in this chapter were hedonistic 
and believed in the rationality of people, they arrived at very different conclusions 
about how one should lead a good life.  For the Cyrenaics, happiness means to 
follow immediate desires because it is the only thing which can be known for 
certain; for the Epicureans, satisfying the basic desires will lead to the greatest 
happiness, while for the Stoics, happiness is the realization of one's proper place in 
the universe.  The key differences in the theories relate to the hedonistic rather than 
the  rational  aspects  of  the  approaches.    The  conclusion  I  draw  is  that  even 
accepting  a  limited  form  of  self-interest,  one  that  might  be  called  informed 
hedonism based on rationality, can imply very different conclusions about the best 
way to live one's life.  Social scientists who model agents as self-interested and 
rational have left open a large range of motives and, consequently, behaviors; so 
large in fact as to be nearly useless as an aid to describing or predicting behavior.  
The final lesson of this chapter is that in order to understand the recommendations 
that each of these approaches made about how to live one's life it was necessary to 
understand  their  assumptions  about  human  nature.    A  modeler  attempting  to 
represent human behavior needs to be clear about the contexts under consideration, 
the aims and goals of agents, and how those aims and goals are assumed to be 
linked in the psyche of the agents under consideration. 
 
 














Previous  chapters  have  been  concerned  with  developing  both  a  theoretical  and 
practical  understanding  of  the  elements  of  self-interest  as  they  might  apply  in 
economic contexts.  In this chapter I use those elements to build a basic framework 
that can be used by researchers to begin to correctly specify the type of self-interest 
that they believe is appropriate to describe the motives of economic agents under 
consideration. 
 
I  will  begin  this  chapter by  describing  the  purview  of  economic  analysis  as it 
relates to self-interest.  The discussion is intended to demonstrate that an important 
aspect of defining agent motivation is taking a clear stance on the scope over which 
an  analysis  is  meant  to  apply.    Regardless  of  whether  the  assumed  motive  or 
motives of an agent can be described as self-interested or non-self-interested or a 
combination of the two, a researcher needs to specify the context in which agents 
are operating; that is, given that the assumption that different contexts call forth 
different  motives  is  accepted--a  point  that  advocates  of  psychological  egoism 
would deny.  That complication aside for the moment, in regards to the point at 
hand,  a  researcher  should  be  unambiguous  regarding  what  (if  anything) 
distinguishes an economic context from a non-economic context or which elements 
of a context are economic and which are not.  If a researcher decides that self-
interest is an appropriate description of the motivation behind observed economic 
behavior in a given context, then the following framework is intended to help them 
to  refine  that  motive  into  a  more  manageable,  less  ambiguous  motive.    The 
discussion  will  largely  follow  along  the  lines  of  the  structural  and  external 
dimensions of self-interest that I have been developing and using throughout this 
manuscript.  I won't repeat in detail the arguments that I used to support each of the 
elements I mention here, rather, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a helpful 
summary of previously discussed issues. 
 
One qualification that I should mention before proceeding is that in the following 
sections  I  will  largely  ignore  the  possibility  of  non-self-interested  motives  in 
economic contexts.  As previously shown, this category of motives includes duties, 
special relationships and altruism.  In general, these are motives with which people 
are willing to sacrifice their net interests for the interests of others.  I make the - 190 -   
 
 
simplifying  assumption  that  these  motives  and  other  non-self-interested 
complications such as weakness-of-will are not present in order to concentrate the 
analysis on the topic of self-interest, which I take to be the default position in 
economic analysis.  By making this assumption I am not claiming that these other 
motives are not present in economic contexts, I take quite the opposite stance as I 
will demonstrate in the chapter to follow, rather, I do so from a desire to keep the 
discussion  manageable  and  concentrate  on  the  main  topic  at  hand--a  practical 
framework for self-interest. 
 
The Purview of Economic Analysis 
   
An issue that has been somewhat in the background for much of this manuscript is 
the  purview  or  competence  of  economic  analysis.    What  defines  an  economic 
context  and,  more  specifically,  what  does  it  mean  to  be  economically  self-
interested?    I  don’t  intend  to  offer  a  detailed  description  of  what  defines  an 
economic context; my approach will be to attempt to demonstrate that there is a 
close relationship between the choice of a context and the type of self-interest that 
describes agent motivation and consequently behavior. 
 
If it is accepted that self-interest and rationality are “the” economic assumptions, 
then the  purview  of  economic  analysis is  indeed  very  broad.
13    Self-interest  is 
clearly an important motive that stands behind many if not most actions whether 
those  actions  can  be  described  as  economic  or  not.    Likewise,  some  level  of 
rationality is necessary or useful to function in nearly any imaginable circumstance.  
Given the prevalence of self-interest and rationality in all human activities, it is not 
much of a stretch to then conclude that economic analysis is the appropriate tool to 
describe and predict most human behavior; a position explicitly taken by some of 
the authors mentioned in previous chapters.  But the very prevalence of these two 
assumptions in human activities, along with a belief that behavior is significantly 
variable across contexts, should be a warning that if the assumptions of self-interest 
and  rationality  are  accepted  as  describing  all  such  activities,  then  they  are 
                                                 
13 Following Pettit (1993, 55), I use the term rationality in a practical sense to mean: "that 
an agent's belief should be such that, under accepted criteria of evidence, they stand a better 
chance of being true than available alternatives.  More specifically, they should be well 
supported inductively or deductively.  They should be inductively rational in the light of 
observation or they should be inductively or deductively rational in the light of rational 
beliefs." 
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exceedingly  malleable  terms.  This  remains  true  even  if  the  position  of 
psychological egoism is accepted.  Recall that a psychological egoist contends that 
all behaviors are, at base, motivated by self-interest, which is different than arguing 
that  all  contexts  are  the  same.    I  do  not  believe  anyone  argues  that  all  social 
contexts are equivalent in that they involve the same or similar aims, and therefore 
I will ignore that possible line of reasoning.  The important point is that I have 
argued  that  to  the  degree  that  contexts  are  taken  to  differ,  and  that  different 
contexts  call  forth  different  aims  and,  additionally,  different  aims  imply  that 
different  sorts  of  rationality  are  applicable,  so  accordingly  should  the  sorts  of 
motives that are used to describe agents in those various contexts.  This remains 
true even if self-interest is taken as the only motive.  In fact, rationality and self-
interest are so widely applicable that they can better be described as necessary 
rather than sufficient descriptions of motivation. 
 
What if we begin by narrowing the focus to exclusively economic contexts, can we 
then conclude that self-interest and rationality are good assumptions to describe 
motives?  The answer to that question rests on whether it is possible to find a 
convincing  link  between  what  is  meant  by  an  economic  context  and  an 
unambiguous subset of self-interest.  In other words, are there purely economic 
interests?  The task, under this approach, is to identify the distinguishing features 
of an economic context in which desires or preferences are economically inclined 
or directed.  I contend that the intention of an act in such a context is, presumably, 
to improve one's economic well-being.  The question becomes, can we restrict or 
interpret the definition of those preferences and desires that promote economic 
well-being to such a degree that the interests represented become manageable?  
Two possible approaches come to mind, one is to restrict the aims of agents to 
exclusively economic desires or preferences, and the other is to argue that all aims, 
economic or otherwise, are in reality closely related. 
 
Both approaches entail limiting the external component of self-interest.  I'll assume 
for the moment that the structural component is some form of pure self-interest (as 
opposed to mixed forms) as that term was previously defined.  The first approach 
attempts to constrain preferences and desires to strictly economic preferences and 
desires.  Part of coming to an agreement that a context is economic might include 
the idea that the goals and aims of an agent, the external dimension of self-interest, 
are best described as economic.  Here I am simplifying the argument by equating 
preferences and desires with an agent’s aims and goals at the point of making a 
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agent  has  at  a  point  of  making  an  economic  decision--a  decision  about  his 
economic well-being.  I am further assuming that a rational agent will order his 
desires or preferences in such a manner as to maximize his well-being. 
 
Traditionally, economic agents were assumed to be attempting to maximize their 
wealth, income or some similar, easily accessible, assessable, monetary measure.  
Wealth, etc., was taken to be the external aim at which self-interest was directed in 
order to promote economic well-being.  It is important to note that economic well-
being wasn't necessarily equated with overall well-being, although it may be a part 
of well-being--a point Adam Smith repeatedly made and J.S. Mill reiterated. I do 
not know of any scholar who argues otherwise, rather, the argument is that all 
human  activities  are  rationally  pursued  in  order  to  maximize  one’s  overall, 
economic and non-economic, interests. Traditional aims would then appear to place 
severe constraints on an agent’s preference set, limiting their choices to those acts 
which maximize their wealth.  Such a limit clearly contrasts with the primary value 
that modern preference theory is intended to support, namely, personal autonomy 
in all of its many aspects.  However, perhaps the historical approach is not as 
restrictive as it first appears.  Certainly many aims can be acquired or realized via 
wealth.  After all, wealth, with the exception of misers, is not pursued as an end in 
itself, but as a means to acquire other aims or goals.  Assuming wealth as the 
ultimate preference of agents shifts the issue to the reasons why agents pursue 
wealth,  only  some  of  which  may  be  described  as  economically  self-interested.  
Wealth isn’t necessarily pursued for reasons of self-interest, and if it is pursued for 
self-interested reasons then those reasons would appear to vary widely as well.  In 
short, the assumption that the aim of an agent is to maximize wealth or income 
doesn't necessarily restrict the motivational set which stands behind agent behavior.  
We’ll have to find a more limiting set of preferences if we want to ensure that 
agents are directed at economic aims and goals. 
 
This is not a difficult task, it is quite easy to construct hypothetical scenarios in 
which agents are restricted to sets of products or services which can generally be 
accepted or assumed to be of purely economic importance.  For instance, we can 
conclude that an agent who decides to buy more widgets at a given moment does 
so because he expects to improve his economic well-being; after all, what else are 
widgets good for?  However, as one moves further away from textbook examples 
and  laboratory  conditions,  the  (revealed)  preferences  of  agents  become  more 
difficult to link with specific motives and therefore more difficult to identify as 
exclusively economically self-interested.  The success of this first approach will - 193 -   
 
 
depend on the ability of a researcher to build a convincing case that the products 
and services under consideration are pursued strictly in order to promote one’s 
economic interests. 
 
The  second  approach  is  a  more  general  maneuver  that  allows  researchers  to 
maintain the claim that economic analysis is everywhere applicable and avoids the 
issue of defining uniquely economic preferences.  The approach is composed of 
two parts; the first is to take the position of psychological egoism so that self-
interest is the only motive behind behavior.  The second part of the argument is to 
argue  that  although  contexts  and  consequently  motives  differ,  there  is  an 
underlying equivalency among preferences and desires across contexts; in short, 
that there really is no difference between economic and non-economic aims and 
goals.    The  two  parts  taken  together  may  imply  that  economic  analysis  is 
appropriate over a wide range of circumstances.  I will demonstrate this approach 
by linking it with modern utility theory. 
     
Modern utility theory avoids the issue of defining economic aims and goals by 
taking the position that preferences can be anything, no stance needs to be taken in 
regards  to  what  an  agent  prefers  and  the  motives  that  stand  behind  those 
preferences other than whether preferences remain rational in the limited sense that 
they are consistent through time.  If this broad understanding of preferences is 
accepted, and self-interest is taken to be the only motive behind all acts, economic 
or otherwise, then the approach under consideration is to argue that all preferences, 
despite different contexts, can be collapsed to one general, underlying preference.  
There are two things to notice about this maneuver. 
 
The first, as I have previously argued, is that assigning agents the motive of self-
interest is a significant departure from the ideal of modern utility theory.  Self-
interest is an addition to, and not a part of, preference theory, one that constrains 
agent preferences.  The second point involves the attempt to avoid the problem of 
varying contexts, and therefore varying motives, by finding a common defining 
characteristic underlying all aims in all contexts.  In other words, the position is 
that  although  self-interest  may  take  different  forms  in  different  contexts,  those 
objects pursued under the rubric of self-interest essentially boil down to the same 
thing.  That “thing” has traditionally been taken to be (net) happiness or pleasure.  
For instance, agents maximize their wealth or the number of widgets they acquire 
in order to maximize their happiness or pleasure, wealth and widgets are not an 
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contexts, but certainly not all contexts in that, as I have shown, agents often have 
good  reasons  to  act  against  their  own  happiness  and  pleasure.    In  short,  the 
argument would have to be made that economic agents, no matter the context, 
always act to increase their net happiness and all happiness’s can be compared.  
That may be a valid simplification in some contexts, but one that runs counter to 
arguments presented in previous chapters.  Promising alternatives to net happiness 
or  pleasure  might  include  some  definitions  of  well-being  as  argued  by  Griffin 
(1988)  in  his  case  for  modern  Utilitarianism.    This  isn’t  the  place  to  begin  a 
discussion  of  the  pros  and  cons  of  Utilitarianism,  that  discussion  has  more 
articulate advocates and detractors.  The shift in approach would involve a much 
more fundamental shift in economic theory, that of re-entering the head of homo-
economous to paraphrase Hicks. 
 
The  choice  faced  by  researchers  is  either  to  severely  restrain  preferences  and 
thereby ease the ability to link economic behavior with a small subset of economic 
interests, or, as with modern utility theory, leave preferences unrestrained and lose 
the ability to link behavior with any specific motive.  If the choice is to restrain 
preferences, then the problem of linking self-interest to economic objects remains.  
The alternative of claiming that all objects are pursued for a common, underlying, 
goal remains open, but then that goal and the motives for pursuing it need to be 
specified. 
 
The wide purview of economic analysis is a two edged sword.  Self-interested or, 
better  said,  selfish  behavior,  narrowly  defined  and  restricted  to  traditional 
economic  aims,  might  be  a  good  description  of  behavior  in  well-functioning 
markets in which price is a sufficient statistic.  However, as economic analysis is 
extended to other social endeavors a narrow interpretation of self-interest becomes 
less tenable without the additional assumption that all objects are somehow linked 
in terms of some common measure of desirability.  People in many contexts are not 
necessarily  focused  on  maximizing  their  own  economic  interests,  they  may  be 
motivated to live a good, well-balanced, life that might involve sacrificing some of 
their interests for the well-being of others.  For example, contrary to the assumed 
motives behind market behavior, living a good life may include a desire to reduce 
one's wants and desires in order to live a less complicated life.  One final point of 
consideration  raised  by  Adam  Smith  and  others  before  him  is  the  relationship 
between  economic  interests  and  other  interests.    Smith,  following  his  Stoic 
influences, recognized that once basic human needs are satisfied, a quest for ever 
more  material  possessions  often leads  to  unhappiness.    Greed  may  be  good  in - 195 -   
 
 
markets, it may serve an agent's narrow economic interests, but it may also lead to 
a reduction in overall well-being.  It should be enough to remind the reader that 
self-interest has been used as a rational justification to live in abject poverty as well 
as extravagant luxury. 
     
The assumption of self-interest alone, or in combination with the assumption of 
rationality, is not precise enough to either explain or predict economic behavior 
unless  preferences  are  severely  limited  as  well.    Without  a  restriction  on 
preferences, and regardless of whether it is meant to reflect real behavior or act as a 
simplifying assumption made in order to build more parsimonious models, self-
interest allows a much too broad set of potential aims and goals to be a description 
of  motives  in  all  contexts.    The  question  of  importance  is,  given  that  the 
assumption of self-interest  is  appropriate  in  a  given  context,  what sort  of  self-




Let's assume that we can agree to restrict the external elements of economic self-
interest to a specified set of aims and goals and, furthermore, we agree to call a 
context  economic,  have  we  thereby  significantly  restricted  self-interest  to  a 
meaningful assumption?  Again, I do not believe so, unless we can further agree on 
a common understanding of the structural dimension of self-interest.  Recall that 
there are many approaches to modeling how an agent orders preferences, including 
purely egoistic approaches such as a psychological, rational or ethical egoisms, and 
mixed egoistic approaches that allow various types of self-interests and non-self-
interests  to  be  included  within  a  preference  set.    Different  means  of  ordering 
internal preferences imply different sorts of behavior.  For instance, an economic 
agent who believes that he should or ought to act egoistically--an ethical egoist--
will presumably have an added impetus to act with vigor to achieve his goals, more 
so then perhaps a rational egoist who believes that it is rational to act egoistically.  
A related issue is the degree to which the interests of others are incorporated into 
one's  own  interests.    An  economic  agent  who  integrates  the  interests  of future 
generations within his interests is likely to behave differently than an agent whose 
concerns are restricted to his own narrow interests. 
 
Recall  that  the  structural  dimension  of  self-interest  can  be  thought  of  as  the 
rationality  that  agents  use  to  order  their  preferences  or  desires.    In  previous 
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self-interest  is  assumed  to  take  in  an  agent's  psychology.    To  prepare  for  the 
discussion to follow, I will briefly review the two broad categories of structural 
self-interest  which  I  discussed  in  detail  in  chapter  4,  namely,  positive  and 
normative  approaches,  and  I  will  include  a  very  brief  review  of  the  external 
dimensions.    The  first  category  is  called  psychological  egoism,  a  descriptive 
position  that  claims  that  people  are  in  all  circumstance  self-interested.    This 
approach has the advantage of parsimony, but the disadvantage of being open to 
empirical  refutation.    In  contrast,  the  second  category,  normative  approaches 
including rational, instrumental and ethical egoism, claim that people should or 
ought to act from the motive of self-interest.  These approaches require justification 
or leave themselves open to the charge of arbitrariness.  For instance, if the claim 
that ethical egoism will make one’s life go economically better is accepted, it is 
reasonable to ask whether it will make one’s life go better in general.  Normative 
approaches required, at a minimum, that researchers specify how they will measure 
the  “good”  they  advocate  and  range  over  which  their  “shoulds”  and  “oughts” 
apply.  For instance, in the case of rational egoism, the basis upon which rationality 
is assessed should be specified.  Hobbes, for instance, is often taken to have based 
his assessment of rationality on the concept of self-preservation.  Accordingly, all 
acts that damage one's ability to survive are irrational in his system.  Similarly, if 
an economist wants to call an act irrational, then he needs to specify what he's 
using as a measure of rationality.  If wealth is taken as the only aim, then all acts 
that  intentionally  reduce  the  net  wealth  of  an  agent  are  irrational--a  claim  that 
stretches the meaning of rationality to the breaking point.  Other structural theories 
discussed include tautological egoism, an approach which misidentifies an act with 
a reason for performing an act, and predominant egoism, an approach that claims 
that most people in most circumstances act egoistically. 
 
Predominant  egoism  is  a  mixed  theory,  one  that  includes  interested  and  non-
interested motives.  Mixed approaches are probably the most promising sorts of 
egoism to describe practical situations, but they come with the stipulation that a 
researcher is required to explicitly state when and which motives other than self-
interest are engaged and under what conditions interests and non-interested motives 
dominate.    Mixed  theories  can  quickly  become  prohibitively  complex  by 
sacrificing  parsimony  for  realism.    Some  of  the  theories  discussed  are  not 
compatible,  for  instance,  psychological  egoism  isn't  compatible  with  normative 
approaches if it is accepted that you can't tell somebody what they should do if they 
don't  reasonably  have  a  choice  to  act  otherwise.    In  addition,  there  is  a  clear 
contrast between psychological and normative egoisms, and mixed theories.  The - 197 -   
 
 
first two approaches are meant to define motivation or what should or ought to be 
an  agent’s  motivation  at  all  times  and  all  circumstances,  while  mixed  theories 
allow people to be motivated by a diverse range of motives at a given moment.  
The incompatibilities among the various forms of self-interest emphasize the need 




I will briefly review the main features of the external dimension of self-interest 
before turning to the task of providing a general framework of self-interest.  The 
standard answer that modern microeconomics gives to the question of what the 
aims of an agent are is that agents attempt to maximize their utility.  Utility, in turn, 
is  a  function  for  mapping  preferences  to  a  real  number,  preferences  can  be 
anything.  Modern axiomatic utility theory, to remind the reader, doesn’t make the 
assumption that people are self-interested: "All that is assumed is that people's 
preferences  conform  to  a  number  of  axioms:  roughly,  they  simply  need  to  be 
consistent.  They can conform to the axioms without being self-interested.  Yet the 
muddle over 'utility' leads many economists to forget this important discovery." 
(Broome, 1999: 22).  In short, utility theory says nothing about the aims of an 
agent, and if self-interest is assumed to be behind those aims, the justification for 
making that assumption needs to come from outside the model. 
 
I have expended some effort in this chapter and chapter 4 arguing that a proper 
understanding of self-interest needs to specify the aims and goals at which the 
assumed motive of self-interest is directed.  As Joseph Butler made clear, people 
don't aim at increasing their self-interest, they aim at those objects that promote 
their interests.  Many different aims have been suggested through time.  Adam 
Smith, for instance, claimed that once basic material needs are fulfilled, people aim 
towards objects which feed their vanity.  J.S. Mill suggested that the pursuit of 
wealth  can  be  used  as  the  aim  of  economic  agents  as  long  as  that  aim  is  not 
modified by the pursuit of any other object.  C.D. Broad argued that there are 
many, irreducible, aims including: pleasure, pain, wealth, power, security, liberty, 
glory, possession of particular objects, fame, health, longevity, status, self-respect, 
self-development, self-assertion, reputation, honor, and affection.  The overall aim 
of the Hellenistic philosophers was to live a tranquil life, which they practically 
achieved  through  the  pursuit  of  wisdom,  temperance  and  justice  (Cicero,  On 
Duties, translated by Grant, 1971).  Mis-specifying the presumed aims of agents 
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to the degree that behaviors induced by different motives are not correlated with 
one another.  An example that I will explore in great detail in the final chapter is 
the case of open source software.  There is much evidence to suggest that many of 
the original open source software developers were motivated by duties such as the 
belief  that  information  should  be  freely  available,  rather  than  the  belief  that  a 
commodity should be sold to the highest bidder.  These programmers started a 
community that has had a large influence on the software market.  Although their 
interests don't conform to the traditional, narrow, interpretation of economic self-
interest, they are pursuing their interests in a highly competitive economic context, 
and to the degree that their aims differ from profit maximizing aims, their behavior 
may differ as well.  An advocate of preference theory can rightly claim that their 
theory accounts for both types of motives.  He cannot however, without additional 
assumptions, claim that the behaviors are motivated for reasons of self-interested. 
 
Theories  of  self-interest  that  portray  agents  as  immoral,  isolated  and  non-
interacting are fundamentally different than those in which the interests of people 
are taken to interact.  In the second half of chapter 4 I outlined one possible manner 
with  which  to  illustrate  how  interests  may  interact.    At  one  extreme,  people's 
interests can be completely independent of one another and thereby implying a 
self-defeating type of behavior, while at the other extreme there is the notion of the 
common mind in which the interests of people are completely dependent.  Between 
these two practically unlikely extremes there exists a spectrum over which interests 
interact.  An important concept used to distinguish among the different ways in 
which interests interact is the idea of the focus of the motive in question.  For 
example, if the focus is primarily on an agent's own interests, even if those interests 
include the well-being of others, then such motives should be called self-interested.  
An  important  point  to  note  is  that  a  person  can  be  self-interested  and  still  be 
concerned with the well-being of others.  Obvious examples are cases in which 
there are special relationships among agents including friends and family members; 
in which case by promoting the interests of these others an agent is promoting his 
own  interests.    Within  the  spectrum  along  which  interests  interact,  I  drew  a 
distinction between cases in which the focus of an act is on the interests of the 
agent, and cases in which an agent is willing to shift that focus to another and 
sacrifice his own net interests for the net benefit of others.  In other words, there is 
an important difference between promoting the interests of others as a means to 
promote one's own interests, and a willingness to promote the interests of others 
even, perhaps, at the cost of one's own interests--what I call an altruistic act.  I 
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one  side,  isolated  selfishness,  and  on  the  other,  self-destructive  altruism,  isn't 
helpful; they are straw-men.  In general, it is important to remember that self-
interest isn't taken to exclude the happiness we derive from others.  Self-interest 
that incorporates the interests of others has many variations that may be important 




In  this  final  section  I  introduce  a  framework  which  will  allow  researchers  to 
systematically address the important features of self-interest.  The idea being that if 
a researcher decides that self-interest is the motive that he wants to use to describe 
agent  motivation,  then  the  following  characteristics  of  that  cumbersome 
assumption need to be considered and, whenever they provide a potential source of 
misunderstanding, explicitly stated.  The breadth over which self-interest describes 
motivation and consequently behavior means that a common understanding of this 
fundamental  assumption  can  only  be  achieved  by  further  delineating  its  many 
components.  The method I will use in this section is to ask the types of questions 
that a researcher needs to consider when he describes the motivation of an agent as 
self-interested.  When helpful, I will include the parameters between which the 
answers  to  the  questions  posed  should  fall.    I  will  not  here  provide  detailed 





Identifying  and  then  categorizing  motives  even  broadly,  is  difficult,  sometimes 
even for actors themselves (chapter 1).  Doing so will never be an exact science, 
but clues can be derived from several sources.  There is, for instance, no substitute 
for  close  study  of  actions  over  a  long  period;  particularly  actions  at  important 
moments in a person’s life under circumstances encouraging reflection. 
 
Does it matter? 
 
The  first  question  to  answer  is,  naturally,  are  the  motives  of  the  agents  under 
consideration important to the analysis?  Economists typically describe agents as 
self-interested;  many  describe  self-interest  as  one  of  the  key  assumptions  of 
economic  analysis.    However,  self-interest  is  a  very  general  description  of 
intentions and behavior, and should be more narrowly specified if a researcher has - 200 -   
 
 
a specific set of intentions in mind.  For instance, it is often convenient in applied 
models to represent agents as maximizers of their own short-term financial gains. 
 
What is the context under consideration? 
  
 
It is vital to understand the context in which an actor is operating because it can 
give clues to the motives of actors.  For instance, can the context be described as 
economic in the sense that profits can be taken to be the main aim of participants?  
How complex is the environment in which the actor is operating?  A complex 
environment  allows  for  the  possibility  of  many  different  motives.    Economic 
markets are complex in that many types of motives can operate.  Consequently, in 
general, the more realistic a context under consideration, the less appropriate a 
simplistic definition of self-interest.  All of which emphasizes the importance of 
picking a subject of study carefully.  When making claims about interests, it is 
necessary  to  understand  the  context  in  which  actors  are  operating.    A  well-
documented, transparent, context will help when divining motives. 
 
An  important  question  that  researchers  should  ask  themselves  is  whether  self-
interest is the only motive operating in the situation under consideration or whether 
some  other,  non-self-interested,  motive  is  prompting  agents  to  action.    Not  all 
motives  can  be  or  should  be  reduced  to  that  of  self-interest;  I  have  discussed 
several non-interested motives including altruism and duties, but there are many 
more as well, perhaps nearly as many as there are people (chapter 2).  That point 
aside, self-interest is the predominant motive in most human activities including 
economic activities. 
 
If  the  decision  is  made  to  describe  motivation  as  self-interested,  then  both  the 
structural and external components of that motive should be specified; where the 
structural  dimension  is  the  type  of  rationality  that  an  agent  uses  to  order  his 
interests and the external component is comprised of the aims and goals of the 
agent.    I  extensively  discussed  various  forms  of  structural  reasoning  including 
psychological egoism, ethical egoism and rational egoism, and refer the reader to 
chapter 4 for a list of some of the rationalities that have been identified in the 
philosophical literature.  By the aims of an agent I don't necessarily mean a detailed 
list of the specific objects of desire of an agent, rather, I mean the more general 
categories under which aims and goals can be collected as discussed in chapter 4.  
For instance, aims can be described as hedonistic, desire fulfilling or found on an - 201 -   
 
 
objective  list.    It  is  important  to  note  Broad's  observation  that  aims  may  be 
irreducible, thereby emphasizing the need for a researcher to explicitly state what it 
is, generally, at which agent’s aims.  Finally, a researcher should be aware that 
many aims that have consistently been cited as worthy of pursuit such as wisdom, 
temperance and justice, are difficult to categorize as strictly self-interested (chapter 
6). 
 
Rather than being wholly self-interested or non-self-interested, perhaps agents are 
motivated by a combination of both types of motives, what I have previous called 
mixed motivation.  If such is the case, then a researcher should state the conditions 
under which the various motives are actuated or risk sending a confusing message 
about the various aims and motives under consideration, and by implication, agent 
behavior. Mixed motivation is probably a more accurate description of practical 
motivation than either extreme, but one that invariably complicates a model.  That 
stipulation  aside,  self-interest  is  in  all  likelihood  a  broad  enough  category  to 
describe  most  economic  activity  in  most  contexts,  non-self-interested  motives 
should only be considered after careful consideration. 
  
What is the time period over which an agent's interests are measured? 
   
This question is closely related to the external dimension of self-interest mentioned 
above, but needs to be emphasized because of the potential complications it can 
add to the issue of interpreting the motives behind observed behaviors.  Some 
interests are immediate, while others act as reference points that extend throughout 
mature lives.  The nature of immediate aims and goals can be very different and 
may conflict with those we set for the long-term.  Joseph Butler's analysis (chapter 
5) of self-interest rests on the understanding that there is a hierarchy of interests.  
According to Butler, immediate interests, expressed as passions and appetites, can 
lead people to perform acts that are not in their best interest.  Importantly, Butler 
also  effectively  argued  that  passions  and  appetites  can  lead  to  benevolent  and 
altruistic  acts--non-self-interested  motives  are  thereby  just  as  natural  as  self-
interested motives.  In addition to immediate passions and appetites, people have 
reasoned medium and long-term aims and goals.  Agents may decide to sacrifice 
short-term interests in order to achieve medium or long-term interests; at any point 
in time people are bundles of interests that have different moments of fruition.  A 
researcher who unwarily plucks an action out of time without due consideration of 
the act's place within an agent's overall set of aims and goals may misinterpret the 
motives inciting the observed action.  The sort of inter-temporal reasoning that I - 202 -   
 
 
am referring to is common in finance and the rest of economics, similar sorts of 
reasoning needs to be applied when deciphering motivation.  Actions that may 
appear  to  be  self-sacrificing  in  the  short-term  (and  therefore  under  some 
interpretations, irrational), may, for instance, be conducted in order to achieve a 
more valued, self-interested, long-term goal.  As a practical matter, an important 
method of addressing this problem is to examine actions over a period, a method 
that I will demonstrate in the next chapter. 
 
Why isn't preference theory enough? 
 
There are several problems with arguing that by pursuing preferences agents are 
necessarily pursuing what is in their interest.  The first is the case of weakness-of-
will,  in  which  agents  prefer  objects  that  are  not  subjectively  in  their  informed 
interest.  Weakness-of-will is a well-documented phenomenon, one that breaks any 
necessary link between preferences and interests.  The second problem exists at a 
more theoretical level, it says that by making a claim about motivation we are 
making a claim about what informs a set of preferences, not about the preferences 
themselves.  Motives are prior to preferences, so knowing an agent's preferences 
doesn't necessarily give insight into motivation.  The third problem is the danger of 
tautological reasoning that goes along the following lines: agents prefer what is in 
their interest, therefore all preferences are self-interested (chapter 3).  The bottom 
line  is  that  interests  and  preferences  shouldn't  necessarily  be  equated  with  one 
another. 
 
Is the objective to describe how agents act or how they should act? 
 
Positive models of motivation such as psychological egoism are open to empirical 
refutation.  The claim that agents are in general self-interested is a simplification, 
clearly there are acts motivated by altruism, duties and other forms of non-self-
interest.  Researchers may decide that non-self-interested motives can be ignored 
for reasons of parsimony, but they can't reasonably argue that self-interest is the 
only possible motive. 
 
Normative  forms  of  self-interest,  those  that  tell  people  that  they  should,  for 
whatever reason, be self-interested, raise ethical issues.  A researcher who makes 
normative claims should be able to defend those claims against other norms.  Why, 
a person might ask, is it better for me to act from self-interest as opposed to some 
other  motive?    Will  self-interest  make  my  life  go  better  than  some  other - 203 -   
 
 
alternative?  Perhaps, for instance, it is better to live life according to the Stoics and 
maximize my understanding of the world?  Clearly, the issue of what makes a life 
good is linked to the external dimension of self-interest and to the wider topic of 
ethics.  Greed in the marketplace might be tolerated, where some argue that all is 
fair (as in love and war), but a proper defense of the motto greed-is-good in wider 
contexts would have to address the basic issue of what good one has in mind. 
 
Finally, as discussed in chapter 4, it is generally believed that there is a close 
relationship  between  self-interest  and  ethics.    Therefore,  to  the  extent  that 
researchers claim that agents should be self-interested, they are making normative 
statements which they should be prepared to defend. 
 
Is a subjective or objective view taken? 
 
Preference theory takes autonomy (subjectivity) as its starting point, and by doing 
so  severs  economic  analysis  from  many  forms  of  objective  evaluation.    By 
subjective  I  mean  that  an  agent's  interests  are  not open  to  evaluation  by  other 
parties.    A  subjective  approach  means  that  a  researcher  is  excluded  from,  for 
instance, claiming that certain interests are more worthy or valuable than others.  
Subjective models dominate modern economic analysis, but that hasn't always been 
the case.  Early economists, including the Utilitarian J.S. Mill, drew a distinction 
between lower pleasures, those that bring contentment, and higher pleasures, those 
that are the goals of a developed human being.  An idea which Mill summarized as: 
"It  is  better  to  be  a  human  being  dissatisfied  than a  pig  satisfied;  better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."  Modern economists have intentionally 
barred themselves from making similar pronouncements by sanctioning personal 
autonomy over every other value. 
 
Objective models, for example, ones that evaluate acts on the basis of an agreed 
upon  list  of  criterion,  are  generally  anathema  to  most  modern  economists.  
Economics, particularly neoclassical economics, celebrates the individual's right to 
make good or bad decisions, based on his preferences, as he sees fit.  However, as I 
have shown, self-interest is not necessarily a normative free position, and to the 
degree that economic models are normative, they imply the possibility of objective 
evaluations; a rational egoist, for instance, claims it is rational to be self-interested 
and irrational to act otherwise.  However, the rational egoist presumably bases his 
definition of rationality on some objective choice.  All rational people, Hobbes 
said, would agree that the preservation of life is a basic goal from which other - 204 -   
 
 
goals derive, while others have suggested the basic aims as the avoidance of pain 
or happiness.  The point that I would like to make is that economists, by assuming 
self-interest,  may  unintentionally  already  be  making  objective  evaluations.  
Perhaps their norms need to be made explicit and thereby subject to assessment? 
 
To what degree are the interests of agents interconnected? 
     
I have extensively discussed this theme in chapter 2 and throughout the manuscript 
as a major part of the external dimension of self-interest.  The extremes of pure-
egoism and pure-altruism are ideals and, as a practical matters go, they are largely 
self-defeating.    However,  between  these  two  extremes  there  are  many  possible 
ways to model the interaction of agent interests.  The fundamental message is that 
the  interests  of  agents  often  include  the  interests  of  other  agents.    An  explicit 
position on this point will help to resolve a major source of confusion in regards to 
what it means to be economically self-interested. 
 
At what intensity are interests pursued? 
 
By  intensity  I  mean  the  vigor  with  which  agents  pursue  their  interests.    The 
intensity of self-interest parallels the discussion within the economic literature on 
the  rationality  of  agents.    The  agent  who  maximizes  his  self-interest  in  every 
instance is an illusion.  Such an agent would be required to constantly perform 
rigorous  calculations  of  expected  net  changes  in  interests  across  all  potential 
outcomes; an unrealistic and probably unworkable description of human behavior.  
A  more  realistic,  but  consequently  more  difficult  to  implement  description  of 
behavior, is that agents satisfice across interests.  Any number of intensities can be 
imagined and the context in which an agent finds himself will surely influence the 
energy with which he pursues his aims and goals. Therefore, even within a positive 
position such as psychological egoism, there is room for the expression of a large 
range of different intensities of self-interest.  A maximizing egoist will behave 
differently from a non-maximizing egoist, therefore, a comment on the intensity 
with which interests are presumed to be pursued might be helpful to reaching a 










The common theme running throughout this manuscript and emphasized in this 
chapter  is  that  the  assumption  of  self-interest,  without  qualification,  doesn't 
significantly curtail potential reasons to act.  Claiming or assuming that agents are 
self-interested  without  specifying  characteristics  such  as  the  context  in  which 
agents are operating, how aims and goals are ordered, and what those aims and 
goals are, does little to constrain motivation or interpretations of resulting behavior. 
 
Researchers need to take a consistent and coherent position about what they mean 
when they use the term self-interest.  This will allow them to make meaningful 
statements  about  the  behavior  of  agents  and  will  allow  others  to  contest  those 
statements.  This is a big step for economics which has been able to largely shield 
itself behind preference theory.  In contrast to that theory, the approach I have 
outlined requires taking a position on what is going on inside the heads of agents.  
However, if a researcher's goal is to attach a label to an agent's motives, whatever 
the motive, I do not see that it is possible to avoid describing how that motive 
operates or should operate within an agent's psychology.  The other part of the 
story  are  the  objects  at  which  self-interest  is  directed.    Generally,  the  more 
identifiable aims in a context, the more complicated the motivations need to be in 
order  to  describe  observed  behavior.    My  objective  has  been  to  broaden  the 
understanding of what self-interest entails and, particularly, to refute the idea that 
self-interest excludes other-regarding behavior.  The result is a rough framework 
that is designed to get researchers to ask the right questions about the motive of 
self-interest. 
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Many explanations have been offered as to why people choose to contribute to 
open source projects.  Explanations range from narrow, self-interested motives as 
found in many accounts of standard economic theory to non-interested, altruistic 
motives.  The previous chapters aimed at building a theoretical overview of the 
complex topic of self-interest, this chapter aims to apply that overview to the case 
of  open  source.    Using  the  theoretical  framework  developed  over  the  previous 
chapters, I will attempt to add a coherent structure to the issue of determining the 
type of motivation exhibited by members of the open source community.  The 
central question addressed is whether the motives of open source contributors are 




As  a  practical  matter,  does  it  matter  whether  the  motives  of  open  source 
contributors are properly identified?  Open source communities, and open sources 
production methodologies, are a potentially rich resource for profit seeking firms.  
Indeed, many proprietary firms are searching for ways to use and incorporate the 
advantages of open source and other community based systems into a structured 
business environment, see, for example, the work of West and O'Mahony (2008); 
Dalle and Jullien (2003); West and Dedrick, (2001); Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 
(2006), von Hippel, (2005); Franke and Shah, (2003); Lakhani and von Hippel, 
(2003).  If the arguments of Frey (1997) and Ryan and Deci (2000) are correct as I 
have outlined them in chapter one, then appeals to self-interested motives when 
non-self-interested motives are determining behavior will be counter-productive.  
As a consequence, it is important for potential users of open source to understand 
the  motives  of  the  open  source  developers.    However,  it  is  not  just  software 
developers that should be of interest to firms, rather, it is the entire community 
existing around an open source software project; including active members who 
use the software, provide documentation, offer help to other users, and suggest 
"wish lists" to developers of features they would like to have, which make open 
source software a product worth emulating. 
 
Open source communities have proven to be robust and vibrant, for example, the 
Linux, Perl, Emacs and R communities continue to provide high-quality software - 208 -   
 
 
which is free to download, but which also comes with common open source license 
requirements as to rights and obligations regarding the use and redistribution of 
software derived from, and in some cases connected to, the software.  Even lesser 
known projects such as those supported by the GFortran and Lisp communities 
continue to provide helpful support for these relatively old, yet powerful, software 
programs.  Getting the most out of these opportunities will depend on properly 
identifying  the  motives  of  open  source  software  community  members,  while 
getting it wrong may damage an important potential resource. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into several sections.  All sections aim at 
determining  the  motives  of  open  source  programmers  with  assistance from  the 
framework  and  general  concepts  considered  in  previous  chapters.    In  general, 
evaluation of the social situation or context in which open source programmers 
operate is a critical feature in determining or estimating motivation.  Where the 
social situation is broadly understood to include the circumstances in which the 
open  source  community  exists  and  operates.    It  includes,  for  example,  the 
institutions,  history  and  important  personalities  which  have  contributed  to  its 
existence and viability. 
 
The first section is a general discussion about open source and asks what makes 
open source an interesting case to discuss motivation.  It is not a coincidence that 
the motives of open source programmers have been the subject of speculation since 
open  source  became  academically  interesting  (Lerner  and  Tirole,  2001).  
Academics  have  been  drawn  to  the  case  precisely  because  it  appears  to  be an 
exception to the general understanding of motivation in the marketplace. I will 
then, briefly, discuss the basic concepts of open source.  There are many detailed 
guides  to  open  source  software,  several  of  the  more  interesting  written  by 
developers themselves (Raymond, 2001, Torvalds and Diamond, 2001), but a brief 
overview of the basics of open source, with particular attention to concepts which 
are  of  importance  to  my  argument,  will  allow  me  to  avoid  potential  areas  of 
confusion.  Over simplification of what it means to be open source has led to both 
over and underestimation of its academic and economic importance.  Next, the 
general  economic  context  will  be  discussed,  specifically  in  relationship  to  the 
motives of firms that have lost in the race to become the dominant design.  A 
review of the history of open source, particularly as it applies to licenses, follows.  
I will argue that licenses are an expression of the long term motives of their issuers.  
Open source has a long and well-documented history that provides further clues as 
to the intentions of the writers and users of open source licenses.  Furthermore, I - 209 -   
 
 
will provide an overview of the main categories of open source licenses; seemingly 
small differences in licenses have large implications for the types of activities they 
allow and support.  The differences in licenses are often neglected, causing some 
scholars to draw general conclusions about open source software when, in fact, 
their conclusions only apply to a subset of those licenses. 
 
The overview and analysis will allow me to be more precise about the motives of 
open source contributors using the framework developed in the previous chapter.  I 
would like to stress that the overview and details presented in this chapter are not 
peripheral,  but,  rather  critical  to  identifying  the  motives  of  open  source 
contributors.    The  social  situation  in  which  the  open  source  community  has 
operated  and  operates,  provide  guidelines  to  determine  the  intentions  of  open 
source users. 
 
Open Source and motives 
 
The  open  source  software  development  process  is  a  significant  economic 
phenomenon with both practical and theoretical lessons for economic and business 
studies.  The process brings together, in a sort of loose coalition, the talents of 
individuals and, more recently, firms, to produce high quality software that is, in 
many product categories, able to compete with functionally equivalent proprietary 
products.  The open source software development process has been made more 
likely by the confluence of several technical developments including the advent of 
cheap,  ubiquitous  communications  technology  and  modular  software  languages 
that can run on various computer platforms, e.g., the C computer programming 
language.    The  combination  of  these  technical  factors  allows  remotely  located 
programmers  to independently  design  and  develop  software  which can then be 
rapidly  and  inexpensively  exchanged  and  recombined  to  form  viable  software 
programs.    While  technical  characteristics  define  important  pre-conditions  that 
have  made  the  development  of  open  source  more  likely,  they  alone  are  not 
sufficient  to  explain  its  uniqueness  given  that  proprietary  software  firms  have 
access to, and use, the same techniques.  The additional factor, and the one that is 
the most significant and theoretically interesting, is the motives of open source 
software programmers and how those motives are expressed. 
 
Lerner and Tirole (2001) were the first academics to ask what motivates highly 
skilled  programmers  to  contribute  their  efforts  and  resources  to  developing 
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agreements.   More  specifically,  the  question  which I  address in this  chapter  is 
whether the economic conception of the motive of self-interest, as understood by 
Lerner  and  Tirole  and  other  economic  writers,  can  explain  the  willingness  of 
programmers to contribute to open source projects.  The task at hand is not to 
attempt to dissect all of the various reasons that programmers have to contribute to 
open source projects as in the Floss (2002) study, rather, I am primarily interested 
in answering the much more modest question of whether economic self-interest can 
explain such behavior. 
 
Open  source  software  is  also  an  important  economic  phenomenon  in  a  highly 
competitive, billion dollar market, particularly in markets for the software that runs 
on servers and behind Internet applications.  It is expected to play an increasingly 
important part in other software markets such as data base management (MySQL) 
and the software for portable telephones (Android).  Large hardware firms such as 
Sun  Microsystems,  Hewlett-Packard  and  particularly  IBM,  have  made  large 
software  contributions  to  the  open  source  community,  and  many  other  firms, 
including Oracle, now offer servers running open source software.  Microsoft was 
quick to see open source as a potential threat and wrote a famous position paper 
outlining  the  threats  open  source  posed  to  its  business  model  (see  Halloween 
Documents, and Young, Chap. 8 in DiBona, 1999).  The economic significance of 
open  source  alone  requires  a  coherent  and  consistent  response  on  the  part  of 
economic and business analysts. 
 
The motives of open source programmers have been a subject of speculation and 
debate since its first appearance.  For instance, I have previously mentioned the 
important work of Raymond and Lerner and Tirole, furthermore, von Krogh and 
von  Hippel  (2003),  editors  of  a  special  issue  on  open  source,  were  careful  to 
categorize different sorts of “individual motives” in their overview article in the 
special  addition.
14    The  individual  motives  mentioned  by  von  Krogh  and  von 
Hippel closely coincide with Raymond's (2001) earlier, and important “musings” 
on the ethos' of many of the original computer programmers, some of whom later 
contributed to open source projects.  I believe that Raymond's views shaped the 
popular impression of the motives of open source programmers.  According to 
Raymond (2001), there is a strong sense of community among programmers and 
the feeling that they need to work together to solve issues.  Von Krogh and von 
                                                 
14   I believe that the use of the term individual motives is particularly helpful, at their 
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Hippel  also  mention  the "non-individualistic"  motive  of  protecting  open  source 
software, which is certainly a concern of many in the open source community, but 
one that I would suggest is a secondary motive in that it does not explain what 
motivates programmers to contribute their code to open source projects in the first 
place.  In other words, programmers might be more willing to contribute to open 
source  projects  that  offer  their  software  protection  against,  say,  copyright 
infringement, but it does not explain why programmers decide to contribute to 
open source projects rather than proprietary project. Copyright laws protect both 
proprietary and open source software (Jacobsen v. Katzer (2008)). 
 
In more general terms, arguments have been made that contributors have motives 
ranging from ideological concerns for issues such as the freedom of information 
and  fairness  (Stallman,  1999),  to  economic  strategies  designed  in  response  to 
barriers  resulting  from  network  externalities  which  are  prevalent  in  software 
markets (Rossi, 2004).  Although some of these motives appear to correspond to 
standard economic assumptions about self-interest, others stretch that definition 
beyond reasonable recognition.  Open source contributors, like everybody else, are 
almost  certainly  motivated  by  their interests,  but  the  question  is  whether those 
interests  should  be  classified  and  understood  to  be  primarily  economic  or 
something else entirely.  Lerner and Tirole (2002) present the clearest defense of 
what they take to be economic interests, their position will therefore be the focal 
point  in  determining  the  degree  to  which  open  source  contributors  are 
economically motivated.  In keeping with a main theme of this thesis, I will suggest 
that much of the confusion on the issue of whether open source programmers are 
motivated  by  economic  self-interest  or  some  other  motive  is  due  to  a 
misunderstanding of what the motive of self-interest entails. 
 
One of the principal practical lessons of the preceding chapters is that assigning 
motives to actions is a difficult and an invariably controversial undertaking, one 
that  requires  a  detailed  and  deep  analysis  of  the  context  and  activities  under 
consideration.  Open source software has several characteristics which make it a 
particularly interesting case to explore issues raised in previous chapters, I will 
briefly mention several of its more important characteristics. 
 
Open  source  licenses  themselves  provide  a  reliable  and  consistent  source  of 
evidence of the motives of open source programmers.  Software licenses represent 
clear, long-term,  commitments  to specific  goals  on the  part  of  their  issuers.    I 
would  argue  that  such  commitments  by  open  source  licensors  are  every  bit  as - 212 -   
 
 
important as the commitments described by Ghemawat (1991).  Issuing a software 
license for an important piece of code is not something that is taken lightly given 
the expectations on the part of users that are incurred once a product has been 
released under a particular license.  The open source initiative (OSI) is tasked with 
determining whether a license submitted to them is an open source license.  They 
offer advice and guidance to potential license issuers via an active mailing list and 
freely available literature so that both the positive and negative implications of 
using open source licenses can be clearly understood.  In addition, there is wide 
variation in the types of open source licenses available, with a license to meet any 
goal.  Its economic importance and the significance of the licensing discussion 
allow me to claim that open source licenses provide a reliable indication of the 
underlying intentions of licensors. 
 
Finally,  open  source  is  an  interesting  case  because  it  is  going  through  a  rapid 
development  process.    Given  its  open  nature,  researchers  can  watch  the 
development of authority structures, rules and norms of behavior, and are thereby 
privy, via newsgroups and other on-line forums, to the internal stresses that the 
open source community experiences as new participants join and new open source 
licenses are issued.  These stresses, as represented by the different interests of open 
source contributors, are an important reoccurring theme that I will be addressing.  I 
will argue that the community was long ago transformed from a loosely connected 
group of idealistic computer programmers, highly motivated to change the way 
information  was  disseminated,  to  a  much  more  diverse  groups  of  participants 
including larger, profit motivated, computer firms. 
 
That  said,  the  uniqueness  of  open  source  software  can  also  been  seen  as  a 
drawback to its usefulness as an object of study.  I know of no other commercial 
product that is developed and sold in a competitive market with characteristics 
similar  to  open  source  software.    There  are  many  examples  of  individuals 
volunteering  and  performing  services  or  providing  products  for  disinterested 
reasons or for reasons other than promoting their own economic interests, but no 
other service or product is produced and supported by groups of organized, skilled, 
workers who then make their products freely available in a highly competitive 
market  under  liberal  licensing  conditions.    Many  people  in  modern  economies 
choose to work for reasons other than profit maximization (Florida, 2002), that 
happy occurrence is not the issue I am addressing, my concern is whether narrow 
economic interests are being represented or some other interested or perhaps non-
interested motivation is at work in open source communities.  The strength of the - 213 -   
 
 
case of open source is that it is a possible indication of the diverse range of motives 
that have always been present in economic contexts.  People, whether acting as 
economic agents or not, are motivated by a complex mixture of motives, the case 
of open source, I believe, is an indication of that complexity within an economic 
environment.  At a practical level, a firm or economic policy that could tap into 
such motives would yield potentially large economic benefits.  The uniqueness of 
open source refers to its ability to provide evidence that non-self-interested motives 
play an important role in a highly competitive market.  It is its transparency that 
makes it of interest.  Whether contributors to open source are more or less self-
interested than other economic agents is not addressed. 
 
Determining  the  motives behind  actions is  not  easy,  but, as  I  have  mentioned, 
several  indicators  provide  evidence  that  helps  to  decipher  the  motives  of  open 
source contributors.  I will use three indicators to assess such motives.  The first is 
the structure of the software market. While not an obvious choice to determine 
motivation,  it  turns  out  to  be  a  crucial  determinant  of  the  motivation  of  profit 
maximizing firms to contribute to open source projects.  The second feature is the 
history of the UNIX operating system; that history led to many important lessons 
being learned and later applied to Linux, the most important open source project.  
Finally, and most importantly, I will examine the open source licenses themselves 
because  they  provide  a  good  indication  of  the  intentions  of  open  source 
contributors.    By  this  means  I  hope  to  arrive  at  a  better  understanding  of  the 
structural  and  external  dimensions  motivating  open  source  programmers.  
However, before discussing these items, I will present a brief introduction to open 
source. 
 
Basics of Open Source 
 
Before examining the details of open source, it is helpful to begin by giving a very 
brief description of how a typical open source project gets started and how open 
source  licenses  differ  from  their  proprietary  equivalents.    A  typical  software 
development  project  begins  with  a  computer  programmer  needing  to  solve  a 
problem (Raymond, 2001).  A programmer writes a piece of code that will make, 
say, some repetitive task such as data manipulation, easier.  Perhaps the project 
begins  to  grow  too  complex  for  the  programmer  to  complete  alone  or  the 
programmer simply loses interest in the project. The programmer may then decide 
that he needs help in order to complete the project.  By posting a message on 
freshmeat.net  or  some  other  public  site  that  caters  to  software  development - 214 -   
 
 
projects, the programmer may be able to interest others to contribute to the project 
or taking it over entirely.  The programmer uploads his piece of code to the site 
where it is typically classified by name, type of product, operating systems on 
which it runs, etc. . The project will later be rated in terms of its popularity within 
the  community,  turnover,  and  other  measures  of  its  success.    At  this  point  a 
programmer faces a critical decision, as the copyright holder of the code he has to 
make a decision about the conditions under which he wishes to license his code.  
The choice of license determines the degree to which programmers and other users 
can  examine,  change  and  add  to  the  software  project,  as  well  as  any  other 
conditions  the  programmer  would  like  to  specify.    The  most  liberal  of  these 
licenses are called open source licenses. 
 
How do open source licenses compare to proprietary software licenses?  Closed or 
proprietary software licenses typically attempt to keep the code hidden from users 
so that it cannot be examined or changed, copying the code is forbidden or limited.  
In addition, licensees are often required to pay a fee to use the software; users do 
not own the software they use, they are essentially renting it.  The proprietary 
model  of  software  development  is  currently  the  primary  model  of  software 
distribution.  Firms like Microsoft hire programmers to code software that the firm 
owns and licenses to users for a fee.  Microsoft retains ownership of the software.  
All major traditional research streams in economics and business support the basic 
idea that firms should retain and protect their valuable resources.  The assumption 
is that the rent generating assets of a firm must be owned by that firm (Penrose, 
1995; Teece, 1980, Wernerfelt, 1984, overview in Foss, 1997).  In other words, to 
generate rents, the assets in question must be owned and controlled by the firm. 
However, the traditional links between outputs, ownership, and control of assets 
have been questioned, where the term assets is widely defined to include both 
physical and non-physical value generating (Child and McGraph, 2001, Hennart, 
1994) 
 
The contrasts between different open source licenses and proprietary licenses are 
critical  to  understanding  the  diverse  set  of  motives  of  open  source  developers.  
Open source licenses, in contrast to proprietary licenses, often include provisions 
that allow users to copy, change and redistribute the program's source code.  The 
Free Software Foundation lists four basic principles of open source software: 1.  
The freedom to run the software for any purpose; 2.  The freedom to study how the 
software works and adapt it to fit one's needs; 3.  The freedom to redistribute 
copies of the software, and; 4. The freedom to improve the software and distribute - 215 -   
 
 
the improvements to the public (FSF).  Licenses in general provide a mechanism 
for firms to fine-tune the degree of ownership that they wish to exercise over an 
asset, making ownership an important strategic variable.  By using open source 
software users are entering an agreement, whether they have entered into a formal 
contract is debatable, but the common understanding is that users must abide by 
certain rules (ProCD, 1966).  The main stipulation of some open source licenses is 
that if users exercise their right to add to or modify the code, then that altered 
program must also be released under the same or similar open source license.  This 
requirement  prevents  people  from  taking  open  source  software  and  then  re-
releasing it under a proprietary license unless all of the code released is covered 
under the open source license.  Note that it is possible, and quite common, to use 
open source code without contributing anything to the community.  The obligations 
are generally believed to come into effect only if the code is modified or linked to 
open source software and then redistributed. 
 
The choice of a license can be particularly important in an industry exhibiting 
network effects because there is a tendency for the market to "tip" in favor of one, 
eventually dominating, standard.  By varying the degree of ownership of an asset, a 
firm can potentially influence the direction that a market tips or survive in a market 
that has already tipped; a topic to which I now turn. 
 
Economic Context: Networks 
     
Software is an example of a product that exhibits network externalities and the 
single most important feature of such markets is that they can be tipped in favor of 
a particular product or system of products.  I will argue that networks play an 
important role in the motives of firms to contribute to open source projects.  Due to 
clever foresight on the part of Bill Gates, the market for the desktop operating 
system tipped in Microsoft's favor while the lucrative server market is beginning to 
go the same way (Frieberger and Swaine, 2000). 
 
The computer software market, and many other markets, exhibit what are known as 
increasing returns on the demand side.  For products in such markets the utility that 
a user derives from consumption of a good increases with the number of other 
agents consuming the good (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).  The properties of increasing 
returns are: market instability, unpredictability, the possible predominance of an 
inferior product, and immense profits for winners (Arthur, 1994).  Many strategic 
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for  example:  (1)  Should  a  firm  move  first  to  exploit  a  market  with  network 
externalities  or  follow  the  leader?;  (2)  Should  a  firm  form  alliances  to  exploit 
markets and when should it go at it alone?; (3) Should a firm work within a given 
standard or create a new standard?  (Farrell and Saloner, 1992; Katz and Shapiro, 
1985, 1994; Besen and Farrell, 1994; Church and Gandal, 1992).  The second and 
third items are of particular concern to firms considering using or contributing to 
open source products.  I claim that for proprietary software firms, open source is a 
loser's response to the Microsoft dominance.  The reactions of Microsoft officials 
to the gains of Linux as well as the professed strategic intent of Linux distributors 
confirm this assumption (see Halloween Documents, Young, Chap. 8 in DiBona, 
1999). 
 
The network characteristics of the software market mean that compatibility issues 
play an important role in consumer decisions.  Once a market tips in favor of one 
product switching costs become an especially important factor.  Switching costs 
result  from  a  consumer's  desire  for  compatibility  between  current  and  future 
purchases and previous investments.  For instance, Microsoft's dominance of the 
desktop computer means that the great majority of software can run only on the 
Microsoft system; switching to a new operating system requires current Microsoft 
users to buy new software as well.  Therefore, any standard that hopes to overcome 
Microsoft's monopoly will have to offer users considerable benefits, financial or 
otherwise.  The strategy that the open source community, and specifically firms, 
has chosen to challenge Microsoft is similar to the strategy that Sun Microsystems 
used  at  one  time  to  establish  a  dominant  design  in  the  computer  chip  market 
(Khazam and Mowery, 1993).  This strategy consists of adopting a liberal licensing 
policy that effectively concedes control over intellectual property in order to gain 
market  share.    In  addition,  to  the  degree  that  liberal  licenses  require  that  the 
licensor make his code publicly available, the ability to realize profits on those 
particular products correspondingly falls. 
 
Many of Microsoft's competitors are following a loser strategy, by which I mean 
the market has tipped in Microsoft's favor and these firms have decided to support 
open source software as a low cost alternative to Microsoft products in order to 
break  through  the  barriers  caused  by  Microsoft's  dominance  in  the  market.  
Licenses give copyright holders, in this case firms, the ability to finely adjust the 
amount of control over the products they release to the public.  By making their 
software more open they make it easier for others to copy and change the product 
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strategy  is  that  it  severely  constrains  the  ability  of  a  firm  to  control  the 
development  process  and  realize  profits  from  their  products.    Some  firms,  for 
instance Netscape, have released their products using a dual licensing approach that 
means  that  they  release  both  an  open  source  and  a  proprietary  version.    Open 
source  strategies,  if  consumers  accept  such  products,  may  force  Microsoft  to 
change its strategy, perhaps through releasing some of its software under liberal, 
open source like licenses.  However, addressing all of the pros and cons of the 
different open source business strategies would take me too far away from my 
main theme which is motivation (Meeker, 2008).  Microsoft, before Linux, was 
faced  with  a  choice  between  setting  a  lower  price  for  its  products  in  order  to 
capture or maintain its market share and setting a higher price to harvest profits by 
exploiting  current  locked-in  customers  Klemperer  (1995).    Open  source,  by 
removing  or  reducing  the  importance  of  the  issue  of  purchase  cost,  may  force 
Microsoft to lower its prices or face losing its dominant position. 
   
I take it for granted that firms are motivated by the need to maximize profits within 
legal  constraints;  their  stockholders  demand  it  and  the  law  in  many  countries 
supports those demands (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998).  I strongly suspect that 
the nature of network externalities in these markets means that many firms have 
decided  that  they  either  won't  or  can't  profitably  compete  directly  against  the 
dominance  of  Microsoft  and  have  therefore  decided  to  support  open  source 
software  in  order  to  provide  an  alternative  to  Microsoft  software.    Releasing 
proprietary software to the open source community has the possible advantage of 
overcoming or circumventing the dominant design.  By helping to create a pool of 
freely available software, these firms shift the competitive playing field away from 
software towards providing services or hardware.  The idea, presumably, is that by 
making a piece of software free or nearly free, the price of that particular piece of 
software will no longer be a consideration in the decision as to which computer 
system  to  buy.    For  example,  by  helping  to  create  a  competitive  open  source 
alternative  to  Microsoft’s  operating  system,  hardware  firms  and  software  firms 
which make complementary products that work with the open sourced operating 
system will be able to take away or reduces the advantages of Microsoft's lead in 
that area. 
 
The battle to control the desktop and server software markets is worth billions of 
dollars, while the networked nature of the computer market means that the standard 
has, for the moment, tipped in favor of Microsoft's operating systems.  Whether 
operating  systems  based  on  the  Linux  kernel  will  be  able  to  challenge  the - 218 -   
 
 
dominance  of  Microsoft  operating  system  is  a  matter  of  intense  debate  and 
speculation.  Much of the debate involves the minutia of comparing the total cost 
of operating Linux versus Microsoft.  Licenses that encourage proprietary firms to 
contribute their efforts to open source projects, while allowing these firms to reach 
a wider audience, might provide a powerful enough combination to overcome the 
immense switching costs involved in changing operating systems.  I won't concern 
myself with issue of operating cost versus total costs, a topic that is best left to 
systems  administrators  and  chief  information  officers,  however,  what  is  not 
debated  is  that  open  source  products  provide  a  cheap,  up-front,  alternative  to 
Microsoft products and are therefore an important component for profit seeking 
firms hoping to challenge the dominant design. 
 
History of Open Source 
        
Learning from the Fragmentation of UNIX 
 
The underlying network structure of hardware and software markets means that the 
history  of  the  computer  sector  is  relatively  repetitive  and  therefore  partially 
predictable, similar opportunities and constraints often reappear.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the issues facing firms in the personal computer and servers 
markets today are very similar to those that firms in the mainframe market faced 
more than thirty years ago.  At that time, IBM had near monopolistic control of the 
mainframe sector, while the "seven dwarfs" (Sperry Rand, Burroughs, NCR, RCA, 
Honeywell, General Electric and CDC) struggled to survive by finding safe niches 
from which to compete (Campbell-Kelly and Aspary, 1996).  General Electric, in 
particular, decided to build a mainframe computer that would use a time-sharing 
system, a market in which IBM was weak (Campbell-Kelly and Aspary, 1996).  
They joined with MIT and AT&T to build the Multics (Multiplexed Information 
and Computing Service) system, although Multics was a failure because it was too 
technically complex, it led to the development of the smaller, more elegant UNIX 
operating system.  The structure of UNIX is simplistic, almost everything in UNIX 
can be thought of as a file which gives the entire system a modular form that, in the 
jargon, allows easy “scaleability”, a feature that would only later show its true 
value (see Kernighan and Pike, 1984).  Another important innovation was that 
UNIX was written in the language C, which allows it to be portable to computers 
from  different  manufacturers.    Previously  operating  systems  were  written  for 
specific computers, a time-consuming, difficult task. 
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However, there arose a fundamental contradiction in AT&T's strategy that would 
later repeat itself in other computer markets.  Network externalities mean that the 
more people used UNIX the better it was for AT&T but, in order to draw away 
users  from  IBM,  AT&T  would  have  to  offer  UNIX  under  license  conditions 
attractive enough to make it a viable alternative to IBM's systems.  Although the 
precise role that AT&T's UNIX played in breaking the domination of IBM is not 
entirely  clear,  (IBM's  fate  was  probably  more  influenced  by  the  charges  of 
monopoly it was facing from the U.S. Government), what is clear is that UNIX 
became the standard for large mainframes.  However, while UNIX became the 
standard, AT&T did not profit from its dominance.  In short, AT&T lost control of 
its proprietary UNIX system in part because it used a license that was too liberal.  I 
will explore the details of this story in the following paragraphs because of its 
direct implications for open source software. 
 
UNIX is written in the C programming language, a language especially developed 
for the purpose of building UNIX, but one that is still used today because of its 
speed and flexibility.  C is special because it is system-independent; in other words, 
it provided programmers the possibility to write software that can run on multiple 
systems or platforms as opposed to having to write programs specifically for a 
particular computer system.  Because UNIX was written in C, it too could be used 
across platforms.  For the first time, and in contrast to IBM's operating systems, an 
operating  system  was  written in  a  language  that  could  be  "ported"  to  different 
computers.  Independent, hobby programmers began using, sharing and improving 
tools that could be used on computers running UNIX, especially when Usenets 
began operating in 1980.  These communities of programmers would later form the 
basis  of  the  hacker  culture  that  would  help  support  the  development  of  Linux 
(Raymond, 2001).  The development phase of UNIX was marked by a spirit of 
cooperation between AT&T's Bell Laboratories and universities, each benefiting 
from the other's expertise, Bell in terms of the insights gained from the application 
of  their  operating  system  on  a  large  scale  and  access  to  some  of  the  best 
programmers in the world, while the universities gained in terms of the advanced 
research and the administrative role of Bell Laboratories (McKusick, Chap. 2 in 
DiBona, 1999). 
 
The spirit of cooperation between Bell Labs and the University of California at 
Berkeley was of particular importance.  That relationship continued throughout the 
1970's  until  the  distribution  of  UNIX  was  taken  away  from  the  Labs  and 
commercialized by another group from AT&T (at which time Berkeley took over - 220 -   
 
 
Bell's role of chief researcher).  The split between AT&T, which predictably and 
justifiably wanted to profit from its years of investment in the operating system, 
and researchers at Berkeley, whose primary concern was research, led to conflict.  
The result was that UNIX split into two versions, a commercial version sold by 
AT&T and a Berkeley version that was licensed under very liberal conditions; 
essentially anyone could get a copy of the program who was willing to take the 
time to download it from an Internet FTP site (McKusick, Chap. 2 in DiBona, 
1999).  However, the slitting or "forking" of the operating system was not over.  
The Berkeley version later split into the NetBSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) 
group, which emphasized porting the system across as many platforms as possible 
and  continuing  research,  and  FreeBSD,  which  supported  the  PC  architecture.  
OpenBSD later spun off from NetBSD with the aim of improving the security and 
ease of use of the system.  In addition to these free distributions, Berkeley's BSDI 
began  selling  a  commercial  version  of  its  UNIX-like  operating  system,  which 
AT&T would try, largely unsuccessfully, to sue for copyright infringement.  The 
settlement in that case resulted in yet another split of the BSD system, one version 
which required an AT&T source license, and another version which allowed BSDI 
to freely redistribute source and binary forms subject only to the condition that the 
university's copyrights remain intact and the university receive credit when others 
used the code (the last condition was later rescinded by the university). 
 
In addition to the forking of AT&T's and Berkeley's versions of UNIX, commercial 
hardware companies such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM and Sun Microsystems would 
eventually issue their own, largely incompatible versions of UNIX.  By this time 
AT&T had lost control of its operating system.  Attempts to recombine this jumble 
of UNIX versions resulted in the creation of a single, common UNIX specification, 
which  was  organized  by  the  IEEE  in  1986  under  the  name  POSIX.  Its 
administrative efforts have produced an evolving set of standards that provide a 
basic, common set of UNIX code which in principle can run across all UNIX based 
computers.  Despite these efforts, the fragmentation of UNIX into small proprietary 
domains continues today as firms search for a balance between market share and 
rents.    The  fragmented  nature  of  the  market  eventually  gave  Microsoft  the 
opportunity to try to tip the market in its favor.  Microsoft's NT and Windows 
Servers  operating  systems  are  now  strong  competitors  to  the  different  UNIX 
operating systems in part because they offer users stability, in other words, buyers 
know that Microsoft will maintain a single, proprietary standard.  The story of 
UNIX is largely one of forking and fragmentation.  Both AT&T and Berkeley lost 
control  of  their  versions  of  the  system,  allowing  Microsoft  easy  access  to  the - 221 -   
 
 
market.  However, Microsoft would soon come under attack from a distant cousin 
of UNIX, but this time from a largely united version of the operating systems, a 
unity that derives from the license under which it is distributed. 
 
To summarize this section, the main lesson that the open source community was to 
learn from and apply to latter projects was to avoid the damaging fragmentation 
that came about because of the different types of UNIX on the market.  What 
became the Linux community, and later the open source community, realized that it 
needed to create one standard operating system that would be available to everyone 
and work across all major computer systems.  On the positive side, the software 
community centered on the efforts of the Berkeley group had shown that it could 
organize itself to such a degree that it could develop and maintain even a very 
complex software project, the portability of UNIX was a great help in that respect.  
However, the community had also begun to realize the limits of its governance 
forms and its relationship with proprietary firms, both limits would be addressed 
with the development of Linux (Raymond, 2001). 
 
History of Linux 
 
While the major computer manufacturers such as Sun, IBM and Hewlett-Packard, 
were fighting over an increasingly divided computer server market, the personal 
computer market was beginning to develop as an important sector.  The vision of 
Alan  Kay,  a  computer  scientist  at  Apple  Computers,  to  build  an  easy-to-use 
computer for the masses was beginning to be realized in the middle 1980's (Hiltzik, 
1999).  Although Apple was successful in building a series of personal computers 
running  its  own  operating  system,  by  a  series  of lucky  coincidences  and  great 
foresight  and  initiative  by  Bill  Gates,  MS-DOS  came  to  dominate  the  desktop 
system  (Frieberger  and  Swaine,  2000).    Network  externalities  then  helped 
Microsoft to maintain its dominance of the desktop.  In the middle 1990's, Linus 
Torvalds would attempt to bring the UNIX and personal computer worlds together 
through the creation of a smaller, UNIX-like, operating system for the desktop.  
Torvalds was not the first to attempt to port an UNIX-like operating system to a 
desktop computer; in the early 1990s, Andy Tanenbaum at the Vrije Universiteit in 
Amsterdam  was  developing  Minix  as a  learning  tool  for  his operating  systems 
class,  Richard  Stallman  was  developing  the  HURD  operating  system  as  a  free 
alternative  to the  expensive  UNIX,  and  FreeBSD  was  porting  a  version  of the 
Berkeley UNIX to the desktop.  Each of these other attempts failed, why did Linux 




The Linux operating system is the most famous, popular, example of a successful 
open source project.  The origins of the Linux operating system was simplicity 
itself;  Linus Torvalds,  a Finish  computer  science  student,  wanted  to  develop  a 
compact,  UNIX-like  version  of  the  operating  system  for  use  on  his  desktop 
computer.  Versions of UNIX were then the standard operating systems for large, 
mainframe computers used by many businesses, universities and research centers.  
One of Torvalds's first steps was to request a copy of the POSIX standards so that 
his kernel (the core of an operating system) would work with the programs that 
were  currently  available,  in  other  words,  to  use  the  knowledge  base  that  had 
collected  around  the  UNIX  operating  system.    The  ability  to  re-use  previously 
written programs was made possible because, as mentioned previously, UNIX had 
been written in the universal language C.  While Torvalds's request for the POSIX 
standards resulted in the disappointing answer that he would have to pay to get 
them, a sympathetic administrator decided to place Torvalds's code on an FTP site.  
As a result, his code was placed on a publicly accessible Internet site that would 
eventually act as a clearinghouse for improvements and additions to what was to be 
called the Linux operating system.  The growth of Linux was enormous, within 
three years, with the help of a large development community, an official release of 
Linux was issued. 
 
There are three factors accounting for the success of Linux versus the other UNIX-
like desktop operating systems.  First, governance by meritocracy; Torvalds was 
willing  to  release  large  chucks  of  development  code  to  competent  developers 
(Moody,  2001:  p.  84).   Second, Torvalds  chose  for  a  simpler, older, operating 
system design rather than a state-of-the-art design.  Thirdly, Linux was eventually 
released under the GNU open source license.  I will discuss each point in turn 
because together they informed many latter open source projects.  Governance by 
meritocracy  guaranteed  that  the  best  and  most  enthusiastic  programmers  took 
responsibility for major parts of the coding of Linux.  Linux was the first project 
for which a conscious and successful effort was made to use the entire on-line 
world as its talent pool (Raymond, 1999: p.51).  This is in contrast with many other 
projects that were run "... in a carefully coordinated way by a relatively small, 
tightly-knit collective of people (Raymond, 1999: p. 16)."  An example of the type 
of project to which Raymond is referring is Perl, an open source project whose 
management is closely controlled by Larry Wall.  Although Torvalds maintained 
control of the Linux kernel, he knew when to cede control to trusted associates.  
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Computer code is released into the community upon which an informal review 
process takes place.  For instance, Linux kernel questions are handled by Torvalds 
while others supervise other parts of the operating system.  The Linux kernel forms 
the center of the Linux system, in other words, other programs must interact with 
the kernel and therefore Torvalds theoretically has final say about what gets added 
to the system in the sense that it must be able to interact with his kernel.  In fact, it 
would  be  impossible  for  Torvalds  to  micro-manage  the  thousands  of  projects 
currently under development to such an extent.  Therefore, major projects, such as 
building a movie player for Linux or a security system, are managed by others.  
The supervisor of a project does not have absolute power because of the liberal 
nature of the open source license.  Open source licenses guarantee that everybody 
has equal access to the same basic code base of a project.  The ultimate power 
therefore rests with the programmer's satisfaction with a project.  For example, if a 
programmer doesn't like the direction that a project is heading, he simply takes the 
freely available common code base and begins his own project in a process known 
as forking.  The GNU licenses makes projects easily susceptible to forking by 
requiring that the source code of a project is readily available, i.e., a rival project 
has access to the entire inner workings of a project and faces no legal restrictions if 
it wants to change the program, provided that it too provides access to source code 
with its new program.  A precarious balance is thus maintained, no project manager 
can afford to alienate a workforce that can so easily start a competing project.  In 
this manner, projects and project leaders informally compete with one another for 
the programming resources of the community. 
 
Torvalds' second important decision was to use an established operating system 
design  known  as  a  monolithic  kernel  rather  than  a  more  modern  micro  kernel 
(Raymond, 1999).  Monolithic kernels were considered obsolete because they place 
too much burden on the kernel in terms of the number of jobs it must do.  Micro-
kernels perform a much smaller set of operations and are so designed as to be less 
hardware  specific,  in  other  words,  they  are  easily  portable  to  other  computer 
systems.  When Torvalds first issued his request for help on the FTP site there 
ensued a now famous series of emails between Torvalds and supporters of the 
mono-kernel  on  one  side,  and  the  operating  systems  academician  Andy 
Tanenbaum,  the  developer  of  the  Linux  rival  Minix,  on  the  other  (debate  in 
Appendix A, DiBona, et al., 1999).  The intricacies of the debate, while interesting, 
are not important for the questions in this manuscript, it is enough to realize that 
the simplicity of Linux has helped to make it the most widely ported operating 
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Linux, its failure to become widely used was, in part, due to its complexity.  The 
HURD kernel project by Richard Stallman, also suffered in part because of its 
over-complexity (see Stallman, chap. 4 in DiBona, 1999). 
 
While  the  governance  structure  and  technical  characteristics  of  Linux  were 
important to its success, the license under which Linux was eventually released 
guaranteed  its  success  by  finding  the  proper  balance  between  openness  and 
proprietary concerns.  Torvalds initially rejected the GNU-GPL license in favor of 
the following abridged conditions: 1. Full source must be available (and free), if 
not with the distribution then at least on asking for it.  2. Copyright notices must be 
intact, meaning that the copyright notices must accompany the code. Small partial 
excerpts of code may be copied without bothering with the copyrights.  3. The 
software may not be distributed for a fee, not even "handling" costs (See Moody, 
2001:  p.  44).    The  third  provision  was  the  major  exception  to  the  GNU-GPL, 
Torvalds was probably, in part, responding to the fact that Tanenbaum had charged 
a fee for Minix.  Although Torvalds initially found the GNU-GPL too restrictive, 
he eventually changed his mind because he realized that by denying fellow Linux 
developers  the  right  to  charge  a  fee  he  was  restricting  the  distribution  of  his 
program (Moody, 2001: p. 45).  Distribution, of even free software, costs time and 
resources, accordingly, Torvalds decided to release his code under the GNU-GPL, 
allowing companies such as Redhat, Caldera and SuSE to eventually mass produce 
the Linux kernel along with other GNU-GPLed software.  In contrast to popular 
understanding of open source software, the GNU-GPL explicitly allows license 
holders to charge a fee for their products.  However, the condition that the full 
source code is available to anyone who asks for it sets a limit on how much a 




As a starting point for further discussion of open source licenses I will summarize 
the GNU-GPL open source software license (GNU-General Public License, GNU 
is an apparently clever, self-referencing definition which stands for GNU is not 
UNIX).  The GNU-GPL was one of the first open source licenses, and it serves as 
the blueprint for many of the open source licenses followed.  The GNU-GPL is 
only around seven typed written pages long and, as far as legal documents go, it is 
easy  to  understand  because  it  is  written  in  a  simple,  non-legalistic,  style.    Its 
simplicity,  or  perhaps  over-simplicity,  has  meant  that  the  document  is  not  as 
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For instance, issues such as whether the GNU-GPL can be considered a contract 
even though no formal acceptance procedure is required to use the software, the 
details of the difference between a new piece of code versus derived works, and the 
degree to which pieces of non-GNU-GPLed code are allowed to work with GNU-
GPL code, have all been points of contention in the open source community.  The 
result is that the GNU-GPL is an evolving document that is continuously being re-
written to incorporate new concerns and resolve certain ambiguities.  In addition, 
the GNU-GPL is more than just a legal document, it is also a political statement 
with what amounts to a manifesto defending the public's right to change and share 
software.  Richard Stallman and Eben Moglen, the authors of the GNU-GPL, wrote 
in  the  preamble  to  the  GNU-GPL  that  their  primary  objective  in  creating  the 
license was to address the following issue: "The licenses for most software are 
designed to take away your freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU 
General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change 
free software-to make sure the software is free for all its users."  The political 
manifesto has created controversy, many open source users and contributors resent 
its proselytizing and anti-business tone; these issues were addressed in later open 
source licenses, however, before discussing those, I will first briefly discuss the 
difference between free or public domain software and GNU-GPL software and 
provide some important examples of open source software. 
 
The ambiguity of the word "free" in the GNU-GPL has led to one of the biggest 
misconceptions about open source software, a misconception that is still committed 
by some scholars writing about open source.  The fact that many of these licenses 
allow developers to charge for "free" software has caused confusion, and arises out 
of limits of the English language.  The open software community never tires of 
reminding people, that the "free" in free software refers to the freedom to be able to 
use, understand and change a piece of software, and should not be confused with 
the meaning of free as in, for instance, the phrase "free beer".  In fact, free software 
can be, and often is sold, as I have previously suggested, Torvalds's acceptance of 
this provision was one of the reasons that Linux has become such a success.  One 
of the most important lessons learned from the history of UNIX by the open source 
community and addressed in open source licenses is that free software needs to be 
protected by licenses that forbid others from taking code that is freely available and 
"hijacking" it for proprietary purposes.  To do that, many open source licenses are 
explicitly not "free" in that they require licensees to use open source approved 
licenses rather than proprietary licenses if they wish to redistribute modified code--
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collects  open  source  software,  adds  some  software  that  eases  installation  and 
update procedures, places the software in easy to use computer packages, and then 
sells to the public.  They, and many other companies, make money from software 
that can be downloaded for free by making it easier to use or providing support 
services to open source users.  Of the fifty most popular down-loadable programs 
on  the  CNET  site  there  are  many  programs  listed  under  the  heading  of  "free" 
software.  However, there the term refers to the price, at least the initial price of 
using the software.  In general, the free software that one finds on the Internet often 
comes with strings attached.  The software may be a diminished version of the 
proprietary program, for instance, or it may have fewer functions or less storage 
space.  In general, either the quality or the amount of time over which the product 
can be used is severely limited.  Much of the software is cost free only if it is used 
as an add-on to a product for which the customer has already paid.  For instance, 
free software available on CNET from Microsoft can only be used in conjunction 
with  the  proprietary  Microsoft  operating  system.    Of  the  fifty  "free"  software 
programs I recently examined on the CNET site which were available to download, 
all but three appear to have some hidden charge.  For example, a large percent, 
around a third, mainly act as platforms for advertisers, i.e., users are subjected to a 
large and constant amount of advertising when using the program, and many of the 
ads refer to costly upgrades of the program in use.  Of the very few programs that 
are free, perhaps three, two can be used to avoid annoying pop-up advertisements, 
and one is issued by CNET itself.  Many of the programs are also very difficult to 
dispose of once installed.  In short, nearly all of these free software programs have 
some sort of severe limitation.  However, the biggest limitation, from the open 
community's perspective, is that none of the programs provides the source code 
necessary to understand and change the program. 
 
Finally,  before  turning  to  the  subtleties  of  open  source  licenses,  I  think  it  is 
important to briefly remind the reader of the role that first free and then open 
source software has played in the development of computing and, as an example, 
the Internet.  Anyone who has used the Internet has used open source technologies.  
For example, when your modem connects to your Internet server, it is probably 
using  the  Transmission  Control  Protocol/Internet  Protocol  (TCP/IP),  network 
protocols that determine how packages of information are split into pieces and 
distributed; both protocols were developed openly.  The Domain Name System 
(DNS), which translates the names you type (e.g., Amazon.com) into IP addresses, 
was also developed through open source processes.  The most critical component 
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that runs the DNS, is also open source.  Even browsers by Netscape and Microsoft 
are  based  on  the  open  source  protocols  developed  by  Tim  Berners-Lee  (see, 
O'Reilly, chap. 12 in DiBona, 1999).  Finally, the web server that you connect to is 
probably running open source Apache software and the scripts that it in turn runs 
are likely to be written in an open source scripting languages such as Perl, Python, 
and Tcl. 
 
The  GNU-GPL  license  contains  thirteen  clauses,  the  most  important  of  which 
concern  issues  relating  to  the  copying,  modification  and  fees  of  open  source 
software.  The essence of the copying clause is that a person is allowed to modify 
or  copy  licensed  programs  with  the  condition  that  recipients  receive  the  same 
rights.  A person can copy all or parts of a program provided copyright notices are 
included and the changes are noted and dated.  Each time a program is distributed 
the recipient automatically receives the same rights and no further restrictions can 
be added.  In contrast to the original license that Torvalds used, users are explicitly 
allowed to charge a fee for the program.  One of the stricter requirements of the 
GNU-GPL is the condition that when the program or parts of the program are 
attached to other programs, the new, derived work must also be covered by the 
GNU-GPL license.  However, mere compilations of works which include a GNU-
GPLed program are not required to be under the same license.  What constitutes a 
derived  work  is  not  entirely  clear  in  the  GNU-GPL,  but  this  issue  has  been 
addressed in newer open source licenses.  For example, Torvalds modified the part 
of the GNU-GPL related to derived works as they apply to Linux; he allowed 
programs that use kernel services by normal system calls, in other words, programs 
that pass messages to the kernel, to be exempt from the requirement of falling 
under the GNU-GPL.  One of the primary lessons that Richard Stallman learned 
from the history of UNIX was the importance of preventing hijacking.  Hijacking 
occurs  when  public  code  is  made  private.    For  instance,  a  person  writes  an 
interesting piece of code, places it in the public domain, and a firm copies it and 
places it in its entirety or by combining it with pieces of their own propriety code 
under  a  proprietary  license  thereby  removing  it  from  the  public  domain.    The 
GNU-GPL overcomes this problem by first licensing software with the GNU-GPL 
instead of issuing the code without a license and requiring software that works with 
GNU-GPL software to be licensed as GNU-GPL software.  While the GNU-GPL 
has been very good at preventing proprietary firms from hijacking open source 
projects, some members of the open source software community were concerned 
that the political manifesto and the perceived anti-business tone of the GNU-GPL 
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they could do better and wrote their own definition of open source and called it the 
Open Source Definition (OSD).  In keeping with the basic spirit of the open source 
community, the OSD includes many of the same ideas of the GNU-GPL and is 
considered a derivative of the ideas contained in that license (Perens, Chap. 11 in 
DiBona, 1999). 
 
The  OSD  is  not  a  license,  it  is  a  set  of  guidelines  clarifying  the  necessary 
provisions that are required to earn the designation of open source software.  The 
OSD  essentially  broadens  the  definition  of  open  source  beyond  the  restrictive 
conditions of the GNU-GPL.  In addition to the GNU-GPL, the BSD license, the X 
Consortium,  artistic  licenses,  etc.,  are  all  certified  to  be  open  source  licenses.  
Attempts to broaden definitions of what it means to be open source have raised 
concerns among some members of the community that safeguards built into the 
GNU-GPL to prevent fragmentation of the code base will be circumvented.  As 
previously  shown,  fragmentation  was  the  issue  that  severely  damaged  the 
portability of UNIX and led to the development of several competing “flavors” of 
UNIX.  On the other hand, the new open source licenses covered under the Open 
Source  Definition  have  undoubtedly  been  the  cause  for  an  increase  in  the 
participation  of  proprietary  firms,  including,  IBM,  Apple,  Netscape  and  HP, in 
open source development projects.  The clauses of the Open Source Definition 
cover the same issues as the GNU-GPL, namely, copying, modifications, and fees.  
Modifications, or derived works, are allowed, but rather than being required to use 
the same license as the original program, the derived work can be licensed under 
another set of terms.  For instance, a company such as Netscape can take open 
source software, modify it, and then release it as proprietary software, something 
that was not allowed under the GNU-GPL, although it still must make the code 
available to anyone upon request. In fact, a program can be issued under multiple 
licenses, some of which are proprietary while others are open source.  The idea is 
to encourage the participation of those firms who want to use and contribute to 
open source projects and allow them to profit from their efforts.  The approach 
appears  to  have  been  successful,  for  instance,  Apple  Computers,  a  company 
notorious for its closed architecture, announced in 1999 that it would release parts 
of the Mac Open Source X Server as an open source BSD system called Darwin.  
IBM  chose  the  open-source  Apache  web  server  to  support  some  of  its  most 
important  products,  as  has  Sun  Microsystem,  Netscape  and  many  other 
corporations (www.opensource.org/docs/products.html). 
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For the purposes of completeness, I will list some of the general provisions of open 
source licenses.  By modifying or distributing a program covered by the GNU-
GPL, it has been argued that the user is indicating an acceptance of the license.  In 
short, users do not have to sign a license agreement or actively agree to the terms 
of the contract by, say, clicking on an "I Accept" button.  This passive type of 
acceptance has not yet been fully challenged in court and its validity is a cause for 
concern  within  the  community.    Any  attempt  to  copy,  modify,  sub-license,  or 
distribute  a  GNU-GPLed  license  except  as  expressly  provided  by  the  license, 
terminates the rights under the GNU-GPLed license.  No warranty is included with 
GNU-GPLed software programs, although Lloyd's of London recently announced 
it  would  insure  open  source  software  (OSRM).    Licensing  software  under  the 
GNU-GPL is as easy as adding a copyright notice and a statement of copying 
permission  to  the  software,  along  with  an  explanation  that  the  program  is 
distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License.  Although there is 
no legal requirement to register the copyright, it is considered safer to register it 
with the US Registry of Copyrights for legal protection purposes.  The license 
covers the program itself, translations of the program, and any derivative of the 
program.  Such clauses are designed to prevent others from simply rewriting the 
program  or  parts  of  the  program  in,  say,  another computer  language,  and  then 
licensing  the  result  as  a  proprietary  product.    Activities  other  than  copying, 
distributing and modifying are not covered in the license, they are outside its scope.  
Therefore, for example, running the program is not restricted and the contents of 
the output are also not covered by the GNU-GPL license (OSI). 
 
Licenses and the Motives of Open Source Programmers 
 
In the following sections I will discuss important differences among modern open 
source licenses.  My intention is to show that the choice of license provides a good 
indication of the motives of licensors and, through the conditions of the chosen 
open source license, the motives of licensees.  There are several possible ways to 
classify open source licenses which make their basic characteristics clearer.  Bruce 
Perens (1999), for instance, distinguishes among the following four categories: (1.) 
Whether the licensed software can be mixed with other software; (2.) Whether 
modifications to the software can be taken private and not necessarily returned to 
the  original  copyright  holder;  (3.)  Whether  the  software  can  be  re-licensed  by 
anyone; and, (4.) Whether the software contains special privileges for the original 
copyright  holder.    Public  domain  licenses,  licenses  which  are  not  open  source 
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possible  to  combine  the  software  with  other  software,  it  is  possible  to  make 
modifications to the software that are not returned to the original licensor, and the 
software can be re-licensed by anyone.  The GNU-GPL, on the other hand, doesn't 
allow any of the above rights.  Finally, many proprietary firms issue software with 
an  additional  fourth  condition  which  gives  them  the  right  to  retain  special 
privileges, but denies users the other three rights. 
 
Perens'  categorization  is  helpful  for  analyzing  the  business  implications  of  the 
various  open  source  licenses;  however,  Larry  Rosen's  (2004)  simplified 
classification  system  is  particularly  informative  in  regards  to  the  intentions  of 
copyright holders.  Rosen draws a broad distinction between reciprocal licenses 
such as the GNU-GPL, and academic licenses such as the Berkeley BSD, MIT and 
Apache  licenses.    The  GNU-GPL  is  considered  business  unfriendly  because  it 
requires  that,  putting  it  simply,  works  that  come  into  contact  with  GNU-GPL 
licensed software must also be released as GNU-GPL software.  For instance, if a 
person downloads a piece of GNU-GPL software and changes it or incorporates it 
into their own software, then any new software deriving from the original work 
must also be licensed under the GNU-GPL.  This, in a sense, creates an “island” of 
GNU-GPL software that can only be accessed if a person is willing to make their 
own  software  GNU-GPL.    Firms  which  are  dependent  on  the  secrecy  of  their 
software for their profitability will therefore generally be unwilling to incorporate 
or use GNU-GPL in any way because doing so will require them to allow others to 
study, adapt and change their software.  The bargain created by the GNU-GPL is 
essentially: You may have this free software with the condition that any derivative 
works that you create from it and distribute must be licensed to all under the same 
license.  On the other hand, software released under academic licenses, such as the 
very successful Apache server software, have essentially the same characteristics 
as GNU-GPL software except licensees are free to distribute copies of the work 
and  derivatives  under  any  license  they  choose--even  proprietary  licenses.  
Excluding the standard warranty and liability statements, the MIT or X11 licenses 
is: "Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of 
this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the 
Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, 
modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, 
and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the 
following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall 
be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software." 
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Academic licenses are not an insignificant category of open source license.  Many 
of the commercial UNIX systems, including Sun Microsystems, Hewlet-Packard 
and Apple, use modified variants of the X11 system in their proprietary software.  
Ubuntu,  a  very  successful  Linux  based  operating  system,  also  uses  X11.    The 
Berkeley Software Distribution, largely regarded as the first open source license, 
makes no legal requirements to return anything to the common pool of software.  
Despite this lack of obligation, companies and individuals continue to contribute 
code to the common pool of software created by these licenses.  In short, free-
riding hasn't constrained the supply of code.  In contrast to reciprocal licenses, 
academic licenses have no attribution clause.  In the case of reciprocal licenses 
such as the GNU-GPL, the names of copyright holders are contained in the body of 
the license.  But there is no requirement that all contributors to the software receive 
credit for their contributions.  The first condition of the second paragraph of the 
GNU-GPL states: "You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices 
stating that you changed the files and the date of any change".  However, the 
intention of the condition is to protect the reputations of creators of work against 
injury arising from flawed derivative works (St. Laurent, 2004, p.39).  The legal 
distinction Rosen's makes between academic and reciprocal licenses also provides 
a critical distinction for assessing the motives of open source licensors as I will 
explain below when discussing individual motives for contributing to open source. 
 
When assessing the motives of open source programmers a distinction has to be 
drawn between open source projects that are initiated by individuals and loose 
groups of individuals, and those instigated by large software developers such as 
IBM, Sun Microsystems, Hewlet-Packard--for simplicity and historical reasons I 
will call the first group individual open source and the second group business based 
open source.  Much of the popular and academic commentary referring to open 
source is directed at individual open source programmers.  These programmers are 
often  represented  as  a  large  community  of  volunteers  who  give  their  time  and 
expertise to develop free software.  It is the presumed motivation of this group that 
I will primarily be addressing in later sections.  The motives of the other group, 




Many firms have become rich re-packaging open source software in convenient to 
use media and others have been successful supporting firms using open source 
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ventures as supporting or secondary open source in that they depend on a large 
base of available open source software.  While many of these firms do provide 
code to the open source community, their primary task is to support rather than to 
add significant amounts of code to the community.  This same reasoning is true of 
all those firms who use open source resources for various reasons ranging from 
testing their software to keeping informed on the latest software developments.  
The more interesting category is the one that I mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
namely, that of firms who wish to build an alternative to proprietary software.  The 
desire to be independent of any one supplier is a standard theme in the industrial 
organization literature.  Following that line of reasoning, Lerner and Tirole (2002) 
suggest that firms may be motivated to support open source projects as a way of 
achieving independence from the pricing and licensing policies of software firms.  
However, open source comes with significant “costs” in terms of the openness that 
firms need to provide in order to join the open source community.  Many things 
including power, reputation, firm value, profits, etc., motivate firm owners, and 
traditional software licenses serve those needs.  However, the primary objective of 
those  who  issue  reciprocal  licenses  is  to  increase  the  amount  of  open  source 
software available in the public domain, while the objective of those who issue 
academic licenses is to increase the use of open source software. 
 
As I have claimed in previous paragraphs, the software market exhibits network 
externalities  and  some  important  market  categories  have  tipped  or  are  tipping 
towards Microsoft.  The remaining firms are in a “losers” position; they are faced 
with the prospect of either being locked-in to Microsoft as the sole supplier of 
software  or  creating  a  viable  alternative.    A  low  cost  alternative  such  as  that 
provided by open source software is an enticing alternative.  Creating a successful 
open  source  alternative  means  that  server  software,  for  instance,  acquires  the 
characteristics of a commodity and shifts the focus of competition to hardware or 
the software that runs on top of the operating system.  I therefore suspect that the 
nature  of  network  externalities  in  these  markets  means  that  many  firms  have 
decided that they either won't or can't profitably compete against the dominant 
design of Microsoft.  Releasing proprietary software to the open source community 
then has the advantage of overcoming, or postponing, a dominant design.  Space 
considerations do not allow me to address the many strategic issues that are raised 
when proprietary firms use open source licenses, for instance, the sort of open 
source licenses to use or the trade-offs involved in issuing software under more 
than one license.  However, these firms are probably more inclined to use software 
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under proprietary licenses, as opposed to reciprocal licenses that would require 
them to release their proprietary software using the same conditions.  For instance, 
the IBM open source license explicitly states that users can re-license IBM code 




As mentioned in previous chapters, the motives which prompt an act are not always 
easy to identify.  Introspection and empirical investigation may not be very useful 
by  themselves  since  motivation  is  often  obscured  by  distorting  factors  such  as 
rationalization, repression, dissembling and delusion.  In short, simply asking open 
source participants what motivates them to provide their valuable resources free to 
open source projects may yield answers of dubious value.  It may be the case that 
observers are in a better position to assess the motives of agents than the agents 
themselves.    Motivation  is  also  a  theoretically  complex  concept  that  combines 
beliefs,  desires,  rationality,  contexts  and  a  host  of  other  issues,  each  of  which 
would require writing volumes to adequately locate a position within these dense 
literatures.  My task is somewhat simplified in that my interest is the relatively 
specific issue of whether open source can be understood within the narrow confines 
of the behavioral assumptions of standard economic and business models.  In other 
words, I won't try to assess all of the specific motives and combinations of motives 
that  drive  individual  open  source  contributors  to  contribute;  rather,  I  will 
concentrate  my  efforts  on  building  a  better  understanding  of  the  meaning  and 
implications of self-interest in general and economic self-interest in particular. 
 
While  identifying  the  myriad  of  potential  reasons  why  individual  programmers 
give their time and contribute their valuable skills would be a futile undertaking, 
the history of UNIX and Linux, the statements of the license writers and, most 
importantly,  the  licenses  themselves  are  all  provide  clues  as  to  the  motives  of 
contributors.  My approach in the following sections is to examine these indicators 
in relationship to a few of the many explanations that have been offered on the 
motives  of  open  source  contributors.    My  emphasis,  naturally,  will  be  on  the 
economic explanations that are offered and particularly those of Lerner and Tirole. 
 
The Analysis of Lerner and Tirole 
 
Lerner and Tirole's approach to open source is unabashedly economic in that self-
interest and rationality play major roles in their approach.  They were the first - 234 -   
 
 
academics to see the significance of open source and I find their explanation of the 
motives behind what I have called firm open source as outlined above convincing.  
However, their explanation of what I am calling individual open source is less 
convincing in that economic self-interest is inadequately distinguished from non-
economic self-interest.  In Lerner and Tirole (2001), the authors propose a research 
program for the study of open source, part of which includes the motivation of 
programmers who contribute their code to open source projects.  In that article, 
they  defend  their  assumption  that  open  source  programmers  are  narrowly  self-
interested  and  respond  to  charges  made  by  other  researchers  that  open  source 
software challenges the economic paradigm.  Lerner and Tirole ask and respond to 
the following questions: 
 
     1. Individual incentives: Why do top-notch programmers choose to write code 
that is released for free?  Is this "gift economy" (Raymond, 1999) consistent with 
the self-interest-economic-agent paradigm? 
 
     2. Corporate strategies: Why do commercial companies allocate some of their 
talented staff to open source programs?  Why do software vendors initiate open 
source projects? 
 
     3. Organizational behavior: Is the apparently anarchistic process of open source 
production, in which no one tells anybody else what to do, a new model of business 
organization? 
 
     4. Innovation process: How does the new process fit with the conception of the 
innovation process driven by intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights and 
trade secrets) that we have inherited from Arrow (1962) and Schumpeter (1975)? 
 
I  have  addressed  the  second  point  already  and  the  fourth  point  is  outside  the 
boundaries of this manuscript, which leaves the first and third issues. 
 
Before  proposing  their  own  explanation  to  the  question  of  why  open  source 
programmers  contribute  to  public  goods,  Lerner  and  Tirole  are  keen  to  reject 
altruism as an explanation.  They tell us that: "economists (and indeed several open 
source  leaders)  are  suspicious  of  the  altruism  hypothesis:  the  view  that 
contributions are driven by pure generosity, or a sense of duty to give back to a 
community that has provided a useful piece of code" (2001, p. 822).  Lerner and 
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course,  altruism  exists  and  can  do  marvels  in  certain  circumstances,  but  the 
altruistic hypothesis fails to explain why programmers do not focus their generosity 
on  more  needy  beings  and  why  free  riding  would  be  less  pervasive  than  in 
biotechnologies or other industries" (p. 822).  The first charge assumes, like that 
previously seen in Jensen and Meckling's agency theory (chapter 3), that altruists 
must maximize the value of their contributions in order to be considered altruistic.  
They must find, in other words, the best use for their altruistic efforts or, according 
to Lerner and Tirole, they are not altruistic.  If I have properly understood their 
argument,  then  it  is  unconvincing.  If  a  firm  can  be  profit  seeking  without 
maximizing profits, why can't a person be altruistic while not maximizing their 
altruistic efforts?  And, more generally, just as a self-interested person can be self-
interested without maximizing their interests.  The altruist faces the charge that he 
can do better and that he is not a “pure” altruist, but not the charge that he is acting 
from other than altruistic intentions.  Finally, not all economists are as wary of 
altruism as Lerner and Tirole.  Although most of the evidence supporting altruism 
comes from behavioral experiments, altruistic behavior is regularly observed in 
everyday  life,  for  example,  as  in  firm  wage  negotiations  (Bewley,  2000),  tax 
compliance  (Andreoni,  Erard,  and  Feinstein,  1998),  and  cooperation  in  the 
protection of local environmental public goods (Acheson, 1988; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
It is not entirely clear what the authors mean by the second part of their charge 
when they ask "why free riding would be less pervasive in software markets than in 
biotechnologies or others industries."  One interpretation of the remark is that an 
act can't be altruistic if free riding is not a significant problem or put more simply, 
open source is possible in the software market because free riding is a problem. It 
is not clear to me what free riding has to do with altruism.  On the one hand, free 
riding is an issue in open source; in fact, it is an accepted “cost” of those choosing 
to issue their code under academic licenses.  People contribute their resources to 
academic licenses without restrictions, without, in other words, concern that others 
will free ride upon their efforts.  Yet the academic license works, people continue 
to contribute despite receiving no guarantees that others will contribute and despite 
the fact that others are allowed to take their intellectual property and use it in their 
own proprietary products.  On the other hand, reciprocal licenses are effective in 
part because they restrict others from using licensed products unless they submit 
their products to the same conditions.  If free riding were a problem that couldn't be 
overcome, then there would be no reason to use reciprocal licenses.  In addition, if 
free riding were a big problem then there would be no sense in using proprietary 
software  either,  all  software,  in  a  sense,  would  be  a  public  good.    Another - 236 -   
 
 
interpretation is that the authors wonder why open source or its equivalent isn't 
prominent in other industries.  I suspect that one of the reasons is the nature of the 
software market (externalities), the history of the market, and the nature of the 
product  itself.    Software,  unlike  biotechnology  and  many  other  industries,  is  a 
product that is easy to transport and manipulate and the costs of reproduction are 
nearly  zero.    Software,  like  many  other  information  goods,  has  well-known 
characteristics that make it substantially different from physical goods.  Perhaps the 
issue in Lerner and Tirole's second point is that an often given reason to use open 
source licenses is that they prevent free-riding by firms or individuals that use the 
software but contribute nothing to the developer community.  That would certainly 
be  a  reason  not  to  use  "free"  licenses  and  why  licensors  might  decide  to  use 
reciprocal licenses, but it doesn't explain why they would use academic licenses.  
However,  all  of  that  said,  I  hold  open  the  possibility  that  I  may  simply  have 
misunderstood the point that the authors are attempting to make about altruism. 
 
Why then, according to Lerner and Tirole, do programmers contribute their skills 
to  open  source  projects?    The  authors  give  two  reasons,  the  first  is  that 
programmers “know UNIX” so they “find programming straightforward”.  The 
explanation that programmers find it easy to code and are therefore are more likely 
to use open source licenses is questionable.  I wouldn't categorize programming as 
straight-forward  no  matter  what  the  platform--UNIX  is  a  platform  upon  which 
many computer languages run, and is itself not a computer language--given such 
things  as  the  rapid  proliferation  in  the  number  of  computer  languages  and  a 
corresponding  increase  in  compatibility  issues,  let  alone  the  new  platforms  on 
which software is  expected  to  run,  but  others  may.    Regardless  of the  ease of 
programming,  the  explanation  offered  doesn't  seem  to  fit  into  even  a  liberal 
understanding of self-interest.  Many occupations may appear “easy” to outsiders, 
but finding something easy to do is generally not considered a good economic 
reason to give away valuable economic resources.  Therefore, the explanation that 
it is easy for some people to write and reproduce software is not a convincing 
reason for why programmers would voluntarily give software away when they can 
charge for those services.  A more important question in such cases is what value 
others place on the software.  For example, it may be inexpensive for a company 
like IBM to release important code under open source licenses, but its value to the 
open source community is immense in that it saves programmers and users from 
having to write code that serves the same function. 
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The second reason given by the authors is more interesting, they write, "...many 
contributors are sophisticated users who need to remove a bug or tailor the code to 
their  specific  applications.    Having  done  so,  they  turn  the  code  back  to  the 
community.    They  may  then  even  see  others  improve  on  their  modifications, 
increasing their private benefit further"(p. 822).  If I have properly understood the 
argument, programmers give away their code because they expect or hope that 
others  will  make  improvements  to  their  code  and,  presumably,  release  those 
improvements back to the community so that the original issuer can access the 
improved  code.    There  are  some  problems  with  this  reasoning  if  a  narrow, 
economic understanding of self-interest is used.  First, it seems to conflict with 
Mancur  Olson's  well  known  claims  about  the  logic  of  collective  action.    In 
particular, the leap of faith that programmers have to make that others will return 
the favor contradicts the basic concept of selfish behavior.  It would be better, 
according to economic “logic”, to wait for others to foolishly release their code 
using open source licenses.  Of course, no one wants to be foolish and so no one, 
according to the logic, will be the first to use open source licenses.  The fact that 
people do use open source licenses, and especially the fact that they use academic 
licenses, seems to point to a flaw in this reasoning.  Secondly, the assumption of 
Lerner and Tirole seems to be that improvements in open source software will be 
returned to the community, however, returning software to the community is not a 
requirement of any open source license. In other words, a person can use open 
source software without ever contributing anything back to the community.  In fact, 
the vast majority of people use open source code without ever giving anything 
back.  The willingness of programmers to contribute their code to the community 
with the hope that an improved version will latter reappear rests on the assumption 
that others may be motivated by something other than a narrow definition, profit 
maximizing, definition of self-interest.  In short, if the assumption is that people are 
narrowly self-interested is accepted, then open source wouldn't be the success that 
it is.  Programmers would have no good reason to contribute their code. 
 
Another benefit to open source programmers that Lerner and Tirole mention is the 
“non-negligible” delayed benefit of contributing to open source projects in terms of 
an  improved  reputation.    This  reason,  I  believe,  is  at  the  heart  of  the  author's 
argument against a non-self-interested interpretation of open source; it is the belief 
that by contributing to open source projects programmers add to their reputations.  
This is because contributions are taken to be public and scrutinized by potential 
employers and peers as well.  Reputation effects have a long history in economic 
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rather than goods or wealth.  Smith argues: "It is the vanity, not the ease, or the 
pleasure, which interests us" (TMS, I.iii.2.1).  Wealth, for Smith, is a means to 
acquire the attention, sympathy and approbation that feeds one's vanity; it is not an 
end in itself once basic needs are satisfied.  Vanity, in turn, "is always founded 
upon  the  belief  of  our  being  the  object  of  attention  and  approbation"  (TMS, 
I.iii.2.1).  Reputation doesn't lead to wealth in Smith's system, but people acquire 
wealth  to  increase  their  vanity.    Reputation  plays  a  large  role  in  Mandeville's 
system as well: “The Greed we have after the Esteem of others, and the Reputes we 
enjoy in the Thoughts of being liked, and perhaps admired, are Equivalents that 
overpay the Conquest of the Strongest Passions... “ (Mandeville, [1732], 1988, i. 
68). 
      
However, Lerner and Tirole do not explain why contributing to open source is an 
especially  good  way,  let  alone  the  best  or  maximizing  way,  to  further  one's 
reputation.    Many,  firms,  as  the  authors  point  out,  also  base  rewards  on  the 
contributions of their employees, so why should a programmer work without pay 
on an open source project instead of getting paid while working for a standard 
software firm and perhaps earning a bonus for good work?  Another alternative to 
raise one's reputation would be to start or join an on-line software project that uses 
proprietary licenses rather than open source licenses.  Alternatively, a programmer 
could contribute to projects that use academic licenses and reissue the software 
under a proprietary license.  Another related issue that the authors don't address is 
why a person's reputation is important to them.  The assumption seems to be that 
people desire a good reputation because it leads to potential economic benefits.  
There is no doubt that this is one reason that some people are concerned with their 
reputation, but there are many others as well.  For instance, to name just a few 
occupations, judges, religious leaders and researchers may be concerned with their 
reputations for a variety of reasons none of which necessarily involve economic 
rewards.    Similarly,  I  suspect  that  open  source  programmers  are  at  least  as 
interested in their reputations as excellent programmers as they are in lining their 
pockets.  So, while some open source programmers, for example, Larry Wall and 
Linus Torvalds, have made money from reputations gained through participation is 
open source projects, there is nothing to suggest that their financial gains are solely 
based on their participation in such project or that any of the thousands of other 
often  nameless  open  source  participants  contribute  in  order  to  maximize  their 
economic gains.  Open source, as a means to financial success, is of dubious worth. 
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The third question raised by Lerner and Tirole is something of a straw-man, I know 
of no one who claims that open source projects are anarchistic nor does anyone 
believe  that  no  one  tells  anyone  else  what  to  do  in  open  source  projects.  
Leadership in open source projects is often quite authoritative (e.g., the Apache 
project and the Linux kernel), the difference with standard firms is that anyone can 
start a new project when they want to.  One of the remarkable features of open 
source projects is that they exist independently of their original developers.  As I 
have mentioned, some types of open source licenses create a pool of free software 
from which anyone can draw.  The relevance to the issue posed by Lerner and 
Tirole is that anyone can start a new open source project based on the original, 
freely available base code.  For instance, if the leader of a project is abusing their 
authority, dissatisfied programmers can simply start their own projects based on the 
commonly available source code.  The most successful open source projects, such 
as Apache and Linux, have well-defined structures that have kept these projects 
active for years.  The newness of open source is not in the structures, but in the 
ability of “employees” of projects to become managers if they choose and that it 
allows projects to be developed independently of their original authors. 
 
I  now  turn  to  Weber  (2004).    Weber's  approach  is  interesting  because  of  his 
critique of the proposed motives of open source contributors, and because of his 
view of open source as a complex public good; an explanation which has become 
popular among some researchers. 
 
Weber (p. 130) writes: "First I want to dispose of two myths about open source that 
get in the way of moving toward analytically rigorous answers".  The first myth, 
according to Weber, is that writing open source code is basically an amusement for 
enthusiasts; a game of fun among like-minded hobbyists.  "Imagine this analogy: If 
all the model train enthusiasts in the world could join their tracks together through 
the Internet, they would build a train set just as elaborate as Linux.  Nobody has to 
tell them how to do this and surely nobody has to pay them; it is a labor of love.  
And because everybody feels the same way, there is nothing to argue about." 
 
Weber argues that this "macro", as he calls it, explanation of amusement, can't 
alone  be  the  motivating  force  behind  open  source  because  open  source 
programmers  have  disagreements:  "The  macro  part  of  this  story  is  either 
unarticulated or naively wrong. Like-minded or not, participants in the open source 
process  argue  more  or  less  continuously,  and  about  both  technical  and 
organizational  issues."  And  later  Weber  writes:  "If  open  source  software  were - 240 -   
 
 
simply  the  collective  creation  of  like-minded  individuals  who  cooperate  easily 
because  they  are  bound  together  by  hobby-love  or  semi-religious  beliefs,  there 
would be little disagreement in the process and little need for conflict resolution 
among developers." 
 
Amusement may not be a primary motive of open source, although it has often 
been mentioned by open source programmers themselves as a motive (Torvalds 
and  Diamond  (2001),  Raymond  (2001).    A  more  relevant  question  is  whether 
programming for an open source project is more amusing than programming for a 
proprietary firm.  Survey evidence from the FLOSS (2002, part IV) study suggests 
that the two most popular reasons for participating in open source projects are to 
share knowledge and skills and to learn and develop new skills; the question of 
whether people participate because it was amusing was not directly addressed in 
the survey.  However, a question about the perception of the reasons why others 
participate in the community was asked, and 20 percent answered that they thought 
that other participants contributed because they derive pleasure from doing so, a 
relatively small percentage compared to the 65 percent who said that it enables 
more freedom in software development and the 40 percent who said that open 
source provides more variety in software.  I would, however, add that coding for 
open source projects is an overwhelmingly voluntary affair, so one can reasonably 
assume  that  participants  receive  some  amount  of  "net-amusement"  from 
participating,  and  even  those  programmers  who  are  paid  to  program  for 
contributing to open source projects may enjoy participating.  It is important to 
realize as well, that coding is only one aspect of participating in an open source 
project.  Many participate by answering user questions posed in newsgroups or 
other online forums.  For instance, the R and Perl groups, but many smaller groups 
as well, have active mailing lists that cater to the needs of new users.  Experienced 
users and programmers voluntarily answering novice questions is a vital service 
provided to developing open source communities.  One incentive for participating, 
often voiced by these experienced programmers, is the pleasure they receive from 
helping others. 
 
The  "micro"  part  of  Weber's  story  attacks  and  then  evades  the  assumption  of 
altruism in open source.  He argues that if there were no mechanism for conflict 
resolution,  the  "hobbyists"  would  have  to  be  following  motivations  other  than 
personal satisfaction.  It follows, according to Weber, that because there are means 
to resolve conflicts within open source communities, altruism cannot be a primary 
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way, and doing things that others want, for the sake of the other and the act itself.  
This, according to Weber, would be altruism.  "To act selflessly in this setting 
would be to write and contribute code for no apparent compensation other than the 
personal gratification that comes from doing something that helps someone else."  
Clearly,  Weber  is  arguing  against  the  motive  of  altruism:  "But  the  evidence 
confounds  any  straightforward  version  of  this  argument.    If  altruism  were  the 
primary driving force behind open source software, no one would care very much 
about who was credited for particular contributions.  And it wouldn't matter who 
was  able  to  license  what  code  under  what  conditions."    Weber  makes  several 
possible errors in his claim, the first is an overly restrictive understanding of the 
requirements of an altruistic act, the second is caused by a misunderstanding about 
open source licenses. 
 
With  regard  to  the  first  possible  error,  and  as  discussed  in  the  first  chapter, 
altruistic  acts  do  not  necessarily  require  a  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  altruist, 
similarly,  they  do  not  require  that  an  altruist  receives  anything  in  return  for 
performing such acts.  Practically, most altruistic acts, like any acts, do "cost" 
something,  say,  for  instance  a  net-loss  in  well-being.    But  if  the  reason  for 
performing an action is altruistic, and there are benefits to others, then an act is 
altruistic.  Contributors to open source projects that use licenses that stipulate that 
their names must be attached to the software in some way are not necessarily less 
altruistic for doing so.  Besides, no open source license requires that the names of 
all contributors are listed in the license, such a requirement would be unworkable.  
The name of the copyright holder is generally available, but the nature of many 
open source projects means that many hundreds and in some cases, thousands, of 
programmers have contributed their code and expertise; such contributors remain 
anonymous.  In addition, most open source licenses only require that the names of 
the license holders be attached to the source code, something few users ever see. 
 
The sentence: "And it wouldn't matter who was able to license what code under 
what  conditions.", is  confusing.    Weber  seems  to  imply  that  because  there  are 
restrictions on who can license code and determine license conditions open source 
licenses  cannot  be  altruistic.    Altruism,  for  Weber,  appears  to  require  that  a 
contribution be an unconditional gift to everyone, as I have shown in chapter 2, this 
would be a very restrictive form of altruism.  Weber reinforces his point in the 
footnote that accompanies the above sentence: "Popular media often portray the 
open source community in this light, but fail to account for the fact that many 
"beneficiaries" of this altruism (apart from the developers themselves) are major - 242 -   
 
 
corporations that use Linux software."  It is true that proprietary firms can benefit 
from  open  source  software,  but  many  who  benefit  are  not  associated  with 
proprietary  firms,  for  instance,  those  who  use  open  source  browsers.    A 
contribution to the needy that happens to help those that don't need it, can still, 
clearly, be an altruistic act. Weber also seems to have missed that a cornerstone of 
all open source licenses is that there are no restrictions on who can use open source 
code and no restrictions on the purposes for which it can be used.  So, in fact, it 
doesn't matter who uses the licenses for what proposes, as long as the rights and 
obligations of the license are obeyed. 
 
Weber adds one last, as he puts it, pragmatic reason to steer clear of altruism as a 
principal  explanation.    Altruism,  according  to  Weber,  and  I  would  agree,  is  a 
highly loaded term; I, incidentally, would add that self-interest is a highly loaded, 
ambiguous, term.  Weber (2004, p. 131) writes: "For better or worse, arguments 
about  altruism  tend  to  invoke  an  economics-inspired  intellectual  apparatus  that 
places altruistic behavior in opposition to self-interest".  He goes on to say that this 
can quickly go on to become an unproductive discussion about whether or when it 
makes  sense  to  redefine  self-interest  so  it  can  accommodate  a  desire  to  do 
something  solely  for  someone  else.    "In  other  words,  should  individual  utility 
functions include a term for the welfare of another?"  Weber chooses to "sidestep" 
this issue.  Weber is correct, the question of how to combine or even compare 
individual utility is difficult and one that is still debated at a fundamental level 
(Elster and Roemer, 1991).  However, as I have explained, questions about what 
self-interest and altruism entail are of practical importance in regards to how to 
motivate people.  The problem is, as Weber correctly identifies, when researchers 
attempt to subsume altruism under self-interest. The two concepts involve different 
intentions and should not be conflated.  Self-interest is one of the most important 
assumptions in economic theory and often, correctly, placed in contrast to altruism.  
Finally, no reputable theory of self-interest suggests that helpings others cannot be 
a component of one’s interest (chapter 4).   
 
The positive account of open source motives that Weber's (2004) offers frames 
open source as a common pool resource following Ostrom (1990) (see also Smith 
and Kollock, 1999).  Weber (2004; p. 16) believes that: "Open source radically 
inverts the idea of exclusion as a basis of thinking about property.  Property in open 
source is configured fundamentally around the right to distribute, not the right to 
exclude."  The position in its purest form is found in van Wendel de Joode (2005), 
which I will presently discuss.  Van Wendel de Joode (2005) claims that his main - 243 -   
 
 
behavioral  assumption  comes  from  Ostrom  (1990,  pp.  33-40);  he  writes:  "It  is 
important to note that Ostrom's findings do not depart from the basic principles of 
economic thought. The individuals in communities described in Ostrom's book are 
not altruistic. Instead, they want to maximize their utility and act in their own self-
interest" (van Wendel de Joode, 2005, p. 23).  I believe that a closer reading of 
these  same  pages  in  Ostrom's  book  provides  a  much  more  complex  view  of 
behavior than is common in economic thought as understood by Van Wendel de 
Joode, in fact, much of Ostrom's work would seem to support altruism as a prime 
motivator  (Ostrom  and  Gardner,  1992).  In  particular,  Ostrom  discusses  the 
importance of norms of behavior in regards to collective activities.  For instance, 
she  writes  that  norms  of  behavior  reflect  valuations  that  individuals  place  on 
actions or strategies in and of themselves, not as they are connected to immediate 
consequences.    When  an individual  has  strongly  internalized  a  norm  related to 
keeping  promises,  for  example,  the  individual  suffers  shame  and  guilt  when  a 
personal promise is broken. Norms of behavior therefore affect the way alternatives 
are perceived and weighed (Ostrom, 1990, p. 35).  Following norms may be in 
one's self-interest, but they are not required to be in one's interest and in many 
cases  may  work  against  those  interests.    Telling  the  truth,  to  take  Ostrom's 
example, if taken as a categorical imperative, is a rule which has force regardless of 
its influence on interests.  In the same quote above, van Wendel de Joode seems to 
confuse utility maximization with self-interest.  A point he makes again on page 
15: "How are communities of utility-maximizing individuals able to overcome the 
problems facing common pool resources?" (van Wendel de Joode, 2005, p. 15).  
And again, on page 194: "The individual behavioral rules identified are based on 
the assumption that individuals want to maximize their utility. This is in line with 
state-of-the-art  research  on  people's  motives  to  participate  in  open  source 
communities" (van Wendel de Joode, 2005, p. 194).  Open source may not be non-
self-interested, but Ostrom's argument and method cannot be used to support that 
assumption.  In addition, as I have shown, utility maximization remains silent on 
the issue of motives; claiming that someone follows his utility is a descriptive 
statement, not a statement about motives self-interested or otherwise. 
  
Much of van Wendel de Joode's (and Weber's) argument, and his reason for using 
Ostrom, rests on the idea that open source is a common pool resource, but is it?  
Van Wendel de Joode argument (p. 51) goes: "Usage of software in general and of 
open  source  software  in  particular  does  not  affect  the  amount  of  source  code 
available to others. To use software developed in a community implies making a 
copy  of  the  source  code  and  installing  it  on  a  local  computer.  This  does  not - 244 -   
 
 
diminish the original stock of source code, and therefore using the resource itself 
does not diminish the amount available to others."  The inability to exclude others 
is critical to van Wendel de Joode's (p. 5) argument: Open source communities 
generally lack such exclusion mechanisms: the culture is to attract as many people 
as  possible  to  participate.  For  this  reason  the  boundaries  of  open  source 
communities  are  much  less  formal  and  are  arguably  highly  permeable.  
Membership in open source communities is claimed to be fluid; current members 
can leave the community and new members can also join at any time. 
 
However,  I  am  not  entirely  convinced  by  van  Wendel  de  Joode's  arguments 
because open source, like proprietary software, is exclusionary; while the argument 
that software is costless to reproduce applies to both proprietary as well as open 
source software and so adds little to the discussion.  A user needs to agree to the 
conditions of a license in order to use it or, as is frequently the case in open source 
and other software, by using it the user is implicitly agreeing to abide by its terms.  
Open source licenses do not remove the software from protection by the copyright 
laws.  The original author of the software, which can be a company, doesn't need to 
undertake  any  formal  act  to  obtain  a  copyright;  any  original  software  that  is 
recorded  on  some  format  is  automatically  protected  by  copyright  laws.    As 
discussed  previously,  these  rights  include  the  exclusive  rights  to  make  copies, 
prepare  derivatives  works  and  distribute  copies  of  the  original  work  and 
derivatives.  Rights can be added and subtracted, but basic copyright law applies 
automatically to all original software. 
 
As  discussed,  open  source  academic  licenses  are  more  liberal  than  reciprocal 
licenses, but both categories are protected under international copyright laws.  Van 
Wendel de Joode is correct in claiming that the open source community wants to 
attract as many people as possible to participate, so do proprietary firms, but in 
order to participate in either open source communities or use proprietary software, 
users must accept the legally enforceable terms of the copyright attached to the 
software.  Open source software is more "open" than proprietary software because 
the source code is made easily available, but that openness shouldn't be confused 
with  unrestricted.    Again,  a  distinction  should  be  made  between  academic  as 
opposed to reciprocal license.  Proprietary software has an additional barrier in that 
it  is  generally  not  available  in  source  form,  but  techniques  to  reverse-engineer 
binary code means that such protection is fleeting at best. 
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Open source software is exclusionary by design; that was one of the lessons to be 
drawn from the history of UNIX outlined above.  Free software, by which I mean 
software for which copyright holders explicitly renounce their rights, was replaced 
in favor of the GNU-GPL in order to prevent proprietary firms from exploiting the 
goodwill of programmers.  The GNU-GPL message is, if you want to use this 
software, then you have to play by our rules.  A close analogy can be found in any 
public library, a library card holder can check-out books for free and read them, but 
the copyrights of the original authors are still in tact, the author has the exclusive 
rights for, essentially, the life of the author plus seventy years.  As discussed above, 
academic  licenses  are  more  liberal  in  that  they  allow  license  holders  more 
flexibility  to  distribute  open  source  software,  but  this  category  of  open  source 
license still protects licensors under copyright law. 
 
In short, Weber's claim that open source radically inverts the idea of exclusion as a 
basis of thinking about property and fundamentally revolves around the right to 
distribute  is  only  partially  true.    In  fact,  the  power  of  reciprocal  open  source 
licensees rests firmly on copyright laws and explicitly excludes those who don't 




It is now possible to return to the motives outlined in the introductory chapter and 
attempt  to  categorize  them  according  to  the  structure  I  have  been  developing 
throughout  this  manuscript.    The  question  is  whether  the  motives  offered  by 
researchers  concerning  why  people  contribute  to  open  source  projects  can  be 
categorized as self-interested.  If not, attempts to appeal to interests will fail and 




Recall Lerner and Tirole's (2001, p. 3) original question quoted in the introduction: 
"Why  should  thousands  of  top-notch  programmers  contribute  freely  to  the 
provision of a public good? Any explanation based on altruism only goes so far. 
While users in less developed countries undoubtedly benefit from access to free 
software, many beneficiaries are well-to-do individuals or Fortune 500 companies. 
Furthermore, altruism has not played a major role in other industries, so it would 
have to be explained why individuals in the software industry are more altruistic 
than others."  Whether open source programmers and programs are "top-notch" is a - 246 -   
 
 
subject of debate (Rusovan et al., 2005; Neumann, 2005), but the point is taken.  Is 
open source a public good?  As argued above, it does not fulfill a basic condition of 
the definition of a public good in that it is possible to exclude others from using it.  
The GNU-GPL, for instance, is very exclusive, requiring software with which it 
interacts to be licensed under the GNU-GPL as well. 
 
Lerner  and  Tirole  use  a  restrictive  definition  of  altruism  which  requires  that 
altruistic acts can only, exclusively, benefit the needy.  In order to be altruistic an 
act needs to be motivated by the intention to be of benefit to others, but that doesn't 
exclude the possibility that those in less need may receive benefits as well.  The 
fact is that many people benefit from open source software, even some Fortune 500 
firms.  The final question that Lerner and Tirole ask is whether individuals in the 
software industry are more altruistic than others.  This is an empirical question 
which can be tested, although I do not believe it has.  I suspect, as I believe Lerner 
and  Tirole  intend  to  suggest,  that  open  source  contributors  are  not  any  more 
altruistic than workers in other sectors.  However, the conditions of dissemination 
and  the  incremental  process  of  writing  software  make  it  especially  easy  to  be 
altruistic, in other words, barriers to being altruistic are low in the software market.  
Dissemination  of  software  is  virtually  costless,  while  the  process  of  coding  or 
helping others online can take place anywhere and anytime and doesn't require 
large capital investments.  The Internet and mail servers make it easy to coordinate 
efforts, further reducing the costs of contributing code and expertise that benefit 
others.  It might be the case that altruism is a very common motive for actors in 
many situations including marketplaces, only the means of expressing that motive 
are less readily available than in the software market.  Contributions to open source 
projects  are  altruistic,  albeit  perhaps  they  are  a  form  of  qualified,  low-cost  or 
costless altruism. 
 
Internal motivation and self-interest 
 
I will now shift to a topic first presented in chapter one of this manuscript, namely, 
the categorization of motives used by Ryan and Deci (2000, p.70).  My purpose is 
to demonstrate the confusion in the literature concerning motives in general, and 
the motives of open source programmers in particular. 
 
The focus of internal motivation as defined by Ryan and Deci and used by many 
others would appear to be on well-being.  Recall that Ryan and Deci define internal 
motivation as: "... the inherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to - 247 -   
 
 
extend and exercise one's capacities, to explore, and to learn."  The authors claim 
that the focus of this sort of motivation is non-economic, subjective, and centered 
internally on the needs of the actor.  However, I believe that Hars and Ou's (2001, 
p.  2),  who  use  Ryan  and  Deci's  interpretation  of  internal  motivation,  have 
misunderstood its meaning.  Recall from chapter 1 that Hars and Ou make several 
claims about the motives of open source programmers.  In particular, they claim 
that  advocates  of  the  position  that  open  source  programmers  are  motivated  by 
internal  motives  implies  that  open  source  programmers  are  not  motivated  by 
monetary incentives.  Rather, according to Hars and Ou, open source programmers 
are motivated by the enjoyment they derive from practicing their hobbies and their 
general preferences or they receive rewards from increasing the welfare of others.  
There are several points of confusion in Hars and Ou's explanation, in particular, 
they mix self-interested and altruistic motives and they accord too much power to 
the economic conception of preference. 
 
The internal, external, categorization made by Ryan and Deci is presumably made 
in  order  to  emphasize  the  source  of  the  motivational  force,  but  motivation  is 
ultimately  always  internally  determined.    The  point  of  the  categorization  is  to 
presumably show that external motivators, such as an employee receiving a check 
once every two weeks from an employer, and working primarily for the enjoyment 
of  working,  are  two  different,  sometimes  incompatible  ways  to  get  work  done 
(Frey, 1997).  But the starting points of internal and external motives are the same, 
the  employee  chooses  to react  based  on  his  own  set  of  preferences  or desires.  
However, in order to understand those preferences, one is required to take one step 
"backwards" and attempt to understand the mechanisms that help to form those 
preferences.    Therefore,  Hars  and  Ou's  suggestion  that  altruism  is  an  internal 
motivator  is  confusing  because  both  altruism  and  self-interest  are  "internally" 
motivated.  Consequently, Hars and Ou's categorization of altruism as an internal 
motivator doesn't distinguish it from the motive of self-interest.  An interesting 
question is whether altruism can be motivated by an external force, for instance, a 
governing  body.    It  is  clear  that  benevolent  behavior  can be  so  motivated,  for 
example,  tax  deductions  for  charitable  contributions,  but  altruism  requires 
intention, which is a much deeper concept and one that is not so readily malleable.  
Hars and Ou (2001) also name community identification as a variant of altruism, 
which, they claim, is the need to be loved.  This too is a questionable use of the 
term altruism because the need to be loved may be a self-interested matter.  To use 
the language of chapter 4, it is an external dimension that can be pursued for self-




Note that my argument is not that the motives which Hars and Ou identify are not 
motivating  contributions  to  open  source,  rather,  my  critique  concerns  their 
identification of self-interested acts as altruistic acts.  The problem can also be seen 
in  empirical  studies.    For  instance,  in  a  question  designed  to  test  whether  the 
motives  of  open  source  contributors  are  altruistic,  Hars  and  Ou  ask  survey 
respondents whether they strongly agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
      1. I don't care about money. (strongly agree/strongly disagree) 
 
2. You can always trust an open source programmer.  (strongly agree/strongly 
disagree) 
 
3.  Recognition from  others  is  my  greatest reward.   (strongly  agree/strongly 
disagree) 
 
4.  Open  source  programmers  should  help  each  other  out.    (strongly 
agree/strongly disagree) 
 
5. I deeply enjoy helping others - even if I have to make sacrifices. (strongly 
agree/strongly disagree) 
 
6.  Open  source  programmers  are  a  big  family.  (strongly  agree/strongly 
disagree) 
 
7.  I  am  proud  to  be  part  of  the  Open  Source  Community.    (strongly 
agree/strongly disagree) 
 
Some of the questions do not, under the definition of altruism that I have provided, 
identify altruistic motives, namely, answers to questions one, two, and seven would 
not help to identify the motive as altruistic as, I suppose, is the intention.  Briefly, 
an altruist can care (or not) about money; not trust other open source programmers 
(or do trust them); and not be proud to be a part of the open source community (or 
be  proud).    Question  three  is  interesting  because  it  would  be  difficult  for  a 
programmer  to  be  both  primarily  motivated  by  altruism  and  have  the  aim  of 
recognition as the greatest reward.  It is difficult to imagine that the intention to 
help others is closely correlated with receiving the greatest amount of recognition 
for one's self.  A person could strive to be the greatest provider of open source - 249 -   
 
 
software,  but  if  the  intention  is  to  become  the  greatest  provider  in  order  to 
maximize  one's  recognition,  then  the  person  would  not  be  altruistic.    In  short, 
question  three  is  probably  not  a  good  identifier  of  altruistic  motives.    An 
affirmative answer to question four would be ambiguous for what should now be 
obvious reasons; the question is why should programmers help each other, not do 
they help each other.  For instance, open source programmers motivated to help 
each other because it harms proprietary firms have a different primary motive than 
those who help others because it is the right thing to do or because of a general 
intention  to  benefit  others.    For  most  reasonable  cases,  a  negative  answer  to 
question four would be a sign of self-interest.  Question five is similar to four; a 
person  may  deeply  enjoy  helping  others  because  it  is  the  right  thing  to  do  or 
because helping others increases his recognition as in question three or for many 
other reasons only some of which are altruistic.  The intentions of asking six are 
clear, someone who sees the open source community as a big family is more likely 
to be altruistic towards family members. 
 
Questions from the FLOSS (in particular part IV, 2002) study are more promising.  
The  FLOSS  Internet  questionnaires  and  studies  are  important  because  they 
represent the most comprehensive attempt to assess contributor motives and the 
conclusions drawn from the studies have been used to ground theoretical claims 
about those motives.  Ghosh (2005), for instance, a leader of the FLOSS study, 
uses what he calls a "selfish measure" or "altruism measure" to get at the motives 
of open source developers.  Ghosh is aware that the measures he uses don't reflect 
intent as he, correctly, says they should, but outcomes, in which case the terms 
selfish and altruistic don't necessarily "fit".  However, he goes on to conclude that, 
on four motive classes, namely, social/community, career/monetary, political and 
product related: "... the responses are consistent with self-interested participation 
and indicate that developers perceive a net positive value flow (Ghosh, 2005, p. 33-
34)."  But do the questions measure what they are intended to measure?  The 
questions related to this issue asked respondents whether their own contributions 
were more or less than their perceived rewards; simply, "I give more than/less 
than/the same as I take."  They found that 55.7 percent of all developers classified 
their relationship as taking more than giving, 14.6 percent take and give in equal 
measure, and only 9 percent give more than the take, i.e., were altruistic.  The set 
of questions that Ghosh is referring to were not included in the FLOSS-US survey 
(FLOSS-US, 2003), which is smaller than its European and Asian counterparts, but 
very similar results were reported in the much smaller FLOSS-Asia (2004). 
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Given the question, it is surprising to me that anyone, except perhaps a handful of 
developers  including  Richard  Stallman,  Linus  Torvalds  and  Larry  Wall,  could 
answer affirmatively to the question posed.  Just by using Linux or Firefox most 
people  are  taking  much  more  than  they  could  ever  give  to  the  open  source 
community  in  return.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  product,  which  is  built  on  the 
contributions of largely anonymous people over many years.  For instance, I have 
contributed  small  amounts  of  code  and  much  time  to  an  open  source  projects 
related to the economics of fisheries and other topics, but that contribution, and any 
contribution I or anyone else could hope to make, is minuscule in comparison to 
the combined efforts that have gone into making Linux a functioning operating 
system.  The question should not be whether there is a net positive or negative flow 
of value going to the contributor, that question automatically makes all contributors 
self-interested or selfish, rather, the question is what are the intentions of open 
source contributors.  The empirical evidence designed to identify the motives of 
open source contributors, particularly those questions designed to identify altruistic 
motives, is only partially successful.  Many of the questions asked don't adequately 
distinguish  between  altruism  and  self-interest  because  they  confuse  these  two 
motives. A better understanding of what both motives entail may have led to better 
questions. 
 
Several other internal motives have been identified in the literature, namely, the 
benefits derived from being a part of a community, the desire to support the ideals 
of the open source community, and the belief that open source software is superior 
to  proprietary  software.    Von  Hippel  and  von  Krogh  (2003)  conclude  that: 
"Contributors to open source software projects may also get private benefits from 
participating  in  the  project  "community"  that  are  not  available  to  free  riders 
(Raymond 2001, Wayner 2000, Lerner and Tirole 2000, Moon and Sproull 2000)."  
Community identification is also apparent in "feelings of obligation to the open 
source software community" which Feller, et al. (2005) mentions, and can also be 
found  in  Barbrook  (1998,  2005)  when  he  writes  about  open  source  as  a  gift 
economy.  Other authors include the intrinsic satisfaction of doing the work, fun, 
and  learning  as  a  source  of  pleasure  (Lakhani  and  Wolf  (2005),  Torvalds  and 
Diamond (2001), Feller et al. (2005)).  In general, most of these motives can be 
traced  to  self-interested  motives,  although  few  of  them  relate  to  maximizing 
financial  gains.    However,  references  to  feelings  of  obligations  would  suggest 
duties  play  an  important  part  in  some  the  motives  of  some  open  source 
programmers.  This concern for duties is best exemplified by the views of Richard - 251 -   
 
 
Stallman, an important figure in the open source community, and to whose views I 
now turn. 
 
The most articulate defense of the belief that software should be free and open 
source  can  be  found  in  the  preamble  of  the  GNU-GPL,  written  primarily  by 
Richard Stallman a respected leader of the open source movement.  Stallman (1984 
version  of  the  GNU-GPL  license)  suggests  that  supporting  open  source  is  a 
question  of  an  obligation  or  duty  to  support  the  freedom  of  information.    His 
manifesto at the beginning of the GNU-GPL is a clear statement of his motives; 
even the terminology used to describe this type of software has been a subject of 
intense debate and is an important indicator of the motives of these programmers.  
Stallman, commonly regarded a key leader of open source software, suggests that 
this type of software should be called "free" software, where free refers to the 
freedom of program users to run, modify and redistribute software and not its price 
(Stallman, chapter 5 in DiBona et al. (1999).  Stallman specifically rejects the 
labels of "liberated", "freedom" and "open" as misrepresenting what he regards as 
the key element of such software, keeping it free from proprietary constraints.  The 
language he uses to describe his decision to develop such software is telling of his 
motivation.    He  refers  to  "a  stark  moral  choice"  he  faced  whether  to  join  the 
proprietary software world and make "the world a worse place" by "building walls 
to divide people" or becoming a programmer that "could do something for the 
good”.  Such language is controversial, at least when compared to the average 
economic textbook used in business schools.  The millions of people who use the 
GNU-GPL and other reciprocal licenses, in my opinion, are supporting Stallman's 
values, values which conflict with standard economic interpretations of self-interest 
in favor of creating a large island of free software for those willing to accept the 
conditions of the GNU-GPL.  Contributors who use reciprocal licenses are, in part, 
supporting Stallman's intention to free information. 
 
Lerner and Tirole and others have suggested that open source constitutes a form of 
gift  economy.    It  is  again  helpful  to  distinguish  between  users  of  open  source 
software  and  contributors  when  analyzing  whether  this  is  a  good  account  of 
motives.  Those planning only to use open source software are not required to give 
anything in return for using the software.  Similarly, users of many proprietary 
products are not required to pay for the software they use, for example, the most 
popular proprietary Internet browser is free to download and use.  Both groups of 
users, those using open source and those using proprietary software, are placed 
under no legal obligation to return a "gift" for using the software.  Contributors to - 252 -   
 
 
open source software projects, specifically those who modify open source open 
source  software,  are  obligated  to  follow  the  conditions  as  described  in  the 
software's license.  To that extent, open source and proprietary licenses are the 
same, it is the license that defines the performance obligation.  Perhaps the authors 
are  referring  to  the  sense  of  obligation  as  explained  by  Scheffler  (1997)  and 
outlined in chapter one of this manuscript?  Users of open source software may feel 
a  special  responsibility  to  the  open  source  community  which  they  don't  feel 
towards proprietary firms.  The argument might be that by taking and using open 
source software, which is costless for most users, users acquire a relationship with 
accompanying responsibilities.  This is an empirical question which needs to be 
explored.  However, in general, the open source community can't be adequately 
described as a gift giving culture because the anonymity with which users can 
download, change, and use open source software means that there is no need to 
acknowledge  the  giving  and  particularly  the  receiving  of  gifts.    A  gift  giving 
culture would seem to require that receivers of gifts be identifiable, this is not the 
case with open source software.  The extent to which a user of open source feels 
responsible for the open source community as a whole rests solely upon one's own 
conscience and not a need to satisfy the expectations of others. 
 
The three motives discussed above represent a mix of self-interested and non-self-
interested  reasons  for  contributing  to  open  source.    Identifying  the  reason  for 
joining the open source community in terms of derived benefits would seem to 
place the issues squarely in terms of self-interest.  People join because they expect 
to  benefit,  with  the  benefits  usually  expressed  in  terms  of  happiness.    While 
feelings of obligation tend to suggest something other than self-interested, perhaps 
deontological  reasons  for contributing.  While  Stallman's  and  the  Free  Software 
Foundation's GNU-GPL license (GNU-GPL, 2007) is clearly expressed in terms of 
duty  to  an  ideal.    Finally,  the  idea  that  open  source  software  is  better  than 
proprietary software provides a reason to use open source software, and is not 
primarily a reason to support it or contribute to its development.  Again, in general, 
these three motives represent a mixed bag of self-interested and non-self-interested 
motives. 
 
Finally,  a  variety  of  other  motives  have  been  offered  to  explain  why  people 
participate  in  open  source  projects.    I  will  divide  these  explanations  into  self-
interested and non-self-interested explanations.  Self-interest is generally defined to 
include a wide range of aims, not just financial gains. Lakhani and Wolf (2003) 
suggest that enjoyment-based reasons drive open source participation and while - 253 -   
 
 
enjoyment  can  certainly  be  an  self-interested  reason  to  act,  I  have  emphasized 
throughout this manuscript that pleasure can come from a variety of aims not all of 
which are self-interested.  The issue that Lakhani and Wolf would have to address 
is  whether  participating  in  open  source  projects  is  more  pleasurable  than 
participating in proprietary projects and if so why.  In the case of open source, I 
suspect that many people participate because it is fun to be a part of a group that is 
seen as offering resistance to the dominate Microsoft. Another reason mentioned is 
that of filling an unfilled demand (see e.g., G.L. Green 1999).  Again, the question 
that these authors would have to answer is why filling an unfilled demand requires 
using an open source license.  An alternative possibility, for instance, would be to 
use a proprietary license with very liberal conditions. 
 
External motivation and self-interest 
 
Once again, external factors are the rewards and punishments induced from outside 
the individual (Ryan and Deci 2000).  For open source programmers, the rewards 
are generally taken to mean the direct and indirect benefits gained by increasing 
their  marketability  and  skills  base  for  the  purpose  of  making  themselves  more 
valuable to  others.    Open  source  contributors,  under  this  assumption, see open 
source primarily as a means to improve their job prospects.  Whereas a contributor 
motivated  internally  does  so  because  some  aspect  of  contributing  provides 
motivation, perhaps because of the pleasure of programming or the benefits of 
being a part of a group of like minded individuals. 
 
The important difference between internal and external motivation is the immediate 
source of rewards (or punishments) facing an individual. The approaches of Lerner 
and Tirole (2002, 2005) and similar positions expressed by Bonaccorsi and Rossi 
(2003) and Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) all assume that working in an open 
source project provides prestige and visibility that gives developers a chance to be 
noticed by software companies.  This point is emphasized by some advocates of 
open source (Raymond, 2001).  Raymond goes so far as to name prestige as central 
to the hacker culture's reward mechanism (p. 89).  I have discussed issues related to 
reputations above in a separate section on the approach of Lerner and Tirole and 
won't repeat them here. 
 
However, in general, the external type of explanation follows standard economic 
theory, an efficient manager pays workers according to the value they add to the 
firm; open source is a means to demonstrate one's potential value.  In the literature - 254 -   
 
 
on  open  source  internal  motives  are  often  used  as  a  foil  against  the  rational 
behavior offered by standard theory.  For instance, Lakhani and Wolf (2005, p. 3) 
write:  "Many  are  puzzled  by  what  appears  to  be  the  irrational  and  altruistic 
behavior  by  movement  participants:  giving  code  away,  revealing  proprietary 
information, and helping strangers to solve their technical problems."  Lakhani and 
Wolf's position is that while external motivational factors such as better jobs and 
career advancement have been the main motivational explanations of contributions 
to open source used by other researchers, intrinsic, enjoyment-based motivations, 
namely creativity, are the strongest motivators.  A more basic question is whether a 
person motivated by external motives is necessarily self-interested.  However, the 
internal/external divide is made to show the source of a motivational force, not the 
motivations  themselves.    All  motivation,  at  least  the  type  of  motivation  of 
importance in this manuscript, is ultimately internal, by which I mean, motivation 
is how an individual chooses to react, if at all, to external stimuli.  The problem, as 
explained  by  Frey  (1997),  is  that  attempting  to  motivate  people  motivated  by 
creativity or some intrinsic characteristic by, for instance paying them more, might 
be de-motivating.  If people contribute to open source in order to signal their value 
from which they would like to profit, then the crowding-out effect would not be an 
issue.  Data from the FLOSS (2002) report show that a large minority (24 percent) 
join  the  open source community  in  order  to  improve  their job prospects;  a  far 
higher percentage want to learn and develop new skills (79 percent) and share 
knowledge and skills (50 percent).  An employer attempting to exploit open source 
directly or use open source production techniques within a firm will have to find a 
balance between these different motives or risk canceling-out potential benefits. 
 
Applying the framework 
 
I have discussed the complex social situation in which the open source community 
operates including relevant features of software markets, the history of open source 
software, and the legal framework in which software is distributed.  I have also 
criticized the positions of others in regards to the motives of contributors to open 
source projects.  I am now in a position to ask whether the economic assumption of 
self-interested  as  defined  by  Lerner  and  Tirole  and  others  agents  adequately 
explains the success of open source. 
 
First, in keeping with my framework, I will clearly state my assumptions about the 
software  market  and  human  nature.    The  context  or  social  situation  under 
consideration is clearly a competitive, multi-billion dollar, marketplace. A specific - 255 -   
 
 
feature of the market that influences the analysis is an underlying network structure 
in which the winner can take all or nearly all of a market.  The structure means 
that, in a broad context, market developments are predictable.  Competition shifts 
heavily in favor of a dominant design and competitors must be innovative in order 
to compete.  Many software firms, which I take to be profit seeking entities, have 
been forced to follow a "losers" strategy, meaning that they support open source 
projects because they are unable to compete against the dominant design.  For these 
firms, open source provides a means to shift competition away from the software 
market  towards  their  relative  strengths.    In  addition,  technical  developments, 
including the Internet, have made communication easy, quick and cheap; thereby 
providing like minded individuals a forum in which to communicate.  The history 
of the software market demonstrated the need to minimize "hijacking", proprietary 
firms taking free software and using it for proprietary purposes.  The result is that 
open source uses legally enforceable licenses to protect software, with some of the 
licenses imposing strong conditions on licensees who want to modify and reissue 
the software. 
 
My  general assumption about human nature in the particular economic context 
under consideration is that people are generally, predominately, self-interested (not 
selfish), but that self-interest is widely inclusive to include non-monetary aims.  
Non-self-interested  motives,  such  as  duties  and  altruism,  can  also  influence 
behavior,  but there appears  to  be  a  very  specific  form  of  altruism  at  play.    In 
addition, and in contrast to some of the authors quoted above, people, even people 
motivated by non-self-interested motives, are rational.  By which I mean that they 
are generally able to incorporate the perceived desires of others into their own 
interests, thereby remaining self-interested, but that they are also capable of acting 
benevolently.  The aims of open source contributors are diverse and include fun, 
fame and fortune.  Finally, the interests of open source contributors are long-term 
in nature and informed by history, in other words, their actions are not a product of 
passions. 
 
The key to understanding the motives of open source contributors are the licenses 
they use.  Licenses help to identify the long-term intentions of licensors.  Choosing, 
let alone writing a license under which to distribute software is not a trivial matter, 
it involves careful consideration and has long-term, often explicitly irrevocable, 
consequences (see, for instance, the Academic Free License and the Open Software 
License).  Much of the confusion surrounding discussions of open source can be 
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licenses.    Together  these  licenses  cover  the  most  popular  and  influential  open 
source  software,  including  Linux  (GNU-GPL)  and  Apache  (Apache  license).  
However,  before  discussing  the  intentions  represented  in  those  two  types  of 
licenses it is important to make one further distinction. 
 
When reading academic papers on open source, including those referenced above, 
it is often confusing as to which open source community authors are referring.  An 
important  point  when  discussing  open  source  licenses  is  to  understand  who  is 
affected by the conditions of a license.  In practice, users of open source software 
who don't intend to modify and reissue open source software or link their software 
to open source software are free to use it without practical restrictions.  For the vast 
majority of users of open source software, open source is a gift without practical 
restrictions.  For instance, GNU Emacs, GFortran, Emacs Lisp, VI Editor, and 
many hundreds of other programs can and are used by people who never intend to 
contribute to the open source community or modify the code in any way; indeed, 
many of these programs can be used to code proprietary projects.  Rather, the 
conditions of open source licenses are mainly directed at those who plan to modify, 
link and reissue open source software.  These are the contributors that allow open 
source software to continue to develop. 
 
The motives of those using academic licenses are primarily altruistic.  Recall that 
academic licenses are very permissive, allowing licensees to distribute copies of 
the  copyrighted  work  and  derivatives  under  any  license  they  choose--even 
proprietary licenses.  Those choosing to use such licenses are clearly intending to 
be of benefit others, even at a cost to themselves.  It could be argued, as discussed 
above, that these altruists could do better by giving only to the needing instead of 
making their code equally available to rich and poor alike.  However, altruism 
doesn't need to be selective, as long as the intention to help needy others is present.  
In addition, the nature of the Internet means that, as a practical matter, it is difficult 
to exclude the less fortunate from the less needy.  The license itself provides few 
barriers to who can use the code or for what purpose, nor does the Internet.  It 
could also be argued that the costs of contributing code are small and so using 
academic licenses is not altruistic.  The argument might follow that contributors 
only give away code that has little value, but this is clearly not the case with the 
Apache  server  system  and  many  other  open  source  software  projects  that  run 
"behind" servers.  In any case, altruism doesn't require a great sacrifice, only the 
right intent. 
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Are contributors who use reciprocal licenses primarily altruistic?  Once again, for 
the  vast  majority  of  users  who  don't  intend  to  modify  and  reissue  the  code, 
reciprocal licenses provide a generous gift with no strings attached.  However, for 
those who plan to modify and reissue software covered by reciprocal licenses, they 
are a type of conditional or selective altruism in that only those who agree to abide 
by the same, strict, license terms benefit.  However, conditional altruism, setting 
conditions on who benefits from a contribution, begins to stretch the definition of 
altruism rather thin.  Licensors using reciprocal licenses make the deal that they 
will only perform an altruistic act if others are willing to do the same in the future.  
The condition can be a heavy, exclusionary, burden, particularly for profit seeking 
individuals and firms.  Reciprocal licenses create an exclusive island of software, 
where like-minded individuals flourish.  A further danger with this license is that it 
is possible to exclude those who really need the benefits because they can't or don't 
want  to  fulfill  the  required  conditions.    Some,  including, Jensen  and  Meckling 
(1994), would argue that such conditional altruism  isn't altruism at all because 
altruism should be applied in a general, unconditional, way.  I would be inclined to 
agree that conditional altruism is less than the ideal, but there is still reason to 
believe that the licensors intend to be altruistic to a select, like minded, group of 
individuals. 
 
The altruistic effects of open source licenses are long lasting in that once source 
code is made available and changeable, it can't be readily removed from the public 
domain.  Modifiers of open source are obliged to follow license conditions, and as 
long as they do so the original information contained in the software remains and 
contributions can potentially accumulate over time.  Note that I am not claiming 
that all members of the open source community are altruistic; there are clearly self-
interested  reasons  to  contribute  to  open  source  projects  as  many  authors  have 
suggested.  However, the primary effect of these licenses, particularly academic 
licenses, are benevolent.  There are open source licenses which attempt to balance 
proprietary interests with open source sensibilities.  These licenses, for instance, 
those issued by such firms as Apple and Netscape, have been less successful in 
part, I believe, because they attempt to gain access to a free resource, without 
recognizing  that  a  primary  motivating  force  of  open  source  programmers  is 
altruism.  The point is that open source would not be possible without the altruistic 
intents of coders who issue their code using either academic or reciprocal licenses.  
Academic  licenses  increase  the  popularity  of  open  source  software,  while 
reciprocal licenses have created a strong core of valuable, robust, freely available, 




The supply of new open source software depends on the continuation of altruistic 
acts.  Altruism is an internally motivated desire, preference or disposition.  If Frey's 
(1997) analysis is correct, appealing to altruistic individuals via their self-interest 
may crowd-out altruistic acts.  For example, offering to pay individuals to produce 
open source software may make them less productive.  In addition, if potential 
open source licensors believe that their benevolence is being exploited solely for 
self-interested reasons, then they may reduce their contributions. 
 
Conclusions Chapter Eight 
   
The  question  that  originally  prompted  me  to  write  this  manuscript  was:  Can 
standard economic theory, as understood by authors such as Lerner and Tirole, 
account  for  the  open  source  software  development  process?    To  answer  that 
question I have analyzed the basic assumptions of standard economic theory.  I 
have tried to show that economics, as it is often used by economists and business 
scholars, uses an ambiguous definition of self-interests that often makes normative 
claims about behaviors that are not supported by the theory.  My next step was to 
show that rationality and self-interest, as those terms are used by economists, are 
often  narrowly  interpreted  as  selfishness,  however,  the  elastic  quality  of  those 
assumptions means that there is probably room for open source even within the 
assumptions  of  the  standard  economic  theory.    In  fact,  the  vagueness  of  these 
assumptions means that very few activities can be labeled anything other than self-
interested.  The standard economic model is in fact so general that it indicates that 
although  rationality  and self-interest  may  be  necessary,  they  are  unlikely  to be 
sufficient conditions to explain or describe economic behavior.  Rationality and 
self-interest are nearly always a part of actions, the crux of the problem therefore 
falls on defining the distinctive characteristics which make an issue an economic 
issue and then applying the appropriate definition of self-interest and, perhaps to a 
lesser degree, rationality to fit the issue.  For the case of open source, a narrow 
form of self-interest or selfishness can't adequately explain the motives of some of 
the  key  contributors  to  open  source  projects.    In  other  words,  despite  the 
acknowledged prevalence of the motive of self-interest, that motive is not behind 
important types of open source software. 
 
I have tried to show that there are two principal motives at work in the open source 
community.    The  first  motive  is  profit  maximization,  which  has  to  be  the 
recognized  aim  of  the firms  participating  in  the  open  source community.    The - 259 -   
 
 
other,  original  motive,  represented  by  Richard  Stallman  and  embedded  in 
reciprocal licenses, is the desire to keep software freely available for everyone.  
Again, reciprocal licenses create an island of freely available code for those who 
are willing to release their code under the GNU-GPL.  Academic licenses are even 
more difficult to explain under the motive of self-interest because they create a 
pool of software from which anyone can draw without the requirement of having to 
give anything in return.  Regardless of whether open source is a self-interested or 
altruistic pursuit, it points to a weakness in economic assumptions.  Simply stated, 
a strict interpretation of standard economic theory is unable to account for this 
important  economic  phenomenon.    Certain  bold  economists  who  accept  the 
approach  of  rational  egoism  may  go  so  far  as  to  declare  that  the  behavior  of 
computer programmers who freely contribute their code to open source projects 
using academic licenses is irrational in part because those programmers are not 
following  their  own  narrow,  self-interests  by  maximizing  or  satisfying  their 
financial  interests.    However,  as  has  been  recognized  for  thousands  of  years, 
motives other than financial concerns may serve one's interests, suggesting that 
some common definitions of economic self-interest may need to be broadened to 
include a greater range of motives, and combination of motives, including power, 
liberty,  fame,  status,  self-development,  self-assertion,  reputation,  honor,  and 
affections. - 260 -   
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